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PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH
ATLANTIC COUNCIL,
PAftE
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
System
CYPHER-AUTO
Priority
Departments!!
Circulation
No.
544
Date:
October 1 , 1952.
(Rec«d October 2 , 1952)
Reference:
Subject:
NATO Annual Review: Issues arising from
papers submitted by Secretary General and
French delegation.
Addressed to External No. 544, repeated to
London Ho. 12.
Done—.
Date—.
Reference
We now anticipate that the Standing Group will
come to Paris about October 20 to meet with the Council
for two or three days. This meeting shovJLd produce
an important exchange of views between the civilian
and military agencies of NATO on the basic problems
now facing the alliance. If It does, It may have an
important bearing on the process of reconciliation
in the current annual review, particularly if, when
the meeting takes place a sufficient number of replies
to the questionnaire have been received to enable us
to form some idea of the forces likely to be available
for 1953. In this message we attempt to forecast
the probable course of discussion in the Council and
behind the scenes.
2. On the military side, the meeting will have
four main problems to consider.' First of all, has
the risk of aggression diminished? The United States,
with emphasis, say not and it would now seem that the
French agree? the United .Kingdom, perhaps not
unaffected h^ their domestic financial and economic
problems, are Inclined to the other opinion. Vie should
know If there are any Canadian views which you would
wish to put forward on this subject.
3. The second problem, affecting appreciation
of risk, is that of the effect of "new weapons". Here
again, as you knoiir, the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff
have developed views of their own. They may argue
either that the requirements for conventional forces
have diminished, or at any rate that they have changed,
particularly as regards anti-aircraft guns and perhaps
fighter aircraft. As a substitute line of argument,
the United Kingdom may suggest that, given current
Done.
Date.
2O,\*-30-P-TO«
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�- S political conditions, it may be worthwhile taking some risk
now In the rate of buildup so as to develop newer and more
effective weapons which may be more economical and in the
long run more decisive. We would welcome some early indication
of the views on these matters of the authorities concerned
In Ottawa.
4. There is a third military problem with certain
political implications which Is raised by the Ismay paper
and also by the French memorandum. This Is the proper
proportion of active to reserve forces. The determination
of this question Implies, of course, some assessment of
the effect of the new weapons. But it also involves
important political considerations. A proportionately
larger number of active (regular) units now may have a
greater deterrent effect than conventional reserve arrangements. The degree of the risk and the effectiveness of the
new weapnns are both relevant considerations in this regard.
5. The French have raised a fourth military problem
in suggesting In their memorandum that the Standing Group
should be concerned with global planning and strategy.
It seems to us almost certain that the United States and
the United Kingdom will oppose this proposal •. We assume
that In so far as Canada is concerned we would not favour
a broadening of the present functions of the Standing Group.
The proposal has however political implications as regards
the commitments of some European NATO countries in the Far
East and also as regards the assessment of the defence
contributions of these countries for the purposes of the
annual review. We should appreciate receiving your views
on the various aspects of this proposal.
6. On the civilian side,, there will arise, we expect,
two main Issues. First there will be the problem of deciding
to what extent European countries have reached the limit
of their economic capabilities; whether, in fact, they would
compromise their internal stability if they attempted to do
more. The second, related, issue will be whether the United
States, and perhaps Canada, can be expected to do more,
particularly if the European governments are prepared to make
an additional effort and, in so dolng# to accept whatever
further internal risk may be involved.
7. It is our view that, on neither side of the Atlantic,
are the "civilian" problems exclusively or even basically
economic. The attitude of governments will depend on their
assessment of the risk and on the 3x£$&t to which their
public opinions are Impressed with/urgency. To a considerable
degree too, no doubt, each government will be influenced by
what the others are willing to do. If the European governments are prepared to take greater internal risks to face
an urgent military threat, the United States may consider
revising upwards the scale of their present defence appropriations. Conversely, willingness on the part of the
United States to increase assistance may Induce the European
governments to accept additional burdens. Some such mutual
prodding may well take place as a result of the discussions
of the strategic problem and, if this occurs, we are bound to
be involved.
