1 20 2 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/05b656c802b1b5b3ccb4c351e8055fba.pdf edbd9b891ee3aa29dcaa5d8af4eb4d94 PDF Text Text ' . . .• ? , .• -.&..... '·. ... .. f - .,,. 0 'MINISTRY OF DEFENCE . . STOREY '$ ,' .:.c • . ' c LONI)ON ' . StJl p ' . .. 'SPEECH. BY· THE RT.HON.HAROLD \t!ATI(INSON,- M.P. l<IINISTER OF DEFENCE TO 1'HE COUNCIL .OF THE ."'WESTERN.· EUROPEAN CHURCH 1-IESTMINSTER,-.ON _THURSDAY 1ST .JUNE, 1961 J!m: . ·To BE CHECKED· AGAINST DELIVERY AND NOi' RELEASED BEFO.RE ' ·· 3- .1•1. ON THURSDAY, 1ST JUNE; 1961. Very delighted have opportunity of addressing· distinguished gathering of Por1iamentarians. a ·Since I addressed the Vf.E.U. Committee •on· Defence Questions and Armaments a year. I have engaged with my Servie e .· Advisers on a very thorough and detailed o£ defence policy requiJ"ements in the 1.960s. I'thought that best eon-· tribution ,I could make to your discussions wo,uld be to set out some of· the broad condusions we have These, of course, far. wider than NATO or \'f.'E •.. U. _coimnitments. . . . . They will I. I -h6p43• . sh·o\i clearly th_at the British attitude · to its defence alliances is to· try to make them .viable and ef• by maki'rig our maxlmum .contribution in all possible t1ays. :'_·. •. ' .... ; First the problem. \1e threaten no•one• \'le· want ·only to 'be free to concentrate on.hotJ· to provide a better moral and material environment in i1hich our peoples can live out their lives .in free- · dom. under the 1·m-r. · But such an ·attitude is. not possible for us so longas the Communist definition of co-existence is based on the. . belief that ·communism is a· way of life -that will in the end triumphover our .European idoals ·.o£ .f.reedom, democracy and religious tolerance. ·The· Communists have n.o doubt. a right to proclaim their in their i'aith 1 but we ha.ve an equal right to say we ·.will :not,.·allow _the gro\'lth of' a years of C:Ulturet development and freedom to .be m.1ept away by 14eals to tihJ.ch l"te ao not subscribe. · Here; then. is the reason for. the ,forms .. of alliance and union into which the free worl" has. been drawn by the of Communist expansion ·and domination. This, then. is. the problem; it is not·· one .of OlJ.r own making, but it is equally one which I knott \'1e are all prepared to face with calm determination. 1'1e plan no form of aggression. \'le do not seek to conquer the Communists; 11e .seek only to prOtect those ideals and the free tiay of life that is th product ·or our long and complex history·;. Perhaps, in the fullne or time. Communism will come t_o our uay d:. ·thinking tool . Clearly,' ear_ or East \'Jest is a :watershed in military s ategy. Defe:o.ce for the tlest must no longer have as its main objective preparations. for long drawn-out conventional struggle. Our Whole .objective . This· brings me to my particular sphere of' the prospect or some sort of balance in the n . • ,··· .:.,. , .. '. �.... .·• __.., ,.•· "· .. ""'• :..:.,·-¥.,, .• ·. ·... ·.. ·- • . • • • .... }/ : .. r- M . ';_ I ..,..., .. · _ ' • . . ."! • . ; ; •. " •• !' ' • •• • ' 't ·!_ ••• ' must be: to ··atop· a :. starting• 'This _:aP.plies not only to nucle_ar t1ar but· to ·a11 forms ·o( war. After two world there can be no· doubt: as. to the and destl"'\lction .by even so• . called conventional· :war.· · banning .weapons solely _as an end in.tt·sel.f.cannot b.e solution; ..could in · · fact inere.ase the dariger of war.- All nations have "an added ind11ce• .· . . ment .to keep. the peace because,of the o£ alnlost cpmplete' ··· destructio.n placed. in otir hands ··bY WestOI"!l .and scientists.· The/'Uuc:Leal'. weapon .is 1 _therefore, an essential in: the sent balance or .force .on mich ,. peace must depend until 'disarmament can Jbe,achieved.:·:, 0.( co.urse, tze wish to-.rc!st th·e peace or the .· world on a.more··secure·roundation than.this·as.soon·a·swe can. tie . are clear in our view. as to how best to achieve .this advance •. l'le believe-that _it can be done first, by se.curing an agreement· . tthich· stop the testing ..and spread ot· nuclear, weapons; second·; . by, and.purposefully · tJhich would lead to real under safe":"guards which trould .,ensUre' that the or force was· not upset .as armaments were . progrossively rle are pledged n'ever to resort to aggression. t1e ·hope the Communist Powers accept this doctrine .too.. But, unti·l raa.l progress can be made. with disarmament, the balance or . forco on .which peace rests has tO be maintained.