1 20 6 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1c6cf8a64823a486ddd7e63626898834.pdf 98de670c5efdd557294d3fa965456973 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inf A S E C R E T July 10, 1959. CANADA-UNITED [.STATES MINISTERIAL ,C0MMiTTEEL.ON.;JQIN!T..;|jl;FENCE : ' • • -"i"i IS-- -'- ' -•' "if ^ -'i *~i\ The Minister of National Defence has suggested that advantage might be taken of the presence in Ottawa of the United States Secretary of State to discuss the possibility of an early meeting of this Committee in Washington. 2. The .ommittee was established in September, 1958, as a result of discussions between the Prime Minister and President Eisenhower when the .latter visited Ottawa. Its function is "to consult periodically"on any matters'affecting the joint defence of Canada and the United States". Its membership on the Canadian side consists of the Secretary of State for External Affairs1 as Chairman, the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Finance. The Minister of Defence Production attended the first meeting of the Cpmmittee and will have a continuing interest in its deliberations. 3. The first meeting of the Committee, and the only one to date, was held in Paris in December, 1958, just prior to the NATO Ministerial meeting. A press release was issued after that meeting which, among other things, indicated that "a decision was reached to hold the next meeting of the Committee in Washington in mid-1959". In answer to a question in the House, the Prime Minister on .April 29, 1959) repeated the above-quoted section of the press release. I+. . If it is decided that a meeting of the Com- mittee should be arranged for this summer, a suitable topic for discussion would be the problems connected with • • • #C A0038465 165-000283 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information A0038465 166-000284 �ent disclosed under the Access to lnformaik)n.Act PpihTcfivulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - the' proposed storage of nuclear weapons in.Canada. For a topic of this importance considerable advance study would be required. It would probably, therefore, be desirable in scheduling such.a meeting to allow time for adequate consideration of the topics, to be discussed in the defence field. A0038465 167-000285 �AW Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Cb A0038465 168-000286 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW06711 Title A name given to the resource Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence - Establishment and activities," RG25-A-3-b, vol 6048, file 50309-A-40, part 2-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Government of Canada Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10-Jul-59 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ecbf5e31dfc6f3c8e30e423f4ebadd70.pdf 35a3992ad9928e77c8c15b9c63e88e2d PDF Text Text 2 ACTION COPY - 017 e OPIMMEDIATE s • — 605 . Document dslosed underthe Access to Infornl^on Act 77*4" de la Loi sur/'acce0^A formation Hajluply 2 Fet. ) FM EXTERNAL OTT JULI 0/59 ROSEC NO DISTRIBUTION 3-2-2-/1 TO WASHDC D1563 OPIMMED “I3a i • INFO CCOS ho st S REF YOUR WISER TELS 72 AND 73 APRS ( OVERFLIGHTS * «BUBSSSM$ Subject $02 ACTOnTO: FEB 2 1 198 r MINISTERS HAVE NOU BEEN ABLE TO CONSIDER THE REVISIONS PRQPQSED BY THE USA AUTHORITIES TO SCHEDULE B TO PC 2307 APR17/52 AND HAVE AUTHORIZED YOU TO HAND TO THE STATE DEPT AN AIDE MEMOIRE 5; IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS TEXT BEGINS: THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CAREFULLY STUDIED THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE EMBASSY BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON APRIL 9 n WITH REGARD TO THE REVISION OF EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR CLEARING FLIGHTS OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND AIRCRAFT OVER CANADIAN TERRITORY WHEN THE MOVEMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IS INVOLVED. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE PRESENT PROCEDURES AS SET OUT IN SCHEDULE B OF ORD ER-IN -COUNCIL RC 2307 OF APRIL 17, 30 1952 BE EXTENDED TO COVER,NOT RPT MERELY OVERFLIGHTS BY AIRCRAFT OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND,BUT BY ALL UNITED STATES MILITARY AIRCRAFT CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, LESS INTER- CEPTORS,F OR WHICH SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS. WOULD APPLY. THE . CANADIAN GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES HAVE PRINCIPALLY IN MIND THE USE OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND FOR RESTOCKING OF USA BASESOVERSEAS AS WELL AS BOMBERS OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND» Y IT WOULD,THEREFORE,PREFER THAT ANY EXTENSION OF. THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS AT THIS TIME BE CONFINED TO SAC BOMBERS AND SAC TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT.ACCORDINGLY IT WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE f PHRASE QUOTE USA MILITARY AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE IN THE TITLE AND NOTE UNDER IT OF THE PROPOSED RE-DRAFT OF SCHEDULE B BE REPLACED BY QUOTE SAC BOMBER AND SAC TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO NOTED THE PROPOSAL THAT CATEGORY QUOTE X .UNQUOTE FLIGHTS BE ELIMINATED FROM SCHEDULE o9 o2 000580 -I �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur l'acces a lrinformation DOWNGRXD 5S 0® ASPhin PACE WO DL563 FEB 2 1 1985 BAND DEALT WITH BY THE PROCEDURES FOR CLEARANCE SET OUT IN SCHEDULE A TO THE SAME ORDER-IN-COUNCILTHE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT CAN AGREE WITH THIS PROPOSAL. WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSAL TO RIVISE THE PROCEDURE REGARDING CATEGORY QUOTE Y UNQUOTE FLIGHTS TO PERMIT CLEARANCES OF SIX MONTH PROGRAMMES TO BE MADE AT THE GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL,WITH INDIVID- UAL FLIGHTS AND ANY MODIFICATIONS TO THE ORIGINAL PROGRAMME TO BE CLEARED IN ADVANCE BETWEEN THE CHIEFS OF AIR STAFF,THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT SUGGESTS THAT THE RELEVANT PARAGRAPH PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES FOR THE NEW SCHEDULE B BE ALTERED AS FOLLOWS8 QUOTE THE PROGRAMME OF EACH SERIES OF EXERCISES WILL BE CLEARED AT GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS• DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL FLIGHTS AND ANY MODIFICATIONS AND CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS NOT RPT NOT INCLUDED IN THE FLIGHT PROGRAMME W Jf WILL BE CLEARED IN ADVANCE BETWEEN THE CHIEFS OF AIR STAFFo EACH OF THESE FLIGHTS WILL REQUIRE TO BE AUTHORIZED BY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS LAID DOWN IN ORDER-IN-COUNCIL 2307 OF APRIL 17,1952a UNQUOTE IF THE FOREGOING MODIFICATIONS TO THE USA PROPOSALS FOR REVISION OF SCHEDULE B ARE AGREEABLE TO THE USA AUTHORITIES, THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WILL CONSIDER SCHEDULE B TO BE REVISED ACCORDINGLY, AT THE SAME TIME,THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT FEELS THAT IT SHOULD TAKE THIS OCCASION TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO THE VIEWS IT HAS EXPRESSED ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS INVOLVING OVERFLIGHTS CONDUCTED OVER EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME.THESE WERE SET OUT AT SOME LENGTH IN THE AMBASSADORS NOTE OF MARCH 6, 1959,IN WHICH PARTICULAR MENTION WAS MADE OF THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT NO RPT NO PUBLICITY BE GIVEN TO OVERFLIGHTS OF AIRCRAFT CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF THE FACT THAT CIRCUMSTANCES 9993 000581 ] I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a ^information DOWNGRAWC 10 SLl . REBUT LSC1lRe8211985 A SECRET PAGE THREE 74563 MIGHT ARISE WHICH WOULD NECESSITATE FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT OF THE DESIRABILITY OF SAC EXERCISES INSOFAR AS THEY AFFECT CANADA AND WHICH COULD JUSTIFY THEIR SUSPENSION.TEXTENDS. 2 AS STATED IN THE AIDE MEMOIRE,IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT IN PROPOSING THAT SCHEDULE B BE MADE TO APPLY TO ALL USA MILITARY ' v v AIRCRAFT, THE USA AUTHORITIES HAD PRINCIPALLY IN MIND SAC TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT FOR RESTOCKING BASES OVERSEAS IN ADDITION TO SAC BOMBERS IT HAS OCCURRED TO US,HOWEVER,THAT THE USA AUTHORITIES MIGHT HAVE HAD IN MIND AS WELL IgA NAVY AIRCRAFT USING CDN AIRSPACE EITHER TO FLY NAVAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BASES OVERSEAS OR INTO ARGENTIA IF AND WHEN NECESSARY AGREMENT IS REACHED WITH REGARD TO THEIR STORAGE AT THAT BASE IF WE HAVE BEEN RIGHT IN THIS ASSUMPTION^ND THE STATE DEPT, RAISE THE MATTER L-=="tm=m—*===G=======-d======5== YOU MAY INFORM THEM ORALLY THAT MINISTERS HAD CONSIDERED THIS ASPECT OF THE MATTER BUT THAT THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO 1 - — —li. W, mi ..... i» i ‘‘"======!* "" I m’’ ANY. PROCEDURE COVERING SUCH OVERELIGHTS_ WI LE_THE STORAGE QUESTION / AT ARGENTIA REMAINS UNRESOLVED-IN ANY, EVENT YOU MAY ASSURE THE STATE DEPT THAT THE PHRASE QUOTE SAC TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE WILL BE INTERPRETED BY US AS MEANING USAF JRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BEHALF OF SAC, V 3.WITH REGARD TO OUR SUGGESTED REVISION OF THE PARA CONCERNING QUOTE Y UNQUOTE FLIGHTS,OUR PRINCIPAL REASON FOR PUTTING FORWARD THIS AMENDMENT IS THAT MINISTERS ARE NOT RPT NOT PREPARED TO APPROVE REQUESTS FOR TRAINING EXERCISED EXTENDING OVER SUCH A LENGTHY PERIOD OF TIME AS SIX MONTHSoUNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES YOU WILL NO RPT NO DOUBT BE ASKED FOR WHAT LENGTH OF TIME SHOULD A PROGRAMME OF TRAINING FLIGHTS BE PUT FORWARD•ACCORDINGLY,YOU MAY SAY THAT IN FUTURE WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF REQUESTS FOR EACH SERIES OF TRAINING EXERCISED BE FOR NOT_RPT NOT LONGER THAN THREE OR FOUR MONTHS. ==================================== AoTHE REF IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF OUR SUGGESTED REVISION OF THE e esol 000582 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur l'acces a Tinformation 7 % 3 COW*. 2 REBU.T & bitl 5 (hAIR) FEB 2 1 1985 PAGE FOUR DL563 PARA CONCERNING QUOTE Y UNQUOTE FLIGHTS TO APPROVAL OF EACH FLIGHT BY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ONLY REFLECTS WHAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN OUR INTERNAL PRACTICE* y 000583 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource External to WashDC DL563 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10-Jul-59 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-b, File number: 50195-40, file pocket 2. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDAC02875 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/dcc61b6ca1aa90cb296b8adacd8e6d8b.pdf 61f942b68b5ac823f08640c57c2bbab8 PDF Text Text 7k zf&x/fr-ytM-vd CONFIDENT l2& J u l y 1 0 , 1959. VISIT_OP MR. HERTER , DEFENCE QUESTIONS C^UTL^J (3&2/&-fX /f*^ \ SZ>£0<?~ / 9 - f O Mr. Herter has given advance notice that he might wish to raise joint defence questions, not in any precise manner, but rather in general terms, i.e., some discussion of objectives and general principles (Washington telegram 1676 of July 2, 19£9) 4 The following may be useful as talking points on the political aspects of United StatesCanadian defenee oo-tperation in relation to Western strategy generally MILITARY STRATEGY 1. There has been a great debate recently in the United States Congressional Committees dealing with defence matters as to the balanee whieh should be established between the provision of defensive weapons and facilities (warning lines, interceptors, BOMARCS, etc.) and offensive weapons and facilities (SAC bombers, strategie missiles, etc.). much deterrent is enough? How How mueh value Is there in continued heavy expenditures on defensive facilities designed to: meet the waning bomber threat, especially in North America? 2, Another feature of this defenee debate in the United States was the call by some experts for increased strength In conventional arms to provide an alternative means for the application of United States power particular situation — in a an alternative to nuclear destruction whether limited or total.. Is there not merit in this stand from a purely political point of view? (^O Is it not more desirable that the United States, . •» <-. A0027627 76-000602 �- 2 together- with her allies, should have, as in Korea, an alternative of fighting a successful conventional action? Must the proliferation of atomic weaponry in so many countries of the world continue? ATOMIC WEAPONS 3. Our two Governments share the view that the "nuclear club" should be as restricted as possible. How much longer can this view, in absolute terms at least, be maintained v/ith any hope of success? The original club has been enlarged to include the United Kingdom. France is knocking at the door. By what logic explainable in terms of domestic political considerations should Germany, Italy, or even Canada be excluded? 4, United States atomic legislation was designed to guard the secrets of the manufacture of atomic weapons. This may still be a valid objective, even though it seems to have forced France, for example, Into a do-it-yourself programme. The other important feature of the legislation is its requirement that the United States have full custody of the nuclear weapons, i.e., the nuclear war heads. Does this last requirement continue to make political sense? The United States Government has entered into agreements with other NATO partners providing for joint control of the use of the war heads. If joint control of use is acceptable, why not have "two keys" to the atomic stockpiles? If the United States were prepared to share control over release of the war heads vdth the partner on whose territory the stockpiles were established, some of the political •• • 3 A0027627 77-000603 �- 3 - pressures engendered by national susceptibilities might be eased; no secrets of the construction of the weapons need be shared to make this possible, POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 5. The Soviet Union has, according to military estimates, the capability to attack North America, and that capability will become stronger as operational missiles become available to the Soviet Union. Is there, however, any clear indication of a political intention on the part of the Soviet Union to attack? Would such an attack be consistent with Soviet domestic objectives, bringing as it would devastating United States retaliation on the Soviet homeland? 6. The policy of the nuclear deterrent is successful only so long as it continues to deter. Yet it relies for its continued power to deter on the possibility that it will be used massively. Will a policy which contemplates the possibility of mutual annihilation continue for long to recommend itself to rational human beings, involving as it will effects on future generations as well as on the present? Must the emphasis not shift to negotiated settlement of differences with the Soviet Union and, on our side, to the taking of certain risks in attempting, to open the v/ay to solutions through diplomatic action? �- 4 - CANADA-UNITED STATES DEFENCE 7. Canada is a small pov/er with a limited population and a great deal of geography. It has many domestic tasks to complete to achieve the promise of its future. In the long run this promise can be achieved only If global nuclear war is avoided; most countries of the world are in the same position. For Canada, hov/ever, the existence of continued tension short of actual combat between the powers who are not only the great powers, but also immediate neighbours, restricts Canada's freedom of action and may jeopardize her national political and economic objectives. Canada has willingly made available her geography for United States defence facilities, i.e., joint defence facilities. The steady increase of such facilities on Canadian territory, v/hich may seem necessary if tension continues, cannot but appear as a steady diminution of Canadian sovereignty no matter how necessary. Nor can It have