8. At present only in the United Kingdom Is it argued
that the danger we face may be less or that It may be met
less expensively. On balance we believe that the other
European governments are likely to follow the French lead,
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�- 3emphasizing the urgency of defence in the forward position and
agreeing with the United States appreciation, of the strategic
risk; In so doing, of course, they would strengthen their case
for additional aid. Perhaps they can be persuaded to promise to
do more on the understanding that such an approach is the only
one likely to Impress the United States Congress.
9. As we see It, therefore, the tendency both on the part
of the United States and on the part of most European governments
will be to favour agreement on higher goals for tho coming year.
The United States will contend that, if more is to be expected
from Congress, some promise will be needed that a larger United
States effort will be accompanied by additional efforts by the
European partners. And, the European governments, on the basis
of their fairly satisfactory showing for 1952, may not be too
reluctant to make additional promises particularly in the
expectation of substantial United States assistance.
10. When you were in Paris you expressed concern about
increased goals for 1953. You hoped that the efforts of NATO
next year might be devoted primarily to fulfilling effectively
the programme for 1952. It appeared to you sounder to complete
the present programme in terms of reserves and logistic support
rather than to embark at once on a larger one. It was your
Impression that this point of view would be shared not only in
the United Kingdom but also among the European allies.
11. It is at least possible, however, that European
governments may take a different line. They may question whether
such a course is as likely to provide adequate forces for the
first critical period.. Perhaps, more important, they may also
doubt whether it Is likely to result In increased United States
assistance for Europe. They may feel that it is more important,
in particular psychologically, to raise and train additional
divisions and squadrons rather than to concentrate on ammunition
and logistic programmes to meet existing deficiencies. In short,
European governments may take the view that the better course is
to continue to develop forces on a broad scale and that gaps can
be filled In later. We would appreciate comments on this
approach to the problems before us.
l'J. The French may well argue that the Intent of their
paper is not so much to suggest that the United States should
increase their defence appropriations but that a larger share of
the present appropriation should be assigned to the European
countries in the form of mutual aid and offshore purchases. This
is a logical argument and one which Is related to the proposal
for screening expenditures with a view to achieving maximum
results with the funds available. There are, however, obvious
weaknesses in it, particularly from the North American point of
view. The changes implied as regards the accepted pattern of
United States defence and assistance budgets are unlikely to
commend themselves to a United States administration in the
particular circumstances of an election period.
13. Turning to our own Canadian position, the situation as
outlined above would seem to give rise to these questions?
(a) If there is any disposition to base actions on the
assumption that, if war breaks out, it is the first few weeks
that really matter, then we (together with the Americans) might
well be subjected to pressure to enlarge our forces actually in
Europe beyond those provided for in present plans;
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�- 4 (b) The European governments will no doubt hope that,
along with the United States, we will lnorease our total
defence effort, whether In parallel with an additional effort
on their part or to fill the gap which they cannot fill without
jeopardising their internal stability;
(c) The form of the Canadian contribution ovei» and above
the forces that we provide will undoubtedly be under consideration. Various possibilities will come to mind, particularly if,
as seems likely from over here, the amount of finished military
equipment that we are able to provide as mutual aid is substantially les3 than in past years. You are, of course, well aware
of the alternatives that have been talked about in the past,
including defence components and materials, and stock-piling In
one form or another, offshore purchases and direct financial
economic aid.
14. We would appreciate advice on the various matters
raised throughout this message. There is some urgency because
even in informal discussion in the weeks ahead views will be
developing here in Paris and positions will be hardening. In
any case, we would hope to have your views before the Standing
Group comes to Paris to meet with the Council.
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�
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NATO
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NATO Global Strategy / 1 OCTOBER 1952
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1952-10-01
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PDF
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CDTT00099
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Permanent Representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Paris to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, "NATO Annual Review: Issues arising from papers submitted by Secretary General and French delegation," 1 Oct. 1952, LAC, RG 2, vol. 223, file no. I-60-1.
Heeney
NATO Annual Review
North Atlantic Council
Paris