1 20 2 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f8ab6d098a9023a70d017ffb22e507a5.pdf 43cd887c7e228ba3abe4568ca370042f PDF Text Text •r~W • - Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET COPY FO. / KEM0RAFDT3M FOR THS J03FT IFTSLLIOENCS COP-TIT TEE 1. In accordance with your directive CSC 14-8-11-2 of October 7th, the Joint Intelligence Staff has made a preliminary survey of the probleris involved in the preparation of a study of the vulnerability of Canada to atomic attack. Attached at Appendix "A" are our recommendations regarding the statement of the object, assumptions a n d method of approach. C^ ^^ ^ ' QX*) c=X\ GiC^ (££) %Q Q^ j^Wi Q ^ } c=0 (s% <|§)1 2. It will be noted, that the statement of the object includes two related, questions. ^"i 3. The first requirement, In our view, is a list Jof the targets in Canada which the Soviet authorities 'might consider suitable for attack with atomic b o m b s ^ Although the selection of targets in Canada, as in other countries aligned against the Soviet Union, would obviously depend in part upon the nuraber of bombs available to the Soviet forces, we think it desirable at the present stage to disregard this limitation and to conduct the enquiry as if the principal concern of the Soviet leaders were to compare results anticipated from the use of the bomb with ' the effort expended in its production. Until there has been a correlation of similar studies in all the countries principally Concerned, it would seem inadvisable to attempt to forecast how the Soviets would in fact use the nuraber of bombs available to them. 4. Similarly, we have felt it necessary to disregard, for the purpose of this paper, the problems involved In delivery, ' We propose to study the problem es if the Soviets had the capability of delivering against targets in this country such atomic bombs as they considered it profitable to use,, 5. A s regards the economy of this country, it will clearly be necessary to exclude from consideration such changes a s cannot now be reasonably foreseen. '.Ve do not propose to speculate on decisions which may be reached with regard to the dispersion of industrj'", and we assume that the location of industry will remain substantially as at present. 6. The effectiveness in scientific terms of the atomic weapon which the Soviet Union may have is clearly a factor of primary importance. V/e think it reasonable to assume that the Soviet atomic boiabs will be more effective than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In. terms of comparable zones of destruction, we propose to assume" a 50?o increase in the radii of these zones. /2. 000461 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -2- >~ 7. The second requirement, as we see it, is an assessment of the effect which the destruction of selected targets would have on the ability of Canada to wage war. It will probably be found that the targets can be classified broadly as centres of industry and transport, centres of population; centres of administration and military objectives. Different criteria may have to be applied in each of these categories. It may be that when this haS been done it will be possible to make an estimate of the number of atomic bombs required to bring the Canadian war effort to a halt. In view of the doubt about the possibility of making such an estimate, however,we prefer not to include this in the object as a requirement. While we propose to treat this second requirement 'tis a purely Canadian problem, so far as possible it is clear that we shall have to pay some regard to the relationship between the economies of Canada rnd the United States. 8. If the object and form of the paper, as proposed above, ore approved, it will be necessary to make extensive use of the studies already carried out by the Vital Points Committee, although it should be borne in mind that these were prepared for a different purpose and. are not wholly applicable. It may also be found that4 the Civil Defence Co-ordinator , the Atomic Energy Control Board . and. the R.C.T,Police haye, material which v/ould be of importance. .Furthurmor 4J, •• it seems probable that much of the necessary basic, data has not yot boon assembled by any authorized agency. JOINT INTELLIGENCE STAFF. Ottawa, Canada, 15th October,1949. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET COPY NO APPENDIX "A" !• Object: To determine the targets in Canada which the Soviet Union might consider suitable for atomic attrck, and to estimate the effect which the reduction or elimination of these targets by atomic bombs would have on the ability of Car ads to wage war. 2» Introduction: For the purpose of this_ paper, the following factors have been disregarded: (a) the number of atomic bombs available to the Soviet Union (b) the methods of delivering atomic bombs to targets in Canada iA y ^ (c) the defences against atomic attack which Soviet forces might have to^ overc ome (d) the effects of any decision which may be made by the Canadian axithorities with regard to the dispersion of Industry (e) XXgeneral, any unforeseeable changes in the ^•'structure 'of the Canadian economy 3'» Assumption: It is assumed that atomic bombs available i J ^ w ^ ^° t ^ e Soviet Union will be more effective than those V^JXW used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A 5C$ Increase in the XJ^" radii of mean comparable zones of destruction is assumed. W- 4. Outline: (a) determine which: (i) centres of industry and transport (ii) centres of population (iii) centres of administration (iv) military installations are vital to the war potential of Canada, with priority of importance. (b) determine which of these Tooints or areas might be considered by the, Soviet Union to be suitable for atomic attack. (c ) determine the weakest links in the industries or transport facilities 6f Canada. (d) determine which segments of the Canadian economy could be rendered unproductive by the destruction of certain rain imum c omp on en t s. (e) estimate the effect upon the Canadian war effort which might be expected from the destruction of some or all of the targets suitable for atomic attack. (f) estimate the number of atomic bombs required to reduce or eliminate each/of these vital points or areas. 