- This must b'e done making sure ·that ·the :West is ·to us_e any farces( necessary to with an aggret;Jsor, and poised a. sufficient threat o£ massive _retaliation to make ·it plain beyond any particle of doubt that a resort to aggression .as a .means o£ furthering stat.e aims is , ' a poli-cy of,self,destruetion.:·. This is where the· plays ·"' its. ossentifll: part ,beeal.tse, the first time in world history, an , aggressor knows_·that :he pay with. own life as .well as of his and his 'population· his_ aggression •. J: do .not . seek to tie ·any particular 'label to the: . \"le are .all engaged; I hope, in this small' speck ot a planet not only -in tho . negative task o:r stoppit:lg a sta.rtlng, but ·in a of trying to end t1ar as an ·instrument or -national policy •: NobOdy 1.1ants disarmament more than the BritiSh, Gov.ernment but I must also mako it. quite plain_ that nobody is .detemined. to: fulfil Our·· defen:eo responsibiUties· than Brit.ai.n because we believe this to · bo. tho best . or keeping 'the peace, unti 1 disarmament ean bo achieved:. ·.. · .· , . ·. · · . . · · .• · · . . · · ..,_o'' ... ' . ·-·Before I deal 'with how' we in Great ··Britain think. this can best bEt'achieved within l'i.E.u. and the NATO I :think- you would w.1 sh nie t·o- say a little about the rest or the world. . Providing we keep our NATO Alliance strong and efficient, it sh'ould remain· one or the least likely places t-rhere an aggressor would contemplate an adventure. ,Unfortunate! y t however, there are many other areas or tho world .uhere aggression might seem.to. be oasier. and perhaps m9re profitable. · In these we1 ·1n company with others of our :NATO have special rosponsioilities., · ·. · . . . . . The world is now too. small to isolate any major conflict • . Th'orefore, to keep the peace outside Europe is just as much a ·European interest as to secure peace within the European theatre. I notice. that your own report th:is view • . . ·· In· association 'tlith the Vnitod States, Turkey:, Iran and Pakistan, \fe are concerned in CENTO t1ith ·the dcfenee o£ the tha.t oxtends the NATO defensive structure ' - .. . .. .. · i . ..••.· 3 ' A0012890_186-000191 '..,."" . I .· �).' ·. l . ' -· . . eastwrdsJ In the Far East, in association with the States also With France •. Australia and New -Zealand.t Paklstan, Thailand_ the Philippines, plan :together in SEATv to protect the £rontlers and interests or territories in the Far East that wish_ preserve their integritY. These regional treaties and "NATO_·_ vital though they- are, ,.do not make up t.he whole of the · United Klngdom defence responsibility.. \fe .have treaty relations . with' various countries iil the Comtnonwealth 1 with some or which we _ have specific agreanent on quest:tons as wall as retaining a general interest'1n defence questlons in oolonial t_erritories. 'fe have vital interests in the area we know as the Arabian Peninsula, _-. and t.o that end our tU.ddle East Command, centred at Aden, is oo,n• cema4 to prot-ect. the.se interests, as well as others that follow .. from' our remaining commitments- in A£riea •. The Near East Oomrnand,_ · based in·Cyprus.- provides. not only potential air support £or0EN'1'0: but has ·a stabilising ..role in -the whole- of_ the Eastern 'to ; ' 'lo .... • y "" see, . • • • • • our ·'• ·- _. ,You t4ll then, that ai though the maj.or partio n _of defence effort ia pledged to 'NATO, we .have an ilJlDlense task in· peace; 1n ·all our interests,. in many other areaet' of th.e world._ I must make it q:uite p,tain that, in _ deciding the·. . . disposition of our forces, we intend to give full weight to this It the centre .held but the flank turned, the ot. the AJ:liance are destroyed • . , ' :! . -- • . i "'" . · '· . ' How. to turn to our WA1.'0 st-rategy'• · Above all, the United, Kingdom aim is to ensure that- the detei"rent to tsar remains as effective-as possible Without waste in the period lthen both East and \>lest can devastate eaeh other. As I have · lready indicated, we believe that t · · : .' .both nuclear an co ven l.Ona weapons.. .It is _the balance, etwem f these · . types o 't'teapons mt in· the ·Alliance that, in our viet1.; _needs in the l.ight of present nuclear ... This not to- say that we think that the purposes of NATO . should be challenged. Nor do- tie ,think it a. good: thing to keep on taking the temperature ·or tho Alliance