1 20 2 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7cb3e84aa9016f63dd5a44ef5317b237.pdf 406cfd29b3037def0622c49491b5ea8c PDF Text Text Only now is their dramatic testimony disclosed-for exclusive publication in Britain through " The People." • In the most fantastic spy document ever compiled Vladimir Petrov toda:, reveals thatBargess and Maclean WP.re recruited as spies 20 YEARS AGO; They supplied Moscow with secret documents of the Bi-itish Foreign Office ON A SCALE HITHERTO UNSUSPECTED; When British Intelligence agents began to investigate t h e i r activities 'Bothjoined usas theywere stillstudents' spredS''.Wfiif'''J;"/"'m"U"" explode is the fiction that Burgess and Maclean only crossed the Iron Curtain because they were disillusioned with life in " capitalist " Britain and yearned for the Russian Utopia. In fact, the reason for their fiight was simple and urgentthey discovered that they were under investigation by the British security services. And they pleaded for asylum. - THE DATE WAS SEPTEMBER 17, 1953. INTO MY OFFICE AT CANBERRA BURST SECRET THEY BEGGED FOR AGENT KISLYTSIN, ONE OF THE BEST REFUGE IN MOSCOW. OPERATORS IN THE AUSTRALIAN BRANCH OF THE MVD, OF WHICH I WAS CHIEF. "It's come off at last, just as we planned it," he shouted, waving a newspaper. Ardent Reds He showed me the huge front page headlines. They reported the disappearance from Switzerland of Mrs. Melinda Maclean and her three children. She had gone, so the newspaper guessed, to join her husband, Donald Maclean, behind the Iron Curtain. No wonder Klslytsln was exultant. This was the final coup in the most daring spy operation ln history-the spiriting away of two highranking officials of the British Foreign Office, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess. Leading part It was a triumph for the en- tire world-wide spy network run from the Kremlin. Dozens of the most cunning agents of the secret service had taken part ln it. And Kislytsin himself had played a leading role in it when he was an MVD officer in London and later in Moscow. It was through him. Indeed, that l was able to discover the truth about a mystery that has kept the world guessing for four years. Even though I was head or an Important MVD branch and held the high rank of'11eutenant• colonel in the service, I should never have been let into t.he Burgess and Maclean secrets. As m other secret services. no one group of the MVD 1s allowed to know anything beyond its own special sphere of duty. So I had no right to question Kis• lytsin about his work tn the Burgess and Maclean affair. But nu sooner did he hear that Mrs. Maclean had disappeared than he sought to u;et in touch with the MVD men in Moscow with whom he had planned her secret journey By VLADIMIR PETROV I , before he joined me in Australia. And to secure permission to send coded cables to Moscow he had to explain to me, his chief, all about his work m the missing diplomats operation. I gave him permission. My wife Evdokia was our cypher clerk. She coded the cabled messages he sent and the replies he received. As a result I learned almost every startling detail of the Burgess and Maclean story, From the secret cabled messages and from Kislytsin himself I was able to build up an astonishing picture of the gigantic coup. And now 1 can lay before the world the full solution to the mystery of the missing diplomats. f'1rst or all, let me destroy some of the myths that have gathered round this case. It ts not yet fully """epted, outside the Iron Curtain, that Burgess and Maclean were traitors to their (,OUntry and gavp secret information to Moscow passed over to Russia any secrets of first-class importance. In fact, both tnese men were long-term Soviet agents. They were recruited for intelligence iwrk while they were still students at Cambridge 20 years ago. And the final myth that The story or the missing diplomats begins at Cambridge University, where these two young men, quite independently. became· interested in left wing politics. Their interest was noted by the British branch of the Soviet spy organisation working from the Russian embassy as " diplomats "-as we did in Australia. Before very long both men were heart and soul on the Communist side in the worldwide battle of ideas. Skilful work by British contacts, acting for our spy network in London, soon convinced them that it was their duty to Continued on Page 5 r can ~=!!!!!!!