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DEPARTMENT
OF EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, CANADA.
( DUPLICATE~
DESPATCH
UNCLASSIFIED
TO: THESECRETARY
OF STATEFOR
EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, OTTAWA,
CANADA.
THE CANADIAN
AMBASSADORS!
FROM;
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March 18, 1954
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by the U.So Secretary
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Ottawa File No,
References
I enclose five copies of Department of State
press release
No. 139 of March 16, 1954, containing
the
text of the article
prepared by the Secretary
of State
for the April issue of Foreign Affairs.
2.
In his news conference
of March 16, Mr. Dulles
made the following
remark concerning this article:
"I might say that I wrote, some weeks ago, an
article
for Foreign Affairs,
which is in substance a somewhat more polished,
I hope, restatement
of my speech which was made before
the Council of Foreign Relations,
which
publishes
Foreign Affairs.
That I did while
I was flying back from Berlin.
I understand
that is being released
for publication
tomorrow
in New York by the magazine Foreign Affairs.
That will elaborate
to some extent the thesis
which I expressed
in my address of January 12."
Internal
Circulation
3.
_The above quotation
is taken from the transcript
published
in the New York Times of March 17 which you
will have seen, and it is perhaps of some significance
that he referred
to this article
in connection with a
question arising
out of Mro Pearso_nvs speech 'Before· the
National Press Clubo
(Sgd.)
Go de T. Glazebrook
For the Ambassador.
Distribution
to Posts
000498
fat,
l80C (Rev. 2/52)
�•
RESTRICTED
March 24,
1954.
ALL POSTS ABROAD
Attached is the text of an article
by the United
States .Secretary of State prepared for the April issue of
Foreis;n Affairs.
At a news conference on March 16 1 1954,
Mr. Dulles remarked that this article
constituted
a more
polished restatement
of the speech which he delivered
to the
Council on Foreign Relations
in New York on January 12 on
the long~range global policy of the Eisenhower administration.
The article
elabo.ra tes the thesis expressed
in the
speech of January 12, but contains no basic change in the
main elements of the new policy.
Greater emphasis is given
to a collective
system of defence which is "the cornerstone
of security
for the free nations"o
This security
depends
upon "the cooperation
of our allies"
without which the United
would not even be in a position
to retaliate
massiv,ely against
the war industries
of an attacking
nation.·
The controversial
statement
in the speech of January 12 concerning the basic
decision
of the United States National
Security
Council "to
depend primarily
upon a great capacity
to retaliate
instantly
by means and in places of our choosing" does rtot appear in
this articleo
In stressing
the importance of local defence,
however, it is stated that "the ID9.in reliance
must be on the
power of the free community to retaliate
with great force by
mobile means at places of its own choice"o
Acknowledgment
reshaping
of the military
various respects"and
the
reply to criticism
of the
defence policy:
is given to the fact that "this
program was misconstrued·in
following points are made in
"new look" in the United States
a) The United States does not intend to rely
wholly on large-scale
strategic
bombing as
the sole means to deter and counter
aggression;
b) the program is not a move away from collective
security
but rather
the opposite;
c) the United States policy does not envisage
withdrawal
of large forces from abroad in
the interests
of mobilityo
Forces in the F:ar
East will be reduced in number. but the force
remaining will have great striking
power.
If the continental
nations in Europe provide
"a harmonious nucleus of integrated
defence"
the United States would expect to maintain
substantial
forces in Europe$ both in support
of the forward strategy
of defence and for
political
reasons;·
d) while it will be practicable
by this program
to reduce economic aid to United States
allies,
this aid will not be wholiy excluded
and the Technical Assistance
Program will
continueo
000499
�POLICYFOR SECURITYANDPEACE
The following
John Foster Dulles
is a~ article
for ~he April
prepared by Secretary
of State
issue of Foreign Affairs.
Since World War II, the United States has faced the
diff,f.cult
task of finding policies
which would be adequate
for pecurity
and peace and at the same time compatible with
·its traditions.
Never before has a great nati:on been called
upon to adjust its thinking
and its action so radically
in so
short a period.
During the nineteenth
century the maintenance of peace and
order depended largely
on Great Britain,
with its Navy and the
system of naval bases which enabled it to operate with mobility
and flexibility
throughout
the world.
By suitable
commercial,
investment
and monetary policies,
Great Britain
and other
nations with surplus capital
stimulated
economic growth in
underdeveloped
areas.
The French Revolution had aroused men
to respect
and promote human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
The United States also made its contribution.
Our people
devoted their energies
largely
to domestic matters,
not because
they lacked concern for others but believing
that what our
founpers called 1ethe conduct and examplett of freedom would
exert a liberating
influence
everywhere.
In fact, it did so.
The 19great American experiment"
was a source of hope and inspiration
to men everywhere,
and especially
to those living
under despotism.
Our dynamic example of freedom drew many to
our shores and inspired
others,
in the old world and the new,
to emulate our course.
All of these influences
contributed
to giving the world
relative
peace and security
for the 100 years between the
ending of the Napoleonic wars and the beginning of the
First World War. During this period there were many advances in the practice
of p9litical
liberty,
and generally
throughout
the world there was a great advance in material
and social well-being.
The events of the twentieth
century,
and especially
the two World Wars and their aftermaths,
have created an
entirely
new situation.
In large measure the Uni tt(d States
has inherited
a responsibility
for leadership
whichi in the
pastj has been shared by several nations.
Today there rests
upon us, to a unique degree, the threefold
task of providing insurance
against another world war; of demonstrating
the good fruits
of freedom which undermine the rule of
despots by contrast;
and of providing
a major part of the
effort
required
for the healthy growth of underdeveloped
areas.
The Eisenhower Administration
inherited
security
policies
that had much worth.
Many of these policies
were bipartisan
in character.