any other effect than to decrease the room for- manoeuvre by Canadian representatives in international gatherings, and perhaps reduce the possibility In tho future of the kind of political contribution to the solution of international problems v/hich a small and "disinterested" pov/er like Canada has been able to offer in the past. 8. In the recent past, while the bomber threat to North America v/as the paramount threat, tho RCAF's contribution in air defence was a vital element of the continental defences. With the advent of the missile • *» o A0027627 79-000605 �•* • a *H i - 5 - threat and the astronomical costs of any defensive facilities v/hich may be constructed against it, can Canada's contribution continue to be as vital? may be priced out of the market. Canada Is there, then, some other vital role for Canada on the Western team which is better tailored to our resources? 9. A good deal is said publicly about the continental air defence plan. When one looks at the siting of particular air defence weapons, can one say that the plan is really continental? With the present siting of weapons, is it not likely that much of the defensive action that is possible would take place over the settled areas of Canada? A0027627 80-000606 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01079 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10-Jul-59 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived ÒAtomic weapons - Canadian policy re - (Fourth power problem),Ó RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5961, file 50219-AM-40, pt. 2.2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource NATO, atomic cooperation, atomic information, Canadian Weapons Policy Description An account of the resource Visit of Mr. Herter Defence Questions Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/62f62a933ee4c4efcc335f9bdbc8dd7b.pdf a1b98d2830e4f1897a49c23726b3325f PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document d ivulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a i'information Defence Liaison 1 BI CamerontHDH 20 July, 1980 MMJMffffl Ml TM ffilBim UK! .-yj2la. NUW I t occurred t o me that you night wish t o discuss with i,r. • arter certain broad aspects of tho French poaition on nueloar weapons which have Inport&nt l a p l i c a t i o i a f o r Canada and for t >« Alliance aa a whole. Per acne t i n e prior t o I itftv paao:.! fusel t. 1 allow I m i t 'a 0 of heads on t h e i r s o i l , t o Preneh revealed a lack of willlngnoee t o co-operate i.. Isafcaaflnfelaf Ihe waoialoni taken by tho ado, of Oovevxasent in 13*7 regard I; eduction of ;. clear weapons into NATO forces* In BVaw* t i c a l l y a l l osees i t has heretofore proved impossible to ;et t as to U s s i e s t t 1 areolae nature of their objections, or t o uofine tho o of arrennewents which they vould be pre* pe ed t o acce; I t now aeons inereaalu. ~ , however, as a res a l t of t .0 inquiries ive nsdo in c -n with the l a t e s t French refusal on the storm © of nuclear weepone, that we oennot expect any change in attitude u n t i l suoh t i n e s s i ranee i s given a voice along with the united States and the i n the d i r e c t i o n of gXobel etrategy, and Leularly In reape t of decisions involving the use of nueloar weapons* Tiiia was oonfinaod reoently by apresentatlve on tl ouncil who indlosted t o *«. Leger that once Oenaral de Oeullo bad been given the 3 acas, and nsohlnery had been s e t up t o discuss global strategy, then the eltuatlon would bo e n t i r e l y differ.! t ; t •eat v-'. 1. I sn 300 aw Ol fa felon If the anevleaas were .»tain tbe only key t o the f r i g i d a l r o order te warheads Stock;.Had i n Freaoe". 4. ..-;. :. As you are aware, the nited ngden have attempted _.= .,. • -.... 1 o ,a .ii.. pw pawal serf ..".... • ;. • ste . f swan 111 I MM botween the Ambassadors of t,.o t u»oe oour la .ao..:... ken* The f i r s t round of talks 001020 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information I - devoted t o organisational questions. Mas' united yinfldoa sad tbe United s t a t e s stressed the diff volvod in bmplswonFrenob proposals, the Importance of SATO sontatlons and tbe need ta evoid saw fonsal ro-or-anisfttion or WA . During b i s w l s i t ss rswis in looses*** Br. Duiios slssuassd sas itlon of the t r i - p a r t i t e directorate with de OauUo and he l a t e r inf armed the French tbat the united Statee would be pared t o consult inf oneelly with Prone* tbe Halted Kingdom on global issues* b indicated that be did not favour U « idee of separate n i l l t a r y d l s e u s s l o . Sines that t i n e there have been infoasal oo e u l t a t Ions with tbs Far *a«t end Africa* Ap» ot too d i e s a t i s f l e d with the type of swahinary established and s r e hopef il tbat more pro rose w i l l be In the future In theee talks sad tbat t u a l l y the anerioans w i l l O.JEJS ar-;.