in -Nor does Britain 'i!ltend td budge in the slightest degree from· our policy of maximum support. for our allies and the_ determination to our full. part in. the 'Alllance •. · A policy that has the overwhelming support of the vast majori.ty.or our cit·izens. What we do believe is -that' NATO· forces must be- seen to remain balanced and effective. So long as tbis remains true and so: long ,as our will to use Olll'" .. strength. if necessary is not _in <bubt; we believe we can avert the dange:r of all-out war. Nor .must we over-.estimate the possibilities. of _a so•called "limited wartt in Europe. An- aggressor cannot assume that should be prepared to n11m1t. the to suit his own tact• ical plan,. How .then. do 11e strike the best balance between the. nuclear and el(;Wents of the deterrent? - of + • ., ,_ First• let me. deal with the .tactical side. ·We 'J.leCOgilize that_· there could be a· danger· in. over••dependen.ce on nuclear: ueapons. '\"le recogniz¢ that,, if the conventional shield is too thin ·there would be a·. serious risk that an acciden'tal Or minor incursion l10Uld result -in all-out war. On the other handt we do not believe that· NATO can. or should such convel'!tional forces as -could hope to deal wit.h an. y.·. c.o.nv.antional atta. eki h.ot1ever large. 1 l4 thout recourse to nuclear weapons. ' Such a. po icy- might· merely indicate that we . should not have ·the courage. ever to- use the · nuclear weapon· in any circumstances. · Between these tll'zo. extremes, \1e must strike a-balance within what the· Alliance can afford with• out. ttaste resources.-· · ·· · A0012890_187 -000192 �..... ... ' ,. .<' , ... ' ' ·• ·'" .. ., ' . 4;, . ,3'· . ! .. - • - consider ·1n •i }: . - tha.t a in fire _power, mobility and . in other characteristics· should; be: considered juatclC?sely as increasmg size or ·NATO's .· :.,conventional forces beyond the ;Levels at .. .In other · · trords: we belie\l'e that priority be given: to ;unproving the eff'.ectiveness of.NATO*s conventional forces; As an example, NATO. forces should exploit the · pos of' VTq;, ,and STOL • \'Ie sh'ould increase the mobility' and·_bitting. po1·1er- of. our armoured . rorees. · sbQ__,uld fiive a rirm backing or . atomic ru-e po't(er to . ,_9ur field forces. y I mean weapops of' ._, . port nature hifhlY mohile,-:lnit of' rangeand·yJ.eld. c 1ear .Y matChed to a ..ro1e •.. · . . _ . . . . '>!• ,, ' , •'• .,:'v .. j' • . "' With a- strengthening .·of these. in . our forces_,' 'we m_.ight n_ot n_ eed >to 1ncrea_ se v_err_ mucp the equip.ment o£ NATO other nuclear t1eapo·ns. .The nuclear armou:r . of NATO is a very powerful one:•· We woW.a • g1.ve low priori·ty to .:further increasing the scope of NATO's nl:+clear · · armoury, .irl. particular. to - ·the provision of' . . . . . ., : 'll'. ., .,.. ,_ . ·:_ . As 1;;o .the a:>.ntrol an·d·location of.. tadtieal nuclear weapons• t1e are p;repared _t<>-:play .our part in any stockpile or'.pool of NATO · if the f'elt that it . its unity and co_heefion to have such an arrangement ann it· .did ·not 1·1eaken_ the . .deterrent·• · · · .. "· J ·. - ·... Apy review' of British def'ence··thinking would not be complete · t-4 thout some :. our contribution to the strategic nuclear or· / . power of. the :llest;; Our nuclear· £orces maintain an important ele. ment of'. the :deterrent .this side of the Atlantic and there seems to be" advant·age 1n making any· S\1eeping. changes in present s• : · · .. ,_ · ,. .. ·' , The main· atm. on which :are ail agreed is that nothing should combining both the and: the forces. It l.s on this that peace can be achieved·. . . · · .c.;'<- \1oa.ken the credibility o£ the rests until. 't . .·' .. . • ' ,· i., . ·.. . ' • : . ' ·.. • !That is why" my countri is opposed t;o any attenpt to . .·.set. out in· public any and instructions l'.rhich would · bind the NATO force's in any We 'have lila de 1 t plain that l1G \11.11 ··'But hm1 we $lould·retaliate to · an aggression and by what meat?.s or what ·weapons must be a matter . for decision by the Alliance -in tho circum·stances. of the time. All we are \1illin to sa in Great Britain is thaj; iie. d the orce ble to us o · ate· tO· an a ession · ·e to be necessary •. · notice ·,·that· your report seeks to ratt certa n cone us ons · rom successive British Defence ?lhite Papers •... You ttould be ver:y mtl.Ch if "you>'dretl the conclusion that lie had- departed from this. lorlg·=·neld policy. · Bomber · Command _for example has,: by. 1t self 1 a capacity ·for · destruction that .. any aggressor nation must weigh· very · . . are. ' . ·- . - . ' . .' or co.urse, .we must have firm politic8J. situation. Our Commanders have their clear lines to ensure this control.. But I see no lishing these rules so that a. potential exactitude .the odds against him in any . .., -. J" . 