They reflected
a national
recognition
of the
peril facing the civilized
world, a united determination
to
meet it, and an acceptance
of the role of leadership
thrust,,
on us by events.
We had helped to reestablish
the economies
of other countries
shattered
by the war.
We had taken a
major part in resisting
the aggression
in Korea.
In the
face of the Soviet threat we were engaged in rebuilding
our
military
strength
and that of other free countries.
·
These and like measures were costly.
But they were
necessary
to our security.
However, they partook much of an
emergency character.
By 1953 there was need to review our
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securTty planning and to adjust our continuing
military
to the other requirements
of a well-rounded,
permanent
effort
policy.
·Under the condition-sin
which we live, it is not easy
to strlke,
perfect
balance between military
and non-military
efforts
anq to ~hoose the type of military
effort
which serves
us besto
The essential
is to recognize
that there is an
imperative
need for .a balance which holds military
expenditures
to a minimum consistent
with safety,
so that a maximum of
liberty
may operate as a dynamic force against despotism.
That is the goal of our policyo
IIa
The Nature
of the Threat
The threat we face is not one that can be adequately
dealt
with on an emergency basis.
It is a threat
that may long
persist a Our policies
must be adapted to this basic fact a
The Soviet menace does not reflect
the ·ambiti0ns :oiC.c'
a single ruler,
and cannot be measured by his life expectancy.
There is no evidence that basic Soviet policies
have been
changed with the passing of Stalino
Indeedi the Berlin
Conference of last February gave positive
evidence to the
contrarya
The Soviet Communists have always professed
that
they are planning for what they call 18an entire
historical
eraa 10
The assets behind this threat
are vast.
The Soviet
bloc of Communist-controlled
countries--a
new form of
imperialist
colonialism--represents
a vast central
land
mass ..with. a population
of 800jOOO,OOOa About 10,000,000
men are -regularly
under -arms, with many more trained millions
in re-serve.
T-hi--s--1.andfe-rce occupies a central
position
which permits of striking
at any one of about 20 countries
along a -per:1-me-t-er -of -seme 20 ;-000---mil-eso -·I-t is supplemented
sy -i-n-cr-easing air power, equipped with atomic weapons:, able
to -strik-e throu-g-h -northern Arctic routes which bring our
industrial
areas in range of quick attacka
The threat is not merely militarya
The Soviet rulers
dispose throughout
the world of the apparatus
of international
Communismo It operates with trained
agitators
and a powerful propaganda organization.
It exploits
every area of
discontent,
whether it be political
disconten·t
against
11
16
colonialism
or social discontent
against economic conditions.
It seeks to: harass the existing
order and pave the
way for political
coups which will install
Communist=controlled
regimes a
B~ the use of many types of manoeuvres and threats,
military
and political,
the Soviet rulers
seek gradually
to divide and weaken the free nations and to make their
policies
appear as bantrupt
by overextending
them in efforts
which, as Lenin put it, are "beyond their strength."
Then,
said Lenin, '°our victory is assured a16 Then, said Stalin,
will be the rnmoment for the decisive
blowa 16
It is not easy to devise policies
which will counter
a danger so centralized
and so vast~ so varied and so
sustained.
It is no answer to substitute
the glitter
of
steel for the torch of freedome
An answer can be found by drawing on those basic
concepts which have come to be regularly
practised
within
our civic communitieso
There we have almost wholly given
up the idea of relying primarily
on house=by-house
defense.
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Instead 9 primary reliance
is placed upon the combining
concepts,
namely,i the creation
of power on a community
and the use of that power so as to deter aggression
by
it costly to an aggressoro
The
free
nations
must
apply
'
same principles
in the inte·rnational
sphere o
.
IIIo
of two
basis
making
these
Community Defense
The cornerstone
of security
for the free nations must be
a collective
system of defenseo
They clearly
cannot achieve
security
separatelyo
No single nation can develop for itself
defensive
power of adequate scope and flexibilityo
In seeking
to do so, each would become a garrison
state and none would
achieve securityo
This is true of the United Stateso
Without the cooperation of allies,
we would not even be in a position
to retaliate
massively
against the war industries
of an :attacking
nationo
That requires
international
facilitieso
Without them, our
air striking
power loses much of its deterrent
powero With
them, strategic
air power becomes what Sir Winston Churchill
-called the 18supreme deterrent on He credited
to tt the safety
of Europe during recent yearso
But such power, while now a
dominant factor,
may not have the same significance
forevero
Furthermore,
massive atomic and the:rmonuclear retaliation
is
not the kind of power which could most usefully
be evoked
under all circumstanceso
Security for the free world depends, therefore,
upon the
development of collective
security
and community power rather
than upon purely national
potentials.
Each: nation which
shares the security
should contribute
in accordance with its
capabilities
and facilitie$o
The Inter=American
Treaty of
Reciprocal
Assistance
(Rio Pact) of 1947 set a postwar
example in establishing
the principle
that an armed attack
against one would be considered
as an attack against all.
The North A-tl--anti-c T-re-at-y i-s based on the same principle.
Its m-ember-s-hav-e--g-ene-much further
i-n -organi-zi-ng Joint forces
and facilities
as a part of the integrated
security
system.
NATOprovides essential
air and naval basesj to which its
various members can contribute~=
each according to its
means ?"aridcapabilities
o It provides the planes and ships and
weapons which can use these baseso
It provides so many
points from which an aggressor
could be harassed,
in so
many different
ways, that he cannot prudently
concentrate
his forces for offense against
a single victim.
While NATObest exemplifies
this collective
security
concept, there are other areas where the same concept is
evolving,
although as yet in a more rudimentary
form.
An
example is the Western Pacific,
where the United States has
a series of collective
security
treaties
which now embrace
Australia,
New Zealand, the Philippines,
Japan and Korea.
Collective
arrangements
are now in the making in the Middle
East with Turkey-Pakistan
as the nucleus.
