1 20 1 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/bf4c30d2a1a7f1293e625dfda0496470.pdf ed781a943ff6db97942e83ff00b1e472 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project CSE ATIP A-2023-00052 CSE A220 Committees - File 72-1 Part 2 PCO Isbister to Robertson 10 November 1970 "Intelligence Operations in the Canadian Government" 9 November 1970 Note: The two versions of the report included below have different redactions. �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies TOP SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY Copy No INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT by C. M. ISBISTER WARNING THIS REPORT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL A-2023-00052--00266 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified mtormauon Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF s.19(1) A/Di:rector, CBNRC BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVE PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE CANADA TOP SECR rPC/6-10 V 20 November 1970. - Copy No: 23 MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE POLICY COMMITI'EE r Intelligence Operations in the Canadian Gwernment Report by C.M. Isbister, Outside Examiner Dr. Isbister has concluded the examination of the intelligence operations of the Canadian Government which w.s undertaken at the request o~ the COJm:Dittee. His report is attached. The Chairman requests your comments on this report by December 1, 1970. .41... D. F. Wall, Secretary, Intelligence Policy Committee. Dist: see next page TOP Sf CRET A-2023-00052--00268 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies r CONFIDEN'l'IAL D..i.S'IRIBJTION COPY NO. Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Chief of the Defence Staff Sec?"eta.ry to the C8.b1net Dev~ty Minister, Department of National Defence Deputy .tiAinister, Department of Fina.nee Secretary to the Treasury Board Chairman, D::fence Research Board Coonni.ssioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police President, National Research Council Deputy Minister, Department of Communications Privy Council (D.F. Wall) Director of Communications Security l 2 Copy No. 24 of Report 3 4 5 6 7 " n 25 II fl tt n 26 11 11 II II 27 If II 8 9 lb ll 12 With an information copy to: ./ DCS (13,14); sec/CRC (15); CBNRC (16); DCIS (17-l9); SRB (20); D of S&I, RCMP (21); Sec/CS'PC (22); A/Dir (23) Dr. Isbister' s Report - Copy Nos. 1, 2, 3 ( sent by Dr. Isbister to Mr. Robertson l for P.M.; 1 for USS X..A. l for Mr. Robertson) n II (held by ca.n. Embassy wash.) ( U ('. IS /3 I~ 'I£ I\, 0 I\) f iJ I= e. ) A-2023-00052--00269 �Released under the ATIA - unc1assmea mrormauun Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies CANADIAN EMBASSY AM BAS SADE OU.:CANADA' 1746 Massachusetts Avenue :t:rw~ Washington., D. c. 20036 November 10., 1970. Dear ¥.u>. Robertson., Here is rny report on intelligence in three copies. If you agree., one is for the Prime Minister., who has expressed interest., one for }1r. Ritchie and one for yourself. ·-~ ..... ------------- Only one other copy has been ma.de and this is being held in the special registry here at the Embassy. Earlier drafts have been destroyed. If you wish to communicate with me about the text, the special channels are of course available through External._ • I shall be pleased to come to Ottawa for discussions as you may consider necessary. I wish I could have edited the report once more and I particularly regret the repetition as between Section IX and Section X. The complexity of my text is more than matched., however., by the complexity of the administrative arrangements I run criticizing. I am happy enough to submit the report as it stands because I think it is clear and consistent and I hope it is understandable. . .... /2 R. G. Robertson., Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet., East Block., OTTAWA A-2023-00052--00270 �Released under the ATIA - unc1ass1t1ea mrormauon Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies - 2 . i In view or the classification, it leems unlikely that you will publish a pocket edition~ If for any reason it should become necessary to pripare more copies· than are required for interdepartmental consideration, I would appreciate being given an opportunity to edit it again. • Yours sincerely, C. M. ISBISTER. r. -, A-2023-00052--00271 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies VUJ?:J J.. VJ. LJ. s.15(1) - DEF r TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS CANADIAN GOV.smn,ffi11T Heport by C. H. Isbister, C'utsid.e Examiner November 9 1 1970 TOP SECRET FOR CAN.ADI~T EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00272 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies Table of Contents FOREWORD Page Section (': ·I. Purpose and Conduct of the Enquiry •.........• 1 II. Perspectives and General Conclusions ......... 3 TTT ..... _i. _ . i . . Scope and Purposes of Intelligence •.......••• 6 IV. Heeds for Intelligence Within the Framework of Foreign Policy and Defence Policy ......... 12 v. Dep~rtreental Needs for Intelligence .•........ 13 VI. Canadian Intelligence and the Tripartite Arrangements ••....•..............• 14 VII. British and United States Programs •.......... 25 VIII. Resources Devoted to Canadian Intelligence in 1970-71 ................................... 29 IX. Decision-Making Points and Processes in the Canadian Intelligence Organization •.....• 31 ~r .,,. . Guidelines of Change ••...........•.......•..• 38 XI. Chairmanship of Committees •............•..... 46 XII. F'inancing of Intelligence ••.................• 48 XIII. Recornrnendations •.......•..•.......... -..•....• 51 Appendices "A 11 11 B" 11 C" 11 D11 "En Needs for Intelligence Within the Framework of Foreign Policy and Defence Policy Response by Department of External Affairs on divisional use of intelligence ~1.esponse by Department of National Defence on Departmental need for intelligence Heinorandum on the Joint Intelligence Committees, United Kingdom Resources Devoted to Intelligence in 1970-71 Decision-:naking Points and Processes in the Can&dian Intelligence Organization A-2023-00052--00273 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY FOREWORD r This report was drafted before I left Ottawa in early September. Since then I have edited and rearranged it but the observations and recoI11I11endations are substantially the same. I wonder~d whether to introduce some comments to bring it more abreast of the current situation, the kidnapings, the emergency powers and so forth. I hope it is more convincing as it stands, and in any event I have no 11 insidett information here in Washington. I have tried to make recommendations of ways in which intelligence can better serve the Government and nothing I know of the current situation leads me to change these. Governments of the past have sometimes adopted measures to deal with short term situations and neglected tbe continuing nature of underlying problems. Perhaps this report can assist in consideration of the longer run as well as of the immediate. TOP SECRET. FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--0027 4 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET r FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY I. Purpose and Conduct of the Enquiry Following a decision of the Intelligence Policy Committee., Mr. R. G. Robertson requested me to act as Outside Examiner of intelligence operations in the Government and I commenced work in early June. The terms of reference are: r (a) to examine and report to the Intelligence Policy Committee on the purposes., organization., operation and financing of the Canadian intelligence program and: (b) to make l""ecommendations to the Intelligence Policy Connnittee on any of the foregoing in the light of current governmental objectives in the fields of defence., foreign policy and national security. 2. Special ~learances were granted for admission to the various canters of intelligence operations - collectors, analysts and users - here in Ottawa and in the other capitals I visited. 3. In London during the week of July 19 - 25 I visited the seven goverruuental departments and agencies principally concerned. These included the Cabinet Office, the Cormnonwealth and Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Treasury., Governm~nt Connnunications Headquarters., the General Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service. I had discussions with the heads of all but one of these organizations and senior officers in addition. 4. I made three trips to Washington, on July 16, July 27 - 31, and a last one in September to visit the National Security Agency, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, The Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Intelligence). Again in Washington everyone was helpful. . .... /2 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES·ONLY A-2023-00052--00275 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SEC&,,r FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 2 - 5. I have been aware for years of the fund of good will towards Canada existing in certain other countries but never more than in these visits to London and Washington. In the field of intelligence I had expected more reticence. Most of the .American$ and British I met were as open and helprul as if I belong6d to their own governmental services, and indeed more so. 6. I had talks with the High Commissioner in London and with the Ambassador in Washington. ?. In Ottawa I visited the Privy Council Office, the Communications Branch N.R.c., the Special Research Bureau, the Department of External Affairs, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Department of National Defence, the Treasury Board and, among users, I consulted representatives of the Department of Finance, the Bank of Canada, the Department of Fisheries and the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce. 8. With the exception of my efficient secretary, I worked witho_ut stafr, by necessity and also by choice. To have obtained assistants from outside the intelligence connnunity would have required too much time. To have drafted assistants from intelligence agencies might have rendered my recommendations suspect in ways which I could not predict. As this report stands I can assume responsibility for everything said and it is limited to what I judge to be the important matters. 9. A number of memoranda of high quality have been prepared for me by our professionals, however, and I wish to register my· gratitude to each of' them. I offer·ed to include their names but none betrayed his calling by accepting. The agencies concerned have been diligent to avoid influencing my. conclusions undu1y. . .... /3 r TOP SECRET FOR CANADLI\.N EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00276 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF s.15(1) - IA r TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 3 II. Perspectives and General Conclusions ~n~en this assignment was first proposed I resisted it. My time was limited and I wondered whether I could do a good job. This remains still to be seen. The subject matter is so vast, howeyer, that there is a sense in which I may perhaps be more useful in a few months than if I had a year. In addition, I had been led in the past into some related governmental underworlds; however important the tasks, I had found them thankless and difficult. I wondered whether intelligence might turn out to be more of the srune. r 2. As I have learned something about intelligence rny adverse reactions have diminished. I have concluded that ll the Canadian Government should take intelligence seriously,ll as it is taken in the United States and the United Kingdom, but in ways appropriate to our own problems and interests. This would be something.quite new. 3. The purpose of intelligence is not to intrude into private lives. as such but rather into other countries r secrets, intentions and pretensions. There is a lot to be said for being able to compare the statements and undertakin,s of governments with what they are actually doing.· 4. On balance the role of intGlligonce is to avert crises and to moderate the reactions of govern.."llents to crises in which there· is the danr•er of escalation to total war • . . . . . /4 TOP SECRb~ 1:i10R CANADIAN ET.d:S ONLY A-2023-00052--00277 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 4- 5. My conclusions are essentially simple. Existing components of the intelligence structure are useful in themselves and their relations with other countries result in substantial benefits to Canada. What is lacking is at the core; there is insuf'ficient ability to formulate purposes and objectives on a continuing basis at the governmental ·(as distinct from the departmental) level. This is not a criticism of persons or organizations because occasions have never arisen in the past to define such responsibilities or to create the requisite machinery. With new concepts of leadership and coordination the entire system would improve in tone. tempo and results. This is my theme. 6. I shall bring forward some proposals concerning organization. Important as this subject may be, it takes second place to the·definition of purposes and objectives at the governmental level. With defined goals people can overcome quite a lot of bad organization. 7. Intelligence normally deals with events ·outside the country. I have not been asked to examine security, which deals with domestic matters. There are connections, however. between intelligence and security which cannot safely be ignored. • B. Particularly in the field of immigration important questions of intelligence and security are meshed together. Organized forces with purposes contrary to Canadian interests can only be ·understood by studying the patterns of their activities comprehensively, and they often operate by moving their agents in and out of the country. From the Goverrunentts point of view we weaken ourselves by allowing artificial barriers to exist between intelligence and security. In recent years, incidentally, controls over immigration have been rendered more and more ineffective. At present there is almost nothing to prevent a knowledgeable professional connected with espionage. subversion, terrorism or organized crime, from entering the country at will. (I have no doubt that some special emergency measures are being applied temporarily.)· ..... /5 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00278 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF ~ FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 5 9. There is another connection between intelligence and security which is, in my view, important. Our security measures sometimes give the impression of dealing with small cases in the same way as larger ones. In the minds of many senioJ:-._administrators., intelligence and security get tarred with the same brush. The Royal Conmtlssion on Security perhaps erred in giving undue support to existing procedures. Some new approaches are needed in security to differentiate between the important and the ·less important. Until this is done both intelligence and security will continue to be affected by a sort of Gresham's Law - that minor questions tend to drive important on~s out of circulation. r 10. Finally, this report contains comments about the scope and importance of intelligence in Britain and the United States. These comments do not imply approval of all of the actions of these countries. I am interested in the security of.the country in the broadest sense and in :ma.king the Canadian influence as strong as it can be in the furtherance of Canadian·objectives in the world as it exists. Perhaps we can learn from some of these other countries how to be even more effective than we are. . ..../6 r: TOP SECREI' FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00279 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 6 - III. ~cope and Purposes of Intelligence What is meant by intelligence? It is tempting to define it as that part of the total information about the international environment which is .gathered secretly by governmental agencies, including communications intercepts and other electronic means; satellite and aerial photography; the work of agents; information provided by visitors, and so on. Not only is such a definition unsatisfactory because of its circularity, but because it does not go far enough. r 2. It is be~ter to define intelligence as information from all sources pertaining to the security of the country and its institutions. The purpose of _intelligence proera.ms is to inform the Government of dangers and thJ:teats from abroad to Canada, Canadians and national interests. The columns of ·the daily press are sources of intelligence in this sense. 3. Distinctions can be made: counter-intelligence deals inside the country with espionage and subversion from abroad, security intelligence deals with home-made subversion and revolution, and general intelligence is directed abroad. l:.. While these terms are useful, they create problems if they are -taken too literally as guides to ·action. In the world of espionage a complex operation by another country may involve Canada's forces at levels of intelligence, counter-intelligence and security. It is obviously µnwise to allow much grass to grow between these closely related functions if a government intends to protect itself. 5. Intelligence involves more than the collection of data. The quality of governmental decisions can be no bettor than the inform'3.tion on which they are based. The problem today is not the lack of data but to get them to the right place in tim,3. Governments are being swamped with more than they can use effectively. With the acceleration of communications and ·:.;he multipl~7!-tion of methods of obtaining and storing facts, it is,~ssential to formulate .f r, . ...../7 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYBS ONLY A-2023-00052--00280 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF r TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAM EYES ONLY - 7 questions correctly, to collect, select, analyze and appraise what is relevant. In both the British and American Governments it is the intelligence community which is generating many changes in these matters and presiding over them. • .. 6. In the United States and the United Kingdom, intelligence services are now ranging into· the consideration of problem areas outside of defence and security as traditionally under•stood. Possibly there is a new conceptual framework emerging in which intelligence and other information will be seen in the future as an integrated approach to external problems in general. At this stage of development of our own intelligence, it is perhaps unrealistic to stretch the concept of intelligence to this extent. At the same time, it is to be recognized .that our intelligence makes some valuable contributions outside of the security field, notably in our trade relations with communist countries. 7. For. the present, Canadian intelligence should aim mainly at· an enhanced capacity to apprehend threats to safety and security,. to diminish them, and to mobilize relevant information from all sources. 8. While it is useful to try to say what we mean by intelligence, it would be stultifying to base programs on. some restrictive definition. Operations would then be tied to ideas of the past even though new problems continually arise. It is preferable to talk about creating in the intelligence community a continuing ability to redefine objectives at the national level and to advise the Government in this light. 9. Ah_ effective intelligence programm _requires decisions on the extent of resources to be employed, organizational structure to formulate requirements and agencies to respond with what is needed. . ... . /8 . TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00281 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF r TOP SECRE'r FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 0 u - 10. In dee.I.ding upon the resources to commit to intolliienco programs weight should be given to: the relative importance of intelligence., and other infor~ation, in the m.ain specific fields of Canadian policy in the foreign (including econo1:tlc) and defence ·rields; the degree of general usefulness which intelligence exchanges may have in helping Canada dea.l across the board with more powerful countries such as the . USA.; on the basis of a common fund of.knowledge; and the contribution of intelligence to be made within the military alliances to which Canada looks for its defence. r 11~ .I. should attomot to state some of the desirable perfo1..mance characteristics of the intelligence co:1llllunity at the Government level., without L71plying that present arrangements are deficient on all counts: (a) The first iEJ broad and includes all.the others. • 'rhe intelligence community should identify external threats and dangers to the safety, security and national intei~ests of Canada and Canadians. Because of' multilateral aspects of Canadian defence policy,. this concern pertains also to threats against friends and allies. Perhaps the corollary should go without saying that intelligence should be able to identify opportunities to improve situations so that fewer threats and dangers will arise. (b) Tl1ere can hardly be any question of' the importance of maintaining competent intelligence on the USSR, China and some of the communist satellites. The intelligence connnunity has been diligent in this. If there is a criticism it is that the6e have boon studied to the exclusion of other things. . ...• /9. TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES .ONLY A-2023-00052--00282 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF r s.15(1) - IA TOP SECRET 'FOR CANADIAN EY.i:i:S ONLY .. 