5, Conclusions: 000463 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIM02592 Title A name given to the resource "Memorandum for the Joint Intelligence Committee" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1949-10-15 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Nuclear Vulnerability Study, RG25, Vol. 4563, File 50041-A-40, Part 1, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Atomic Vulnerability Description An account of the resource Joint Intelligence Committee, Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5ff03d0300cf95eb4a9405d9d39d632c.pdf 8d22658b513c857ae745a34b0e661872 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Docunwntidivrikue u n ^ n ^ u f t u ean e pveijtiiifle e l ^ e la Loi sur I'acces a I'information t s V : .TCP SECRET Sto<j{- NEMORANDIT TG^T^Lj^^.T_^^^i^-mcri _v Ho OPY NO, cgrrm^I 1, In accordance with your directive CSC 14-8-11-2 of October 7th, the Joint Intelligence Staff has made a preliminarv survey of the -oroblens involved. In the preparation of a study of the vulnerability of Canada to atomic attack. Attached at Appendix "A" are our recommendations regarding the statement of the object, assumptions and method of approach. 2. It will be noted that the statement of the object includes two related questions. 3# The first requirement, in our view, is a list of the targets in Canada which the Soviet authorities might consider suitable for attack with atomic bombs. Although the selection of targets in Canada, as in other countries aligned against the Soviet Union, would obviously depend in part upon the number of bombs available to the Soviet forces, we think it desirable at the present stage to disregard this limitation and to conduct the enquiry as if the principal concern of the Soviet leaders were to compare results anticipated from the use of the bomb with the effort expended in its production. Until there has been a correlation of similar studies in all the countries principally eoneerned, it would seem inadvisable to attempt to forecast how the Soviets would in fact use the number of bombs available to them. 4, 'Similarly, we have felt it necessary to disregard, for the purpose of this paper, the problems involved in _ delivery. We propose to study the problem es if the Soviets had the capability of delivering against targets in this country such atomic bombs as they considered it profitable to use, 5. As regards the economy of this country, it will . clearly be necessary to exclude from consideration such changes as cannot now be reasonably foreseen. Te do not propose to speculate on decisions which may be reached with regard to the dispersion of industry, and we assume that the location of industry will remain substantially as at present. 6 The effectiveness in scientific terms of the atomic weapon which the Soviet Union may have is clearly a factor of primary importance. V/e think it reasonable to assume that the Soviet''atomic bombs will be more effective than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of comparable zones of destruction, we propose to assume a 50yb increase in the radii of these zones. /2. 000464 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information t 7. The second requirement, as we see it, is an assessment of the effect which the destruction of selected targets would have on the ability of Canada to wage war. It will probably be found that the targets can be classified broadly as centres of industry and transport, centres of ' population^ centres of administration and military objectives. Different criteria may have to be applied in each of these categories. It may be that when this hag been done it will be possible to make an estimate of the number of atomic bombs required to bring the Canadian war effort to a halt. In view of the doubt about the possibility of making such an estimate, however,we prefer not to include this in the object as a requirement. While we propose to treat this second requirement 'as a purely Canadian problem, so far as possible, it is clear • that we shall have to pay some regard to the relationship between the economies of Canada and the United States, 8. If the object and form of the paper, as proposed above, ere approved, it will be necessary to make extensive use of the studies already carried out by the Vital Points Committee, although it should bo borne in mind that these were prepared for a different purpose and are not wholly applicable. It mav also be found that4 the Civil Defence Co-ordinator , the Atomic Energy Control Board . and. the R.C..F. Police . haye material which would be o£ importance. Purthermorv;,it seems probable that much of tiro necessary basic, data has4 not yet boon assembled by any authorized agency. JOINT INTELLIGENCE STAFF. Ottawa, Canada, 15th October,1949. 000465 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET • COPY NO 1» .Oki®£t: To determine the targets in Canada which the Soviet Union might consider suitable for atomic att?ck, and to estimate the effect which the reduction or elimination of these targets by atomic bombs would have on the ability of Cai ada to v;age war. 2* Introduction: For the purpose of this paper, the following" factors have been disregarded: (a) the number of atomic bombs available to the Soviet Union (b) the methods of delivering atomic bombs to targets in Canada (c) the defences against atomic attack which Soviet forces might have to overcome (d) the effects of any decision which may be made by the Canadian authorities with regard to the dispersion of industry (e) in general, any unforeseeable changes in the structure of the Canadian economy 3» Assumption: It is assumed that atomic bombs available to the Soviet Union will be more effective than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki'. A 50p increase in the radii of mean comparable zones of destruction is assumed. • 4. Outline: (a) determine which: (i) centres of industry and transport (ii) centres of population (iii) centres of administration (iv) military installations are vital to the war potential of Canada, with priority of importance. (b) determine which of these points or areas might be considered by the Soviet Union to be suitable for atomic attack, i (c) determine the weakest links in the industries or transport facilities of Canada. (d) determine which segments of the Canadian economy could be rendered unproductive by the destruction of certain min imum c omp on en t s. (e) estimate the effect upon the Canadian vrar effort which might be expected from the d e s t r u c t i o n of some or a l l of the t a r g e t s s u i t a b l e for atomic a t t a c k . (f) estimate the number of atomic bombs required to reduce or eliminate each of these vital points or areas. 5» Conclusions. 000466 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIM02591 Title A name given to the resource "Memorandum for the Joint Intelligence Committee" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1949-10-15 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Nuclear Vulnerability Study, RG25, Vol. 4563, File 50041-A-40, Part 1, LAC. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Early Cold War, Atomic Vulnerability Description An account of the resource Joint Intelligence Committee, Ottawa Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en