These developments show the growing acceptance
of the collective
security
concept we describe.
The United ;Nations is striving
to make collective
security
effective
on a basis broader than regionalism.
The central
principle
of the Charter is that any armed attack is of universal concern and calls for collective
measures of resistance.
The Soviet Union, by its veto powerj has made it impractical,
as yet, to make available
to the Security Council the 1varmed
forces,
assistance,
and fac:Lli ties 10 contemplated
by Article
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1,-3·of the· Chartero
W}:lenaggression
occurred in Korea, however, the pr~n~iple of collective
action was invoked by the
United Nations and acted on by more than a majority
of the
members, includin~
l~ which sent armed forces to Korea to
repel the aggression o The "Uni ting for Peace'' Resolution,
adopted by the General Assembly in November 1950, grew out
of that experienceo
That resolution
will enable members of
the United Nations to join in carrying
out similar
collective
measures. .agaj:ns.t. any future aggression
without being blocked
by a [Soviet vetoo
The free worla system of bases is an integral
part of
its co11ecti ve security o At the recent Four __;Power Conference
in Berlin 9 Mr o Molotov repeatedly
attacked
these bases as
evidence of aggressive
purposeo
Actually these bases on the
territory
of other sovereign countries
are merely a physical
expression
of the collective
security
systemo
They were
constructed
only at the request of the host nation and their
availability
depends upon its consent, usually
as a legal
condition
and always as a practical
oneo The requisite
consent to the use of these bases would never be accorded
unless it was clear that their use was in response to open
aggression,
and reasonably
related
to its scope and nature.
This gives assurance of their community function.
Thus the free world has practical
means for achieving
collective
security
both through the United Nations and the
various regional
arrangements
already referred
to.
·.lJL,
~
Strategy
to Deter Aggression
The question remainsg How should collective
defense
be organized by the free world for maximum protection
at
minimum cost?
The heart of the problem is how to deter
attacko
This, we believe,
requires
that a potential
aggressor be left in no doubt that he would be certain
to
suffer dam.age outweighing
any possible
gains from aggression.
This result would not ·be --assured, -even by pollecti ve
measures, if the free world sought to match the potential
Communist forces,
man for man and tank for tank, at every
point where they might attack.
The Soviet-Chinese
bloc does
not lack manpower and spends it as something that is cheap.
If an aggressor
knew he could always prescribe
the battle
conditions
that suited him and engage us in struggles
mainly involving
manpowerj aggression
might be encouraged.
He would be tempted to attack in places and by means where
his manpower sµperiority
was decisive
and., where at little
cost he could 1mpose upon us great burdens.
If the free
world adopted that strategy,
it could bankrupt itself
and
not achieve security
over a sustained
period.
The free world must devise a better
strategy
for its
defense,
based on its own special
assetso
Its assets include, especiall.Y,
air and"naval power and atomic weapons
which are now available
in a wide range, suitable
not only
for strategic
bombing but also for extensive
tactical
use.
The free world must make imaginative
use of the deterrent
capabilities
of these new weapons and mobilities
and exploit the full potential
of collective
security.
Properly
used, they can produce defensive
power able to retaliate
at once and effectively
against
any aggression.
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To deter aggression,
it is important
to have the
flexibility
and the facilities
which make various responses
availableo
In many cases, any open assault
by Communist
forces could only result
in starting
a general waro But
the free world must have the means for responding effectively on a selective
basis when it chooseso
It must not put
itself
in the position
where the only response open to it
is general waro The essential
thing is that a potential
aggressor
should know in advance that he can and will be ,
made to suffer for his -aggression
more than he can possibly
gain by it.
This calls for a system in which local defensive strength
is reinforced
by more mobile deterrent
powero
The method of doing so will vary according to the character
of the various areaso
Some areas are so vital that a special guard should
and can be put around themo Western Europe is such an areao
Its industrial
plant represents
so nearly the balance of
industrial
power in the world that an aggressor might feel
that it was a good gamble to seize it -- even at the risk of
considerable
hurt to himselfo
In this respect,
Western
Europe is exceptionalo
Fortunately,
the Western European
countries
have both a military
tradition
and a large military
potential,
so .that through a European Defence Community, and
with support by the United States ·and Britain,
they can
create an adequate defense of the Continento
Most areas within the reach of an aggressor
offer less
value to him than the loss he would suffer from wellconceived retaliatory
measures.
Even in such areas, howe-ver:.,
local defense will always be importanto
In every endangered
area there should be a sufficient
military
establishment
to
maintain order against subversion
?nd to resist
other forms
of indirect
aggression
and minor satellite
aggressions.
This
serves the indispensable
need to demonstrate
a purpose to
resist,
and to compel any aggressor
to expose his real intent
by such serious fighting
as will brand him before all the
world and promptly bring collective
measures into operationo
Potential
aggressors
have little
respect for peoples who have
no will to fight for their own protection
or to make the
sacrifices
needed to make that fighting
significanto
Also,
they know that such peoples do not attract
allies
to fight
for their causeo
For all of these reasons,
local defense is
importanto
But in such areas the main reliance
must be on
the power of the free community to retaliate
with great force
by mobile means at places of its own choice
a
A would-be aggressor
will hesitate
to commit aggression
if he knows in advance that he thereby not only exposes those
particular
forces which he chooses to use for his ·~ggression,
~ut ~lso deprives
his other assets of "sanctuary"
~tatuso
Th&t does not mean turning every local war into a world war.
It does not mean that if there is a Communist attack somewhere in Asia, atom or hydrogen bombs will necessarily
be
dropped on the great industrial
centres of China or Russia.
It does mean that the free world must maintain the collective
means and be willing
to use them in the way which most effectively makes aggression
too risky and expensive to be
tempting o
It is sometimes said that this system is inadequate
because it assures an invaded country only that it will
eventually
be liberated
and the invader punished a That
observation
misses the pointo
The point is that a prospective
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attacker
is not likely
to invade if he believe~ the probable
hurt will _outbalance the probable gain.