9 {c) , ted by of exposure with all of the political consequences. (d) To produce hard and relevant intelligence on trouble spots, the intelligence community needs to blend into a more creative process the military contributions of National Defence, the political contributions of External Affairs, the counter-intelligence .and security contributions· of the RCMP, and the special role of Manpower in the·f'ield of immigration. (e) The intelligence community should respond to various levels cf interest, whether departmental or national. Long-range missiles provide a case in point. Since the Canadian Armed Forces have been given n.o very great defensive role in thts field, the Government may well have an interest which is broader than thD.t of lfa.tional Defence. Missiles . from China in the next couple of years is another example. I suspect that the Government's general interest in this exceeds the purely military interests. (f) The intelligence community should identify subversive assaults on Canada by external forces not necessarily governmental in character. The leadin 6 ex.ample from the past is illegal Chinese· immigration. One of the greatest scandals of Canadian history was exposed in the late 1950 1 s, involving large-scale organization in China and Canada which hB:d penetrated politics and government • . . . . . /10 TCP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES 01ITtY A-2023-00052--00283 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - IA s.15(1) - DEF r TOP SECRET FOR- CANADIAN EYES ONLY -10- In this area, criminal and security sa.f'eguards are both important, and.those who emphasize the latter as against the fol'"Iller are misinfoI'Ined. r and subversion are not rom entering {g) The· _intelligence community should develop a sensitivity to the relationships between organized subversion from abroad and the instability in some of our cities leading to acts of terror and riots. This is mainly a domestic matter and the intelligence interest while real is peripheral. When domestic disturbances are augmented by interventions from abroad the intelligence connnunity should play an effective role. The. armed services can be brought into action inside the co"ntry under emergency powers or, on provincial initiative, as aid to the civil power. These measures need to be brought up to date because there are obvious gaps in them. I reviewed this matter with National Defence. Responsibilities in . , 1 the Government must be well defined so that crises~ not be met with uncertainty. The Armed Forces rely quite properly on· the RCMP for intelligence in this area. . ...• /11 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00284 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF r TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -11- (h) 'rhe intelligence community should develop a new capacity to define projects in terms of Canadian "interests. The North presents the leading-opportunity. The intelligence community is expert on the Soviet Arctic but, it could lead the governmental structure into formulating an organizeddata base on the Arctic as a whole. This needs to be done and no other organization is doing it~·- Responsibilities and information about activities in the North are now scattered in so many departments that it is often difficult to sort out the factual picture. With aspects of sovereignty at issue the Government has an interest. in obtaining a more concrete view of everything that is going on. If the intelligenc~ community has not enough manpower to take the lead, it might well contribute information and methods. r (i) The Government should develop a better capacity toiplan and budget for intelligence activities on a coordinated basis. For security reasons this cannot be effected wi thot1t :modifying \ normal Treasury Board procedures. It should, • however, be possible to make decisions to qo a little :more of one thing and less of another, and to control the aggregate resources on a centralized basis. . .... /12 TOP SECRET - . FOR CANADIAN : ~ ONLY A-2023-00052--00285 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -12- IV. Needs for Intelligence Within the Framework of Foreign Policy and Defence P~licy I have taken the Government•s recent paper, Foreign Pol.icf :for Canadians., and the Prime Hinister 1.s statement of pril 3, 1969 on defence policy as the best. statements of current governmental objectives. Probably neither was drafted with intelligence specifically in mind. rraken together, however, they provide a good basis and rationalization for continuing participation by the Government in intelligence work. The detailed analysis is included as Appendix nAn. r • .... /13 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00286 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF r TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EY'.ci":S ONLY -13- v. Departmental Needs for Intelligence I1emoranda were p1"'epared at my request by External Affairs and 1Jational Defence to indicate attitudes in those Departments towards intelligence material. I obtained permission to include these in their entirety and they are reproduced as Appendices 11 Bn and "en. In my view they serve better than briefer su:mmaries to indicate the strengths and weaknesses at this stage in the two most important 11 consumer" Departments. r.rhe Defence memorandum is a statement which .indicates military needs. The External memorandum is made up of a number of individual submissions, not articulated into a departmental view. Taken together these ·1atter show that intelligence is widely used and appreciated in External and, further, that it is not always understood and not given a very prominent place. TOP SECRET . .... /14 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00287 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -14VI. Canadian Intelligence and the Tripartite Arrangements Canadian programs can only be understood within the larger arrangements with the United States and Britain which give them meaning. The United States and on. a smaller scale the United Kingdom maintain world-wide intelligence networks. Canada makes contributions of a specialized but important nature in selected fields, and draws upon the common pool. Australia operates in much the same fashion as Canada. Canada is a beneficiary of these exchanges on a net basis. Our partners also benefit but in a different sense. If Canada were to withdraw, the others could get along although they would have to do some things in a more expensive way, and their attitudes towards Canada would change considerably. It would be impossible on our own to supply the Canadian Government with world intelligence except on a scale so small as to be derisory. Canada should therefore continue to pay the price of membership in the club. If we were outside the arrangements we would rack our brains to get in and the ad.mission fee would then be too hi~. 2. r 3. ·Canada is spending $40 million and 2,600 man-years • in the fis·ca1 year 1970-71. A check list of activities and Canadian cohtribut.ions to intelligence is as follows: (a) Signal Intelligence directed north, east and west from Canadian territories (the-biggest spender by far); (b) analysis and interpretation of the Soviet Union north of 60° and the Arctic on the Soviet side, using raw materials collected in Canada and elsewhere; • (c) in Special Center activities; application of newer American techniques, using photographic raw materials collected by the United States; (d) information on agents of other countries operating in and through Canada; ..... /15 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00288 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -15(e) information obtained by Canadian Forces Attaches and other military personnel posted abroad; {f) information from interviews with ships' captains-, travellers, defectors and immigrants; {g) information from diploma.tic sources in some sensitive key posts; (h) intelligence reports, and comments on British and American reports, under the aegis of the Joint Intelligence Committee; (i) specialized analysis of some ~elected Soviet weapons; (j) with Britain and the United States, limited but expert contributions to general military assessments of all aspects of the Soviet Union and satellite countries; (k) with the United States, assessments of the Soviet air threat against North America; (1) in NATO, participation in military appraisals, acceptance of some responsibilities for_drafting of papers. 4. What does Canada obtain in return? In very broad terms, two things. First, we have access to a pool of worldwide intelligence on which the United States and the United Kingdom spend possibly $150 or $185 for every.dollar we spend. Second~ very important for a country which must understand the United States, we have access to the data base on which the United Stat~s makes its strategic and many of its political decisions. I have already referred to the large and increasing extent to which intelligence organizations are being used in London and Washington and it is mainly through the intelligence communities that we have an opportunity to be in touch. 5. These benefits should be amplified. . .... /16 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYBS O:NLY A-2023-00052--00289 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF s.15(1) - IA TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -16- 6. The Department of National Defence obtains a current picture of military matters in a wide range of countries, unfriendly and otherwise. The Government obtains raw and processed intelligence 8. Each of the United States Armed Services makes its own budgetary case to Congress in public, as if it is important whether the country is destroyed from the sea or from the air. Altogether these can add up to totals which are exaggerated. In addition, the United States Government, like any other, is concerned about the propagandist effect of its statements at • home and abroad. Without the inner access through intelligence sources, Canada would simply have to choose for the truth among competitive press releases from Washington. 9. Information derived from contemporary intelligence sources can be used in numerous important situations as the hard basis of verification of other information and reports. In recent weeks intelligence provided immediate accurate information about the placing of Soviet-made weapons at the Suez. It is one thing to see an item in the press of another country but quite another to know what credence to give it. 10. The ROMP and othe~s place great value on being able to turn to larger United States systems for advice, interpretation and assistance, in addition to obtaining information. 11. Canada depends for its safety upon others, the United States in particular. Since a country must be expected to give tangible support to joint defensive arrangements on which it depends, intelligence activities provide a concrete opportunity for Canada to contribute. 12. There are some agreements and understandings which place geographical limits on the sharing of intelligence. I have decided not to comment upon these because they do not seem to be very restrictive in practice. My impression of the present arrangements is that Canada can obtain access to the intelligence on any area in which it can establish a need and an interest. 13. There is a difficulty to be acknowledged, that United States and United Kingdom collection agencies naturally focus on their own problems in choosing intelligence targets. Since ..... /17 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00290 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF r-. s.15(1) - IA TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN -17our interests are different and sometimes less concretely defined, Canadian consume:t's cannot use everything to which they may gain access: this gives rise to prob:;I.ems _of selection. Since Canada is always concerned about the world 1 s trouble spots and about peace$ however, there is a very wide -Canadian interest in the data which a.re available • ..... /18 TOP SECRh~ FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00291 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF s.15(1) - IA ,r"' TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EY6:S ONLY -18- 15. In contrast with many other international arrangements., the tripartite intelligence community has grown in a very special way. There are as yet no rules as to how much intellicence a country should collect for the others in relation to gross national product, population, military expenditures o~ anything else. The relations are stable and they seem to be understood by the participants but not on any basis of the value of what is exchanged for what. The governing concept is rather one of a balance of effort by each participating country in relation to opportunities open to it, in brief, that each should try to do its best. It is •in this sense that Canada is regarded by the others as the most marginal member. r 16. Countries have engaged in intelligence out of necessity and their own interests and.this is accepted. The CIA was born out of Pearl Harbour. It grew in 1954 when the President needed a more accurate appraisal of the Russian bomber fleet than he was getting from the Armed Forces. It e;rew again with the calculus of ICBM 1 s and ABM 1 s. There is no suggestion that Canada should therefore have done these very same things. 18. Canada does not run spies and I found no strong suggestions from Americans or British that we should do so. They accept the Canadian judgment that we have no interest of our own in.doing this. We avoid electronic and other eavesdropping where there is risk of political embarrassment. We ..... /19 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00292 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF s.15(1) - IA TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -19- r r •..•• /20 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00293 �Pages 294 to I a 295 are withheld pursuant to sections sont retenues en vertu des articles 15(1) - IA, 13(1 )(a) of the Access to Information de la Loi sur l'acces a l'information �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la Joi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRJT FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -22- r '1I 34. .The cost of maintaining a given level of signal intelligence-is l"ising substantially from year to year. Aside from pl"ice increases which affect all governmental programs, the·def'ences to be penet.I'ated are becoming more elaborate. This in turn calls for methods which are more sophisticated· and expensive. 35. If it is decided, ag I think it should be, that signal intelligence is to continue to be the major Canadian contribution to the international arrangements, the Government should have a policy of capital spending to keep abreast of new techniques. It may be that the next step-_ is in the computer field but I would defer to the professional.son this point. Since one-quarter of the Government's ~ntelligence budgets is for capital programs which are well advanced, it should be quite possible to find the amounts needed • r . . . . . /23· ~ FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00296 �Page 297 is withheld pursuant to sections est retenue en vertu des articles 15(1) - IA, 13(1 )(a) of the Access to Information de la Loi sur l'acces a l'information �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.13(1)(a) s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY "'!24- 40. I have already drawn attention to the unsatisfactory nature of ,.-µhe arrangements for coo~d.ination of the intelligence coI!lillunity, establishing of priorities, planning, budgeting and so forth. ~his creates a serious weakne~s in our ~elations • because no one is in a position to plan, negotiate and advise our Government with re~ard to the entire intelligence oo~plex. No one is in a position to think and decide about maintainin American cooperation While the continuing cooperation of our partners is conditional upon the contributions we make, important decisi9ns about Canadian policies for the collection of intelligence are made at departmental leveis. This is dealt wit4 concretely in what i'ollows. r r TOP SEC Rl!,--.rr •... . /25 FOR CANADIAN EYF.S ONLY A-2023-00052--00298 �Pages 299 to / a 302 are withheld pursuant to sections sont retenues en vertu des articles 15(1) - IA, 13(1 )(a) of the Access to Information de la Loi sur l'acces a l'information �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EY~S ONLY -29- VIII. Resources·Devoted to Canadian Intelligence in 1970-71 This is a summary of information provided by departments and agencies in response to a questionnaire. It represents a good estimate, subject to the acceptability of certain judgments noted below that were applied to the data. The conclusions can be further summarized as 2. follows: Total planned expenditure on the intelligence function in 1970-71 is about $40.4 million. (a) r (b) Of this amount, some $11.6 .million is capital expenditure, and this figure would vary ~omewhat from year to year. The operating cost, which is probably fairly stable except for price escalation, is $28.8 million in 1970-71. Some 2,627 man-years are associated with these operations. (c) .The figures above include some $3.1 million and 226 man-years not dedicated to intelligence as a primary function but rather as an incidental activity to other functions. Resources dedicated to intelli~ence as a primary function in 1970-71 are $37.3 million (including $11.6 million capital) and 2,401 man-year~. The following judgments were applied to the data: (i) Expenditures on "security" as distinct from "intelligence" were excluded. This involved a reduction of $3.8 million for departmental security from the External Affairs return on "incidental" intelligence expenditures. Other departments excluded 11 security11 from their returns. (ii) A contribution of $4.2 million to CBNRC was removed from the National Defence (DCIS) return to avoid double-counting, since expenditure of the same funds is dealt with in the CBNRC return. No other double-counting was discovered. TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00303 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRRr FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -303. The questionnaire asked respondents to list elements of the Federal Government who were suppliers of intelligence to them. The purpose was to determine if there were other departments and agencies outside the group canvassed who might be doing a significant amount of intelligence. Respondents have listed the following as "other suppliersn: AECL, AECB, Customs and Excise, Justice, DOT, National Harbours Board, Eiv.IR (seismology}, ITC, Innnigration, Ex.port Development Corporation, CBC, Supply and Services. 4. r The questionnaire has not been extended to these latter. It is thought that nearly all of them are suppliers in such a limited and incidental way that such measurement would be impractical (EMR, where there is a discreet activity, may be an exception). It is noted, hrnever, that a number of other departments and agencies are suppliers of intelligence incidental to other activities 6 but it is not practical to measure the incremental cost, if any, of this by-product. The figures are shown in detail in Appendix nE". TOP SECRET FOR CAHADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00304 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF r TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -31IX. Decision-Making Points and Processes in the Canadian Intelligence Organization This section deals with .intelligence organization and adlninistrative decisions. The intelligence activities of the Government are considered in some detail in Appendix °F", unc.er the following main headings - collection, processing, production and dissemination. 2. In summary, the decision-making processes, below the level of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence and. of ministers, are as follows: Intelligence Policy Committee (IPO) 3. r Recommendations approved by the Prime Minister and the Ministers concernod in 1960, assigned to the IPC responsibility for coordinating and maintaining general policy dlr0ction of all intelligence matters including signal intelligence and connnunications-electronic security. The IPC was charged, subject to direction from ministers from time to time, with determining directives and priorities for the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), recommending what resources it should be given and assessing its perf'ormance in carrying out its tasks. 4. The IPC is the senior official level decision point on questions of coordination and general policy direction of all intelligence matters, all aspects of the functions of the JIC and all SIGilff policy matters within the IPC 's terms of reference •. 