========================~ Soviet spies I can now disclose that beyond all doubt these t1Go men regular/" supplied the r ·emlin with all the information they could lay their hands on as trusted servants of the Foreiqn Of!ice. Certain public men !n Britain have consoled themselves with the idea that the two diplomats were Soviet spies for only a short time and could not have New Oxydol washes whiter thanBleach! Yes I New Oxydol has an entirely new Oxygen formula, wi1hfar greater whitening powers than bleach itself I So New Oxydol now boils whites whiter than fOU can bleach them I Try it! OXYDOL'S • NEW OXYGEN FORMULA AI.L THE DIFFERENCE MAKES • Dl>UT QV.l.LITT l'SODVO'I 000136 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDMB Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Extract from CDMB00030 Both Joined Us When They Were Students Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Subject The topic of the resource MacLean/Burgess Description An account of the resource A-2023-02971 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canadian Crown Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived LAC RG25/R219 2017-0440-5 Box 11 File 7-5-Burg Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/91facb2806d40957f8dda2f8128e44f1.pdf 40634975006c274082f0c13e68a1801d PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information IP SECRET ri * '* mmmm no SECRET SI A SECRET THE UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM-CANADIAN COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF ATOMIC ENERGY 1940 - 1954 rap SECRET 000381 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET This document coiisisjj: of _ y / / _ _ pages'? .. w . „ _ . Wi _^c_j. pages^ £- °* —3— Copies, Series J ^ ^ - c J . No THE UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM-CANADIAN COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF ATOMIC ENERGY In 1945 the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada released statements setting forth the background of the development of the atomic weapon and the collaboration of the three governments which brought the weapon into being, l/ With the cessation of hostilities, the three governments proceeded to concentrate their energies and efforts on the development of peacetime programs in each country. In the case of the United Kingdom, an atomic energy program had to be started, for all practical purposes, from the very beginning. This was true because the major activity of British scientists during the war period occurred in Canada and the United States rather than in the United Kingdom. States, the United In 194-6 the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada established legislative authority for their separate peacetime programs for atomic energy research and development. In the case of the United States, the Atomic Energy Act of 194-6 established limitations which prevented the type of collaboration with the United Kingdom and Canada that had existed during the war period. From 1946 to 1948 cooperation between the three governments in the field of atomic energy was brought to a virtual standstill. Hov/ever, ty the modus vivendi of January 1948, cooperation between the three governments was revived in limited areas consistent with the existing legislative authority. The following history and appendices constitute a summary record of the collaboration in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada between 1940 to January 1, 1954. l/ Canadian Information Service Statement, "Canada's Role in Atomic Bomb Drama", August 13, 1945 "Statement ty the President of the United States" - White House Release, August 6, 1945 "Statement of the Secretary of Vkr" - U.S. War Department Release, August 6, 1945 "Statement issued by the Directorate of Tube Alloys (Department of Scientific and Industrial Research)", August 12, 1945 "A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes Under the Auspices of the U.S. Government" by H.D. Smyth, August 1945. „ TOP SECRET <-it-/f/f-/<$.A-*S �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information .TOPSECRET Early Developments The conclusion that an atomic weapon based on the fission of uranium might be technically feasible was reached by both the United States and the United Kingdom at about the same time. In the United States, President Roosevelt in the fall of 1939 appointed an Advisory Committee on Uranium under the chairmanship of Dr. L. J.. Briggs, Director of the Bureau of Standards. This Committee was made a Subcommittee of the newly organized National Defense Research Committee, responsible to Dr. Vannevar Bush, in 1940. In the United Kingdom in April 1940 a committee of scientists, headed by Sir George Thomson, was established in the Air Ministry to coordinate existing research and to determine whether the feasibility of producing an atomic weapon for use during the war was sufficiently great to justify intensified future effort toward this end. During this period contact between the governmental atomic energy groups in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada was informal and unofficial. Each followed the others' activities, primarily through the medium of visits made back and forth by British, Canadian and American scientists, generally in connection v/ith other business. First Governmental Cooperation. 