A system which
compels potential
aggressor,
to face up to that fact indispensably
supp~ements a local defensive
syst~m.
L Practical
We can alread·y
begin
Applications
.
'
to see applications
of these
policies.
In Korea the forces fighting
aggression
had been so
closely limited
that they were forbidden even to apply the
doct}ine of "hot pursuit"
in relation
to enemy planes that
were based across the Yalu.
The airfields
from which attacks
were mounted were immune, as were the lines and sources of
their supply.
The fighting
there was finally
stopped last
July on terms which had been proposed many months before.
That result
was achieved,
at least in part, because the
aggressor,
already denied territorial
gains, was faced with
the possibility
that the fighting
might, to his own great
peril,
soon spread beyond the limits
and methods which he
had selected,
to areas and methods that we would select.
In
other words, the principle
of using methods of our choice was
ready to be invoked, and it helped to stop the war which the
enemy had begun and had pursued on the theory that it would
be a limited war, at places and by means of its choosing.
The 16 memQers of the United Nations who fought in
Korea have invoked the same principleo
They have given
public notice that if the Communists were to violate
the
armistice
and renew the aggression,
the response of the United
Nations Command would not necessarily
be confined to Koreao
Today, if aggression
were resumed, the United Nations Command
would certainly
feel free to inflict
heavy damage upon the
aggressor
beyond the immediate area which he chose for his
aggression.
That need not mean indulging
in atomic warfare
throughout Asia.
It should not be stated in advance precisely
what would be the ~cope of military
action if new a~gression
occurred.
That is a matter as to which the aggrespbr had best
remain ignorant.
But he can know and does know, in the light
of present policies,
that the choice in this respect is ours
and hot his.
In relation
to Indo-China,
the United
stated that if there were open Red Chinese
there,
that would have "grave consequences
confined to Indo-China."
States has publicly
Army aggression
which might not be
On December 26, 1953, President
Eisenhower made an
ifilportant statement which clearly
reflected
our present
policy -as applied to Asia.
He announced a progressive
reduction -of United States ground forces in Korea.
However, he
went -on to point out that United States military
forces in
--t-he F-ar East will now feature
nhighly mobile naval, air and
- amphibious units;"
and he added that in this way, despite
some withdrawal of land forces,
the United States will have
--a capacity
to oppose aggression
"with even greater
effect
than
he-r-etofore."
In the same month the United State·s reaffirmed
i t-s 1-ntent to maintain in Okinawa the rights made available
-to us by the -Japanese Peace Treaty.
This location
is needed
to ensure striking
power to implement the collective
security
concept.
In Europe, our intentions
are primarily
expressed by
the North Atl-antic Treaty.
Following the aggression
in Korea
of June 1950, the Treaty members proceeded to an emergency
000505
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buildup of military
strength
in Western Europeo
The
st·rehgth built between 1950 and 1953 has served well the
cause of peace.
But by 1953, it did not seem necessary
to
go on at the original
paceo
At the April 1953 meeting of the NATOCouncil, the United
States put forward a new concept, now known as that of the
"long haul."
It meant a steady development of defensive
strength
at a rate which would preserve
and not exhaust the
economic strength
of our allies
and ourselves.
This would
be reinforced
by the availability
of new weapons of vastly
increased
de·st-ructi ve power and by the striking
power of an
air force based .on internationally
agreed positions.
President
Eisenhowe·r is now seeking an amendment of the present law
to permit a freer exchange of atomic information
with ,our
NATO·.Allie•s.
When we-went back to the NATOCouncil meeting of last
December, we found that there was general acceptance
of the
"long ·aauln concept.
The result
is that most of our NATO
allies
are now able to achieve budgetary and economic stability,
without large dependence on our economic aid.
The growing free-world
defensive
system, supported by
community facilities
and coupled with adequate policies
for
their use, reflects
the nearest
approach that the world has
yet made to a means to achieve effective
defense,
at
minimum cost.
VI.
The. Current
Military
Program
\
One of the basic tasks
been to review our military
foregoing
policies.
of the new Administration
has
program in the light of the
In the years 1945-53, our military
programs went through
wide ffuuctuations
which hindered orderly and efficient
administrationo
During the first
part of this period,
the
policy -was to -recl·uee ·-t-he mili·tary -establi-shment
drastically.
During the latter
-part of the -period, -the policy was to
increase
the military
establishment
rapidly.
During both
the decrease and the increase
tne military
budget reflected
the so-called
"balance of forcesP concept.
In practical
terms, this meant splitting
the available
funds into three
roughly equal slices .for the Army, Navy and Air Force.
When the E!senhower Administration
took office,
our
national
security
programs, at home and abroad, were costing
over 50 billion
dollars
a year, and were planned at about
55 billion
dollars
for the next year.
Budgetary deficits
were of the order of 10 billion
dollars,
despite
taxes comparable to wartime taxes.
Inflation
was depreciating
the
purchasing
power of the dollar6
Our allies
were similarly
burdened.
The .American people have repeatedly
shown that they are
prepared to make whatever sacrifices
are really necessary
to
insure our national
safety.
They would no doubt support
military
expenses at the levels which their government told
them were required
for security,
even at the cost of budget
deficits,
resultant
inflationary
pressures
and tax-levels
which would impair incentives.
But the patriotic
will :to
sacrifice
is not something to be drawn upon needlessly.
Government has the high duty to seek resourcefully
and inventively
the ways which will provide security
without
000506
�•
sacrificing
economic and social welfareo
The security
poliGies
we here describe m.ake possible
more selective
and more effi'cient
programs in terms of the composition
of forces and
of procuremento
The new Administration
has sought to readjust,
in an
orderly way, the program for the military
forceso
Before
this could be done, it was necessary
to clarify
the extent
of our reliance
on collective
security;
to define more clearly
our basic strategy
both in Europe and the Far East; to reassert our freedom of action in repelling
future aggression;
to assess the impact of newer types of weapons; and to relate
the composition
and size of our ready and potential
forces
to all these factors.