5. The-Department of External Affairs provides the Chairman or the IPC and of the JIC and the Director of Comm.unications Security. The Defence Staff provides the Vice Chairman of the IPC and of the JIG. Department of External Affairs 6. Within the Department of Extei-•nal Affairs the Head of the Security and Intelligence Liaison Division is responsible for the intelli~ence activities of the Depart~ent. He is also the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Direcbor of Cormnunications Security. . .... /32 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00305 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECR3T FOR CANADIAN EYBS ONLY -32- 7. The Head of the Security and Intelligonce Liaison Division reports directly to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, who is also the Chairman cif the IntelliGence Policy Committee. S. The Head of the Security and Intelligence Liaison Division is, in effect, the intelligence program manager for the Department and the USSEA -;ls the senior official decisionmalcing point within the Department. Department of. 1fational Defence 9. Within the Department of National Defence (mm) the Deputy Chief Intelligence and Security (DCIS) is the prograir1 manager for Defence I~tellisence. He is responsible for policies and· plans for• the :rianagement, operation and develop, ment of the strategic intelligence resources of the Canadian Armed Forces. Under DCIS direction, detailed management of the progrBlll is the responsibility of directors operating within their specific areas or fields of defined interest. In the mm decision-making process, the Defence I':1telligence Program (Military Intelligence) is established within the framework of Cabinet decisions on defence and foreign policies with intelligence priorities being linked to the purposes for which Canada maintains its armed forces establislunent. The departmental chain of control to or from DCI3 is through Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS), Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), to the l Iinister of National Defence (NND) with the Chief of Defence Staff Advisory Committee (CDSAC) being the senior decision-making point within the Armed Forces, and the Defence Council, under the Chairmanship of the Ml:ID, being the senior decision-making point within the Department. Although DCIS takes his direction normally from, and is controlled by, VCDS he does have direct access to the CDS and MIID, with VCDS being kept informed. However, these by-pass channels are not used for intelligence progra:m planning and development; rather, they are used for the passage of .important or crisis intelligence :1.nf·ormation to avoid delay in dissemination to top autho1--ity. 10. 1 . .... /33 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00306 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET r FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -33Reconunendations for major changes in program and on new progrrun develoI ment are staffed through and approved by VCDS for consideration at the CDSAC level,· and thereafter at Defence Council. Jnterdepartmental action follows. 11. 1 12. Decisions or intelligence matters that are within the framework of cstal:lished programs are made at -the DCIS and director levels with interdepartmental consultation being conducted at all levels from desk analyst to DCIS, and through the JIC. Exrunination ~nd development of interdepartmental .studies e.nd projects is normally arranged and accomplished at the DCIS Divectorate level. Royal-Canadian Mounted Police . 13. r The. Commissioner and the Director General of Security and IntelligEnce deal regularly with the Solicitor General concerning the security service. In addition they have direct access to the Prime Minister on certain matters as occasion may demand. 14. -The Commissioner of the RCMP is the senior decisionmaking point within tbe Force for all matters, including the security service. The Director General of Security and Intelligence is, in effect, the security and intelligence program manager. 15. The Security and Intelligence Directorate of the RCMP contributes to the work of other intelligence agencies and of the IPC Committees. Incidental to its primary mission as a security service the Directorate obtains intelligence of value to other intelligence agencies which is released to them with appropriate conditions governing security and control in each instance. The Directorate drafts one major .TIC paper • .Joint Intelligence Committee 16. The Intelligence Policy Committee is the senior decision-making-point for all matters of intelligence·for which the JIC is responsible. • ••• • /31+ r TOP SECREI' FOR OiNADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00307 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -3417. The decisions of the JIC are the collective responsibility of the members of the committee and the JIC members obtain departmental or agency decisions concerning matters before the committee through their respective departmental or agency decision-making arrangements. The JIC has no program management responsibilities of an administrative or financial nature; but it is responsible for the information and judgm.ents contained in the intelligence products it produces, and the advice it provides to the IPC. Special Research Bureau 18. The Special Research Bureau is administratively attached to the Department of External Affairs but has a separate budgetary and program planning arrangement so that its priori ties_ are not in direct competition with the priorities of the Depertment proper. r 19. Policy decisions concerning the nature and extent of the Bureau's program are made by the Intelligence Policy Committee. ·Administrative decisions are made by the administrative d~cision-making processes of the Department of External Aff'.airs, and acL-ninistrative action is taken on the authority of the USSEA. The program manager for the Special Research Bureau program is the Director of.the Special Research Bureau. S_IGINT Programs 20. The .Intellie;ence Policy Committee is the senior decision-making point for general policy control over all aspects of the collection, processing and dissemination of ·srGINT. The IPC exercises general policy control through the Director of Communications Security (DOS), who acts as manager for the conduct of relations with foreign SIGINT authorities, · and for the justification and control of • estimates and expenditures for CBNRC and for the SIGINT equipment vote. The Communications Research Committee advises the DOS, as required, and is supported in turn by the Communications Research Technical Group. 0 . •.. . /35 TOP SECRET r FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00308 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET r FOR CANADIAN iITES ONLY -3521. Manning, administration and maintenance for the SIGINT collection program carried out by the intercept service is provided by DND and is subject to DND decisionmaking processes and also to the general policy control of the IPC. Decisions on the tasking of collectton, and on processing and reporting operations at intercept stations are made by the Director, CBNRG. 22. The SIGINT processing and reporting programs carried out by CBNRC are managed by the Director of CBNRC. Decisions on the nature and extent of these activities and on the allocation of resources are made by the IPC, on recommendations from the DCS, advised by the CRC. 23. In fact,the intelligence system operates quite differently than the formal structure would indicate and the terms of reference of the Intelligence Policy Committee have become misleadinz. r Thi"s latter Col1'llllittee is ineffective: recently ~ it went for six years without meeting. Essential decisions were made from time to time by telephone canvass of the members. Thus there has been no vital center for the S intelligence community, either to consider objectives and ~ programs or anything else. 24. 25.. It is not enough to criticize the Committee for not meeting. It is composed of the most senior, able and hardpressed administrators in the Goverrunent. I suppose there must have been some dcubts that an intelligence program required articulation and leadership at the governmental level. Whether or not this is the case, there should be no difficulty in revitalizing this Committee if this is agreed to be important. (The membership would, of course, have to be brought up to date with reorganizations which have taken place in the meantime.) 26. To the extent that the intelligence community exists at all,lt is tied together by the Joint Intelligence Comndttee and by its Chairman who is at the sru.ne time the Head of Security and Intelligence Liaison Division in External Affairs and the Director of Communications Security. r TOP SECRET • .... /36 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00309 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET POR CANADIAN -3627. The Joint Intelli£;ence Committee brings together the senior departmental 0xperts and does a useful job. It cannot provide a substitute for the IPC: it lacks the authority to compose departmental rivalries at a high level of synthesis. It is forced too often to take the lowestCOilllnon-denominator approach to intelligence questions. Of course, it cannot consider intelligence programs in various departments on a comprehensive basis and change the status quo. Z ( S 28. Tne Chairman is in a position which is too difficult, however great his ability. He is not sufficiently senior to n1ake the voice· of intelligence audible at the policy level in his own department or to deal effectively with the high \\ administrative level in National Defence. As Directo1.. of Conm1unications Security he has administrative responsibilities over the Communications Branch - in my view wrongly. With the devolution of the corr.nuittee system he has no authoPity to deal directly or through the Joint Intelligence CorMaittee with the intercept station on matters of National Defence responsibility, so that there is neither a person nor a committee to consider signal intelligence comprehensively. 29. The Chair1:1an of the Joint Intelligence Comr~ittoe has no secretariat to prepare papers but National Defence provides assistance in connection with JIC meetings and the receipt, distribution and despatch of some material. The terms of reference of the Intelligence Policy C-, Comr.-,i ttee are broad enough to allow it to consider the related • aspects of domestic-security matters and of criminal intelligence in addition. This has not been done. Even within the RCH~ organization crin~inal and security intelligence are kept in separate administrative compartments under .the Commissioner who is of course vory busy. It seems quite wrong to have no intelligence group anywhere in the Government with the responsibility of·examining all aspects from a general and comprehensive point of view. 30. 31c, With reference to CBI'TRC, the management function has been render~d ambiguous by the special executive responsibilities which have been given to External Affairs. Policy decisions affecting the intercept stations are outside its control. It does not receive cons.idered direction from the Intelligence • Policy Coillillittee. Add to this the secrecy and security of· TOP SECRET ..... /37 FOR CANADIAN EYBS ONLY A-2023-00052--00310 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRLT FOR CANADIAN EYES·ONLY -37.its work and the conclusion is inescapable that the problems in that orr5anization are as urgent and difficult as anY1.,,rhere in the Public Service. 32. I must go on to say, however, that the United States attributes great value to the professional ability of the SIGDil organization to ans.lyze, interpret and to make independent contributions. Since the expertise collected in CBNRC is an asset to the Canadian Government, care should be taken to preserve and enhance its value in making the administrative reforms reco:r.rrnended in this report. r ..... /38 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONL': A-2023-00052--00311 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -38- x. Guidelines of Change In a more positive vein than in the preceding section., analysis of current arrangements shows that three levels of decision making are required: a general policy level, exercising general policy "✓ <t· control of all intelligence matters., including ~_;....J.,,tV those requiring government-wide policy control ,,,--r" (national intelligence), and those under departmental control; a middle level, exercising government-wide control of activities at the national level; and giving ·professional intelligence advice to the senior level; an agency level, exercising detailed control of the intelligence agencies. General Policy Level 2. At the political level decisions are made by the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence for governmentwide activities and b-y ro.inisters for departmental activities. At the most senior official level the Intelligence Policy Cor.mtlttee {IPC) was established to provide government-wide general policy coordination and control. For all activities placed under.its general policy control, it is supposed to determine the nature a.nd extent of their programs, the resources to be assigned to them., and to assess their performance. It should control the nature and extent of all relations _with foreign intelligence activities. Departmental activities are controlled by senior departmental officials, with the exception of the special arrangements made for the Connnunications Branch. Middle Level 3. r This level coordinates and controls intelligence ac,ftivities at the. national level including the production of~intelligence at that level and relations with foreign national level organizations, and gives professional intelllgence advice to senior levels. It consists of the most senior intelligence officers - who are the program managers of the ..... /39 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00312 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET r FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -39individual specialized intelligence agencies. An interdepartmental co:mrr..i ttee, the Joint Intelligence Cornmi ttee ( JIC), advises senior levels on most intelligence questions other than SIGINT at the national level; produces the intelligence end-products required at the national level; and conducts rel-ations with foreign national intelligence organizations. Comparable responsibilities for advice and foreign relations concerning SIGINT are discharged by a Director of Connnunications Security (DCS), advised by an interdepartmental CoillI!littee, the Communications Research Committee (CRC). Coordination between the JIC and the DCS - CRC structure is provided by the most senior intelligence officers being members of both the JIC and the CRC. Agency Level. 4. The head of each of the intelligence agencies is its program manager and principal decision point. These officers are: External Affairs - Head of Security and Intelli 0 ence Liaison Division; DND - Deputy Chief for Intelligence and Security; RCHP - Director General, Security and Intelligence; SRB - Director of Special Research Bureau; CBNRC - Director, Cornmunication·s Branch, National Research Council. Within policies approved at the general policy level, and vrithin assigned resources, these intelligence . program managers control day-to-day operations of their agencies, and carry out necessary inter-agency business with the consumers of their end-products, the sources of inputs to their agencies, an& wit4 foreign intelligence organizations at the agency level. 5. In deciding what needs to be done at these three levels, the main questions requiring clarification are the principles governing which matters should be under control by departments and which under control by the Cabinet Committee • . It is recognized that no clear-cut divisions can be made but the following principles are recommended as working guidelines: (a) Departmental control is appropriate for departmental activities which are based almost entirely upon their own resources and to meet their owh needs. For example, military intelligence about technical and operstional military capabilities in more detail than other departments would normally need. TOP SECRET FOR CANA.DIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00313 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF r TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN r~ -4-0(b) Interdepartmental control of activities is desirable: --for those agencies which serve all depa.rt•ments - such as the Special Research Bureau which provides economic intelli~~ence, CBNRC which provides SIGINT, and the intercept stations; - when departments need to make substantial demands on other departments or agencies for information and judgm.ents. Examples of analyses and forecasts which should be produced interdepartmentally for this reason are: analyses and reporting concerning foreizn military activities in situations of interest to External Affairs - as they require military as well as political skills; judgrnents needed by the Defence Staff on the likelihood that foreign military forces could become involved in situations which might also involve CnnaGian forces - as they require External Affairs as well as military skills. In many cases one or both departments also need the zervices of CBNRC or SRB. - for those activities which our allies regard as of substantial value to them and which therefore affect their attitude towards providing the help upon which all our intelligence agencies are very dependent; - for dealings with foreign intelligence organizations; - for those collection activities which involve risks of public or diplomatic protests or publicity of a type or extent which would be of concern to the Government. TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00314 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EY3S ONLY -41Senior official level decision~making and organization 6. The basic purpose of intelligence is to help the Government to assess foreign situations by addinc; to material derived from other sources of information-and. analysis. This requires the blending of the work of intelligence and of other advisers and calls for control of intelligence activities by the same most senior departmental officials who control nonintelli 0 ence activities. The concept of a single Intellicence Policy Comr.:i ttee 1 composed of the official heads of t.i10 C_u:);_~2t:.nents most concerned with fo1.. e ign affairs 1 defence and seCUl"'ity is therefo:;:,e fundamentally sound. Agency level decisio~~al~ing and ol"'ganization 7. The arPangern.ents summarized under the heading of the progra...'11 1nanagemeni; of intelligence acencies are funda..-nentally sound. So,- also, is the di vision of functional specializations and of collection 1 processing 1 and production activities between depart~~nts and agencies. Considered across the boa:!:'d the intelligence agencies compare favouraoly .for theiP size with equivalent activities in London and ~ashington and with other activities of the Canadian Govermnent. 11 A 6 ency level"· fol" 8. A noteworthy difference between the scope of Canadian and of both British and An1erican intelligence activities is the l"'elative absence of a cove1. . t intellizence collection se1»vice in Canada {spies). No case can be rr1ade on ~he basis of critical Canadian needs, nor on the basis of the existence of unique human sources which could only be employed by a Canac.ian se1"vice, which would. be sufficient to j]Jstify the large resources required., the long lead time which would be necessary to create a capability in this fie.ld 1 and the political risks attendant upon cove1"G intelligence collection operations abroad. Middle level decision-making and _organization 9. It is moI•e difficult to determine the best; arI•anr;er,10nts at the middle level than at the senior policy or the agency management levels. The basic question is whether to acco::iplish coordinated and cooperative activities between tho intelli3ence ..... /42 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00315 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - DEF r TOP SECRET FOR CANADTA1l EY'~S ONLY -42operating agencies by: a central intelli.<rnnce agency; an intelligence community, coordinated and operated through a committee or comritltt0es; or a loose association of departmental in~elli~ence organizations conducting ad noc bilate~al and multilateral dealings as necessary. 10. A central intelligence agency with a single adviser and controller is not as com.patible with the Cabinet system of government and Illinisterial responsibility, and with the membership of -the Cabinet Com;,nittee on Security and Intelli.::;ence and the Intelligence Policy Comr,iittee, as a comr,dttee rcpres~nting all departments and independent agencies. Having a single adviser on intellisence matters is also more likely than a co:m:nittoe system to lead to intelligence being presented to senior official and political levels in isolation rather than blended with material from other sources and from all departments, as the pro er role of intelli~ence would re uire. It is noteworthy that 11. A loose association of departmental intelligence organizations would entail problems for the IPC because of their number and variety. To coordinate advice from them for the IPC a secretariat would be needed, but it would be less i:1 touch with agency views and problems and less expert than a con-:1i ttee of agency heads. In the absence of continuing machinery to produce national intelligence there would be a greater likelihood that conflicting intelligence would be presented to political and senior official levels by individual departments. _·when national intelligence was produced sor.ie kind of ad hoe machinery would be needed, but it would be less expert and therefore less effective than continuing arrangements. Departments and agencies would also be in a weaker position if they dealt with foreign agencies singly and on the basis of their own product alone than they would be dealing as a concerted body on the basis of our collective efforts. For many reasons, therefore,arrangements would be needed to achieve coo~dinated advice and cooperative activities. These arrangements would be weaker than a com:'ni ttee of agency heads with a strong senoo of common interests, because they would be less strongly supported, would be less·expert, and would lack a sense of collective responsibility for the effectiveness of our intelligence efforts as a whole. .., ... /43 TOP S E C R E T ~ FOR CANA1)IAN GYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00316 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN -2:YES ONLY 12. A number of middle level arrangements could be made to work and each would have its peculiar merits and demerits. The worst problems to be avoided would be too much control and too many decisions being taken out of the hands of departments in an overcentralized system; and too many decisions being taken and too many act"i.vities being undertaken by departments in isolation in the absence of continuing. machinery in which the intelligence agencies could participate in coordination and cooperative activities. 