1940-1943 More formal cooperation began as a consequence of an aide memoire left with President Roosevelt by Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador on July 8, 1940 (App. A). There was proposed in this memorandum a broad interchange of secret technical military information betv/een the British and American Governments. ' Although the atomic weapon was not mentioned, it implicitly fell into this category as work progressed. Discussions on secret technical military information were agreed to by the U.S. Secretary of State (App. B) and gave rise to a visit to the United States by a British Scientific Mission headed by Sir Henry Tizard, in the fall of 1940, at which -2- TOP SEGBET �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a finformatio TOP SECftET time a full exchange of information on research and plans for technical military development was approved. As a result there came into being a close relationship between the British and American scientific groups engaged in basic military research which included atomic research, with each keeping the other informed regarding the nature and scope of their work. The United Kingdom; Tube Alloys - 1941 During this period a special study was made in the United Kingdom to determine whether atomic research should be continued on a large scale* The conclusions reached in the British study were encouraging and in September 1941, Prime Minister Churchill appointed Sir John Anderson to head all phases of the atomic project in the United Kingdom. A new division of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research was created and called, for security reasons, the Directorate of Tube Alloys. Mr. W. A. Akers of Imperial Chemistry Industries was appointed director. The United States; United States Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD. S-l) In November- 1941 the first American mission concerned with atomic research was sent to the United Kingdom to become familiar with the British project. This mission consisted of two American scientists, Drs. H. C. Urey and G. B. Pegram, both members of subsections of the Uranium Committee. In November 1941 the responsibility for atomic research was placed directly under a section of the United States Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) with the code name S-l. From December 1941 to the first half of 1942 work on uranium fission in both countries continued largely on a laboratory research scale, and during this period the exchange of information between the Directorate of Tube Alloys and the OSRD S-l Executive Committee was quite informal but complete. Meanwhile, in the United States sufficient progress was being -3- TOP SECRET 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET. made to allow greater emphasis on production problems and less exclusively on laboratory research. The United States - Manhattan Engineer District - 19U2 In early 19^2, Dr. Bush informed President Roosevelt that research had progressed to the point to permit hope that an atomic weapon could be produced in time to be of value during the war and recommended, therefore, that the U.S. Army be given the responsibility for furthering this project. In June 1942, by Presidential order, the engineering phases of the work in the United States were.placed under the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The control of laboratory research remained for a time with OSRD. The OSRD gradually transferred all of its responsibility to General Groves, who was placed in charge of the entire project in September 1942. In 19^3 all connections of OSRD with uranium work were severed and the S-l Executive Committee ceased to function. Discussion Between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had taken considerable personal interest in atomic energy developments from the beginning, and had been in direct contact v/ith each other concerning this interest from time to time. During the first half of 1943 a series of conferences v/ere held among the close advisers of the Prime Minister and the President which led to the signature of an agreed document at Quebec in August 1943. This document is known as the Quebec Agreement and established the formal basis for the further collaboration in the field of atomic energy between the United States and the United Kingdom until after the war (App. C ) . The Quebec Agreement The Quebec Agreement established the principles and mechanism for formal cooperation betv/een the two countries, namely, the Combined Policy Committee as well as basic principles governing future collaboration during the war in this, field. TOP SECRET �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SESIET The Combined Policy Committee was organized with the initial membership specified in the Quebec Agreement of the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson; Dr* Vannevar Bush; and Dr. James B. Conant as the three United States members; Field Marshal.. Sir John Dill and Colonel J. J* Llewellyn as the United Kingdom members. Whereas Canada was not signatory to the Agreement, Canadian participation in the joint effort was recognized by the appointment of C. D. Howe, a Canadian, as the sixth member of the Committee. The Combined Policy Committee held its first meeting in September 1943 and by December 1943, the report of a Sub-Committee (membership: General W. D. Styer, Dr. R. C. Tolman, Professor J. Chadwic^, and Dean ' C. J. Mackenzie) had been approved which, among other things, made recommendations on the division of the program of work and the assignment of British scientists to various portions of the Manhattan Engineer District laboratories and