Inevitably
this has taken time.
It bas required
a
series of difficult
basic decisions
by the President
with
,the advice of the National
Security Council and with supporting decisions
by the Department of State,
the Department
of Defense and the Treasury Department.
It has been necessary
to exchange views with Congressional
leaders
and our principal allies
and to inform world opinion so that neither
our
friends
nor our enemies abroad would misinterpret
what we
were doingo By now, however, the new course is charted and
is guiding our military
planning.
As a result,
it is now
possible
to get, and share, more basic security
at less costo
That is reflected
in the budget which the President
has
submitted for the 1955 fiscal
yearo
In this budget, national
security
expenditures
for fiscal
year 1955 will amount to
45 billion dollars as compared with 50 billion dollars for
1953 and 49 billion dollars for 19540
Initially
this reshaping
of the military
program was
misconstrued
in various respects.
Some suggested that the
United States intended to rely wholly on large-scale
strategic
bombing as the sole means to deter and counter aggression.
What has already been said should dispose of this erroneous
ideao
The potential
of massive attack will always be kept
in a state of instant
readiness,
and our program will retain
a wide variety
in the means and scope for responding
to aggression.
Othexs -i-n-t-erp-r-e-t-edthe -pxogram a-s -a move away from
collective
security.
The· exact op·posi te is the case, as
has been shown •. Our policies
are· base,r squarely on a
collective
security
system and depend for their success on
its continuing
vitality.
Still
others feared that we intended
to withdraw our forces from abroad in the interest
of mobilityo
Now that the fighting
is ended in Korea, our forces in the
Far East will be reduced in numbers, as has previously
been
announced, but the kind of force that remains will have
,great striking
powero Moreover, the program does not mean
that we intend to pull our forces out of Europeo
It is,
of course, essential
that the continental
nations themselves
provide a harmonious nucleus of integrated
defenseo
If they
do so, the United States would expect to maintain substantial forces of its own in Europe, both in support of the
forward strategy
of defense and for political
reasonso
Another consequence of our new policies
is that it has
become practicable
to reduce our economic :atcil to our allieso
The Technical Assistance
Program will go on and economic
aid is not wholly excludedo
There are still
some places
near the Soviet orbit where the national
governments cannot
maintain adequate armed forces without help from uso That
is notably so in the Middle and Far Easto
We have contributed
largely,
ungrudgingly,
and I hope constructively,
to end
000507
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- 9 -
aggression
and advanQe freedom in Indo=Chinao
The stakes
there are so high thijt it would be culpable not to contribute
to the forces struggiing
to resist
Communist oppressiono
But broadly speaking,
economic aid in the form of
grants is on its way out as a major element of our foreign
policyo
This is highly desirable
from many standpointso
It helps to make our own budget more manageable and it
promotes more self-respecting
international
relationships.
That is what our allies
wanto Trade, broader markets and
a flow of investment
are far more healthy than intergovernmental grants-in-aid.
It is, of course, important
that we
do actually
develop these mutually advantageous
substitutes
for "aid."
To do so is one of the major objectives
of the
Eisenhower Administration.
It is an essential
component of the
over-all
policies
already described.
gather
In the ways outlined,
the United States and its allies
strength
for the long-term defense of freedom.
VIIo
Our National
Purpose
We do not, of course, claim to have found some magic
formula that ensures against all forms of Communist successes.
Despoti;sm is entrenched
as never before.
It remains aggressive,
particularly
in Asiao
In Europe, its purposes
remain expansive,
as shown by Mr. Molotov's plans at the
Berlin Conference for Germany, Austria and all Europe.
However, time and fundamentals
will work for us, if only we
will let theme
The dibtators
face an impossible
task when they set
themselves to suppress,
over a vast area and for a long time,
the opportunities
which flow from freedom.
We can be sure
that 'there is going on, even within the Soviet empire, a
sile~t
test of strength
between the powerful rulers
and the
multitudes
of human beings.
Each individual
seems by himself to be helpless
in this struggleo
But tpeir aspirations
in the --ag-greg-ate make up a mighty force.
There are: some
-si.-g-:a-sthat the Sovi-et ruler-s -are, in terms of dom~stic
-policy, bending to some of the human desires
of their people.
There are promises of more food, more household goods, more
economic freedom.
This does not prove that the dictators
have
themselves been converted.
It is rather that they may be
dimly perceiving
that there are limits
to their power indefinitely
to suppress the human spirit.
That is a truth which should not be lost sight of as we
determine our own policies.
Our national
purpose is not merely
to survive in a world fraught with appalling
danger.
We want
to end this ·era of danger.
We shall not achieve that result
-merely by developing
a vast military
establishment.
That serves
indispensably
to defend us and to deter attack.
But the sword
of Damocles remains suspendedo
The way to end the peril peacefully is to demonstrate
that freedom produces not merely guns,
but the spiritual,
intellectual
and material
richness
that all
men want.
·
Such are the guiding principles
we invoke o We haNe-~canfidence that if our nation perseveres
in applying them, freedom
will -ag--ain win the upper hand in its age=long struggle· with
despotism,
and that the danger of war will steadily
recede.
000508
�..