13. The best overall results are likely to be produced by a committee system, in which all the departments and independent agencies would be represented, and in which the committee members would take collective responsibility for the effectiveness of our intelligence efforts as a whole. This would require on the part of the members a sense of community as well as of departmental and agency interests and responsibilities, and it should be one of the principal concerns of the committee chairman to foster this spirit among the members. 14. The basic system for the middle level should be a sinele committee, which micht be called the Intelligence Management Committee. It should consist of the heads of the departmental and independent agencies. Its responsibilities should be to advise the senior o~ficial level on all intelli0 ence questions which might be considered by the Cabinet Committee or the IPC; to produce intelligence end-products at the national level; and to conduct relations with foreign intellisence organizations at the national level. 15. The. scale of SIGU;rT in CBlJRC and in National Defence and the extent of its resources should be regarded as general policy questions under the IPC, and therefore of the Intalligence }fanagement Committee. SIGINT is by far the largest and most important of the activities which our allies regard as of substantial value to them, and which therefore affect their attitudes to all our intelligence agencies. Since the success of all agencies is likely to be affected in very important ways by all aspects of our SIGINT program, all agencies should have an equal voice in advising the IPC on the nature and extent of this program and of its resources. This should include the ..... /44 TO FOR C A-2023-00052--00317 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -44collection (intercept) stage as well as the processing stage. This snould mean that middle level responsibilities for SIGIET should be the common concern of all departments and agencies, operating through a corl'lillittee wh~ch would take collective responsibility for its activities. 16. Other activities which are also regarded by our allies as of substantial value to them, and which should likewise be added to those already under the control of the IPC, are Special Center activities and Canadian Forces Attaches and Advisers. This would provide comparable middle level arrangements for SIGINT and for all other activities, including those at present conducted by the JIC, and there would appear to be no merit in having two separate committees for this purpose. 17. To·· avoid the occurrence of compromise decisions which can arise in cow.111ittees which require unanimous decisions, the terms of reference of the middle level committee should explicitly state that members should have the right to dissent from decisions of the connnittee and to express their views in footnotes, and the terms of reference should also explicitly record the collective responsibility of the connnittee members. 18. Present arrangements should also be improved by a clearer identification and recording of those intelligence activities which are the responsibility of the Cabinet Committee, and therefore of the IPC and the Intelligence Management Committee, according to the guidelines set out in the preceding pages. These should be grouped into a number,of clearly defined programs for program planning and budgetary purposes. They should follow normal government procedures. Programs, plans and budgets should be initiated by the program managers. They would be submitted to the Intelligence Management Committee for its comments and recommendations and for subrn.ission to the IPC, which would approve or refer to ministers as necessary. A;ency program managers should be responsible for the day-to-day operations and all relevant management decisions. The exercise of program management functions at the middle level, as occurs at present by the DCS for some SIGINT decisions~ should be discontinued. The Special Research Bureau has a separate program already and this arrangement should be continued substantially as at present, with such adjustments as are required to conform to new connnunity-wide procedures. SIGI1JT needs to be ••.. . /~-5 TOP SECR.ST FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00318 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN !!.Y.:::s 01JLY -45reconsidered for program management purposes consistently 1-rith the recomruendations made for reorganization of the field. 19. I assume that the center of gravity of intelligence matters should remain in Ext;ernal Affairs for the prese~t. Because intelligence looks outward beyond our boundaries-, it seems to me to be best centered in :2:xternal if that De-oartment is wllling to handle it. The changes now taking place.in External in response to Govern~ent policies and internal reorganization will render it more able to deal with intellisence alon 6 with other things. This question should perhaps be reviewed.again in two or three years' time. 20. Whatever else is done I think the Privy Council Office should·play a more active and positive part than in the past. Conceivably the PCO should become what I have called the center of gravity of intelligence operations, - e;• • •• • ; r 21. There is a nice question as to how far the HC!iP organization can assuine more responsibility for the generalized aspects of ·intelligence ( and counter-intelligence) Hi thout unduly stretching the individual case-by-case approach of a police force. On this depends to some extent whether a small ::i.nalytical and advisory group should be established els01·1her•e, perhaps under the Chairman of the Intellie:;ence Hanagement Cor.rrni ttee or p·erhaps "lAnder the representative of PCO on thc..t Com:rai t t e 0. r ..... /46 TOP SECRii:T FOR CANADIAN EY'~S ONLY A-2023-00052--00319 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF ~ FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -46- -- . .•YT . Chairmanship of Committees In the design of the intelligence decision-rnnldnG r,w.chinery, it is important to ensure that intellicence is responsive to the changing needs of the users and that their future needs ar•e anticipated, while at the same time full use ·is made of those lessons from t~e past which are of continuous value. • 2. At the general policy decision-making level the 1ninistors _are aware of' cul"'rent and future priori ties and concerns, but are not familiar with the processes of intelli 6 once and of the many considerations which affect its successful operation. They must therefore look to the most senior official level (i.e., the IPC) to ensure the right balance between responsiveness· and expertise in the intelligence organizations. Since the basic purpose of intelligence is to assist in the assessment of foreign situations., the Chairman of the Intelligence Policy Comr,tlttee should be the IPC member concerned most centrally with both intelligence and non-intelligence participation in this process •. The present arrangement should be continued., whereby the .Chairman of the IPC is the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. • 3. At the middle level the Intelligence IS::anagement Cornmi ttee should contain a proper mix of career personnel fr•om the foreign and military services and of intelligence experts. The former should be chosen to bring fresh viewpoints., and usors 1 viewpoints, to bear on all the processes and products of intelligence. The latter should bring to the collective consideration of intelligence the depth of experience which is necessary because of the complexity of the total ramifica~ions of intelligence activities, and because intelligence involves many sensitive questions concerning control of intelligence products and in our dealings with foreign agencies. 4-• To p1.. ovide the necessary balance, and because of the wide and continuous responsibilities of the committee, the Intellisence Manaeement Connnittee should have a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman. The Chairman should be a career foreign service officer for the same 1,eason as the Chair1r1an of the IPC should be the most senio1~ official of the foreign service. To provide stability and time to make an effective contribution to the job it is desirable that he should serve for a minimum of ..... /47 TOP SECRET FOR C.\K1-\DIAN EY~S ONLY A-2023-00052--00320 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF r TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYi::s ONLY -47two yoA.rs. ··To ensure that fresh viewpoints continue to be injected into middle level management it is desirable that the Chairman should not serve for longer than four years. The Vice-Chairman should have experience and qualifications which are complementary to those of the Chairman and he sh.oµld be an officer with depth of experience and expertise in the intelli~ence function. . .... /48 TOP SECRET FOR CAHADIAN EY.i:,~S ONLY A-2023-00052--00321 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF r FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -48,;, XII. Financing of Intelligence 'rhere are two main .ways of approa.ching the problem of dividing·intelligence costs between departments. One approach is to make the division according to the benefits received by departments, and the other according to their ability to hide the costs within departmental totals. v-n1ile the former way would appear to be the more rational, there are very real difficulties in finding an objective way of . measuring the benefits received. For example, if either the SIGift"T interc~pt budget or the CBNRC budget were divided up according to the benefits received, as measured by the number of personnel working on tasks requested by the respective departments·, External Affairs would pay nothing - because no Canadian collection or processing is being done specifically :ror them - while the RCMP would pay a very greatly increased share. If these same budgets were divided up in proportion to the benefits received, as measured by the number of items of SIGINT end-product from all agencies re:rerred to depart~ents, then the Department of External Affairs would pay almost if not as much as DND, whereas the RCMP would pay yery little. The first of these two systems is obviously inequitable in terms of benefits received. Since the total External Affairs budget is about one-twentieth of that of DlID the second method would make it very much more difficult for them to hide their share than it would be for Dl\TD, and this method is obviously unworkable from the practical, financial and the security points of view. 2. On balance it is preferable that the principal departments .ii:x.ternal, Defence and the RCHP - should pay the costs oi' the activities conducted by their departments, plus a portion\ of the cost of cmmc., so that their total payments for intelli- ~ sence activities are roughly in proportion to their total budgets. Under such a regime it is important that Treasury Board avoid giving the 11 paying11 departments the impression that they aro being penalized for their service to the Goverllillent as a whole by continually asking them to reduce other things to pay for intelligence. In effect., Treasury Board should accept \ the responsibility of tucking away out of sight the intelligence expenditures in departmental budgets. ''ii I ~ "I~ f';~ \:1 3. Decisions on the manpower resources and the sums of money to be spent on the intelligence programs which should be under the general policy control of the Cabinet Conmlittee . . ..... /~.9 ~ FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00322 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -49- l r shou d be made by the Cabinet Committee each e • The necessary program and estimates decisions s ould be made as separate decisions from Cabinet decisions concerning foreign service,. defence and security programs in general, although they will necessarily be in step. Program Forecast and Estimates submissions should be submitted py the IPC to the ~reasur~...B,Qarg following normal procedures as to form and, content. Plans, manpower and estimates for intelligence programs under Cabinet Committee control should be examined by the Treasury Board,. or by a special group of the Treasury Board,. and decisions on them should be made and reported as separate programs from those of the departments proper. In this way the intelligence prograiris which had been considered by the Cabinet Committee as separate programs would not be directly competitive with the programs of the departments proper; although they will of course be indirectly competitive with demands on total gove1.. nment resources of those and other departmental programs. The personnel and budgetary data for the intelligence programs would be submerged in departmental totals in the printed Government Estimates and for all public unclassified parliamentary purposes. These arrangements would be the same as those carried out by the Department of External Affairs for the Special Research Bureau for the last three years. Funds authorized by these procedures should be expended as far as possible through the machinery of the Department_ providing the administration for the activity. 4. Departments receiving only the economic part of the total intelligence output are not now paying anythlng towards intelligence costs. To do so would involve different kinds of security and presentational difficulties. It cannot be assumed that intelligence will never be the subject of public enquiry and report and SIGINT,. as the largest and most expensive activity, would loom very large. Explaining expenditures for such purposes by departments such as Finance,. Industry, Trade and Commerce, the.Bank of Canada,. etc.,. would raise many more difficulties than the conduct of these same kinds of activities for military,. political and security purposes,. as many public disclosures and writings about SIGINT in other countries should have done something to prepare the public for the idea that such activities. are normal and necessary for those reasons. Heasured by any criteria the proportional benefits received by those department~ which receive only economic intelligence would be very small. The presentational difficulties, taken together TOP SECRET ..... /50 FOR CANADI/ulT EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00323 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -50with the administrative complications of administering a number of very small amounts of money hidden in the estimates of numerous departments, argue strongly against allotting shares of intelli~ence budgets to departments who consume only very small proportions of the total intelligence pro&ucts and it is re.cmmnended that they not be involved • . . . . . /51 r TOP SECR~T FOR CANADIAN £'YES ONLY A-2023-00052--00324 �Released under the ATIA • unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI • renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF XIII. Hecoir..nendations: 1,. That intellisence be reco3:nized as a~-1 esson:-ial and continuing activity of the Jovermient ~-1itl1 a basis i:1 established foreign ana defence policy., 2., T~·.at the ·,,:aln purpose is to utilize inforn.ation fro:;;--, all 30\.Jf'c:;:;, "tX"Jrtaining to the security of the country and its ins~ i tut ions., to i nforr.:. the ,.J-ovc,rnment of daneors and throats from abx•oaJ by foreign organizationG ·which nr.rJ be private as well as gove~nffiental and may operate inside or outside the country. J., That the Gov n~n::ont continue in -'.:ho licJ-1.t of Cano.Ji an intcr0s ts to .)o.rt le ipate ln the a1"rang.e;,10nts -.,.; : t;:1 L10 '.Jnited Linsdora1 o.nd che ;Joitod States, as t:C1e best iray of obtaini □ G access to world-wide intellizence. 1:-., '.I"'hat an offo be r-:ade, consistently with the a1°I•o.n;:.:;crr1.onts in 3. abo7o, to give more en_phasis to aroas of direct i~terest to Canada~ That l;he Cabinot Conr-2ittee on 3ecr:.::"ity and Intolli~once be continuodu ft '.:f :)., ,1at che Intelli ·~·on6e ?olic~.r ., Gon:mittee be reactivated, along the lines succested, to guide u □ d appraise t~o entire intellicance coruuun:ty and to deal with all matte~s or irrter-50.:.)artr·10ntal and nation-wide interest. 7., That the Joi:1t In!~olliGence Co:mnitteo be :::.Esh:::1ded and an Into lli,::;onc e : (1ugm11ent Con:mi tteo be cr•eo.t ed to advlsc: ~·v::i scni:)1' 01~:Cic:i.al level on all quest ions wh'Lch ,;;ht be considered by the Cabinet c;on.::,1ittee or "'.:11e IPC, to produce ::he best possible assessments on relevant matters at the governmental level, and to conduct relations with f'oreie;ri' . intclli::;ence organizations at the gov02nmental level .. 3.. That chairmanship and :nembership of the Com:nittee be as proposed. 9.. T:1.at ,;:;{terne.l Affairs revi0w the Security and Intelli3ence Liaison Dlvision and its othsr intellicance a:.. . ran,rn:·:1ents to bring them up to date with the new responsibilities and that an Assistant Under Secrete..ry be responsible in the D0pf"rt1;1ont for intellizonce., TOP SECRET FOR CAHADTAU BYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00325 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified informatic Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements nc classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN" EYES ONLY -52- 0 10. Tl1at an intelligence unit be established with the responsibility of exunin1ng all aspects f'l"orn a more general and comprehensive point of view than at present. (Depending on where this unit is located it might serve also as the secretariat of the IHC which will be a requ1rement in any event.) • \ 1 ,,,<, 11. That signal intelligence continue to constitute ( the major Canadian contr1bution to the tripartite arrangements for some time to come and that some capital improvements be undertaken to keep it up to date., these to be phased with ti.1e early completion of other capital programs in National Defence.· 12. That the Director of CBNRC be made the managel" of .1 CBNRC by terminating the special management responsibilities'· now exercised in External Affairs (DCS). 13. That a method be found of conducting periodical administrative and management reviews of the various intelli3ence units., despite the requirements of secrecy which lead to the work being done in relative isolation from the Government's central control machinery. 14. That the Government develop the capacity to plan and budget for intelligence on a contemporary and comprehensive basis, as suggested in some detail. o--f.