- d t o eeptlng t h e i r point of view* tsnerto. m have received froa United fflnqrlnm s a t united States sources* however, 1 tattoos have not boea soneernsd with global "deoieio .a" and have been U n i t e d to a general awhwag of views on subjects of c waiea* Tbe rrenoh ropresentatlvo made i t abundantly clear at tbe nestin g on the Far » s s t that General de Oaulle'a i n t e r e s t l a aawdng eases talks wue Isrgsly i i r s t s a l i rasl ooneerned t b s uss of tbe nueloar deter: . t ; he wanted t o e s t a b l i s h i n seeh tbeatro w11 c r i tor la would j u s t i f y "conventional ear aad "nuclear waa-". Tbe United States represent a t i v e took the l i n e tbat i t waa inpoesible t o say in advenes when snd now t ited s t a t e s ni^bt resort to f o r c e . fhs teaieSaa was the Free; eut«e alone, and ov depended on tbe oireunetencee and tbe s e a l s Tbe Froneb representative press tbe nntteWm *** S*e*at report reeeived fron our M a s s y In »t indlostes thet no new round of talks la sorvedulod for tho immediate future. Moreover, tbe S t a t s Department gave uo ladiestIon of say f l e x i b i l i t y In the Jnited Statee position re* luting t o the custody and oontrol of nuolear &. I t seems l i k e l y that en attempt may ba me/.e t o arrange for a aeetlng thie suaaer or f a l l * between Oenaral de Jeulle and President Tfflsewhawar In an attempt t o resolve the present deadlock whiob has already aads I t nsjesssery f o r a ro-do. States squsdrons stationed i a Franco. 001021 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lot sur faeces a {'information - Cane proposals for s t r i - p e r t l t e directorate were ;crsohf.ll,/ t o General do Gaulle by -•ioe Minister during hie v i s i t to i axis lti.t SOVMsbar. fsnbeker indioatad that i f the French leader waa s t r i v i n g f o r c l o s e r consultations with hi s a l l i e s than Canada was i n entire . . he JT bend* IX be bad A a triumvirate would take decialone without consult a t i o n with otfter manors of tbe A l l • enue* Canada oould not accept h i s propos tars* ewer* Ce, accept any extension of the geographical area of responsibility of la! . Tbe fcer stressed tbat las asjplsaastatJ • sf n plan iaaeayiai s aa features would proi ably lead t o tbe die* tagratloa of tho Allien o* in addition, i t would have a bad e f f e c t on tbe uneowAitted eountries and oould asks more d i f f i c u l t any reasonehle aooowmodation with tbe OSS . •hen a r . JDlefenbaksr oxpj oeeed the hope that propoeals would ra. be submitted t o IATO o f f i c i a l l y beeause of the disruptive e f f e c t on the Alliance, Oenaral de a a . l i e indicated tbat i senting then t o *A£ . a cool response from I -ltsd Statee end th: bincd with the wlews expressed by tbe Minister sppear t o bars persuaded -joneral de Oaulle t o lay l e s s .ia on tbe need f o r reorganising SATO and to ooneentrats h i s e f f o r t s on b i s nain objective of obts a iter voice for Prance in decisions relating strategy ead tbe use of nuclear • *n a Canadian point of view, tha a n s a assets shtsn hers sssa este,.l i s h e d f o r informal --,>artlte o * n a t a t i o n s a t tbs Ambassadorial l e v e l in at ton ere searcely a cause for objection on our pa elnce I t i s c l e a r that talks are concerned with problems of specia l inter a t t o the Tires outside tbe KATO area snd taere i s no I n t o on tbe part of tbe united States oa* the United Kingdom tbat tbe t r l - p e r t i t e machinery should interfere with the established NATO a on eith.-r tbs p o l i t i c a l Itary lev el a . I t la e l s e besoming Increasln; the Frenob da sat a,.-.;.Idar that t h i s t r l - p e r t l t e o tern of consultation s,.o Od have argr oanneotion t b HA . What we would wish t o guard against, however* i s that ths t r l - p a r t i t e sonsultatlons aijtit deal with probleas wbieh are t e in lasi j r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of HAT . S Since i t w neither tbe ualted ffinpflcn nor tbe United S t a t e s 001022 �Document disclosed under the TtcreSrto Information dc^™Ow Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information ' • 4 - are willing ta go mush farther than they have already gone In arrsngl&g for informal consultations at tbe Ambaesaderial level* end since General da Oaulle seems Intent on at* teinlng a voice in tbe direction of Weatera global strategy, especially ineofer es it would relate to the use of nuolear weapons, it would bs Interesting to have ar. herter'a views on the poaalble eutoome of the preaent Impasses, with the French. 9* to be questioning; tbe adequacy of tbe H4T0 arrenganente f o r equipping ef haTo forces with n»leer weapons. tether* they are saying that they w i l l continue to refuse t o a ©-operate in It a until such time as they are given e . in tbe d i r e c t i o n of Western global strategy equal t o tbat of i d Statee and the United Kingdom* The price t i e / wish to cxe t i s a high one* but a f a i l u r e t o pay i s already having serious oonsequsness • the a. defence prograsne i n fcjurope. If the French attitude with reepect t o the a tor a © of MMUk • M A M MAOM^Vnil SSLfl*fl^flM 0 fl* *- 4* A e i M ^ L M . «*tf^ut..fli-J.a fl* ^ i f l ^ , have t o be wads t o sieve those squadron! of tbe Air Division whlab are being re-equipped from t h e i r beaos in Prence, cr re-deploy the equadrone ao tbat only the four squadrons of CF-100 airoraft (which w i l l not be eased with ;) w i l l be stationed i n France. . . , i 001023 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02454 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for the Minister by N.A.R. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10-Jul-59 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived �NATO - Stockpiling of atomic weapons in NATO countries,� RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5958, 50219-AL-1-40, pt. 2.2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource atomic cooperation, NATO, nuclear weapons Description An account of the resource NATO Nuclear Weapons - French Position Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/51e7cf08cd2de04368c059dd497c314e.pdf 35a3992ad9928e77c8c15b9c63e88e2d PDF Text Text 2 ACTION COPY - 017 e OPIMMEDIATE s • — 605 . Document dslosed underthe Access to Infornl^on Act 77*4" de la Loi sur/'acce0^A formation Hajluply 2 Fet. ) FM EXTERNAL OTT JULI 0/59 ROSEC NO DISTRIBUTION 3-2-2-/1 TO WASHDC D1563 OPIMMED “I3a i • INFO CCOS ho st S REF YOUR WISER TELS 72 AND 73 APRS ( OVERFLIGHTS * «BUBSSSM$ Subject $02 ACTOnTO: FEB 2 1 198 r MINISTERS HAVE NOU BEEN ABLE TO CONSIDER THE REVISIONS PRQPQSED BY THE USA AUTHORITIES TO SCHEDULE B TO PC 2307 APR17/52 AND HAVE AUTHORIZED YOU TO HAND TO THE STATE DEPT AN AIDE MEMOIRE 5; IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS TEXT BEGINS: THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CAREFULLY STUDIED THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE EMBASSY BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON APRIL 9 n WITH REGARD TO THE REVISION OF EXISTING PROCEDURES FOR CLEARING FLIGHTS OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND AIRCRAFT OVER CANADIAN TERRITORY WHEN THE MOVEMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IS INVOLVED. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE PRESENT PROCEDURES AS SET OUT IN SCHEDULE B OF ORD ER-IN -COUNCIL RC 2307 OF APRIL 17, 30 1952 BE EXTENDED TO COVER,NOT RPT MERELY OVERFLIGHTS BY AIRCRAFT OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND,BUT BY ALL UNITED STATES MILITARY AIRCRAFT CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, LESS INTER- CEPTORS,F OR WHICH SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS. WOULD APPLY. THE . CANADIAN GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES HAVE PRINCIPALLY IN MIND THE USE OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND FOR RESTOCKING OF USA BASESOVERSEAS AS WELL AS BOMBERS OF THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND» Y IT WOULD,THEREFORE,PREFER THAT ANY EXTENSION OF. THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS AT THIS TIME BE CONFINED TO SAC BOMBERS AND SAC TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT.ACCORDINGLY IT WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE f PHRASE QUOTE USA MILITARY AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE IN THE TITLE AND NOTE UNDER IT OF THE PROPOSED RE-DRAFT OF SCHEDULE B BE REPLACED BY QUOTE SAC BOMBER AND SAC TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO NOTED THE PROPOSAL THAT CATEGORY QUOTE X .UNQUOTE FLIGHTS BE ELIMINATED FROM SCHEDULE o9 o2 000580 -I �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur l'acces a lrinformation DOWNGRXD 5S 0® ASPhin PACE WO DL563 FEB 2 1 1985 BAND DEALT WITH BY THE PROCEDURES FOR CLEARANCE SET OUT IN SCHEDULE A TO THE SAME ORDER-IN-COUNCILTHE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT CAN AGREE WITH THIS PROPOSAL. WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSAL TO RIVISE THE PROCEDURE REGARDING CATEGORY QUOTE Y UNQUOTE FLIGHTS TO PERMIT CLEARANCES OF SIX MONTH PROGRAMMES TO BE MADE AT THE GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL,WITH INDIVID- UAL FLIGHTS AND ANY MODIFICATIONS TO THE ORIGINAL PROGRAMME TO BE CLEARED IN ADVANCE BETWEEN THE CHIEFS OF AIR STAFF,THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT SUGGESTS THAT THE RELEVANT PARAGRAPH PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES FOR THE NEW SCHEDULE B BE ALTERED AS FOLLOWS8 QUOTE THE PROGRAMME OF EACH SERIES OF EXERCISES WILL BE CLEARED AT GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS• DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL FLIGHTS AND ANY MODIFICATIONS AND CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS NOT RPT NOT INCLUDED IN THE FLIGHT PROGRAMME W Jf WILL BE CLEARED IN ADVANCE BETWEEN THE CHIEFS OF AIR STAFFo EACH OF THESE FLIGHTS WILL REQUIRE TO BE AUTHORIZED BY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS LAID DOWN IN ORDER-IN-COUNCIL 2307 OF APRIL 17,1952a UNQUOTE IF THE FOREGOING MODIFICATIONS TO THE USA PROPOSALS FOR REVISION OF SCHEDULE B ARE AGREEABLE TO THE USA AUTHORITIES, THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WILL CONSIDER SCHEDULE B TO BE REVISED ACCORDINGLY, AT THE SAME TIME,THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT FEELS THAT IT SHOULD TAKE THIS OCCASION TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO THE VIEWS IT HAS EXPRESSED ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS INVOLVING OVERFLIGHTS CONDUCTED OVER EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME.THESE WERE SET OUT AT SOME LENGTH IN THE AMBASSADORS NOTE OF MARCH 6, 1959,IN WHICH PARTICULAR MENTION WAS MADE OF THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT NO RPT NO PUBLICITY BE GIVEN TO OVERFLIGHTS OF AIRCRAFT CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF THE FACT THAT CIRCUMSTANCES 9993 000581 ] I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces a ^information DOWNGRAWC 10 SLl . REBUT LSC1lRe8211985 A SECRET PAGE THREE 74563 MIGHT ARISE WHICH WOULD NECESSITATE FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT OF THE DESIRABILITY OF SAC EXERCISES INSOFAR AS THEY AFFECT CANADA AND WHICH COULD JUSTIFY THEIR SUSPENSION.TEXTENDS. 