DEPARTMENT
OF EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS
t
DATE
March 17, 1954
PUBLICATION NoYo Times
Transcript
of Secretary; Du'lles Remarks on Defense
at His News Conferenceo
Special
to The New York Timeso
WASHINGTON~
March 16 -- Secretarz_ of Stat&... Dulles
,.ilUthorize4.Jpr
direct publication
the following
section of the
transcript
of his news conference
today: bearing on the llaew
J&.Q.K"in foreign affaj,rs and military policy:
Q o - 11/Ir
o -Secretary,
would you please
of, one, the concept of instant
retaliation;
consultation
with our allies,
and, three,
ment in war only by an act of Congress?
give us the reconciliation
two, the concept of
the concept of involve,,
A,, - I assume your reference
supposedly taken from an address
to instance
of mineo
Q. - And one by the Vice President
Saturday·
II
retaLiation"
is
of the Uni ted ..'8.tates
on
night~
.,
Ao - I cannot comment on what the Vice President
said, but
I will b~ glad to comment on what I saido
If you will read my
address of .Jano 12 - you will see what I advocated th·e.re was a
~capacity"
to retaliate
instantlyo
In no place did I say we would
retaliate
instantly,
although we might indeed retaliate
instantly
under conditions
that call for thato
The essential
thing is to
have the capacity
to retaliate
instantlyo.
It is lack of that
capacity which in my opinion accounted· for such disa_sters as
Pear'1 Harboro
If we had had the capacity
to retaliate
instantly,
in my opinion,
there would· have be~n no Pearl Harbor o · But it took ·
about four years to retaliate
against Tokyoo· I belteve we should.
have that capacity
to retaliate
instantlyo
1
'
,,
Facts
Will Be Weighed
. -~,.
...·-
.;
Now, the question of whether or not you retaliate
instantly
and where you retaliate
is a matter to be dealt with in
accordance with the facts of each situationo
I take it few would
have any question but what if there were an attack up.on,>the United
States there would be instant
retaliationo
Yo.u have questions
of
retaliation
in the event of a violation
or an attack upon a member
of the North Atlantic
Treaty and upon oth~r countries
with whom
we have treaty relationshipso
·
. The question of circumstances
under which you retaliate,
where you retaliate,
how quickly you retaliate
is a matter which
has to be dealt with in the light of the facts of each particular
caseo One thing I want to make clear beyond the possibility
of
doubt is that I don°t believe you should tell the enemy in advance
just where, how, and when you plan to retaliateo
The whole
esse"iice of the program is that the action should be an action of
our choosing and he is not to know in advance what it is, and that
uncertainty
on his part is a key to the success of the policyo
Q.. - Sir, if I may pursue thato
You mentioned in the event
of an attack upon a member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Alliance
000509
�_,
...
you say what would then be instant
retaliationo
Does that mean
in the event the concept of involvement in war only by act of
Congress does not apply where there is an attack either upon the
United States or upon a member of alliance
of which we are a part?
Ao - It means·in all respects
the United States acts in
accordance with its constitutional
processeso
There is no way
in the world in which we can get away, or want to get away, or
intend to get away from our constitutional
processeso
How long
that will take, I don 9 t knowo It did not take very long after
Pearl Harbor to.get a declaration
of waro The trouble is it qid
not do any immediate good to get a declaration
of war because we
did not have the capacity
to do anything with ito
Defense
Treaties
Cited
I have never advocated,
and nobody else in the Administration
has advocated any departure
from constitutional
processeso
The North Atlantic
Treaty has provided that an attack against
one
of those states
shal1 be.deemed the same as an attack against
the
United Stateso
We have other treaties
with language which is not
precisely
the same as thato
Just what action by the Congress is
requir.ed is a matter to be decided in each case.
The fact that
you advocate hav1PS. a capacity
for instant
retaliation
does not
change your constitutional
processeso
It means we don't have to
wait for four years after somebody attacks
us before we are in a
position
eftectively
to hit backo
.
..,
Qo ~ Sir, does the fact that the Senate of the United States
has ratified
the North Atlantic
Alliance mean in the event of an
attack on an ally we could, within constitutional
procedures,
retaliate
against
that attack without action in the Congress?
A. - That is a matter which, as you know, was debated very
thoroughly
in the Congress and in the Senate; at the time that
treaty was ratified
I was in the Senateo
It is my opinion that
the provisions
of the treaty,
which state that an attack upon one
of the allies
is the same as an attack upon all -- or in other
words that an-attack
upon one of our allies
is the same as an
attack upon- the United States -- and that is also, I may say, in
the Rio pact -- that gives the President--,.;;_of_the United States the
same authority
to react as he would have if the United States were
a ttackedo
Qo - Thank you,
matter
siro
Ao - Whether he would use that authority
in every
for his discretion.,
In my opinion he has ito
case is a
Qo - He has the right?
A. - In my opinion he has the righto
That does not
necessarily
mean in all cases he would use the right without
consultation
by Congresso
It would depend on· the gravity of the
attack,
whether it was obvious the attack meant all-out
war, which
inevitably
would involve uso Many matters would .have to be
considered
and doubtless
would be considered
A¥ the President in
determining
whether or not to use his discretibnary
authorityo
Qo - Mro Secretary,
might I raise a question on another word
in the reference
to capacity
to retaliateo
The sentence ends:
"By means and at places of our choosing"o
Now, :Mro Pearson (Lester
E. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs)
raised the question whether the word "our" meant the United States
000510
�..
or whether
- 3
it meant the free
=
community of nationso
Ao - I think that the sentence is reasonably
you read the whole sentence if you have 'it before
Statement
Qo - Yes o
clearG
you?
Would
Read to Dulles
(Reading):
"The basic decision
great capacity
to retaliate,
of our choosing."
A.· - Does it
was to depend primarily
upon a
instantly,
by means and at place
use the word "free
world?''
Qo - There were two sentenceso
One is ' "The basic decision
was to depend primarily
upon a great capacity
to retaliate,
instantly,
by means and at places of our choosing."
A. - Is that
Ao· - Yes.
the whole sentence?
I would like
to have the first
part
of the
sentence.
Q. - The ·first
part
be changed, the Presldent
National Security Council,
This has been doneo The
upon a great capacity
to
places of our choosing."