facilities. From that point on, it was recognized that the most efficient division of effort called for the concentration of work on the atomic energy project in the United States, where the United States' resources, manpower and materials could be put to the best use, secure from enemy action. Canadian Role in Cooperation « Early in 1943 a large Canadian-British research establishment had been set up In Montreal under the general direction of the National Research Council of Canada. Practically the entire slow neutron research group at Cambridge, England under Hans Halban was at that time moved to be nearer the corresponding U.S. work at Chicago. In April 1944* following the recommendation of a CPC Sub-Committee on the Joint Development of a Heavy Water Pile, it was agreed to "undertake the design and construction of a heterogeneous heavy water pilot pile as a joint American-British-Canadian project". Ultimately there would be made a comparative study of the Hanford and Canadian pile operations, it was anticipated. In May and June 1944, General Groves, Sir James Chadwick and Dean Mackenzie met to discuss the contributions the U.S. would make in the project. The primary results of these meetings v/ere the final drafting of the agreement delineating the role of the U.S. in the joint project and the establishment of the U.S. Evergreen Area Office TOP SECIT 000386 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information T0PSEG1ET 1. .ontreal to handle interchange matters. Exchange of information vdth Canada vras limited, the latter having access to information developed at the v Metallurgical Laboratory and the Clinton Laboratories, but not at Los Alamos and Hanford. The combined effort at Montreal was formally directed toward research and development of a high flux heavy water reactor ultimately to be constructed and operated at Chalk River, Ontario. The small Zero Energy Experimental Pile (ZEEP) went into operation in September 1945, and the large heavy water reactor, the NRX, in July 1947. The Combined Development Agency On June 13, 1944 another agreement was signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, entitled "Declaration of Trust", which referred to the objectives set forth in the Quebec Agreement and established the principle of collaboration in uranium research and procurement betvreen the United States and the United Kingdom. To implement this principle, an agency known as the Combined Development Trust v/as established in Washington, to be composed of and administered by six members appointed by the Combined Policy Committee. The objective of the Trust was to seek out and develop the production of uranium supplies to be allocated among the member governments. The original trustees of the Combined Development Trust were: United States - General L. R. Groves, Mr. G . Harrison, and Dr. C. K. Leith; United Kingdom - Sir Charles J. Hambro, Mr. F. G. Lee; and Mr. G„ C. Bateman from Canada. Development of the First Weapon As a result of the Quebec Agreement, teams of U.K. scientists v/ere integrated into the program in the U.S. and Canada, working at the following locations: Los Alamos, Berkeley, Oak Ridge, Washington, New York and Montreal. The joint objective was achieved in the explosion of the world's first atomic weapon on July 16, 1945 at Alamagordo, New Mexico. British personnel participated in this test, as they did in the later test at Bikini in July 1946. -6- TOP SECIET �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information AJPSECfH The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb •On June 1, 1945, the Interim Committee, charged with advising the President of the United States on the questions raised by the apparently imminent success in developing an atomic x^reapon, recommended unanimously that the bomb should be used against Japan. This recommendation v/as concurred in by the United Kingdom, in accordance with the requirements of the Quebec Agreement, at a Combined Policy Committee meeting on July 4, 1945. On July 24, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference Prime Minister Stalin was informed by President Truman, with British concurrence, that an atomic weapon had been developed and would probably be used with decisive effect on the Japanese. Consequently, Hiroshima was bombed on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9» Disclosure of Wartime Collaboration and the Combined Policy Committee Public disclosure of certain aspects of the wartime cooperation and the existence of the Combined Policy Committee v/as made in four separate documents in information releases subsequent to the use of the first weapon on Japan by the United States, August 6, 1945 (App, D ) ; Great Britain, August 12, 1945 (App. E); and Canada, August 13, 1945 (App. F ) , The fourth document was the Smyth Report on "Atomic Energy for Military Piurposes". Prior *to the release of these statements and in view of the agreement at Quebec not to reveal information concerning"the project to third parties without mutual consent, the three statements had been sent to the other countries for comment. The British approach to the U.S. releases was considerably more cautious than the American, and the former indicated concern that such full disclosures regarding the technical processes for the production of weapons was contemplated. Although agreement on both the press release and the Smyth Reporttfasfinally obtained, the, final outcome of this dis cuss ion on the release of information was the establishment of a U.S.