0 .. . control of the military instructions and guide ·useful purpose in put>- . ·can calculate· . particular circumstance. •• ... . :·.. A0012890_188-000193 �:. .. ' .. .• .. . ... . t ,· - ... '· ··I a·s a J.fthister or Defence that military preparedness iS not .enough •. · For • if we wer.e to hold the balance· here, only .to let it be ti.pped by economic penetration or ideo• · we are not fulfilling our duty as the trustees ·or. · .!'SY of which we' hope to hand on, ·. · · unlJllpalred, to ??-r children. · · .· . . ·T? economic penetration, t1e must all aim at ma1ntaJ.nJ.ng a strC?ng and healthy 'national In any ·country's economy tJle.re are a number of competing claims and for Britain with her population,. in s.1ch a relatively small area, are· ·special problems here• . cannot allow the .claims of Defence to upset the its effect on· our:.export drive. At the aame time With the ·ever-increasing speed of development in the Commc:m.only :in the-way of· political development but in calls for qapita* and. a.id,: we must ensure that defence expenditure does not u,p 'a,;x our available surplus. · ,. · · •;- •· ... - ' . i'· ' :c', .·. . . . . . . · Our has been toe ensure that defence expenditure., .sl:lould n.ot be varied,.considerably.from year. to year.in response·· to short!"'term. fluctuations in the economy,. Over the past .five· · years we have this po:Licy With ruccess, and steadily programmes. The proportion or the gross national product absqrbed has remained steadily at over seven. cent, about .ten per cent of the output of our engineering. and allied industries is .devoted to defence •. . .. .·, .; . . . ·, ·, .;,"' • .._ '. t . . .·. ·. . . . . . . · Som,e commentators -have sought to read a weakening of our. · dei",ence effort into our long-standing· decision to place our. force$· on an all;;::I"egular basis.' The reverse ·is the truth. t1e hope sigliificant mil.itary· in long term from this ·,change.: Again;.it must -be rananbered that·.;we serve Europe's interests not,: only· :Ln Europe the Near East l.fiddle Eaat and .. Far East. ::.: might 'possibly. have met .our needs in. · . Europe. ·It ·is the most wasteful and ineffi·cten.t. use or manpower in our_ other overseas responsibilities. 'is now going . uell.- I.t was -·always anticipated that a change from recruiting forces on a· basis of two year engagements to that· of. six years or more would pZ.esent us With an awkward period or But the recruits · that we.,neoed. are now. coming along and I am certain that we shall succeed· in'· our. taak •.· . · '; •,,;. HO\fevEn··, :our def'erice ·ror.ces in Europe· throw special burden · on Britain -·that .is- not in .general shared by her continental Allies, · In order _to-fUlfil c;mr NATO and t1e-maint(lin BAOR and a' tactical air.force ·in Germany the basis agreed with SACEUR •. Your, report rightly the fact that it is SACEUR tzho. advises · t-1EU-.1n tbis·matter·and he.is kept fully informed at all times of our plans BAOR thr()ugh the appropriate revie\1 However, · as a· result ·of maintaining· these forces on the Continent of ·Europe; . we -have a permanent and considerable drain on our foreign exchange · lri f'act, the· Federal German Government's annual surplus. of foreign exchange .on . current account is a oout equal to what the United States and United have to maintain their forces in Germany. \"Te feel strongly :.our. AllJ.es ·should understand our dif£iculties in continuing to meet our .commitments,in and. help us to find a ·tJay or 59lving .this chronic cause of _ _ . . ··. . -. . . · - t • '-\ ·. • ,. e. ·'. , •;: ; ' ....... . ' I. A0012890_189-000194 �. .·, ... .. .... .:: .,.., •t.=:-- "" .. • •' . . .. . "'. - . ... . - _ .... t: . .·-. . ..... 6' . ... ,A - ' .- . .• .. me -to _t.he vital . queation of .. ttl':·secure:within and without i'Iestern Europe .much. greater interdependence and eo-. Qperation in every $})here· of de£ence." . Here,c p.ious · ttill get us Only resUlts Will meet .the neea. I am vert glad to that with ou·r German.and French: Allies have reeently'ma<?.e .impo_rtant ·and encouragi:ng progress in· the sharing of research arid _production. , The British Govern;, meiit intend.