->n:t.r:~_-__ 15. . That total intelligence ex;~di~~s be maint. ained \ at their existing level during ·the coming ye~ while the Government is developing a continuing capacity to appraise the whole field on a current basis. A-2023-00052--00326 ,, j �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies BLANK PAGE A-2023-00052--00327 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF APPENDIX 11 An TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY Needs for Intelligence Within the Framework of Foreign Policy and Defence Policy Any consideration of Canada's needs in the field of intelligence must be based on the framework of Can&dian policy objectives, as indicated for instance in the Government's recent paper, Foreign Policy for Canadians, and the Prime Minister's st.atement of April 3, 19611, on defence policy. Summarized below are some of the significant points made in these documents, together with cormnents relating them to the subject of this report: 11 (a) Foreign policy is the product of the Government 1 s progressive definition and pursuit of national aims and interests in the international environment. It is the extension abroad of national policies~" . (FP for C's p.9.) The basic role of Canada's intelligence program is to help the Government assess the nature of this international environment. (b ). "Objecti vos have to be set not in a vacuum but in the context in which they will be pursued, that is, on the basis of reasonable assumption of what the future holds", but "the risks of' faulty or short-lived predictions run high••• Forecasts for foreign policy purposes must be generalized. They rest on the facts and interpretations of international developments which are both subject to correction and change, and susceptible of widely differing deductions.If (FP for -C 1s, PP• 11-12 and 20.) Intelligence, prudently used, often provides a small but important extra margin of hard fact which permits the much greater mass of. press and other overt information to be more reliably interpreted. {c) nsix main themes of national policy form as well the broad framework of foreign policy, 11 i.e. (i) Fosterin 9 Economic Growth, including, in the foreign field, export prornotion; keeping up to date on scientific and technological discoveries, world trade TOP SECRET ..... /2 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00328 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified informatic Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements nc classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRE'T FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY and financial trends, policies of major trading countries and blocs, etc.; expansion of trade and markets; innovations in goods and services offered; inmrl.gration; information activities. (FP for C1 s, pp.14 and 34-5). Intelligence of various kinds is important for an understanding of the great closed societies, the USSR and China, which are or may eventually be major trading partners of Canada and of its Western economic competitors; indeed intelligence analysis is an ultimate source of much of the most useful published information about these countries. r Intelligence on the economic policies of non-Communist countries is not usua!Iy important compared with other sources, but it sometimes provides information which is tactically useful to Canada as well as its competitors (wheat sales opportunities, reactions to Canadian policies}. Intelligence exchanges, e.g. with the United States, reflect and reinforce the climate of mutual confidence which facilitates early transfers to Canada of new technology (which is to an increasing extent military in origin). United States reliance on Canadian defence industries is also encouraged. (ii) Safeguarding Sovereignty and Independence 1 'is largely a matter oYprotecting Canada's territorial integrity, its constitutional authority, its national identity and freedom of action". {PP for 0 1 s, p.15) • ..... /3 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00329 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 3 -- Intellieence is of course directly relevant to this policy theme in its military sense, i.e. the task of safeguarding sovereignty through surveillance and control of Canadian territory, stressed in the April 3, 1969, defence policy statement. Intelligence exchanges have been useful, and could perhaps be more so, in gaining knowledge of external paragraph r of this report. {iii) Promoting Social Justice, in the foreign field, includes in particular development assistance programs, which in turn must be correlated with policies on issues such as the peaceful settlement of disputes, promotion·of human rights, race conflict, control of arms export, and military training programs. (FP for 0 1 s, pp.15 and 35-6). Intelligence can help to throw light on the activities of Communist countries in these fields - activities which are important because of the extent of resources behind them and.because they can affect the implementation of Canada's own policies in the developing world. {iv) Enhancing the Qualit~ of Life involves, abroad, such activities as cultural, technological and scientific exchanges, and bringing under control problems such as air hijacking, the international drug traffic, and organized crime across frontiers. {FP for C1 s, PP• 16 and 36). -- Intelligence, by providing information on the technological and sc.ientific needs of r TOP SECRET ..... /4 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00330 �Released under the ATIA • unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI • renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - L~ - Communist countries, can help to clarify their objectives in accepting exchanges and assist us in bargaining with them. International police action, backed by intelligence activities, is of course important in the other aspects mentioned above. • (v) Ensuring a Harmonious Natural Environment -- Intelligence can provide information on the environmental concerns and policies of those industrialized countries which are closed societies. Canada already has serious environmental problems in common with the USSR (e.g. in the Arctic); accordingly, this aspect of intelligence could be increasingly important in future. r {vi) Working for Peace and Security 11 means seeking to prevent war or at least to contain it••• through defence arrangements, arms control, peacekeeping, the relaxation of tensions, interna.tional law., or improvement in bilateral . relations. 11 1'Dei'ence arrangements must be ••• sufficient to ensure respect for Canada's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and also to sustain the confidence of the u.s. and other allies••• (and) sharing in the responsibility for maintaining stable nuclear deterrence and by participating in NATO policy-making in both political and military fields." {FP for cts, pp. 15 and 37-8). This policy theme is closely linked with the Prime Minister's dei'ence ~olicy statement of April 3, 1969., which indicates that - Canada's defence policy anuld contribute to world peace - Non-alignment for Canada is rejected - Appropriate Canadian parti.cipation in collective security arrangements (e.g. NORAD and NATO) will continue r ..... /5 TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00331 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 5 Canada's defence forces will be designed for: the surveillance of Canadian territory and coast lines, i.e. protection of sovereignty North .American defence in cooperation with the United States agreed NATO commitments peacekeeping roles which may be assumed \ -- Intelligence is basic to effective Canadian policies in the field of peace and security •. This is not only because of the tactical intelligence requirements of Canada's military forces but, more • important, because the ability to make independent judgments about the relative military capabilities and intentions of the major world powers is essential in order for Canada to be able to make its own distinctive contribution to a.rtns control and d~tente efforts, and to decide on the most rational allocation of its own resources.among different defence roles. Without contributing to and thus gaining access to the huge pool of intelligence raw materials gathered largely by its allies, Canada would have to determine its "peace" policies and the pattern of its defence expenditures -largely on the basis of other countries 1 , assessments of the data. Such assessments can be consciously or unconsciously colored by the political preoccupations of thei~ authors. {d) qanada must assess its various policy needs in the context of two "inoscapable realities 0 - the problem of maintaining national unity, and that of "living distinct from but in harmony with the world's most powerful- nation, the United States". (FP for C I s, PP• 20-1). (The paper elaborates on this point about.the United States in a nwnber of other passages.~ r The possible reJ_evance of intelligence to national unity h1;3..s been nentioned above under the sovereignty. policy theme. TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00332 �Released under the ATIA. unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI • renseignements non classifies s.15(1) - DEF TOP SECRET FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 6 - Participation in intelligence exchanges with the United States - particularly in the highly sensitive but crucial communications area which provides much of the most solid intelligence available - helps to set the United StatesCanadian relationship (like the United StatesBritish relationship) apart from the United States' relationship with virtually all of its other allies. The fact that Canada, along with two or three other nations, is largely privy to what the Unitod States regards as one of its own key sources of information is an important factor in the degree of fr~nkness which United States officials fee}_ they can or must adopt with us on issues involving other countries. The world env:.rornnent as a. whole is extensively affected by the privileged knowledge which the larger pouers·have or one another and of smaller count1•ies through their own costly intelligence offorts. Our appreciation of this fact, gained through our intelligence ex.changes, helps us deal realistically with the policies not only of the United States but also of' other major countries. TOP SECRE'T r FOR OARADIAN EYES ONLY A-2023-00052--00333 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies n n A-2023-00052--00334 �❑UCl.iment Released Under the Access to Information Act / Document divulgu6 en v(rtu de la Loi sur I'accik; a (' information. Note: Appendix B was almost entirely redacted from the CSE release of this document. This version of Appendix B is from a PCO ATIP release likely dating from the early 1990s; the ATIP request number is not known. 1 APPS bTX DEPAIMIU-11-11' 01: EAUL'UNAL AFFAIRS U 1r r }.UMSTERE DES AFTANES Ott•c•r•1, Jul,)' ^7, 1970 js J i)C:: r . 2 J) LI Dr . Tsbi ,,iter: You will recall thkt in mice-Jvmc, :•;; EQ WO W• C,- ; the Un ! er•- 3ecretary t , o f fice •:ii.5C:l Sl':•i; t ho tO Uh ,:?^ Lr,1FlUt of o1n., intclli4cnee f ,. 1t11 Uric! cr-Scc;•c.tary and ; s;'. 'i'rembla.y rcccnL)c:n^i::i that. •,ou , rc:a?; to 6), Herds oi' l:i:• is:i.c , 1 -,., a al.out ' his Tr•. .tte: , You subse,: .: ntl;y indl ica' .:d thetl you ti;oul(j Iikc to see the results of a . urvcy ti•;h:i.<:h we , lr.ve be::,1 condll;•tin— lyith the'. Divioions i11co, Karch for the j)urpc;-e of cvaIva l f n. ti7C of the that i:I MaCIC ava=ilable to the:!—.l iYt tornm of the Divisions 1.princi.pa). interests. ,fe have consulted our Africa and kiddie East Di.vi: i.Or1 F Ams Control and Disa.m-.,%T;.ent•• Div:1si.on, Comnion:,recl.).th Division, vision, •rZlropean Division, Far &. stern Division, i--ttin Ara?rican Division, CoTmerc:ial Policy Division, Transport, Communications and .::narc;y Division ' . North Arw:ricari Ds.fence a-A NAT U 0 Division, and Peeccke.cpin• and ]: i].itury Assistance Division, A srinlrarf o• the result;,• of our consultations is att-.chod. You have •1hlc c' in pa1•ticulc,•_r about the usci•ulness of inte:i.l.•ec;nce in h•lp:in• us to adv -1 sc ti-pr: Covc:ln-•l••nt r YOu have also asked, aUa1tt the use of intelligence. by CIA. DA. I11t•:t11:iZ,enee is vc;`; selcior,: sent. to CIDA, The latter is ac'.vzs ci c>rl aid r:,r:';t:_ by tIv.; Divisions of t)li_,- Dopartmz t dc•alirl:;; .:i:•l) the countries an, tl: "• )` advice tales i17to account any il)forimation ve roc -civ9 t•hrou h intC:J.1-. 1 ,• 1C11C•C Ctrii•l.;'• that may be availablc and relevant, Your: s.il;c 000062 :1'levizO. Mv1F:vT u;i :Jparl:a to i`vo, I �Document Released Under the Access to Inforniotion Act / Docurnent divulgue e11 vertu dE• Ire Loi sur I'acc(•.s ai'irtfor;nation. 2- DT' 3.)TliYi On April 8 r;e co,isu].i:od. the Head of the Section of thi.:: ll:i% ie:ion tits ?J 7. ; res}_o•,•,il•lu for r the ef•'ec :i•• c;•:::, s of the ir,tellir-:-nct: thr.t i• _-Iabout r ay.ailabl.c to }: ire r ,'le Ormight his VI.&...:, on to nd u.•cfl1lne:"E, of currant ill cJ.l.i c,i •C as a sure •. 110"'L"'11 repo .t:i.;r 41 of Our u,i.s ; ions on three eutca;ories of inte].1•acne•,t }• c 1.1':Cl.irivf>• ,^_ J 2 000063 �File / Dossier. Page(s) A-2011-00010 64-66 is (are) withheld because of / est (sont) retenue(s) pour ✓ Exemptions(s) / Exception(s) D Exclusion(s) 0 Duplicate(s) of / Duplicate(s) de(s) ♦ Not Relevant / Non pertinente(s) s.15(1) �Document Released Under the Access to information Act / Document divdg, en vertu de fa Loi sur I'acc6s a(' information. 3 AIFRICA lull) On July 2 we consulted Africa and Middle East Division about the uscfulness of the intelliGence that iv available to the llivOR r we placed thca recont intelligence rcporbs on J lop 000067 �File / Dossier. Page(s) A-2011-00010 68-69 is (are) withheld because of / est (sont) retenue(s) pour ✓ Exemptions(s) / Exception(s) 4 Exclusion(s) 0 Duplicate(s) of / Duplicata(s) de(s) ® Not Relevant / Non pertinente(s) s. 15(1) �Document Releaser! Under the Access to Infu-oration Act / Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a l'information. _ l: "Obviously, 3' a-rec rri-th Mr. Dclvoie about tha desirability of . hzvin suwas.txi.es which hi ghl -fight nevi olcracnts ' in lengthy reports on s:i.twd.;ions of continuin- i.ntcrest ri ct.li2l this 1Lmy not always; bo practicable.; bllt w;ithGll:, . £. l?ch Sl`J:'t,':••.1'y y or some pointer to new clenionts, 1 fcar -mally of. these rel:,ol,ts r1ske. little impact with Inc ) for sheer lack of reading ti mcp Une final paint, l-ir. Dclvoie hao noted that one of the itcnts y uhieh we made use of ,x thinlc in a dangerous an d tricky si_tuatioll tire. are. b;tuc off to get promptly warn.-im- signal.:• F - 000070 �Document Released Under II-) eAccess to Information Act / Document divulgue en vertu de la poi sur I'acc6s •• I'information. Ot ] April 6 we consilltej the }fead of the sect.`Lon of t),i:., ni,•i si which is x esporis.i.hle for Foti of the inti-11j enct J tb•tlt, the effectiv ness , that is availa]]lc(• tWU )( inCtS f of Lnti ] ]- j-CriC•: UIle a sot"ght his vic,:i of ; 1]r: us.chll• n(i sJ of• 11-, vine the other for the re- a lJ 3r l.r]'T on U ance it r, ay have (- J 000071 �DOcl.lment Released Under the Access to Information Act / Document divulgu6 en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (' information. AR -HS CONTRar.. ,VII DIVISIcr C•n June 22 , ro consulted the 11cad of this Div:;.sion about the it ^efll•.liCs:, foie hi.s 1;ur•:.•ses uJ,, tha in;.elliEencc th::t, is ava:iJ.abl.c to U3 I ` F.i> 000072 �File / Dossier. Page(s) A-2011-00010 73 is (are) withheld because of / est (sont) retenue(s) pour ✓ Exemptions(s) / Exception(s)_s. 15(1) 0 Exclusion(s) Duplicate(s) of / Duplicata(s) de(s) Not Relevant / Non pertinente(s) �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act / Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inforination. COI•••;Oi•f;''1:'•;•i'?i J3TV•7C: On Jul;, G ric cony .-ultc;l tr;e }{ cad of. this Division about the us( , :fu].n::st, for his Durp c)::es of t1:c A -ritellip.ence, that is available to ur, (• ♦0t a,/2 F r.+ t h • 4 000074 �Document Released tinder the Access to Information Act / Document divulgu(-I c'n VE-ftu de la Loi Sur I'acc6s a (' information. T`vi MIT i W "A,main, the F t p •.. i. • F. _• rcports r S excelicl:t - detailed, specific, and as far as I know accurate, HIVU•% -;;r s rcC_uireilel•l.t for infol'r: ation in this amount of detail is lose our j entcrprises , bc=30 our interests in the form of businass and rE':sMent Oman colshunitien — _ •Agiin, infori-at Lori on r;s:;.-s;,•- r .i trou'Dle iS that t.h; n re'adii)6, a no'..., e, I find. that I have f•r•c ,uently fordoQen Vint was in the :Last one or what the Ceneral situation was • p=erhaps so= mctho i of quicker and ;Wore cent ramous distribution could be devinad, "A good part of thy: Problem is Un waY in which inforantion bcc000:, available to tin: pCople i.n divisions, During a crisis, one tends to W. flooded ,•:.it,h informtaion of all coros, much of it press and Radio rc,,oYW-' which are often of poor SAW' and very :, lanced, the graat Iwoblaw in to recnW" and sift the Whcat frolL the ch„fif, at a tiro when one is ver%;• bu;y doing many- other thin.;s,. U»c;f:r present di.: ,tribut.icn r•iJ es, divisional officers havo only brief access to hiehly cl^ 5sifiod int.Nj] j_ gen" reports; in a welter of information and nds:infurnation, CC,`.` c is a tendency to forget what thu-F _ rC:O)'t.S of. a few days ago said, an_l thnv is some difficulty in getting access to it quickly, n• (. C 00007: �Document ReWased Under the Access tO lakrmation Act / Document divuQu6 en vertu do la Loi sur i'acc6 s • I'inforrnation, FURCI'1, N DIVISION On Ily 19, 1970 we sought the coamcnts of Furopuan Division on hho effectivencss of i.nte:l.lixonco that is ai ilabl.o to them i _JWe requested a Fencral as css— ment and we also soug ht the views of the Division on the tir.alines s 4nd rise-fulncss of cuprc of intell gemc, vicwnd as a cuppimcnt to the non;al rcpor. tin,: of Canadian t:ii:si.ons, on three upecif:i,c subjects: 3 c 1• 00007b �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act / Document divulgu6 en vertu de la Loi sur 1'acc6s a l'information. ,(1 C;• • i l i.Vii !.. •1• j FAR 1)TY T.):1.ON On June 29 wa consulted the ):fend of the DuparMont is For "astern Division about the useful.n ss for his purposes of the intell.igcnce that is availa ble t0 USF '•' G•) ,Q 1.- r.rr h GO , . r 000077 �File / Dossier. Page(s) A-2011-00010 78-80 is (are) withheld because of/ est (sont) retenue(s) pour ✓ Exemptions(s) / Exception(s) ® Exclusion(s) 0 Duplicate(s) of / Duplicate(s) de(s) 0 Not Relevant / Non pertinente(s) s. 15(1) �DOCLIment Released Uncler the,Access to Informatiori Act / Document divulgue cn vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a l'intormation. TUP (; 1i'1T Jn4, 1.6 y 0 1,4 :.. lJ Of •Trzt, r,lltl•c',ce .n he lnl'r_Y)1_,,{,' 6 6 I'or•Pn1.9.c -c. & the Infol,ar.t?.on 10 , n of ill? forei•-r, n(.i no one cr•r..cCr•lcd with the dv*vc:l.r.•l':;-r,lt and ca;Ccut:i.on lofi fo1•;L1tn• lo:L:•.cy t,i1?. :►. i.r':,i•ly d^•p)'a.vc ha.rrn atf Q-01. 1. IntcI1:tr•;:,]cc T::,1tCL`i':• itt of NlY )•ourc% Of I'010•e•.;.it infol;•f!l;iii.c,1 :tt curl l•f_ ; tlt •;t , pits of vic re::trictaa u: c; to Put , rr,tl. S hc,r., (,•. c,. I c,t,;;.,otc 1ri:c}l other info••lca. or) ft})` t:'iu 3t:i•t i,G•.r,?1 of the i1:,Cr a.nd tll: ? C: SpUI.'t G; (! N'1.j )r1b]_f l'1111:J there r:la;,• bc::,o •• uc!: o••v:;'C)11 l ;,, r•• t]'li;)• till U^C•.CS3 11C11.i''i,i_C^1 111ft•^t:'i'l•'..Un J' .:n t.j:ro7T,ati on than oi:•]cr and ut!e:t , (i 1'c:)1 a hJ.C.•lef• 1)r:io).J.t;T• ba 2 J't } rj'hC . n:, ; C:4:C',"!t 0 tl)e r}c;r ,Clt i:I,l nu I :ic.tt1•, ), ._ t' at u ct• Ire j.11 1. is . cJ th:i.n"i or t'r:o .;:; • • h:l. ,toY°y t 3.., concornec• ;rs.t}] t 'D C)'fi t ]n , ACC o.0 the sc <le f.hi.)i,;: the 1 lrc:ltc:]:iaJ. r•cscu.rce.:, a••a;,:Larr•e tc, it and r.;:u:i.i i•lle t-•_umr. errcct.a.t'r: u:::c a Coli;•;i.tt•t•c its - r:r., of ins tr<.•i)ictl bo dec:idcd is l.f':cller the cost of .yoh];' rerourcc. The quc:ctt.e)) to a intcll.-E,c•ncc in 1::_!n-. llourc] nnri r.onc:y ]; or'•.t, t•h r, ttlS C VG 17;1:}CC Of' rc.:olirccs coltld r•o, c u3,• it or wlc---t.11er 'c,lll•sc Sully be clr:l l-0 - cd in otht r directions. 3• poli.r..io;; yre e.TLThis matter pi' Prioa:ltie:s ohould de1::.nd u rnu•suinr . llra••:inr. + • j••J-V e... V•r 1V1• IY 1 1.44/1 " • G]l }7G !'1},1_i:: {• Jul-i' {: 11:? fir,;t. is no doubt i,he nl:ltter of natio)lal'uilt•,,••:•l••cl uphcr-c of l•ctcrn-tl Affair.: i.:) novc j*-tl]el,,•l•hich •lthouflI ol!t, .- do t!-' C O'il2` Sccond '.n;;o119. c:ncc: .. ! o vitally relcti•e,tlt to It.. t_ l ) Y.;L .» ity l:ould be the ):,•:irttcnllnc:C and extc+ln' on of our nai; of the T••:tvrlal Aff1-,ir )a, l• " Y•:ttiordc:nc a ti;hich t.s r;.t the vcr,; c•' O'L.ler cl.cn,clit^ rJitll il]tCla J irrr7 l.catlor_Jz have bct.n irlc.ntif'Lc;d in the DCpai'ir•(i]tr ; 1rh:ite l,J:pc nce but t•l,( 1'01.1o)rt;) o>r el'•'r•t.ions will. be Confined to the u,su Of jilt(: li'cencr: mw:tel•ia]_ in ) -elation to the: above oU,jCctivos. 4 l?e r1 l,j.I, )1'itlUr;tLl r r c:•:tri;],al P0lici.cc corr.-nancl broad , tt)itl t it is e ec*ti;i.al tlu:L all Country .U)J. t*)M t our Cn•a,n1 accer t;)lr..C, • ,at])in talc: idcntt.t r } • C' i. (•5 reinforce tlio COlint2'y r;; 3. It -• n a co:mlon di.t;lo"latic device .for ono cot;t,ti,, to drive ,.J b(:tl-Jcen dAffcrent cectio:ia and 3.)1';,c•z'erta ti.c{t :b;•)] $1~f snot };el• Courti'y , a.nd ty,erc S., cvcz Y rc ason t.) br.:l'l •: vC that C, j.t.a is v!11nerab.• c to' thic, trctltn:c:lt r ^ ; " rlhc c: ,:i.rter:co of t11i:, sox•• of i,•l Ind h,.. rno'l: been cycrtl,t fivrrl i.ti. indicates tll =t. i.hcrC is a Clear n(:ccl• Corcc cotl:c₹•cnt,ldcf•-•, LOn o npp.:lr„tun to i•erpond to t-be chaltcnEo. F 000081 �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act / Document divulgue en vertu de is Loi sur faeces • i'information. , r F . r r 'A cnc! ti 11 bc, j.t •t;icx:• r,ac n:•cessur fc•1 u {o t ' to a ')r.;otect; C ?;•: cLian izitc;ru3t3 a.,c r:r;:u.,{u• c,• abroad (• f J 000082 �File / Dossier. Page(s) A-2011-00010 83 is (are) withheld because of/ est (sont) retenue(s) pour ✓ Exemptions(s) / Exception(s) ® Exclusion(s) D Duplicate(s) of / Duplicata(s) de(s) © Not Relevant / Non pertinente(s) s. 15(1) �Document Released Under the /access to Information Act / Document divulgu& en vertu de is Loi sur 1'acces aI'inforniation. •- 4 J l3• 1' wrote r Att..clpc:d , Wj.tll •• , o:Lo r r• • r Gi •, •.• N1 cytr.•act fro-i ra. bcoJ: to be 1Mb1:i.r)lCd ,a by w or th tj)cy CXIA • 1 1 ,: 111.0; •— U; ° 1` 11 ':'t to •....., coverb tll On cc ; L?o stio.l of the ci'ouzbi J.:) f;y ( Ipf.I.C,I` Lit and iC,•`l!j it •;,• ,:•. t;tculy' will ct i•. JU.1•t;un (, t •, .tliornat,iorl oS WO ; • A Ac, ptr.rt:l.aip •• S • t )\ r: 1 .Gh.. does not l.t.ZZ) J .•.._"'••`••"... ;•:here als\;.ou ; illi',c ,' r :, t raid an obvjon3 abAlity fop doing • cdvc;nt•s N for inioroa'•ion, i]1C.U).1•Orcit.!i 1 r:ij' \•, ;;i M t•hr.:•• l,a:y k •• : on t.)c. • cacr•••. u••e):ulncss Of r" I would cor,cll+.ctcul]. tt)• , t! :_ and c33_s••r.)vR)li:s>>c in p•ece:ivi.n; this tyl;c tp• ll i e.,1.'0 •,; ao f j Priox-j dars. iii •• rcL':n > >' L c W o a question of }',rice ant r Qc;r:p tJccnt: . hu•,,• r, } : c s the value 01' intelliconco to til i l.d not be too dfjj, l.t, io c;llc::• Use 1:'e I u3t : ic7-vic , and tt)a:,c oS Othc '1F.tC Ga.n<•dA41. J.C•til.li•; 11 a;;:;ic••J..c:;"i.Elp t•7i.lt tiL'i'1•:L^,l'• Ll•,f l•fL' ',•• IUUI.•t he c.bl:; to ••.. i71t1'?` c;•t• ]. 11 :•. lit.n}_).J.•;i'h u: Material t E : ,") pL ^ 9 our own CiC.'J:,•: •' [.: li p evial in t 1' •: r,t.:il•••t: ?' i br:;cd an t• • c7,n• of. •• 1-'^rccnt:••,;c D ! he Ll.`I r: i ; 1p ):. 1•,Y U G 1t •.., • i' np'Gcl i • Cl t3 L ...1•. E • :1.I1GU,•,.1 J•,:' ''- ..;:1 by O l,c:nt in piuc,,•.;;(•il:;.; :•.: IE:•,:Jil,' - .` 1)" 111— ti ! a: d avo , c 000084 �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act iDocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acc6s a l'inforlllation. 4 ,, C[ +1.':•'.ai'•. l: Ll inir{)t 1:V.*L:L i':;.n,d t1:,!•:• [ ncx;' `:; ; r • (• G.;l.I';:{:t:`.;t to::;: & 10x, " t•;1' :i 1" v:•r'•:+ \ 1]_l.y :• r,•:ar ;•. bla :i for us ' the il, t•::li::•:.. 1'1 :L.1'? ,,C:%'a3L ; i..:I ,, it ls•l Llc; 1 ; C11O11!i OUL of DOW 11+75• ,-., l 1 • t t hink x' ,.•;) ;l• j V ,, j•l ^Y'`'Je F ,i ₹• ; (i I c: 1't tai' }: o:•.l.,.•C CVt+lbb.1_C.' c, ,:in is 11 : I 1. to say M at C:LCI.I ' th! I13L.1_" on •. 00kc(; C , • .1'.:':1.1 ? C. t.•1,•:}:(,]Z,1 vv f } •C:::! ti! o n : i Ui,)•t point WC.'1?['ver asst;•:;Wun ; ('L'i. Ci] of 11. t,).._L, ltEl 1, .