-U.K. subcommittee to draw up the principles and conditions which would govern the further release of scientific information concerning the atomic project, -7- TOP SECRET 000388 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET The -x'oblem of Post-War Collaboration With the end of the war, the three governments reexamined their relationships in the field of atomic energy in view of the fact that the objectives of the cooperation established by the Quebec Agreement had been achieved with the victories over Germary and Japan. President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee met in November 1945* and a public declaration was released on November 15 (App. G), stating that the three governments agreed to cooperate in promoting the international control of atomic energy. On November 16, another statement, which was not made public, was signed by the Chiefs of State of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, which declared that the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Trust should continue, as well as full and effective cooperation in the field of atomic energy. The Combined Policy Committee was instructed to consider and recommend appropriate arrangements to achieve this objective (App. H ) , The Combined Policy Committee was not able to agree on arrangements which the United States could regard as consistent with the support of an international control system, and would not agree to agreements which would be contrary to Article 102 of the U.N. Charter. The United Kingdom representatives in Washington had argued that the United States had already agreed to continue full cooperation in the field of atomic energy between the two governments and cited the provisions of an aide memoire summarizing a conversation held at Ifyde Park, New York, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on September 19, 1944. 2/ A paragraph of this document called for the continuation of full collaboration between the United States and British Governments in developing Tube Alloys for military and commercial use after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement. (App. I) 2/ A copy of this" aide memoire was given to United States authorities by the British in;the spring of 1945, after a search of the Department of State, the War Department and White House records disclosed no evidence that a copy existed in the United States. -8- TOP SEC1T 000389 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET Tne Organization of British Atomic Energy Efforts: The Ministry of Supply ,Prime Minister Attlee announced on October 29, 1945, in the House of Commons, that the British Government had decided "to set up a research and experimental establishment covering all aspects of the use of atomic energy" and that responsibility for this function was being transferred from the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to the Ministry of Supply, The new arrangements were given statutory form in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, after the Prime Minister's announcement, on January 29, that the Government planned to produce fissionable material in sufficient quantity to enable the United Kingdom to develop a program for the use of atomic energy as circumstances might require and launched an extensive program of research and development.. The United Kingdom had first announced in the House of Commons that atomic weapons were being developed on May 12, 1948, The Establishment of the United States Atomic Energy Commission On August 1, 1946, the Congress of the United States passed the United States Atomic Energy Act which established a new Atomic Energy Commission and contained provisions which severely limited cooperation in this field with other countries. The functions of the Manhattan District were transferred to the United States Atomic Energy Commission on January 1, 1947. Modus Vivendi - 1948 (App. J) In.addition to the unresolved question of the type and extent of cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States, there also existed the problem of determining an appropriate allocation between the two Governments of the raw materials which had been acquired by the Combined Development Agency. In the latter part of 1947 it became apparent, in view of the obstacles to the international control of atomic energy which had been encountered, that it was desirable that the existing United States atomic energy plants be used to their capacity for the production of fissionable material in the interest of the common defense. To support these plants and the additional plants required for defense TOP SECRET 000390 �13? SIX Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information purposes, it was necessary for the