Q. - I think
spoke about
is:
"But before military
plan,ning could
and his advisers,
as represented
by the
had to take some basic policy decisiono
basic decision
was to depend primarily
retaliate,
instantly,
by means and at
there was a sentence
the free worldo
in the text
there
which
Q.• - Not in that particular
paragraph.
There is an earlier
sentence to this part which says:
"The way to deter aggression
is for the free community to be willing and able to respond
vigorously
at places and with means of its own choosing."
A. - I thought
that
was what you were reading
from.
Qo - Which is it?
A. - Well, it·would
depend a good deal upon the circumstancesa
If there were an attack upon the United States and if we had the
capacity
to respond from our own bases, we would certainly
do thato
It is, I think, well known that the bases which we have in f~reign
countries
are in general not use~ble as a matter of law, and as
a practical
matter are not useablej
except with the consent of the
countries
where the bases are.
For example, the bases which are
available
to our Strategic
Air Force in Great Britain
are not
useable as a base of attack except with the consent of the British
Governmento
The same is true in general with all our foreign baseso
Therefore,
it is implicit
in our security
system that it operates
with the consent and acquiescence
of the other partners
who have
helped to provide the facilities
which create a sort of international
police systemo
Q. - If I might go on. There were two other words which
Mro Pearson raised a question
to in relation
to the point which
you have just made, the one being "instantly"
and the other
being ''means. 11 Does his mean the choosing of means would lie with
the free community or only with the United States?
Would there be
consultation?
000511
�.,
..
I
•
= 4 =
A. - Yes, there would certainly
be consultation
in most of
the cases that I can conceive ofo I might say that I wrote, some
weeks ago, an article
for Foreign Affairs,
which is in substance
a somewhat more polished,
I hope, restatement
of my speech which
was made before the Council of Foreign Relations,
which publishes
Foreign Affairso
That I did while I was flying back from Berlino
I understand
that is being released
for publication
tomorrow
in New York by the magazine Foreign Affairso
That will elaborate
to some- extent the thesis which I expressed
in my address of
Jan,, -I2o
qn another
(Mro Dulles'
article
page of this issue
in Foreign Affairs
is published
Qf The New York Timeso)
-
Q. - I would like to ask another question on this subjecto
There has been some discussion
and speculation
to the effect
that
reliance
on the capacity
to retaliate
instantly
as a major part
·~f your defensive
system would mean, in the case of a limited
challenge
in some remote area, you would have tpe choice either
of an all-out
war or no resistance
at allo
Ao - That is not a correct analysis
of the thesis at all•o
Let us take, for example, the declaration
which\Y(ijs-·made by :'the
sixteen powers in relation
to Korea, which is one of the illustrations
I made in my speecho
It has been stated there that if
aggression
should be resumed that the reaction
would not necessarily
be confined to Koreao Now what does that mean? That does
not mean necessarily
that there will be an effort made to drop
atomic bombs on Peiping or upon Moscowa It does mean that there
are areas of importance to the aggressors
in that vicinity
which
may have an industrial
or strategic
relationship
to the operation
which would no longer be what General MacArthur called a ''privileged
sanctuaryo 11
I cannot imagine any policy more futile
or more apt to
create war than to adopt the policy that you will only react at
the particular
place, and by the means the aggressor
selects 0
If anything would ever put a premium on aggressionj
it would be
thato
We want to take away that premium on aggressiono
Qo-- Mro Secretary,
while we are annoting that speech, there
was a reference
in there to a lesser
reliance
on local defense,
and some question has been raised as to whether that meant less
reliance
on defense by local,
indigenous
forces which we might
aid, for ~ample,
or less reliance
on local actions
by American
forces,
in local sectors
of the long front?
Ao - What I meant there, when I say "I", I might say that
that speech was not just a personal
speech,~was that if you have
the capacity
to strike an aggressor
at the points which will hurt
him, the deterrent
power~of that is sufficient
so that you do not
need to have local defense all around the 20,000-mile
perimeter
of the orbit of the Soviet world because your deterrent
power, to
a large extent,
reinforces
your local power· so that you do not
have to depend upon having in place forces-in-being
sufficient
to
stop an attack in its tracks anywhere where it could occur
because-you rely primarily
upon deterring
that attack,
not necessary upon being able to stop ito
f
With the Soviet-Chi~ese-Communist
world -800 9 000,000 people occupying a central
location;
with
land armies - it would be utt,erly
impossible
to have
all around that 20,ooo~mile orbit sufficient
to stop
might come at·whf)jever they might chose to make ita
have got to find some way whereby that type of local
with its
its vast
local defenses
any blow that
So that you
ground defense
000512
�e •.
•
=
can be supplemeritedo
capacity
to retailiate
own c}1oosingo
5
=
And the way to supplement it is to have a
at times, places,
and with methods of your
Now that doesn 9 t mean that you eliminate
wholly, by any
means, land forces -- it means you do not necessarily
make them
your primary reliance
because, as against
the kind of d~nger
which threatens,·
it is impossible
to match your potential
enemy
at all points on a basis of man-for-man,
gun-for-gun
and tankfo-r-tank.,
If we try to do that, we are going to go bus to
Qo -Mro Secretary,
if I may go back to one point of yours,
you said that in.Europe the ·President
had the same authority
under the NATOand Rio treaties
to retaliate
if the United States
was attaekedo
Well, last Wednesday he seemed to give a pledge
that he would not use that because he said that there would be no
involvement in war without Congressional
approvalo
Ao - But if the Senate
is a different
mattero
has given approval
in advance,
Qo - Well, the specific
case was Indo-Chinao
was what some of us were wondering about"
I think
that
that
Ao - Yes, there has been no Congressional
approval given in
advance of a war in Indo-China to which the United States would be
a partyo
He certainly
did not mean, I think, to imply that if the
United States was attacked,
and if Congress was not in session,
that he would wait until Congress was called back into session and
make a declaration
of war before we would react to a bombing attack
on New York City or Detroit
or Washington"
I think if any President
waited under those circumstances,
he would certainly
not be carrying
out the will of either
the Congress or the American peopleo
Qo - Sir, I 0 m a little
dense on this matter of Indo-China;
would you clarify
this for meo France is our ally in the North
Atlantic
alliance"
French troops are fighting
in Indo-Chinao
If
the Chinese Communists, with the regular forces from China, should
cross the frontier
into Indo-Ohina and attack the arme~ forces of
our ally, France, would our responsibilities
or obligations
under
the NATOalliance
come into force?