•_• i•. "• 1 c4 1 • L , , Ll:l • R•L',L J should C;_+ r. L Ln, of PaI',.:'.GiPAt_;.G;1 CW Of Canada }`•1'il•„3.:.'.•.}.'L' Cr::;1r:Cr•t1C.1 :'ii;l i.'•• ••••• • i;U!111i.1;; FO2' •;• li; I:i:L_•.(:'1, ti un Of i ! Wn Altu re; is }'! :' C: •. .t:C, •1f11,1:5: f ., , Y i:.LC';i7•.• +.} 1!'a l,I`QS•'] i{^. I'••-.L Ul.luC;7.C;(.• i-l'?tC7.',"CI`\;:)C(• • •`• !I r •. t }- I'!''+ t+1 G11 Cta.I`:CL• • •i. •_ ,^ • 1 t.T1C, the }:;; l.i.nZ+ •, • C'J of u':;•ury bion _.i. Str•,.•,••tn, ",. r:ic.;.;",r of 7 l••11.:; C.,`, : • ?.r(` 11.1. I'• t c •, le : Lnv Of en Jwreana 1,1.J''1ncy Cf`:j-h ': s ? j j,j, on b • lc. L:0 1.'i+j l.(:(; Nmjt:'i.l::L(• I':', i' 1: ''• C+f,'1 CJ,^ 000005- �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act / Document divulcdi.a6 erg vertu de la Loi sur I'acc6s ,bI'inforniation. I7 tr( '.'! , e• E F - 7.,hTJPi __-r,11 ?:CC,': 71T)I V.','.' TG14 ---- the l;cad oa Latin ,17-,e7 ica - On Jun.>. 22 us r• al =alit • 7u7,-•a f- e , oft!i•; :i7itel.3_it;•;tce the-. t; :i,• c,.l•,:i1.r41;1c to for h:L s `» ..S ,,,12— �Document Released Under the Access to Information Act / Document divulguP en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a (' information, t L 4) CU:pC'.f• t•h`' ar; Lin rc 11C1`£cl VaIU:; •) ii•;?L)1 V l'y or 1'VC'•)) O• t0 L11C CL••_r;11COL1^• L 4 t.` 1`c?y`OJ. i• --s r,e I.yh „>>r found t);,tt ) Yrit:l-1rr. are COr,SirlCr< •✓ t1JU1•-l11 C)i .).Cl to Pi:c2'1'J:1'L• : ri: @ G O1Ua CI) J.0 Oi' •'.• V•'•lUC On OCCF:S].Ci3i• ial.c.:• v;lluc r• Iti tJ)c. c•oc of I:ypOrt.r, on do >> clo;l•c ,llt:: ill c(•u ttr i.cs in 1•;))icy' Cauudk /~ cu'r; CSf;Ciitlll c dlld 1:1 •%• be 11 %}`c= hive o)il.y •i;;•:o • cne•';11 cG1lu,lerlts usefulll:. r,t1 1!:it.h regard n- t o a.l. (nice in r. cl rc t iic t atioli to i•),:;.s Di•"wsj r • r7Ciln;i i •. 1 - ( is ll ,.t sar.)c tJ1;)C) W` would lika r,ore o:::t this time Yf) :c1 1 Y1C 1'U ) ib31t1.1)r iJOO::: li:at.C'l':C:?1 ..l.r to c'• ••• «n (t1 JUI•t j; 1`rducexl <stni is 1t the er.)}> i , ;:i. •.n c 1n it cr. ir11: - even t})otl• h ); h,:• u)• I)itr —1 •- 11`1 i:;ioll- as o:), •. Zm ? rco a trul. Gf )34 c l)1r 110 •, At the; r,11}:•1)1.CG(' cr,•.:i.;litt:nYien{ `l ',) 33].ZC, i,):•ltt ) o ad jtl"t •. o trs t: kacp 1 • r.111 . : 1.11 Tairld fol'' this; on what :J.s Ji:i•' c)) k Ul 000087 �DOCL.Irnent Released Under the Access to Information Act / Document divulcgue en vertu de is Loi sur I'acc6s a (' information. ov Sid •CCo•n;Acrc:f.a1. PoJ..i.cy I•:w:ii iori) 3]. wc• corisulte:d thJ ) leae; o1 t)-j-, Uzviu•.c•n stout the th for l ) i•; JAIV))o > ce of t))C 5.i1•cJ..laE;ci)cO that i.S avZz:•l.•• . c to tts O1i INY-ch 1 •is z: •. ,. •;,. 000088 �DGCUment Reieased Urider the. Access t Information Act / Docurnent divuigue en vertu de fa 1_oi sur i'acces • i'information. •L.. •Jii'- L (!'zM3)1port, i a . nd' t>,tl On J,i.rr:i.l ap connu'itocl the lica(i of i.hi.s t)iv:is:ion at 0:e Luxfulness for jjj8 l:,urposc;, of t}ic ant ,•l3.i.••r :is arail.atl;lc -L us F j 000089 �Document Rr~lea3ed Under the Access to Information Act / Document divulcgue en, vc:rtL] de la Lai sur i'acces aI'inforiilation. 1CJI fMt ' Y OF1;7C, } ;'C; _._..__ On JLUIC' 25 we ccn"Ited the .110ad of thin':; u;+cful.•i• fol. }:i t:ur}•a e of the a.i•teli.i•;citr,.e that 'Lin o••va irtble h'o us v b 1 e R,% 000090 �File / Dossier. Page(s) ✓ A-2011-00010 91-94 is (are) withheld because of/ est (sont) retenue(s) pour Exemptions(s) / Exception(s) Exclusion(s) D Duplicate(s) of / Duplicata(s) de(s) 0 Not Relevant / Non pertinente(s) s. 15(1) �Document Released Under the Accoss to Information Act / Docuri]ent divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces • i'information. OF ,rTCls Ul'' i=ti',:L','.(C;)- 1; i'.:{'.'.::'?Y. Orl co)isult 1'or l]_i }•u:•,.o:>cs of' th e: r c'd Lhe 110"I( lo f tlli is act•.t•c cor,ce>1 n in t;]e: fit;j Di_v:i:•:r_ar, }] e. j _ 2. •• F;' fs v.;'"r:Cl tli ^.'i )Jl l].CtCli1• II]• .sUL'C t.}!c> '•;• ; f } J 1,; it-9 - Fl r, t 1?1dC(: >' 7.S].Cll151C}E'it t}].,I7 :': d Vt:1 ll. Ull t L t of i .r ltc].]. ;;. ru r; a ••,:inst o1 :lI1'i.:'ZZJ"':i;r•r_' C1:U111]•:.]_:i i'l]c Lj.1 s t.ha.sills tc }1J.Vj.:,;iU]] nc t:)la.t. ) i1fi5 U:]J t} ';• •- il. I]CC '' s is 00.0095 c' �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies C A-2023-00052--00369 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies SE:CRET DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE APPENDIX 11 C''.. MINISTERE OE LA DEFENSE NA.TIONALE V 2O00-25(DCIS) Canadian Forces P.eadquarters Ottawa 4, Ontario JS1September, 1970 Dr. C.H. Isbister Special Adviser to the Privy Council Office 63 Sparks St Ottawa, Ontario Dear Dr. Isbister: To 11eet your request for a National 1efence input on the question oi Departmental noed for Intelligence, ·the I.CIS wishes to offer t.he attached study, entitled "The 1eed for Intelligencen. It llll.6 prepared by Plans Branch (Director of Strategic Planning) to meet a CtS request in October, 1969 and is valid todai. r 2. The study represents a fair statemer.t of 11eed as seen by the strategic plarmer at the CFHQ level. Ho.iever, there are a nu:111hP.r n, n~:?ec+.i:. 01· na.i.ioHal lin•el iuLt::::i.l~t--"'u..i..: fw1ct.i0;·,o ,,!·.~;;.;-, ;:;.:-~ either not covered or 'Which are noted but are not given appropriate e~phasis_due to the purposes for which the original study was prepared. 'Ihus, the purpose of this covering statement is to suf,plement the views expressed in the Plans study. 1b1s is done by offering additional points for consideration so as to make the roles and value of intelligence more readily apparent to the non-military reader. J. One.important consideration is that Intelli~ence is a subbranch of the VCDS Branch headed by·a teputy Chief in the same manner as Plans, Operations and Reserves, and Force DHvelop:ir.ent. 'Ihis f\J.nctional equality ensures that the decision-ffiakers at the Vice Chief, CG?, and 1-J~D levels obtain a balanced view of Departmental requirements to xneet the defence objectives of the Gover-r.t.ll"!ent.. In fact, this organizational set-up goes a long w~y towards ensuring that Intelligence, whic_h is the end pi·oduct of Canadian ana.l;,-sis of Allied and Canadian collected inform.at.ion, plays: its part in the . forn;ulation, developrr,ent, and employment of the Canadian .Arn,ed Forces, and is indicative of Canada 'coming of a&e' as a truly indepe1,dent nation. 'l'he important point is that the end prcci.:.ct, or ::u:tellii.ence usad, is e. consey_uence of analysis done· from the Cc,nac.ian faint of viow. . . /2 A-2023-00052--00370 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies SECRET CAi~AuIAf·i EYES OliLY r - 2 - 4. It is Canadian policy to provide military forces to accomplish in order of priority as listed, the following roles: a. Assistance in maintenance of interr.al security. b. '.fhe surveillance of our territory E-.nd coast lines, ie, the protection of our sovereignty. c. The defence of horth An,erica in cooperation ~ith the USA. d. The fulfiJ.lment of such Ni..TO conmi br.ents as may be agreed upon. e. 'Iho perfor1r..ance of such international peace:keeping •roles as we may from tillle .to tir.:e assume. 5• Tirq.el:y and accurate Inte'iligence that is "Canada first" orientated is essential to the development and maintenance of an effective yot economical :military posture whether the concern 1 be or,e of internal s.ecuri ty, soYerei 6 nty, collective defence o:r po·~ekeepir;b. The development of coir.oonent ar,d unit organizations (broad and deta1J ed) oot.i.wate>& Qf M-<!-J1P.V-+.-:ar nee~&, pol.i.c.i.~i &n .,;.sapOJJ.~ c>.od equ..i.p,oe.pt p~4;,~wa~ ment 1 ar,c the selection of com,.::orient a?1d i.:ni t types to i:r.eet both the stnde,eic and tactical demands which arise from Car:adlan co.r.m tn;ents are in larfe part depencent on our Intelligence on 1::::,th enemy and friend1y forces, thoir cai-,abili ties and de_ployrr.ents. Fro1!1 top to bottom, for training and 9perations, the military establishr,;ent needs sour,d k1:o,-~1F.cc:e of foreign rr.ili tury organizations; deployments, v:e&J.; ons characteri stk s, doctrines of employment, likely courses of action, fi;.tur·e prospects, and topographical, environmental and poli tical/econon:ic fact(lrs. i-.s noted in the ?la.ns study, n;r planning and management of •the Caiiadian Force:;s • would indeed be haphazard s.nd un-nation like if it .were not based on the best ave:ilable lnto11igence -which has been analysed by Car,;:;dians for use of the Canadian Forces. 6. Assistance in maintaining internal sE-curit;y is essentially a function of preparation to aid the civil power ..-hen called upon to do so. 'lhis involves Canadian Forces cooperation ,,1ith the hCi.'.1', provincial and·nn;.nicipal authorities on matters relatec to subversion, sabotage, espionae:e ar:d serio1.~s threats to peace and ore.er. 'Jhe or.'.. 5 ir:~ of thest:1 thn,:f;ts 1r.a.y be extel-nal or inter.r:.al to Car,ada, bt:t if the forn:.er, th€Jy are i.:rilikely to involve the mlli tary forces of an unfrieridl'y power v.xcept thoze elements which have been tb.skE'd to gather Ir;'l.,:;,l- • lit;enct·. Eo"t-JE:Vl;lr, if the occ2sion were to .?.rh;e in which contingents of the Can,nc1un F0rces were to be comn!itted to internal s·ect:r:1.ty cpen:tic-r.s .. /J A-2023-00052--00371 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified informal Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements r classifies SECRET CANADIAN E-P....:S ONLY - J because of actual or impending breakdown of civil authority, the need for operatior.al security Intelligence, lihich is collated and coordinated for mib.tary use, wot!lc1 be immediately apparent. The mainteuancs of current and long range- estimates of the danger, extent, and 1ocale oft.he internal securitj' threat is, therefore, a high prior:l.ty task for Int_elli6 ence in support of continger,cy pll:.nnin&• 7. r The role of surveillance of Canadian territory and canst lines, while: relevant to the def6nce of North America, is not at the ,r;resent tin;e primarily a function of preventing unauthorized intrusion by foreign :r.,.ilitary forces. In fact, Intelligence estimates in recent years have been unable to envisage circumstances where the e:mploy,i;ent of milit.;;.r;y forces by- an unfriendly power in deliberate violation of Canadian sovereignty would occur except in the context of a general nuclear war. Theso estims.tes have been based on the premises of: the state of mutual nuclear deterrence between the Soviet Lnion and the tSA, the existence of CAN.ALA - USA cefence treaties and arranger:e~ts, and the lack of suit.able :a1ilitary capabilities on the part of any fore!gn power to test, through.overt hostile aetion, the defences of North .Arr.erica below the level of n,iclear wa1~. In general terms, these eiti.rr.ates still hold true, nevertheless; intrusions could occur in the :fti.ture unwitting1y, by design, (for reconnaissance pur.:;;~c :! ;;'!'':';:-:~+.41'\-r, •f',-.,... rnniintt:t:llt!V or ~(.;f,1.~r.;~_ :;~~lear ~ar) and/or siv.ply to test CAr.adian reaction in respect to jurisdiction of remote areas. In the long term,corriiercial aspects generated by the prospects of·development in the Canadian Arctic will create a situation where :r.ilit8.ry surveillanc€-, including Intelligence collection and analysis, of activities in-territories -that are now largely unocc~pied, cf uncontrolled waters, and of air space, may become an important function relative to the preservation of Canadian sov~reicnty. In U.is regard, negative Intelligence is at least of equal value to positive indications of an imper.eing or developing threat. .t'UOQi;;!, ~Jl ~:,_ .:..:,~/~• T_._tu":? 8. The value of the annual Canada - United States (CJJnJS) estimate or. the threat to !forth lur..eriea to Canadian defence developments can hardly be over-emphasized. Our participation with all the i.r.-.e:tican Intelligence a 6encies (Cili, DIA, ~-;SA, and the three I Service S.[;encies) and ·with Headquarters NOH.AD,_ which ha.s onl:, an observer status in the preparation of the esth ate, gives us a clear insight of .Ali,erice.n strategic thinking and force developm~nt in addition to l!S views and attitudes on the Soviet Union, China, and other powers, both friendly and potentially t:nfriendly or neutrnl. This allm,;s Canadian Intelligcr,ce to develop views on the united • States anc. the balance of military _power -whieh can be of considorn.bl.e .. /4 A-2023-00052--00372 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies SECREI, CAllALIAN EYES CNLY ... ~ - 4 value as s~pport for Canadian decisions on the ty}~, q~ality, and quantitJ or.cefence 1neasures required of Canada both for the defence of C;;.nadh.r~ tf,rritory and }lorth Ji:,.1erica, and the preservation of Ce.nadian so,-ereii_nty. Every other year, the· responsibility for draftitii:, the C.A,}..'1.IS estimate devolves on Canada and this is -yery profitaLle to us. Hot only cloes the opportunity t9 infli..:.ence iur:erican lntellie;ence v:iews·arise thereby, but also the cnus of challenge as to tho validity of the assessment then lies with the Americans. Ver:; often the conses_1,...e.-nce is publication of Intelligence which misht otherwiso have been withheld fro!': general Canadian use clue to sec\i.rity classification a.nd ;,,:o,erican interests. CAhlJS) as a consequence of continuing, year round exchane,es of 1nforination and analysis provides Canadiap. a\;.thori ties a tr.t;.ch 1tor·e accurate and timely as5essment of the strategic situation anc threat than any estimates that ~re revealed through NATO or other bilateral or alliance arrangeEents including those of international. coirz.ands stcr. as i.eadq,uarters NORAD. 9. Although NA1'O, SHA.PE, and S.ACLAllT Intelligence is available to Canada, it is not as important to the Canadian dt::cision r:1aker as Canadian estirr,ates whether the latter agree or differ substa.ntivel.r or in llinor detail ~~th the vie~s of these· international organizations. Canadian Intelligence plays its part in the development of ii.A.TO Intel+i@G>i1Ce ancl major tv!I.TO Cmmn~.±s, b~t it s.r.c'J..ld!. b~ :rec.~g~"'..t.zed t_h.z.t 0.;lt:h co:rrmand, and each nation endeavours to have its views accepted in the proc€ss,. and that the result is at best a coJ'lpromise. The 'agreed' estiniate is• not always the :most appropriate one on which to base national military planning, and without our participation and consequent r-ecolnition of the difference, Canadian dofenoe planning l-:Jj.th respect to NATO -would be 'captive'. Moreover, Canadian a~cess to .American and British source, !latel'ial which, in whole or part, is not automatically or alwa:,,s revealed to other NATO nations and international commands, edds to tho competence of Canadian analysts when advising on both the accuracy and the ro.levance of international Intelligence estimates. --- r 10. \-in.en considering the peacekeeping role, the. importance of Intel. ligence to the success of Canadian activities extends beyond the function of planning,. Contingent colT.ll&nders and their staffs must bo thoroughly briefed anc the troops educated on conditions and likely dev-elop1tients in the crisis area. This is an Intelligence fi..;nction with most of the i'.1~terial used being the _result of continuing analysis and national holdings on rrl.1ital"j', pclitical, economic, topographic and e1.vironmontal conditions in the area. Durinf; the peacekeeping operations, the fact that there are no friendly fo:rces---often, not even within the international force--- lr.J.kas . Intellil!,ence a. pri:rr,ary concern for the national contint,ent. The impc,rtnnce of local I1,telligence collection and analysis, and the need for a link • .. /s St.CELT CA.li1~1.Al~ E'.1.t.S C2tfil A-2023-00052--00373 �Released under the A TIA - unclassified informatic Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements nc classifies r SECRET CJ..NADIMJ Erl';S ONLY - 5between the contingent and Canadian authorlties who monitor the operation at the CFr!Q national level are fundamental for the safety r.nd success of the Cru1adia.n .(orces inTolvoo.. It is this link and the analysis stemming therefrom \-~hich assists Canadian authorities in decision making in respact to the continuation, level and kind of p,2-rticipation, and cessation of the mission. The vital role of intelligence in pee.cekeE1p:i.ng may be difficult for the authoriti,es of the United Ne.tions to accept~ but for officers and men who have parUcipat"d in peacekeeping and control ocmnission operations, its importance is very clear: • 11. With regard to Oparo.tional Intelligence, as defined in the Plans study, tha part played by the central DCIS orgtmization requires amplification. Cana.da, as a consoqu.ence of gove!'lt'7lont to government agreE<ment, is a partner in the Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agrosment with the United States and the United 1Cingdo;n. Op0rationtl Intelligence also inchi..dos the staffing of tha Curront Intelligence Indict1tions Centre at CFHQ, manning of ccr..murrl.oa.ticns, wa.teh-keaplng on 11. 24-hour basis, and analysis of e,,urrent military deployments and operational activities; particularly in Co:.;;mu.~ist countries and areas of Camnunist country interest. The fu.nction is t.o 1mm, through the JIC, senior Canadian authorities, the United St~teG &nd the !:'::~4:::= !(:.!:".~~ ...... ~.,..,-M,,..,.,t_,.,..o:i: nt· hn!':tilit.ies~ F1A1·Li.,.,.i1Aul·0, .-..lt!l,:;:.::g!-: e,;~!"!~.:~i·.~~!'l Intelligence is otherwise a function of operational ccmmand s..nd in CL\nactA's case is prlma.rily the responsibility of :i.nternational hendquarters ttnder which t:;anadian units serve, Cami.dian contingent cro1r.1anders and tbai:r staffs must be kept aware of Canadian estimates if for no other reason than the protection of Canadian forces involved and Canadian inten,sts in respaet to a developing crisis. The need of operational commanders for timely Cr..n..<i.dio.n intelligence estimat0ts would bo very cle!!.r whore tha Canadian approach h&ppena to differ from that of our illies in a givon situation. It 15 also true to say that one of the unstated functions of Canndian forces in t'orflign the.atras is to colloct and report infoma.tion on friends and foos l.'hich wU.l aid in decisionm.aldng at the national level. 12. Scientific and TechnieAl Intelligence is a basic e.nd essential neod r or accurate nnd timely analysis of the military establista:i&nts. of foreign nati'ons. It is requirod to assess the che.ra.cteristics end c1t.pabili ties of specific weapons systems and oquiµaents, to indicate pr~ssnt and projaeted levels of scientific cai.petonce of potontial n<lv0rsary nations, their present and future areas of o-mpbasis and the weapons Md equip.:l!cnts likely to dtiriTe thoref'rom, and their overa.11 capa.hi.liti0s as cooipar&d to Ca!lJl.da and its Allies. Teichnological foracssting is &."l important aspect of Scientific Intolliganca and Can~da can hai-dly afford to remain ignorr:.nt of the rapid advanee of scienca in those c01.mtri<:is • frooi which inform!ltion i~ not freely a.vrllo.ble. The possibility of .... /6 SECRET CANADJ.AfJ E""r"ES ONLY A-2023-00052--0037 4 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified informatio1 Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements no1 classifies r. - 6 technolo~ical surprise remains one of the ma~or concerns of Intelliger~ce at the: nat:i c.na::;_ level. lJ. lhe re are r:.ar,y Lepart11,ental needs for Intt,llii;euce which are irr,r:c.t'iately apparent. The Plans stuci.1 covers some of these 1..ncer U,e ~.E::;.;c;.ir, 6 of nether Aspects". }1uch ri,ore r.-:itht be said in this area but it is co,izidered sufficier,t to .emphasize the ;}oir1t that the Ii,tF 1 lit,E:rice cata be.r,k on foreibri arn,ed forces, weapons anC: equiprr.ents is of' consice1abl£ value as an a:1.c to decision ir,rudng Ol! questions of a1·3'1S ar.d equj ;,r.,Gr.t e.rrangerr,er.ts, ~1:.rcha.ses, loans and 1,,ilitarJ aid. Also the .P'oce£s of cevelo1;ing accurate ll'lSfs and charts has been markedly improYec in recent years through use of Intelligence methods for col) ection ar.c a1!al;rsis. Finally, the value of lr:telliger.ce in contrib..:.ting to the kr,owled£e and education of arir,ed forces personnel, and p~rticularly the very real contrjbdion it makes to .the forn,al education of of!'jce rs and offie:ials at ~:ta.ff Schools, Staff Colle 6 es and the t\atior:al De fer,ce Collei;e is ,::ort.hy of note.· .:-'c,1:La.t•s 1,ot lh. l(er.tion was made earli&r of the eqnali t:, of llttellic::ence •,d. th other staff frnctions in 'cFFC It rel'nains now to riote how Intellii;ence r..akes an in:,?act on all levels of staff plar.nir,g. This is achiBVcd throt:gh ci.aiJy' clesk to cesk contact a.r.d discl:ssion between lntelli&ence analysts s.rici' staff officers both belo,.; and at the Director le,vel. ', h.; ~ !°' rn,.. r. ~ ~ ~ nm.n -I P.tr-enteC bv ue :r-_j_ uUi\,; u.l f l11~0 dlJ~ d~·;~l;;~::-:c_:n:. of sh:die·s "•!·i:·re the Intelligence factor is important to the· action recorrrr.er;c€:'c. _ In a ir.ore. formal sense; the Intelli~e:nce contribution tc the I:epartwer:ts.1 planni1,g and ·.nanagement precess is E'xelT.plified by the l·efer.ce ilamiir.g Gi.:idance tocnnent which lists all Canadian Intel-, ligence estitr.atcs as reference material for sto.f!.iJlanning and, throuehot:.t its te:xt, reflects the essentials of these cstin-,ates in the develo_i.;rr.ent of defence. objectives and prograrr.mes. t;: ; :..1;; ~~le~ t;a.:_.or General LE"-pt:ty Cr.ief Jd.ellit,;(;nce ar,d See\;;.ri ty r A-2023-00052--00375 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified informatio Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements no classifies 1 ... _,,/ SECRET (CANADIAN E.'YES ONLY) V 2100-1 (DSP) 24 October, 19l9 T!it. hi!.ED FOR DiTLLl.IGEl~CE AH'i 1. To discuss the neec for intelligence and the purpose it served to the n~in users. r - 2. Through participation in collective defence and as a result of spech.1' af;rcerr.ents with the United States and Britain, Canada gains pr:i.vilc[.ed access to military, political arid econon:ic intelJ.igence gathered bj• other col:ntries. i;evcrt.helesst to er.sure the best assessn:ent of Canadian interests it is vital that there be an exclusively Canadian input to the h1t.ellitence estilliates w4ich fonr. the basis fo1· our planning and operational C:.ecisions. 