United States to obtain a substantial portion of all the uranium available to the two Governments, A series of Combined Policy Committee discission on this problem, the problem of technical cooperation, and other matters began in the latter part of 1947 and resulted in that Committee's adoption on January 7, 1948, of a Modus Vivendi consisting of the following main points: 1. An agreement on the part of the United Kingdom for the allocation of uranium from foreign sources for the next several years to the United States; 2. The establishment of limited areas of technical cooperation between the atomic energy establishments of the three governments; 3. The agreement that the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Trust, renamed the Combined Development Agency, should continue but that all other agreements, including the Quebec Agreement, should be considered null and void. Cooperation Under the Modus Vivendi After the modus vivendi was approved and after the Technical Cooperation Program was put into effect, differences of opinion developed betv/een the United States and the United Kingdom on the definition of areas. The British view of the problem was that the areas shovild be interpreted in a liberal and broad sense. From the United States point of view it became increasingly difficult to differentiate betv/een atomic energy information on the basis of whether or not it related to the production of materials for weapons. The United States considered that production and weapon information was not a part of the Technical Cooperation Program and that such exchange was prohibited by the terms of the Atomic Energy Act, Discussions were initiated among the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States in order to determine whether a nev/ basis for cooperation could be agreed upon, but in the early part of 1950 they v/ere suspended by informal agreement and since that time technical cooperation has taken place within the limited framev/ork of the modus vivendi of 1948, -10- 000391 ^J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information OP SECIET Security , In the development of the modus vivendi it was agreed that an objective of the three governments would be the establishment of common standards of security in the atomic energy field. This objective assumed greater urgency with the discovery by the British of the Fuchs espionage case in February 1950 (App. K ) , and of the cases of Bruno Pontecorvo in September 1950 and Donald Maclean in May 1951. In June 1950, in Washington, there was held the first tripartite conference on security matters among officials of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the British Ministry of Supply and the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board to discuss policies and procedures with respect to establishing closer comparability of security standards among the three countries. A second conference was held in London in July 1951 and a third in Washington in May 1952. Since that time there have been several exchanges of visits by small working groups and a close and continuing cooperation has resulted. The atomic energy personnel in the three countries, including personnel that may have access to classified atomic energy information but are not working directly on atomic energy projects, are given full background investigations comparable to the system adopted by the United States since 1947, (App. L) -11- TOP SEC! 000392 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information BRET «U3 document consists of pagos No. c . of °PiR3, Soriea ~y "WHITE PAPER" APPENDICES Document Memorandum - Lord Lothian to President Roosevelt, July 8, 1940 Memorandum - Secretary of State to Lord Lotliian, July 30, 1940 Quebec Agreement, August 19, 1943 Presidential and War Department Information Release, August 6, 1945 British Information Service Statement, "Britain and the Atomic Bomb", August 12, 1945 (To be found as App. 7 of the Smyth Report) Canadian Information Service Statement, August 13, 1945 (To be found as App, 8 of the Smyth Report) The Three-Nation Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy, November 15, 1945 Truman-Attlee-King Statement, November 16, 1945 Hyde Park Aide Memoire, September 19, 1944 Modus Vivendi, Jaiuary 1948 United States Press Release on Fuch6» Arrest, February 3, 1950 British Press Statement on Atomic Energy Security Practices % w. 000393 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft history / revisions / US-UK-CAD COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF ATOMIC ENERGY (1940-1954) DRAFT Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00056 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canadian Embassy, Washington to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Atomic Energy: White Paper on the History of Tripartite Co-operation," 9 Dec. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 5957, file no. 50219-AF-40, part 1. AECL atomic energy Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Office of Scientific Research and Development OSRD Scientific Mission Sir Henry Tizard tube alloys Vannevar Bush