· to continue. to :_r,orward in every possible vay · ··plans (or the much closer integration·of ..de.fence ·r(;)seareh.· development and .production. We bel:ieye stteeess 1Q.5hi's fieid is· esse ti· · · · ... • · · · · .commitment-s .as a · . arid we are liilling. to face ,sharing.· or risk an sovereignty that muSt be an. part of the operation. · '"· · ·= · ·, ·-on . . I hope .that the and negotiations interdependence; nOl'l in hand in most NATO countries will show clear- ·. · .. results before the end of the. year. , must all draw much elo.ser ·. together in defence as -in: other . . · .: ·. · . ·· .· · ' •.i . . . • ·- . '- . }' .t . . • • 'J' How, -then, do I ,sum up the problem posed to the f'ree world by the eomnn.J.ni.st wish for .expanston-, and rnay_be domination? First_, should -try. to .. see our problem as.·.a;,.whole.•.. It .is greater than any OX\e nation•s aspirations. .It is than any one ·of is . defenc_e philosophy alone. ·I tmnder is the 'less9n,. Wes_t learn. ·Only we ·can. secure more . more interdependence, can we . to do a11· · . . ·. that . we trould. wish,_ bearing in" m+nd that first have to provide . to -anything . our peoples· with standards of living ·. that the Communist trorld· offers to it.s own Slbjects. > TJ:'jis is an· . immense task but one that should be a· stimulating challenge to. our akill and detennination. ·. .. · . ,' · .. ', -.,.' ._ , ... 4 The 'best.·wa·y· of.meet'ing the ·on•zv.sh of the Colllm;unist faith is· by, the firm Cleferice o£'our own passionate belief in ·our free way of · ""One day.,: .Conmunism in !ts o11n inevitably have tO sufficient internal change and evolutl.on to follot>I our · path·•.. Until then,. we .must. in the rugg·ed envi;ronment of . . competitive co-eXistence-, keep and foster; our free _way . · of lit e. . · · · ' · · ... .. ,. ' _.; .. . ,.), . ' .. ,• ... .... - :;; ; - ' .. ' - . . i . .· ";.> ... : ·' -:,_ • ,: • ;, .. ·' . ... . .. -. ,·,. .. < . . ," "· :...- ·"·... ... ·, -· ... ,_ •. i . j' _.' . . . - . ., .. A0012890_190-000195 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02848 Title A name given to the resource Speech by the Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson, M.P. Minister of Defence to the Council of the Western European Union At Church House, Westminster, on Thursday 1st June, 1961" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "NATO - Nuclear weapons - Policy - NATO long term planning," RG25-A-3-b, vol 5959, file 50219-AL-2-40, part 3-1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1-Jun-61 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ada286f2aa1cf203d44d74c09009177f.pdf 202f5b8ef8f39dbeebc5988105a6e6ea PDF Text Text A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 D R A P T SECRET Ottawa. June 1st, 1961 DRAFT OP PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING THE PROVISION OF STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR CANADIAN FORCES Sir, V I have the honour to refer to discussions which have taken place in the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence and in the Permanent joint Board on Defence regarding ^the terms y and conditions under which nuclear warheads might be provided to and accepted by Canada. My Government's understanding of these conditions is set out in the Annex and Schedules attached to this Note. If your Government concurs, I propose that this Note, together with its Annex and Schedules, and your reply thereto should constitute an agreement between our two Governments. I further propose that this agreement will be brought into effect when both Governments have confirmed, by a further Exchange of Notes, their Intention to do so, Accept,'Sir, etc... A (J ^ - ^ c - o (Au^y $"* bi^*?