1... GouU l:r1i.t":ll.it--.. euci; ls t!i~ 1Gci5 Cf ~ zc~::C. :t:!:'c:t~gy fro"T ~!h~_ r.h flnws our capabiltt.ies plan and operational concepts. Without it, ,-;e wouJ.a .uicK. the assurance that our cefence policy is expedient. 4. The Canadian contribution of resources to collective defence arrangements ensures our participation from the onset. Intelligence is one of these resources. 5. In the planning and impler.1entation. of peacekeeping acthri ties, sound intelligence ~".ill help to ensure that Canadian ccntihgents are properly structured, ecit:.ipped a1~d deployed to carI"J' out the tasks assigned. 6. Sound ir.telli~ence is vital to the :'Lmplementation of ale1°t systems to ensure flexibility and suitable rea.ct.ion to any change of circumstances affecting Canadian security or Canadian interests. 7. Defence research, to be productive, must be based on the best, 2t!ost detailed and wide ranbi ng intelligence available .. 8. Although this paper !'oc\:.ses ori the need for intelligence by the major ir,ilitary i..:.se1·s, the need for intelligence is not restricted to DNt. Gther departments of government nlso benefit frorr.: the activities of the • Csnadian intelligence co:mm.mit:,. . ./2 SECI..2T ( CMW".iIA.N~ 1Y.i!:S O}~LY) A-2023-00052--00376 �R~leas~d under the ATIA - unclassified informc D1vul~~ en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements class1f1es SZCf..ET ( CAU..:U:lA.l~ EYE.3 OliLY) - 2 - ,·. hbL_e t:::e J,,;;e-:! for lntelligence on which tc-• base ;.:la.ns and operat5.or.a1 cor.cE:pts is .al:··.c.st a self evident .fact• it is not alw.a:,s so apJ;are:r:t tl.t:.t there i.:; alsc_, a ver~ real req\:.iroient for Ca1,Bdiar. ir.tellit_;E·nce and Ca:,c.c;iE..~·1 i~rcct:.ccd i!"ite1li.genc~ csti.i:ates to ensure that our situati,m is assessec~ i:: ol~ective fashion without the risk of 1?eing, und\:..l:,, influenceci by out.side orinicn. lC.-. J~ s2cc!'1C.! c;ene r-~1 factor ~orthy of reentior-. is that throuih our con,trit:1...tions to ~oirit. L .S., 2ri tish int8lligence activ:i.ty and our partici.:,_.,at i.or_ in collective d<if'er:ce arranr,en,ents, we ga.in accf:ss to military, econ01:;lc and jJo:it~cal i1.tclligence which \-:ot;ld probably not :,therwise- be available to vs. ·11. 1~ :aC~ition to intelligence on our yotential eoend.es, it should be r:ctec that U,ere is also an irnl)ortallt req•.,irement for information about our frier,ds w.. ich, i1t ::aoll'e ir,starices, has provP.d to be· just as di.ff.J.cult to obtalr;. r 12. l,ot.;ithstar;di~·ig the Ca.na.dian orientation to ccllect:i.ve security and tLe ~,rctection of' the deterrent,- there. is also a neEd for intelliJer.ce in are5s other .t Lan th0.se directly associated with our c·ontritt.. tion to ~,-.estern lJ. ln t}-i$ p12fer the value of int!,.lligence to the user is di5cussed ur,der si>. :na,:;ar·he~di:~gs: a. St:ratee,ic Planning; . t.. C<;htinental tefence Planning; c. lr.te1·r.ational flannin&; d. Cf,cn,ti.o!;al lutelligence; e. J:ofer,ce I.esearch arid Analysis; f. CU101 . Aspects. lL. Althou,h intelligence is disseminated to au extensive list of departments, branches and a~enc:;.es in the Governn ent, 1-ithin n~r the first a.nd prohaoly 1r:ost esse:itia.l applj.cation of intelli&er.ce occurs during the _prcciuctior. of str-.:itegic stl.idies which is the ini tia.l step of the ma.nat;,;:ria.l process },:~adini to the ,)peraticria::.. c~~nc:ept ar..d im~.i~ementatj_on f-1ar: for the .-.:ct't.r:ce forces. If these stl~dies, many of vhicb ciTc wice u.nbi?1 6 :in na.i.ur·c, ::ire 1i0t l::1te:ed ·):·. ~~:curatf.. and up to d~.te infor:ir.ati,:n and ir1te1l l 5 -sr.ce, th'-H1 A-2023-00052--00377 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies •'. •• SEChl:T (CAfu\L~ EYES ONLY) ·r 3their own ~alicity is q~estionable. Of particular importance in this resp£:ct is the as~essrne1:t of the circun:st.ances which affirm a defence inter-.,st; ~st:.ally Ue intelligence appreciation of the threat and capab·lities of the I,ot.i:-r.t.ial enemy. Thus, intelligence exerts considerable inf'lt:.er:ce r.ot onl;}'- on progr,;;ms for force struct\:re, n!annine; and procurement but also or, friori tit:,s and allocation of resoi..;rces. \d thout it otr plannin~ processes l-!ould be hafhaz,9:rc ·at best. 15. There are n-,G.rty sources of strategic intelligence available. to Canada beside oi:.r o~:li, e.g., in l!.t.TO: 5hAPE, .SACLAHT and t:Ow.L Ho..:ever,.these &H each ccr1cer:r..ec with only one particular field and related to one theatre. Canacian intelligEnce estimates are Canadian oriented. They enable us to obtain a balanced ~ ,_;_di;err,ent on those factors that relate most, regardless of area• io the C.:efcnce of C.:anada and to the achievement of our defence policy objt::ctives _. le. S:i.nce ,-:e can never maintain forces to ·cover the whole range of poss;ible defence.needs> it is essential to isolate from all the possibilities in a. rapidly chan.,;ing world those that are most likelJ to occur a.nd, of these, to decide which are most critical to the security of Canada. Ca!ladian intellie,ence estimo.tes :;u·e essential for maki?'lf, .judgements such as these. r 17. Basic to the determination of policies and plans for North .American defence is an accu n;1.te and continuing estirr.ate of the threat. 'Ibis assessment is detaihd in the Canada-tini ted ~tates 11.telli~ence Estimate (Clll·,Lb 69) -which is a joint appreciation agreed between the tuo countries and which is • basec on a corisider·able contribution fro:in Canadian intelligence sources. It is this Canadian input that ensures our participation in. the for.m.:.lation of ~lans and policy for !forth American defence from their inception. 18. The Canada-~nitetl States Intelligence Estimate is the basis from which the, objecth·es plan is developed for presentation to the G.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Car,&.dian J:.efence Staff. • r 19. ill£• Iri U.e main, r:ATO plans and ~•o1icies are based on NATO intelligence estin:ates. Eowe'Ver, there is one direct contr:'..bution from the Ca11adian intellii;ence coir.munit,y whii;:h is of particular significance in relation tci Cam.,dian reactions to NA'IO proposals. In a number of cases, r,i.10 ir.telligenc:e does not take into account recen·t developments because such infon;/a.tion is uot rnade available to it because of the risk of security breaches by the large multi-national staffs. C;;i.nadiar, intelligence sources, because of their rel.stionship. -with specific countries, are often .at-le to provico inforr.w.tior. that would not othernise be available. This pt:.~ly Ca11,,C.jf>n :Lr,put ofter: enab~E' s tl",6 Can&dian planning staff to take a n:ore ex:ii;,,hter,t·d ar.p1·..:kch Uwr. w0uld otlier1,ise be the ea.so. . ./4 ~EC::·.ET ( Ci.liillAil tYJ.:.S QI<;lY) A-2023-00052--00378 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified informatior Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements nor classifies SECRET (CANAtIAN EYES 01;1y) ... 4 2C. FeacekEef,in1;. -.::anadian produced inte]li[;er.cc serves the planning st.,.f f ct:ril,i., • ti·;tt:e s l2.ges of peacekeer.:,j_ng operatioi:s: b. c. :.ct.hities in1.re-=-diately priol' to a pe[lcei<eeplni; oi:-eration; operation. 21. l~vn:ts icf,dq lp to a Peacekeeping Operaticr.. • lhe international 1,Jla1~1 .-:;. 1.f_ ,::;tz,.ff cc:Ltim.~(•"~ly :llor•i tors intelliget,c!;' c,r1 i:t lected r1;; 6 ions of the ,.,,r;rlc! -t l'·.;.t _:.,:.\'•- be-.-·- .. e~rnarked on the basis of tbei:r potential as likely art:;:.s for ft:.t:-n --~•f:...!tt:('P.,Cil~t activj_ties. Luring this stat,e the pla1mers ru.::st i:e ar,prisi:.:-:c· af ~,:J. U,e inforn:atior, and intelligence it is possible to ct.L:=.i11 on tte poLtfoal, Iriilitary and economic structure of the ccuritries COLCt l"}!Gcl.. 2~. .Actl vHJ_,es lmmcc.iate].y Prior to a Peacekeeping 0p!:-rntioh. Cnce the cecision.l.as t.eerJ :nade to con:n-,it Canadian F'orct:s to a pe&cekeeping task l:,e pla1.ri:c rs ,~ill 1-equire a continuous updatin£., cf all ir1telligence i·elati ve to the &rea, in particular that of a military nature which will ir,fJ'.,bt1Ce t.he strer.~ t.h, organization, arms and equiprr:ent of the Canadian CO!i'l.:..11i:;er,t. 23. Lurint-~ the Peacsk62_Ping. Operation. The information ea the ring resources of 1:1 peaceke€ping force are limited and unC:er rather strict re&t r-ict.ions in so _f::.r as the tll is concarned. 'Iherefore, in orcer to prott-ct O\ir own perscr:,nel, intelligence ag.encies ov.tsioe of the theatre of o_ferations must keep a close watch on events in the area to enst,ra that there are no u.nti:rely s~rprises. This is a contimting commitment as long as Canacian i,Jersonnel are involved in the operation. Levels of l·.<,,s,:,01,se r a. In.1tcciiate h~2,1,£,nse Fi.eguirer.:eri~. Air I-efence Corr.mand, 1 idr [ivision, haritirr:e Cor,iMmd, Canadian Contingent· C;y;iri.!s ~nd 4 Ci·;BG, in whole or in part, must be capable of i:rr.rnediate response to specified threats. 1'he provision of battle intelligence in ret,ard to those threats u,ust be tirr.ely, accurate and continuous. Res:-~onsibility for such intelligence lies vrimarily with tl:e international head4.t:.arters to ichich ·our forces are assignee. b. EarlY. F.cst;'~nse hequirement.. l-faritin.e, Mobil~ and Air 'lraLsport Co!llll:ands trust be capable of rapid resporise to thre~t.s to national sovereii;nt:-> and internal security,, . ./5 SECRE.'I ( Cid~ALIA1~ EY~S Cl;LY) A-2023-00052--00379 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies Il SECRET ( Cii.Nlt.LIAN EYES_ OliLY) - 5 to inte rnati oual peace and security. The provision of 5. nte llle;er1c€ nn:st be adequate, of course, to meet the:?eed~ and -~~.e respor,sibility for this lies pri:-:-.ari ....,y -..:ith CFh-.. • &.,:c c. Gred1;atec l.es: ,.)nse. The Canadian Force:5, in whole or ir. pa:·ts rr,,Jst be capable of suitab],e response to the fonal _ale rt sy steu:s, or to a phased increase l.r1 readiness for en,er:....enc:i€s o~tside the scope of the formal systerr.s. 'Ihe i::r.1-.le,:entation of any phased increase ir1 readiness is baEed O!, intelligence. Responsibili tJ for provj_ding tl-:is is :;.hared t.J CFfa~ and applicable int~rn~tional head.quarters. 2_;. 0;:~1 e.t:i cr,al Planning. Prelin:inary planning for identif:i abl€: catecJries o! or:eraticns within existing corr.n:itn:ents or specific possible C'.:)erati0ns, n:i.:st be initiated, updated, superseded or car.celled o:n tr:e assesz:went of ccr:tirn. . ous intellieence:. 1--:ost of this planning is carried out ~~r; c-:;ra~niction with other ~overnttent and/or international ai,encies, anc. is facilitated· b/ the prcd-uct of -as contir:uot:.s e.n exchange and coo:rc'!ina:tio1~ of intellifc-r,ce arr,or.g the intelligence comr:unity of· U.ose ai;~r~cies _ as c&n te arraneed. t-::.1ch of the inforn.ation needed concerris the national and jL1ernational at,er.cy with which 9lanning is being clone and is often more c:.fficult to.obtain than that concerning the threat. This requirement !f!r:~st t,e met •~J· ~~~~"'.1-~t e F~c·vi!:i ::~:; fer p~r;;:.:..r,c~t 1:5.~i~~~. 26. Cpe.ratin.:ua: I,i:::·adiness. 'lhe -whole process of achieving the general r.;tau'.ard of Oi)(;l"8.tic!1al n,actiness fi:xed_ by national po1ic:, > inclt.cHng the fcrr.1t~lati0i.,_ of cor.cepts, doctrine• and proced1..:res; tl-.e. organization, equi;.irr.er.t, tr·ainir.g and orienhtion of cµn·atj onal elemer.ts; the cevelop:r.ent of support ca.pabilit:i.es, ar,d periodic testing and evaluation, cannot be effec-. tively carried 0:1 e:r.cept in the context of the current. state of the nation ir. relation to ti-:e world situation. This c~lls for the a,ailability of strategic, tactico-l ·and technical intelligence,- lon& and short term, of ever·;t ·nature, n:ilitar:,;- and othendse, und CO?llf•iled :_n us~ble form. Such· int.ellit.er.ce is the res1;-cnsibili t,Y of the Canadian intelliicnce con:m~ni ty • 27. The Veft,,r,ce ftesearch and Ai,al:i·sis Establisr..~!ent requins detailed iLtelli.:;;1::nce- ·data of a wide v:ariet;y. l'he majority of its studies are highly 1~8i!e:·.dent 0:1 the caliLre of intelligence receiTed. As is the case with other 1;sers cf fr,tellitH.ce, tr.e quality of its end proc~uct can only be ae good as tl·.e input ·used. Strategic operational research, to use one example, rt<i,uires present. and .futul'e estbates of' the capabilities· of .'.;,oviet a.no Chinese thn,at.s to l~orU. Alterica, :including dets.ils on developments $uch as ElltVs, FCos aLcl EOL3s. • .. /6 SECRET (Ci..!.•:Ailli1 ~YES Ct~LY) A-2023-00052--00380 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies SBChET {CAN.ALIM; EYES OliLY) r - 6 28. For maritime, land and air operational research, a great deal of cat;. is req~;ir·ed c-t1 tbe cpers.tional concepts and equipment systems of other rat.ions i.: :1,eani: ...,f,..;.::.. comparative analyses are to be obtained. For war g:ames ar.c other 1r.etLc.cs of anal_ysis by· simulation, the analysts must know as r-'.iuCf; F..C:Od tr:e t.:.d. ical concepts and wearon s:rsten:s d(;veloped or uncer c7 eve:?.cpment by potential ene.rrJ.es as they do about t:-.eir own. 29. Ahreen:e:it.s o:-i the Purchase 1 Exchange or Loari of .t1;ilitary Eg_ui_p1~ent. lr. smne ca.ses, ir.forn:&tion obtained from intellie,ence is of value before. c oncJ uC:l.t.i.:, abl e~~ir.ent$ wj_th other nations re 6 ardi11g the p-...:rchase, exchange or loan of r.;iJ it.ar.r equipr.ent. Intelligence also maintains surveillance of sc,r.:e items of r,.,i:!.itary equiprr.ent and weaponrJ after the:,; hav~ boen sold on the C.,;.nadian e>:port market. r JO. EilHar;y Aid. Before meetir.g requests for military aid it is ~ecessar3· to ass~re as far as is possible, that it will be used for the purpose stated a.ncl within the paran:eters of Canadian Gow:::mment polic_y. after c.elive1·y, st:.rveillli..nce is nece.ssary to ens1,;.re that military aid is beirig ~secl within the letter and spirit of the abreement. a. b. .ii.xperier.ce has proved a need for the widest possible co.vera~e to be obtainad, catalogued and.stored. In r.;any cases, intellitew::e is the only source for obt.;.ining maps and cha:rtsJ and for updating them, particularly for areas not covered within the terms of international map exc·h~e agreements. ,32. .AC:vice · on SE:::curity Classificatior. ape Dissemination of Classified lr.foni:ation. lri view of the wide variety of security classifications in us~ by the iesterr1 allies, it is often difficult to decide what s'!lbjects rr.a.y or n:ay not be discussed, with whom anc what the release and disse111ina.tion cf class:i.fied information should be. All directorates of CFh~ dealing 1-:i th classified material obtain continuous ad,rice and direction on these aspects and it is also available for the correct classification of documents ar1d putlicatio,ns originating within CFH~. r JJ. • Iu~octrir:atior: ar.d Education. Or.e of the overlooked uses of intelligence is the continuous indoctrination and education intelliger;,c-e r,i·ovices corr:mancers and staffs tlirough the circulation of intelligence , ir;ests and est:5 7.ates. 1his background often subconsciously ~rovicles a n:easure of tlte experience on which ~udgenents are roade. S::C.t1.i:/l (CANAI:Ll}i LTuS O~\LY) A-2023-00052--00381 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies = t:g A-2023-00052--00382 �Page 383 is withheld pursuant to section est retenue en vertu de l'article 13(1 )(a) of the Access to Information de la Loi sur l'acces a l'information �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies CulJJ:<' IDJ:;N 'I' lAL - 2 - and scientific intelligence assessments. This Committee is a lineal descendant of previous Whitehall interdepartmental Committees. Q£_r~ral Pur:eose of the JICs The existence of fully representative Joint Intelligence Committees in. the Cabinet Office ensures that (a) The interests of all customer Departments and intelligence Agencies are served. (b} A proper balance is kept between the different types of intelligence (e.g. political, milit8.ry and economic). {c) Depart.mente and thus Mini5ters are made more fully aware of what intelligence can and c.:annot do for them. 1..£!:!ns oJ: H~i'erence of t.he JICs The ma:in functions of' the JlC (A) \1hich is co·ncerned ·with politico-military intelligence are as follows·- (a) To giV€~ higher direct,ion to and keep under review the organisation and working of intelligence ·as a whole at home and overseas. It considers intelligence priorities and targets and whether our inteJ.l:l.gencc resources are being used efficiently and what new measvres_are necessary to improve our intelligence. Thus the JlC (A) has a managerial as well as a deliber•- ative function. (b) 'ro· assemble, evaluate and. pre~ent joint_ly such polit:i.co- military intelligence as the Cabinet, individual Hiniste1~s or tho Chiefs of Staff may require f or as the Cowfiittee rnay dec~m necessary. ( A very '"id0 variety: periodical intel.ligonce reviews, special assessments of thrcatm1ing situ..~~t.ions or long-term reports). - 2 - A-2023-00052--00384 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies CvNF lD.i:;N'l'lAL r (c) To maintain liaison with the intelligence authorities of international defence.organizations of which the United Kingdom is a member (1,A'l'O, Cr..NTO The main function of the JIG(B) is to supervise assessments on economic and non-military scientific and· technical intclliecnce: the JIC(B} has no managerial functions. -.co,mpos_iti.9n np.d Orgrmj..~ation_ of the JICs 'l'hi.s is shoi·m on the attached chart. The mel'.!1bershlp of the two JICs overlaps in order to • ensure co-ordination of the work of the two committees. JJ·~_C(t) . ~ r" mee t .s a t 1 ens t 'l.'he k JlC(b) meets at approximonce a wee~; ataly six weekly intervals. \ }:~~1.pporti.nr;_ Staff for th,e JlCs The two JICs are served by a single Secretariat responsible for tho administrative, publishing, and distribution work connected with . the running of the Committees and by an Assess. ments Staff responsible for producing long-term· and current intelligence reports 011 the basis of interdepr-u·tmental connultation" .Both those E,taffs are located in the Cabinet. Uffice and consir,t of personnel on cecondment from Departments represented ,.on the JICs. The Chief of the Assessments Staff is a senior Diplomatic Service officer on secondment. The Assessments Staf'f" contains a mixture of middle .ranking officers fr'om Vf11--iOll~~ disciplines .a11<l nervi. ce&, witl1 fu11ctional a11,i of int0rd0~purt.ruental working. groups on whatever· subject requires A-2023-00052--00385 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies • CUNflDEh'l' lAL r - 4 Prf>J> 9 ration of.· _s;_urrent and Long .:rerm Intellig~n.ce Assessme_n_!;_Q Current intelligence_ is nonnally :!.ssued under the authority of the JICs. The preparation of current intelligence reports is the responsibility of the Assessments Staff which works through the • machinery of the Current Intelligence Groups {CIGs). 'l'he ClGs are organisecl into seven geog:raphical sectors; each group iB ch.:'.ii red by the Chief of the Assessments Staff or by a member of his t3taff. :Cach. <.:IG :ts made up of members from the Departments represented on the JIG (A), including membt:,rs from the intellig- ence Collecting Agencies (the ~ank of the departmental representatives at the CIGs is about the equivalent of Colonel). ·; liH j_ri:.t'u1·w;,.1 t.i.un • wl! i ci1 lti ivii:i t. l v ~ t:'! v u:i. Ut:1. ~~u. ~.i:i., i..i1e ruu L.i.ut! weekly meetines of the CIGs covers the whole spectrum of intelligence. It includes reports from the intelligence Agencies; information obtained i'rom a stu,dy of the world press and broadcasting; information from our diplomatic representatives or Service attach~s. The information may be already fully or partly evaluated or it may be unassessed, raw, int.ellig:ence. It, is gcmerally a mixture of all these thj.ngs. 'f;J1.atever the nature of the· information, it will normally have been circulated by the originators to all Departments represented on the CIGs in ad:vance of the weekly meetings. r, At the meetings, the ClGs will d.ocide on which inform:-.tt:i.on is import.ant enough to justify the pr~pB.r.':"¼.tion of an as::~esLr.'.l~·mt, for tho JJ.C Ud. :-i ne • AssfJEGtnents msy be drafted imrnedj_atoly .folJ.c1-;- a full iut.erdepartrncntal d1 scussion at the meeting; but more A-2023-00052--00386 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies {.;(.J Id,' 11JhN1' IAL r - 5 - frequently a draft is prepared and circulated in advance and is amended in the light of verbal comments at the meeting: every membe:r of. the GIG has an equal right to comment. The draft current intelligence assessments prepared by the CIGs are then normally submitted to the JIC(A), whioh meets two days later, for approval. Aft,~r JIC (A) approval the assess- ments are diBtributed to a variety of interested rec~pients both at home and abroad, eometimes only as extracts, and a shorter s1m.mary is also prepared mainly for certain 1-1inistcrs and the Chief~j of St,aff. Apart. fr·om the preparation of current intelligence ast:essmentB both JIG ( /..) and JIC ( B) supervise the production r co-ordinated by the Assessments Staff who draft papers in full consultation with the JIC Departments concerned. The reports are, like the shorter notes and as3essments, usually submitted to the JlCs before they are finalised and issued. Although each Department, whether Service or c1.vil1.e.n, prepares reports or assessments for its own purposes and for its own Chiafs, assessments which are designed to provide the bDckground for major policy are bost prepe.red on on interdepr~rtnental basis because - (a} r It is rare that a. full assessment can be effc~tively baaed on the judgement of one l}ep:n·t~inent. - 5 - A-2023-00052--00387 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies CO·NF' lDtN 'r lAL r- - 6 - (b) Having to contribute to the work of joint assessment helps the Departments concerned clear their own views on any particular subject. ( c} The vio~1s o;f Departments are exposed to criticism by a body representative of most, relevant. interests. (d} The joint approach .1voids the risk of intelligence· being slanted for the purpose of a particular Department and an unconscious bias in favour of a vested interest. (e} There is advantage in spreading rou~d the Governmental machine an agreed view on international affairs E;O that in preparing their indivio.ual policies all Depa.rtments can start more or less from the same a.greed premises. r prepared jointly, than to papers prepared unilaterally. (f) The joint approach provides tho best guarantee of a proper balance of military, political and economic intelligence.