If not, why?
.
'
Ae - No, they will not because the NATOalliance
does not
apply to any part of the world except the North Atlantic
area as
it is defined in the treatyo
That definition
in the main is
confined to Europe, although it does cover a portion of French
North Africa -- I think Algeria is covered by ito But in the main,
it covers only the European area, including
a slight bit qf North
Africa and, of course, the Asiatic. portion of Turkeyo
Qo - Mro Secretary,
in the context
Ao - Now, I don 9 t mean to imply
--
that if the event you
of happened, we should do nothing"
I myself have said that
believed
that if that happened we should do somethingo
But
doesn°t mean we should do it without Congressional
approval
consultationo
spoke
I
that
or
.,.
Qc - In the context
of the answer you just gave about New
York, Detroit
or Chicago in referring
to an earlier
answer you
gave, would it be fair to say that the President
has the same
power to react in Europe in the case of a bombing of London or
Paris?
A. - Yes,
siro
000513
�..
= 6 -
Q. - Sir, would it be accurate then to say that instant
retaliation
in effect is recognition
of the restraining
effect
of the possession
of atomic weapons -- the deterrent
power? Is
there a distinction
between instant
retaliation
and deterrent?
1t is a deterrento
A. - Yes, I have said that the capacity
to retaliate
fully and instantly
is, in my opinion,
the great deterrent,
that wh~n you are faced with the kind of potential
enemy,
with the assets that this potential
enemy has, I believe
deterrent
of that sort of the most effective
way there is
preventing
a waro
powerand
or
that a
of
Now I can imagine a di~ferent
world condition
where
reliance
might properly be placed upon other methods, and other
means, but, as far as the present world condition
is concerned,, ·
that capacity
to retaliate
powerfully
at places of our chosing
is, in my opinion, what will serve as a powerful deterrent
to waro
I believe that the original
Korean attack would not
have occurred if it had not been assumed either
that we would not
react at all, or if we did react only at the place and by the
means that the aggressors
choseo
I believ • that the Allied
sixteen-power
declaration,
which now operates
in the case of
Korea, will probably prevent any renewal of Communist aggression
thereo
Q. - Mro Secretary,
in order to clarify
something in my
own ~ind at least,
is. it your understanding
that the Presideq.t's
right to orde~ instant
retaliation
applies
only in the case o!
an attack either on the United States or another North Atlantic
Treaty power because of the un~erstanding
that Congress had given?
President's
Rights
The United States ~s two treaties
that I referred
to:
One is the so-called
R:io Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance,
wh.i-ch
contains
the provision
that an attack upon one is the same as
an attack upon all; that sp.me provision
is found in the North
Atlantic
Treaty o -In my opinion -- whatever it ls worth as a
lawyer, and as one who was in the Senate whe.n the North At1iantlc
Treaty was adopted -- I believe that that authorizes,
is a: . ·.
consent in advance to, the President
reacting
against an attack
upon one of our allies
named in those treaties
in the same way
that he would be authorized
to react in the event of an attack
upon the Onited States itselfo
I repeat,
however, that the fact
that the President
has that constitutional
authority
as the
result
of·those
treaties
in my opinion does not necessarily.
mean
that he would use ito
He would use his discretion,
1 think, as
to whether or not to react instantly,
or whether to get either
a formal declaration
of war by the Congress, or whether to have
consultations
which satisfied
himself that that was the will o!
the Congresso
That would be discretlonary
_with the Presidento
Qo - Mro Secretary,
doesn 8 t the President
power under the United ~ations Charter itself?
A. - In my opinion,
have that
noo
Q. - Does he not have the power under the United
Constitution
same
as Commander in Chief?
States
A. - To do what?
000514
�\-
.,.,
- 7 -
Q. - To take military
by Congresso
action
without
a declaration
of war
A. - Well, now you are raising
the question which, bas been
debated ever since our nation was formedo There are certainly
areas within which a President
can act -- certainly
areas in which
it has been customary for Presidents
to act -- withoat any
formal action by the Congress.
There is a twilight
zone there.
Nobody has ever attempted to define accurately
that twilight
zone• and I shall not attempt it hereo
-q~.- lrlr. Secretary, at one point there you said "ln connection with consultation
to consult in most cases that you can
conceive of. 11 Would you consider,
say, an attack upon the
northern part of Canada an attack upon the United States,
and
would. you consult with other NATOcountries
before you reacted
to that attack?
Q•. - I do not think that it J;ij wise or appropriate
to try to
answer a hypothetical
question of·'that
sort.
In the first
place,
it is impossible to determine in advance what all of the surrounding circumstances
are, and it would certainly
also not be
advisable
to give any fore-knowledge
to a potential
enemy as to
whether or not he would have any time between his attack and
having ..to,. ~uffer the consequences of 1t.
000515
.
_J
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Deterrence
Dublin Core
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New Look / 18 MARCH 1954
Date
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1954-03-18
Format
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PDF
Language
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en
Type
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Text
Identifier
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CDTT00023
Source
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Despatch No. 503 from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, 18 Mar. 1954, LAC, vol. 4903, RG 25, 50115-P-40, pt. 2.
Berlin
Dwight Eisenhower
John Foster Dulles
Korea
Rio Pact
Soviet bloc
US National Security Council