**^"^-.. *V—V / Crf-"©*" A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 D It A V T SECRET ANN E X A. 1. Definitions In this Annex and attached schedules, unless the context otherwise requires: "Canada" means the Government of Canada, and "United States" means the Government of the United States of America; the term "warhead" includes "weapons" where the two cannot practically be considered as physically separate components; "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; "Allied Government" means any Government allied to Canada and the United States through membership in NATO; "Allied Commander" means the Commander of a NATO Allied Command; "SACLANT" means the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic of NATO; "COMCANLANT" means the Commander of the Canadian Atlantic sub-area; "SACEUR" means the Supreme Allied Commander Europe NATO; "NORAD" means North America Air Defence Command, established by Canada and the United States by an Exchange of Notes of May 12, I958; "CIMC IJORAD" moans the Commander In Chief of NORAD; A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 000181 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 .2. "Storage Site" means the 3ite or sites at which the warheads are to be stored together with their appurtenant facilities suoh as magazines, fences and buildings deemed essential for preserving the security of the warheads together with the land on which these are to be constructed. B. General 2. Ownership of any stocks of nuclear warheads covered by this Annex and Its attached schedules will remain with the United States. 3. Except in cases when the sharing of storage facilities with other Allied Governments requires otherwise, arrangements for the security of the storage 3ites for the warheads will be the joint responsibility of Canada and the United States, to be exercised as follows: (a) United States personnel, to be provided in the minimum numbers required, will be responsible for the safeguarding and maintenance of the warheads; (b) Canada will be responsible for the external security of the storage sites. 4. The procedures under which the nuclear warheads will be released from the storage sitee to meet logistic or operational requirements will be based on the principle of Joint responsibility exercised by means of intergovernmental consultation. 5. Authorization of the use by Canadian Forces of the nuclear warheads subsequent to their release from storage in accordance with paragraph 4 will be the responsibility ..of-w, Canada. They will be used only in a period of grave emergency and in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of the Command concerned. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 „„„„„„ 000182 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 .3. 6. The detailed procedures under which the principles outlined in paragraphs 3* ^ and 5 will be carried out are set out in the schedules to this Annex. 7. The United States will be physically and financially responsible for the provision, maintenance, modification and assembly of the nuclear warheads, including the provision of technical equipment, and of personnel in the minimum numbers required, for these functions. The warheads will be provided in numbers sufficient to enable the weapons systems for which they are intended to be maintained at all times at the level of operational effectiveness required by the plans of the Commander concerned. 8. Safeguards in the design of the nuclear warheads will be the responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling the nuclear warheads to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards. 9. No test firings of the warheads will take place in Canada. C. 10. Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces in Canada The location of the stockpiles to be held in Canada will be determined by Canada in consultation with CINCNORAD or SACLANT as appropriate. 11. The United States will be responsible for the movement, in accordance with agreed procedures and in conformity with applicable Canadian laws and regulations, of the nuclear warheads to and from Canada. 12. Except as may otherwise be agreed, Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of: A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 „„„.„„ 000183 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 A. (^a) provision of the land required for the storage sites and associated, facilities; (b) construction of tho storage sites and associated facilities which, except for those specified in paragraph 13 (c) below, will conform with standards and criteria prevailing in NATO, and also their operation and maintenance; (c) construction, in accordance with normal Canadian standards, of the Increments to Canadian administrative installations and facilities (housing, messing, offices, etc,) necessary to accommodate United States custodial and support personnel, as well as the operation and maintenance of these facilities; (d) movement of the nuclear warheads within Canada, subject always to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above; (e) external security for all nuclear warheads during movement within Canada, and elsewhere as may be agreed, the detailed arrangements to be made by the appropriate military authorities of the Governments; (f) a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. 