2 AS STATED IN THE AIDE MEMOIRE,IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT IN PROPOSING THAT SCHEDULE B BE MADE TO APPLY TO ALL USA MILITARY ' v v AIRCRAFT, THE USA AUTHORITIES HAD PRINCIPALLY IN MIND SAC TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT FOR RESTOCKING BASES OVERSEAS IN ADDITION TO SAC BOMBERS IT HAS OCCURRED TO US,HOWEVER,THAT THE USA AUTHORITIES MIGHT HAVE HAD IN MIND AS WELL IgA NAVY AIRCRAFT USING CDN AIRSPACE EITHER TO FLY NAVAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BASES OVERSEAS OR INTO ARGENTIA IF AND WHEN NECESSARY AGREMENT IS REACHED WITH REGARD TO THEIR STORAGE AT THAT BASE IF WE HAVE BEEN RIGHT IN THIS ASSUMPTION^ND THE STATE DEPT, RAISE THE MATTER L-=="tm=m—*===G=======-d======5== YOU MAY INFORM THEM ORALLY THAT MINISTERS HAD CONSIDERED THIS ASPECT OF THE MATTER BUT THAT THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO 1 - — —li. W, mi ..... i» i ‘‘"======!* "" I m’’ ANY. PROCEDURE COVERING SUCH OVERELIGHTS_ WI LE_THE STORAGE QUESTION / AT ARGENTIA REMAINS UNRESOLVED-IN ANY, EVENT YOU MAY ASSURE THE STATE DEPT THAT THE PHRASE QUOTE SAC TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT UNQUOTE WILL BE INTERPRETED BY US AS MEANING USAF JRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BEHALF OF SAC, V 3.WITH REGARD TO OUR SUGGESTED REVISION OF THE PARA CONCERNING QUOTE Y UNQUOTE FLIGHTS,OUR PRINCIPAL REASON FOR PUTTING FORWARD THIS AMENDMENT IS THAT MINISTERS ARE NOT RPT NOT PREPARED TO APPROVE REQUESTS FOR TRAINING EXERCISED EXTENDING OVER SUCH A LENGTHY PERIOD OF TIME AS SIX MONTHSoUNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES YOU WILL NO RPT NO DOUBT BE ASKED FOR WHAT LENGTH OF TIME SHOULD A PROGRAMME OF TRAINING FLIGHTS BE PUT FORWARD•ACCORDINGLY,YOU MAY SAY THAT IN FUTURE WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF REQUESTS FOR EACH SERIES OF TRAINING EXERCISED BE FOR NOT_RPT NOT LONGER THAN THREE OR FOUR MONTHS. ==================================== AoTHE REF IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF OUR SUGGESTED REVISION OF THE e esol 000582 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur l'acces a Tinformation 7 % 3 COW*. 2 REBU.T & bitl 5 (hAIR) FEB 2 1 1985 PAGE FOUR DL563 PARA CONCERNING QUOTE Y UNQUOTE FLIGHTS TO APPROVAL OF EACH FLIGHT BY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ONLY REFLECTS WHAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN OUR INTERNAL PRACTICE* y 000583 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDAC02875 Title A name given to the resource Overflights Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10-Jul-59 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-b, Volume number: 5912, File number: 50195-40, pt FP.2 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Overflight Policy Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/73bffa384accee93f9a2aeaf1bad471c.pdf 89cab4fd775e739e00e5a29bc649a052 PDF Text Text document disclosed under the Access to Infp, lActDofura^wrfrtr>ilgJ(l»yen//<ffifdee l a AtyLtputrfgccj^/^information f« CONFIDBifTTATr- July 10, 1959. VISIT OF MR. HERTER DEFENCE QUESTIONS / "' j ^ U / t ? - / ^ S-43 &£»WjJ^^Jg Mr* Herter has given advance notiee tfeart he might wish to raise joint defence questions, not in any precise manner, but rather in general terms, i.e., some discussion of objectives and general principles (Washington telegram I676 of July. 2, 1959) § The following may be useful as talking points on the political aspects of United StatesCanadian defenee oo^eperation in relation to Western strategy generally MILITARY STRATEGY • -•iipi 1.11.11 tM\wvm^**mm\m-m '"f*^!^ 1. There has been a great debate recently in the United States Congressional Committees dealing with defence matters •as to the balance whieh. should be established between the provision of defensive weapons and facilities (warning lines, interceptors, BOMARCS, etc.) and Offensive weapons and facilities (SAC bombers, strategic missiles, etc*). much deterrent is enough? How How much value is there in continued heavy expenditures on defensive facilities designed to meet the waning bomber threat, especially in North America? 2. Another feature of this defence debate in the United States was the call by some experts for increased strength in conventional arms to provide an alternative means for the application of United States power particular situation — in a an alternative to nuclear destruction whether limited or total. Is there not merit in this stand from a purely political point of . view? Is it not more desirable that the United States, A0038465 169-000287 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a llinformation O A0038465 170-000288 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information together with her allies, should have, as in Korea, an alternative of fighting a successful conventional action? Must the proliferation of atomic weaponry in so many countries of the world continue? ATOMIC WEAPONS 3. Our two Governments share the view that the "nuclear club" should be as restricted as possible. How much longer can this view, in absolute terms at least, be maintained with any hope of success? The original club has been enlarged to include the United Kingdom. France is knocking at the door. By what logic explainable in terms of domestic political considerations should Germany, Italy, or even Canada be excluded? 4, United States atomic legislation was designed to guard the secrets of the manufacture of atomic weapons. This may still be a valid.objective, even though, it seems to have forced France, for exaraple, Into a do-it-yourself programme. The other important feature of the legislation is its requirement that the United States have full custody o f the nuclear weapons, i.e., the nuclear war heads. Does this last requirement continue to make political sense? The United States Government has entered into agreements with other NATO partners providing for joint control of the use of the war heads. If joint control of use is acceptable, why not have "two keys" to the atomic stockpiles? If the United States were prepared to share control over release of the war heads with the partner on whose territory the stockpiles were established, some of the political A0038465 171-000289 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a ['information f>, A0038465 172-000290 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 3 - pressures engendered by national susceptibilities might be eased; no secrets of the construction of the weapons need be shared to make this possible* POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 5. The Soviet Union has, according to military estimates, the capability to attack North America, and that capability will become stronger as operational missiles become available to the Soviet Union. Is there, however, any clear indication of a political intention on the part of the Soviet Union to attack? Would such an attack be consistent with Soviet domestic objectives, bringing as it would devastating United States retaliation on the Soviet homeland? 6. The policy of the nuclear deterrent is successful only so long as it continues to deter. Yet it relies for its continued power to deter on the possibility that it will be used massively. Will a policy which contemplates the possibility of mutual annihilation continue for long to recommend itself to rational human beings, involving as it will effects on future genera*tions as well as on the present? Must the emphasis not• shift to negotiated settlement of differences with the Soviet Union and, on our side, to the taking of certain risks in attempting to open the way to solutions through diplomatic action? .... 4 A0038465 173-000291 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information G> A0038465 174-000292 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information i V V _ 4_ CANADA-UNITED STATES DEFENCE • • • •.•.llilH^p^M^a—IMglll^l | I f I »—»i'^"IMII II •• II 1^.1^ i—M.M.P.IW 7. Canada is a small power with a limited population and a great deal of geography* It has many domestic tasks to complete to -achieve the promise of its future. In the long run this promise can be achieved only if global nuclear war is avoided; most countries of the world are in the same position. For Canada, however, the existence of continued tension short of actual combat between the powers who are not only the great powers, but also Immediate neighbours, restricts Canada's freedom of action and may jeopardize her national political and economic objectives. Canada has willingly made available her geography for United States defence facilities, i.e., joint defence facilities. The steady increase of such facilities on Canadian territory, which may seem necessary if tension continues, cannot but appear as a steady diminution of Canadian sovereignty no matter how necessary. Nor can It have any other effect than to decrease the room for manoeuvre by Canadian representatives in international gatherings, and perhaps reduce the possibility in the future of the kind of political contribution to the solution of international problems which a small and "disinterested" power like Canada has been able to offer in the past. 8. In the recent past, while the bomber threat to North America was the paramount threat, the RCAFfs contribution in air defence was a vital element of the continental defences. With the advent of the missile • •» o A0038465 175-000293 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information P A0038465 176-000294 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5 - threat and the astronomical costs of any defensive facilities which may be constructed against it, can Canada's contribution continue to be as vital? Canada may be priced out of the market. Is there, then, some other vital role for Canada on the Western team which is better tailored to our resources? 9. A good deal Is said publicly about the continental air defence plan. When one looks at the siting of particular air defence weapons, can one say that the plan is really continental? ViTith the present siting of weapons, is it not likely that much of the - defensive action that is possible would take place over the settled areas of Canada? A0038465 177-000295 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a ^information A0038465 178-000296 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW06710 Title A name given to the resource Visit of Mr. Herter Defence Questions Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence - Establishment and activities," RG25-A-3-b, vol 6048, file 50309-A-40, part 2-2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Government of Canada Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10-Jul-59