13. Canada will be responsible for arranging for reasonable administrative and logistic support, Including that for United States personnel required to Implement this agreement. Details of the support for United States personnel A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 -5. • • • will be a matter to be mutually agreed between the appropriate agencies of the two Governments. Each Government shall bear the cost of the pay and allowances of its own personnel. 11^ The status of United States personnel in Canada in accordance with the terms of this agreement will be governed by the provisions of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and any supplementary arrangements which may be agreed upon. D. 15. Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian forces in Europe. The location of the stockpiles to be held in Europe will be determined by the appropriate Allied Commander in consultation with Canada, the United States and the Allied Government or Governments concerned. 16. Canada and the United States will consult with regard to any notification or other form of diplomatic communication addressed to the host government concerning the proposed establishment of any stockpiles of warheads on its territory for possible Canadian use. 17. Subject always to the provisions of paragraph 4, United States forces will be responsible for the movement of the nuclear warheads into and from the Allied Command Europe Area. Responsibility for movement within this area will be as agreed between the appropriate Canadian, United States and Allied authorities* 18. Storage sites and associated facilities included in NATO infrastructure programmes and allocated for the use of Canadian forces will be subject to NATO infrastructure funding and procedures. Canada will be responsible, in accordance with the terms of Part C of this Annex, for arranging for the provision of facilities in Europe which it Is mutually agreed are required for Canadian forces and United States personnel and which are not provided under common infrastructure. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 �A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2\ .6. x 9» Where Canada is the sole user of storage facilities in Europe, the responsibility for operation and maintenance of the facilities and administrative and logistic support for United States personnel will be in accordance with the provisions of part C of this Annex, subject to agreement with Allied host governments where appropriate. 20. Where'"Canada! is a joint user, with other members of NATO, of stbrage facilities in Europe, constructed as part of an infrastructure programme, the final determination of the division of responsibilities for the support and external security of the site or sites will be as agreed between the . Governments\and; the' Allied Command concerned as may be appropriate. i 21. Canada will be responsible for and bear the cost of a reliable means of rapid communication, where necessary, to meet the purposes of this Agreement as shall be agreed by the appropriate authorities of the two Governments. E. 22. Supplementary Arrangements , Supplementary arrangements between the appropriate authorities of the United States and Canada and between these " authorities and Allied Commanders shall be negotiated as required for the purpose of implementing this agreement. F. 23* Review and Termination The terms of this Agreement or any of its Schedules may be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months" notice. A201600064 CSC 1888:9 Pt. 2 000186 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW00284 Title A name given to the resource "Draft of the Proposed Agreement With the United States Governing the Provision of Stockpiles of Nuclear Warheads for Canadian Forces" Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Acquisition And Storage Of Nuclear Weapons For Canadian Forces In Canada And Europe," RG24-B-1, vol 21440, file CSC 1888:9, part 2, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Nuclear Weapons Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1-Jun-61