· Other J_I_c· Or__ganisations 'fhese are (a) r _'!'}1e JIG .~;atch 0rg_§n1.satio..n. 'l'his is manned on a·twenty-four hour basis in order to look out for situations in the world threatening our national inter~sts, including threats to UA'£0 •·so that the :i.nt,elligen.ce conmmi1ity can be given advance warning. lt maintains a clon~ link with trH~ current intelligence as~essmer,t organisa tiO'n and a.11 Dept1 rtmen"l,s of JIG U~) . - 6 - A-2023-00052--00388 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies CUHFlDli.N'l'lAL - 7 - {b) Specia_list IntellJ~once. 'J.'be JIC {A) ~ias sub- committees on u large n~mber of technical and sci£:ntif'ic matters and for other specific matt,ers 1·:hich demand more time, attention and expertise than the main Committee can devote to them. A-2023-00052--00389 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies ., r ' r,-;~;.-;~·1 1 .,., _ _._.._._ --· ~ .... -1. I ;' I I I -GJ_r_~J •m - . -,·,•·1 - ... - ,,. -J OJJ,11 Ili n,L1,IG-r,1\C;~. hODfo (Duty Intolligonco Officers) "T;"li •l i -:--, • , ~----------------,-~--- ----·-'I i ! ' .... SERVJCJSS ..,.__"':9"_~ ' •-L--·•1 I I I A-2023-00052--00390 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non tlassifies )· [;;;,~~-;~7;;-;;-;;;~::{;~;:~~-, ~~.=~----·.:c·-I r--··-· ·------------··•.·---•-j·•-·-·•·-·- ····-- ··-·-·--·-- - I• I l ""c.;~,,. .. ,.,,.. ''-.-~----:~-·-re (f\.) - : .. :., .1"''·--1·,-·, . . . . ,, • • • . ]., ~-. ..... c l..--,:, .. , .. ~-1.,.: ,, _____ ,_ "-····. -·•··· ....•. ,- - ·--- . - -·-···-· ·-·•· -·· <) C'l~5.a;,:c,i: ! 1.!c,~:J::::::~: Sa!~io1~ rc1)r-0t0::t:-?.t:i:\rcs of: • r -- .. J ,...,.; -···-······J :.... ----···· ..· .. ----·-·1 i ~- ".1'1 ·•!•c "1 "\ ~ .... n':.. ~~ ~ c,...i,.. i' it··- . . ,. . . I f Ch.:.lin.,~n: ~ro:-.:;~1 ,· J l ~·... . . . . "-.'-· ., If .•·0•1,....,_....,~"'c-. , ....,., ....,. -~.-_. •.·-•·.·1.c,_~.. -,, . .,........~. -.,·\•, ...... ··-· ...... · ' " - '. . . . . •••-:--. -··'P'• .... - . · · : ·. . . . .... • . . . . . . . ."'"!.,.:_.;.··• . ·.i.:.;,·.. ·-:. /\J.•J ·~: \ !.ttr:5.!':'~!. Y ot De.f c!:=.::,J I·C:.tc~lli(;c~1~0 .-\.c:::no5 er: 1 -.-✓---· - • - - · - · - · - ... -■-- ... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,.. _ _ .., _ _ _ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Vf.-t•~ • J ■ :.. 1' -.L,.,.t,.~-;'""' ... ~' I t ~-o,·c> :;,, C, Ca,.:·,,cn,.-cnlt.i1 Of'ficc -·1 #'y":, I c;-,· .L • ,.-..,.J-!-., . .,_ O ... •...,..;.L.!1 ..:.·.... ,. i...,, ..... ~ .... Jtt~•t..~ ....... v... I I - ~~=-~--·. --·-·--·-·- --- .. ~r-•.,•••(".,.: ... O•"";•.:: .;. J .L.C!C E~>r~r'-1. cf :i'i:•:::.1]_ J •• 1:I1l5. ~{;r-j.·· oft C•"tt:t·r.uf.. :. Dci\ ::.:J.n1)1 ... ., I• I' 1 rac::~t~ i.:)1:ir; t·•j:" c~I. D,.;ft!t!c,'i l A-2023-00052--00391 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified intormauon Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies r CU NF l D~ NT I AL ------------Objects of a Central. l1?~llit5ence Structure B. 1'U AGH.t-h AW) {.;0-0lmINA'l'E DEP P..lt'l'Hb!./i1AL INTr~LLIGI:;NC1 ht:4UlHJ~f,;EN'l':., idW Pit.JOHl'l'lES FUfr '.i'llh GUIDANCE 01" r GO.LLI:,G'l'li/E JUDGbll'll!.N'l' AND .MADE AVAILABLE 11~ l"H.E ! A-2023-00052--00392 �•:. ) ... - -- ....~ -- . - C O N F I D E. N I~ Released under the ATIA • unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI • renseignements non classifies I A1 ~z Il\~"'WR?.ART!,IEil:x.~..1 TIJTSLLIGEir :~ cc1.2,rr~:r:~E s~t..TCTG?L (JD"LY, ~ 97C [ I Psrs co;,J,:!:r:T:::~ CRATIU,:J.J.j . . . I Secretary of th13 : ~ l l JIC(A) i _· JIC(B) j r1.rrn·~-LTG-7i'"C"' c.:..:1 ., I CH.ADJ,~·{ : '.:':lXAS;:,'?.Y C0-0RDn;:;:.:rn: (Second. Scc:-et~r:t) 7 .J....l'1J.tl.i ~- :J - ,.. I I Ji.BSESS:,:3:~r:rs STJ3F Chief of Asaesz:r:cnts CONFIDE A-2023-00052--00393 �Released under the ATIA - unc1ass1t1ea mtormauon DivulQe en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non ~ classifies 1 ORGANISATION 01<' THE ASSES: :HE:NTS STAFF l l i l l .v. JA~ :::.::·-.ir--~~r~ Gt· ~I-~~:;, t -----, ' --··--·-1 I _________ I I I De.ferci;:) ___] .__..,... _______I . .Assess:;:ients Staf ;7 --------------· _ _ _ _ _L _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ Curren't Intelligence C~roups ,--i-f {b1~te:n 1 ,·. ,. .. 1 i :~~rcto I Ii l'I ~ ....... .""). ...... i~ ... 4 r·- .,_..<.,;,. ' ~ 1 w~r --=.~"':le ~.J.. • _______. -4" .:,J,, -,L. ..... - ~ I lt_____ 1.~ic..dle East __. Eastern - -----------------------·--------::."'.:-:1::.~r~ ::~-::!:-:; ;.:. ·-1,~!"ie +,~r o:i'" pc-J.i ~ical 1 ..:>~~~.:~·.:::>.::;~~;!:C~ G:...c-~:-~ {c:t14~) ...:.1:.i :a~ di$Ci!)lir-es; .J.· 1.,0 Q:'Ci.lpr;::l. r0g:i.o!'M~lly O~f.':'-~1.i zJ "'~b.o· ~~'~C-r.:!~. ta~:..: !J"t.uc:ie :; "' A-2023-00052--00394 �u1vu1~...- ~ ■■ ,,, ____ - - -- classifies PRI!IB FtI;L,\?. .l C•!iS -r --- · - · - - - - - · · - - - - - - - ' :-11:,T~ .... , .... .;..1-.J :--·~ ~:, r ·p-·t:··. '11_r·t=.'.J~.r -•-,-;-...◊--·-~1i f.! .. ~~-_-i':i:-: :::~i:i1s-O}~s-~·:C.~:s-7------ -7 r . ;___ : . I.I'l~R:•.1';p,1s-;'~rp Tir-~r,~3 [) ±"{QJ{~~-:rpf;)f\V" - PC O - .. ·---- -- ...... .. -··· '-.JA,,.,..., ...... ..., --.1...J.. "- -""'J.,1.....J INOtMd \ Cl.. B nr~~ri1 :___..... .... - --- --- --·- - ......... ·-· ..... t --, i - . ,i.---·-· CEf":TR~.. L PL.:\l<i J-~: lfG· i ____ _, I l , - ..... ._ • •h• • - - ••••••---! ...!tD"';l J.~3 I ••-- • •• • • _,_..._ L .. I~·r··:p";!T'-rt lJ ;'s 01::i S ~('ATE lr-.,.1i1~-~T"""'\'t-.. . ·....~...--;; \..-,J..:, .•.: !..,,.i ;~_J.!:.,, ---- T ... -;r,--,.-.,... -r1., ... ,.,, .. '"".,.•• .1..N'.!..'J.1~.,;....J..'v".C;r~l.....-:-; ;:• . JIC ?k'\K:fING) CH.S. I£l!-fi\.1'1· , . JIG ------------ ------ CT.jaf(E:~·,1,. 1 I I IrcT·~~LI.J I GENCE ..... - •• --··-- -·---- . - .....·--·---·--. ?:_r_;z~~~~ !rs STl\.J.7'!.~ ; .. ~:tsr~ss1·-21{TS L-------------a.:1TAFl~ GfWD?S 1 JIC I-. '/l••._,., - .,• l·-• )I .... . . - \. V . ~ ' it ( ~;_·.Vl.:W.,.):.::,. l"'---. "C''!,".",..,. i'• ' r-··--· -·--"------·-... -·•-..--·-• ....... . 1 P :~R~t4.1~:Cl'fr1: t.71f:)E?. D2P !~R.S.'\~.;~61;1~ 1 It OFFIC~F.S) !l [5 £:E\E=ritRi S DEr::.. ~ES -•~•- .. - -.. --••• - - - • __ ... T•-~ " 't"\ \ 4 L. / ,I / ••· ?E::~:ft'.~:;12 JIC (. U:.. : T.~}'l~).1~.h ) ; - _ ,• i · - .................. .!. . . . --+-...••- - _..., ___ _ i.. __ .••• -·· Ci:3 I1-£ST o:?FIC:S LIAISCIT ··, ' ., ' ... . A-2023-00052--00395 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies r n A-2023-00052--00396 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies Resources D0..,-o~s Intellip;enco ~ '•·1 1970-71 ---•---- Onerat~on~~•-.______.____________ Unit as a nrimmy i'u.nctic·n incidental to • • man-years -Deputy Chief Intelli~- tional • Defence • encc Services {DOI$} 18tl2 Total other funct:lon~ ($000) • man-yecrs -- 1ss2 -Directornte of Naps· and Charting To•.;al National Defence . . f~l:.ce .Roscarch ,~ :-:-.:::d • •. 'S/ -Stafl" assigned to mm One:i::_aticns (~000) 19,867 213 1682 . 19,867 213 2,852 21C 1 25 2095 11,415 20 · 22,719 11,1~95 34,211; ~ - • t fo~al Research '•• I .- ~ 17/;· -Com.'!l.1..mfcc>.tions Brunch. 435 4,776_·. -Dcpart~1ent 17 245 -Special rreseurch Bureau 20 2Z2 Total External Affairs 67 821 235 116. • ,'.;,r:r~iai_ Af.£-airs 4 21 327 --71 l+ Security.and Intelligence Directorate 2401 81 226 902 110 110 3,068 2S,742 11,611 ¼0,353 A-2023-00052--00397 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies .1 ' ! i .I r .] I ! A-2023-00052--00398 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies fJ.1 or· r.-~::"\ ~ L:\.?:.DL:. ;~· f££j·~·~i.on J-fa1{~rn.o: Poi.~~~-~L~~r:~s~~ j_n the C,'J...'l<:'.di~n InteJJ.j-e -:::c.e 02.::_f;Q.r,.:i z,~tion c}~ :·~_-: :~2 i:cE cc. ;:t~ '. CILt\.}TJ~:-~I~·~: OITI,:t 0 l. Collecticu c;f li!t eE.: >-.:nee The principal inputs of -r.:n·r and processed intelli~~ence tc :'.;c1.riadian produc~ion processes come 1'ror:i tl,e col.la!x.1!'at:l.n;: j_ntf-.:..li(ence <J;'.~e:i(:j_es of thB U.S., Br:_~-,r~in, J..ustrc.lia, New Zr:ttland and t,1,Tti: with i,:.iporu:~nt Canadi.:.cn inputs 1n so-::lc instances. The acqu::.sition of int_elli:::ence tl~rcu~h liaison anci r:n.:.tual cxi::L:::.£;a c1.rrancc;:icnts wi t.h collabcra.ting foreien acencies is included at tl~e end of this sc~ction on Collection of Intellirence. A. SlG:iNT Source fkscr:i pt.ion - TI1e intercept of co:::i.::1w1ications and other elcctrom.agn8tic; signe.ls. Ona ini.ndrcd intercept positions, plus tile necessary ancillpary t:.nd support st,::,ff, Lave been aµprc-v.ed _t,o operate at field stations in Canada (fi-,re nt pre'.Jent), which arc lccated to provide the most useful and unique contributions to the intercept co·✓ erage on a world wide basjs prcvided by the intercept program.T..es of the Uni tcd States, Britain and Australia~ Initial l,l.;tho:tit~r-!::· •· Chiefs of Staff Co:nmittee and appropriate Ministers. ,.. _ _....,.,_, --- • ......,,._4.,_.._,...,,_ _.._ - - - _ _ _ ,_,_TT - -.___/ 'f\---.! -..>.! VL .J:. v ....t.t..V .1. ~ n_ --~ _ ... --· - ,i..l~\.,.i. 1-..1'.J,.V.l.lJ • (1) l•fanninr.: lGvcls for intercept stations, !3tation ad;nin:i.str.ation and -!!!?}-Htf:D~':!~cc:-This is a :xm progra.mr:1e and decisions on ~l~'._;l , ,eror..~0:~:-!!".!S .:J.nd _e~t-:i.0:~te~ <~re rn.--::i.de by tlie Defence Staff 1;-rithin ·exL,ting D:·iD policies. Action initiated by· DCIS, for approval by VCDS and CD3. Funds provided by I?ND. (2) SIGINT cq~ment fer intel·cent stations Annual pror.:rar:m:8s r,n~ est::._r_:::-;~£~ are prepared by the CH'IC and foritar-ded tbrocgh Lk CiiC to tl:e Director of Co:::1-n-:_1.a:i.cations Secu:-i t.:.: who ~ub;;d.ts to lPC for deecisions. F\mds arc provided by DUD. Ind.:iv:i.dli.1:1 conti·:::.ct dc:7E.n_rj~~stt:\_'?~, within the .-lVi"Jl'Oved anrw,,.l prograrn;te, arc prcp2.red by C.:-i:TG and fcn,arded to DC:3 for ap;.::·oval. They then go to E~D and arc processed ~hrcugh m~D channc~l:c- i'cr approval by the D::;puty Hird ster of N2.tional D0fenc~:. Hcq_':.Jicj_tion~;, when approved, are f:ertt to t:-.c ll-Gpti.rtmcnt of S'.lpply 2.nd Services for tr:o contracts to be let. ~:- The current authoriU.,is ~trc thB ;-;:ost recc11t annu:;..l dcciE;ionn r~ached acr.ord..ing to ti;(;'. follo·,,-j_nu pl:ocedures. A·2023-00052•-00399 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies ~:i::l;:i:·.T ---- - 2. r 'l'hcse are decided o:i a cont:i nuing basis by •~i.;,::tC in accor~anc e wit.h processing require::lC'nts based on intellL~ence rcquire::ients submit. 1~(:d by CaILo.dian user agencies and collciL,).rating !_;riti~1 and·U.S. agencies. New Prograrr.::,Les (including capital construction and equipment procure:nent) Coordination of the requirements and views of user and collection agencies would be done by the DCS through the CRC. DC.3 would subrnit recommendations to IPC for· approval. Decisions on new progr.'.3.r!'.:nes within established policies \>/Ould be :nade by IPC, with ref Brence by individual n•c .:ae:nbers to tt.eir mi.nistE:rs as they might feel necessary. Decisions on new pror,rru:unes involving new forr..s of ac.tivity or new policy consid'clration3 would be referred by IPC for decisions to the Hinisters of External Affairs, Defenco and any other ministers involved. B. C. SPECIAL CEnTRE HA 'YERlAL "l,l - n .-. ..,_ . ,&l'\J VO,llQU..S..C..1.1. .JI..!' ~ .:.- r .., - , "'Ii ,. ~ L ... ~ liV.l..1..t.iL..Li.LU11 t I t • t:S.l'.:.l.,.LV.J.\•V• HUl{AU SOURCES Cf.NADIAH FORCES ATI'ACHI:S Source Descri.otion - The collection of intelligence within for.1:::ign countries by visual observation, _photography and such other means as may be authorized. Initial Authoritz. - Hini.sters of Nationa..l Defence a.nd External Affairs. Annual or Periodic Decisions r (1) Personnel selection decisions arc 1r.ade by the Defence :3t&ff (Chief of Personnel in consultation w-ith DCIS) but are subject to the aereement of the Department of Ext.ern&l Af.tair:;;,. Changes of f:'l.2.nning level are decided by the Hinister of Nat:i.oinl Defence, subject to tlJc concurrence of the Minister of External Affairs. (2) ~~l Stnffj.nr:; CFA Post~. Prq~1tlmi'.: s a.n d l~st im.,.~.~-Q~;·a t.ione and J•i:aint.onnnce_ (inc lur.!lr~r travel and traininc). Deci:,1on point is VC..:DS. .3ubDissions r.1t.1.ci.e by OCIS. ... /J A·2023-00052·-00400 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies _,, r 3 (3) Taski!1.'•'. and ReDorting. Decision J.Oint, i$ DClS. Head of Hission nBY override such decisions if Hie loca-1 situation dictates. Head of H:i.ssion also controls protocol tas~:s and co;:t·,1ercial tnsr~s wticre appropriate. New Pr0Gra:11:.1e~ - The creation or deletion of. CFA posts; new for::1s of activity and procurement of special operational equipment. The decision points would be the Hinisters of National i.Jcfencc and E:>;terna.l /dfo.irs. Pror;osals would Le subr,.ti.Ued from DCIS throueh VCD:3 to CDSAC to Hinist:..er of Hational Defence h1rn rwuld consult the Hinister of External Affairs and the Cabinet if necessary. SHJ P OOA RDI !r. F RC',GRA!--fi.ffi Source Descriptiori:. - The collection of intelligence within Canada from selected Ships Captains, involving the briefing and debriefing of these sources in cooperation with the British pre ~anune. r Inj_tial Authority -~ Ministers of National Defence ar.d External Affairs. Was submitted to ministers by the IPC on the recom,t1ondation of JIG. Arrnua~_aiYd f'en'..odt.c:. D@c.i~i.or:is ~ use-s ~.x1s.-·t1r.g DCIS Mlij l:ta1-y i·eae.eiurct:::s; uv separate annual programne or estit.1ates action required. Sta.ffing, tasking and rcportip~, 'training_. Decision point. is DCIS. Het1 Pr.ogrrum..,es - The extension of programmes beyond cristing nuthori ty. Decision points would be Ministers of National Defence and EJ..-term..l Affairs. Recommendations would be made by DCIS through .JIG to IPC for approYal and sub:nistiion to ministers if necessary. CANADIAN FORCES SEFNH;G Ar:K1AJ2 Source Inscriptiofl - T'ne collection of intelligence abroad by selected personnr:il of Canadian Forces serving abroad (including Canc.dian aircraft. and ships in transit abroad). Initio.l Authodty - l-tinistcrs of National Defence a.I1d E.xtcrnaJ. Affairr.. As occasions a.rose approval was obtained from 1~in:i.stcr~ by Uie It'~ 10.cmhorn on the reco:nmendations of the .JIC. AmmaJ and Periodic DecisiC?,~ - uses existing mi.liti".ry resources; no separate anrn.1:,i..l progr2,11r,1c or estimates ·action required. St,iffing 1 tai1kingym..L n!p})!tinz., train:5.nr;.. Dr.:cisicn po:\.nl:. is IX:J~, r;ubject. to const~ltatj_on ,6tl1 the l)(~pa.rt.,;ient of E..'J(.to1•n·,~1 Aff2.irs if net_OSS1Lr".f. A-2023-00052--00401 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies ... ,., ,~-T \.);',11.J.•J.:.. r - 4 - New ?rc1-;rn.m:;1e3 - New for:as of activity; :1ew areas or countrie!l involved in oDcrations; use of special oper~1.t:o:-12.J.. e-:uip:nent. The decision points would be ·the !·'.ini sters of l'ia t.ioual Defence ,Hid ~>,.."teri !al Affa:Lrs. Recommendations would be nade by ;)Cl3 tbrough J iC to IPC for approval and subr:iission to ministers if necessary. }'RAVKLLEHS, mFI~C'I\dw, l!f.~IG.RA~:T.s (SRB Program,e) Source Description - The collection of intelliJ.;ence within Canada from selected travellers, defectors ,md immig-ants. The interdepart~ental Defector Cora,11.i.ttee co0rdinates action concerning tlie adr:lission of potential defectors to Canada and their status and handling in Canada as defectors or innnigrants. Initial Authority: - Ministers of External Affairs and National De.fence. Was subm.i t ted to ministers by the IPC on the recorJ.-r.cnda tion of the JJC. Annual and Periodic Decisions r (1) Annual progra.rmnes and estimat~ - Decision point is the IPC. Submitted by t.h~ J)j T'f-J~t.0r SRB, (2) Staffing, tasking and report~qg, training - Decision point is Director SR.B. (3 )' • Selection of sources for debriefing - Decision point is Director SHB. (4) Selectlon of source for briefing_ - Decision point is USSEA. Recormiendat.ions submitted by Director SRB. New Progrr..n1:u0s - Extension of activity to sources of infon~ation about additional countries ... Decision point would be Minister of Exterml Affairs. Submissions would be made by Director SRD through JIG to. IPC for approval and submission to ministers if necessary. CAH,\DIAN DIPL0~·1tTIC OFFIG:p',13 AiJ:W;\Q (excluding CF/~ 1 s) Source Descr:t.Etic_r:_ - The collect:i.on of intelligence wi. thin forcicn com1trics by ob::iervational trips to sensitive areas or the solicitation of infonnation or opi:-iion from a potential inforr.ant. Initial Authority - m.nistcr of External Affairs. Annual or Pet1oclic Dr:ci::;ions - Continuing :i: rogr::n1L,~e using oxisting diplm~f.itic resource~~; no a.111111.2.l decisions required. 1 . .. /5 A-2023-00052--00402 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies S1CRET Q:e.£Fational Decisions - i-fr.ctl1~r to engage in a particular colle-:tion actJ.vity i,aving regard to the diplom.tic ~,ropriety of ttie proposed activity and the Uitivereal raquire::1ent 11 to re5pect1' local laws ,?..nd regulations. The decision will usually be taken at tHe local level by the head of the Diplomatic Hissicn. RCMP SOURCES Source Description - Intelligence about natters other than security obtained by the ~ecurity and Intelligence Directorate incidental to their pr:imary mission~ Decisions Rcauired - The only decision additional to those pertaining to the ro.lc of the· Directorate as a security semce are decisions to release t.he intelligence gained to other interested intelligence agencies. The decision point for this is the Director General Security and Intelligence or the Commissioner of the RCMP. D. !USCELI,J,NEOUS SOURCES In addition to human sources avail.able· in Cc1.m.d<i t.hAra ::n•A ot.hP.r . --- - ~..-!!I.; !!~ :.:.. a=n !:::r!..:..i--':; ~~ ....a........... .... .,;. v.i.6..i..i.,.i,i:g L>i:Wv.1.ua. or iu 1:.ramn.T,, crasnea aircrart, rra terial exhibited r _ •• II. 't,J!!!-'V.L U"--l.A ... ~ • I t- h . l 1-h-,, • 14,.I 'I, I '\ 11 I 1_,"7" -# • ~ I~ ,•• .!_! l..-t::°".~-,_!,_.!,_ 0 • - ., • • ~ "'-1,!--!.i_•& I Y.i.-.....1!,4 V at Trade Fairs or Exhibitions, foreign published material and filme9 Such sources are exploited by DCIS or SRB on a continuing or an opportunistic basis c:.nd uoing existing resources. The Department of External Affairs is consulted ii' there are risks of public or diplo1:::atic protest or publicity about the activity. Dacisions concerning operati9ns are takon at senior official or ministerial level aB appropriate. E. PROCUREMF~NT FROM COLJ..AEORATrnG FOREIGN AGENCIES e.9.~-12£?._cr2;-_2t.i~l}_ - The acqui::iition of intel.ligenco through lia.tson and mutual exchanf;;c arrangements. with collaborating foreign agoncies. Int.clligcnce prob1cit!3 facing the \fost are ~o complox and difficult th2.t not. oven the United States or the United Kingdom can meet o.11 their intell:tgcflce needs fro;n their own resources or plan thBir intoll::.gence progra:nrr.es in isolation. Goopero.tion is even r::i.orc n~cossary fer Canac.2., because our intelli;:,ence resourccn are so liPJ..itoq. Our cooperation is prir.ri.rily with the United i~ingdon and the United States and to a lc$nor · extent ,nth Austrnlia, New Zealand ~nd NATO. . .. /6 A-2023-00052--00403 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies r- - 6 - Periodic dec1sions - whether to solicit ;;articular infor1:a tion in accordance witu consumer requirements anri within existing authorities. The decision point would be tbe prograr.Jae manager responsible for the particular liaison channel and contacts in·rolved. It cou.ld •be the JIG or a departmental or agency intelligence prograr:une manager. l1ew Programmes - The extension of arran.sar.1er1ts beyond existing authority to new countries or new and politically sensitive categories of inte3=-ligence. The initial decision point would be the Minister of External Affairs, with reference to the Cabinet. Committee on Intelligence as appropriate. Proposals would be sub!llittod through JIC to IPC • for ·approval aud submission to Ministers • .. A-2023-00052--00404 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies 1 II. Processing of Intelligence This stage consists of the prinnry precessing of collection products by c"specialist personnel to produce a product useable by intelligence production agencies, including collaborating foreign agencies. A. SIGIHT Initial Authority_ - Appropriate Ministers. Annual Decisions Y...annir.g levels, ;;:.nnual programme and esti~~tes for CBNRC. The decision point is the IPC. Proposals are prepared by CEHRC and forwarded to OCS. After consideration by the CRC t.l1ty are submitted by DCS to IPC for approval. Funds are prov:'..ded by individual departments, to whom share!1 of the CBNRC budget are allocated according to a.n agreed formula. J Operating Decis~~ r (1) T'ne general allocation of processing tasks and pri.ori ties. _____ , b __ ......,.._._,.__._ a) _--.-, ... ~ ... .a...:--- ..:.,. . ;......,.;... ____ .._..,...,...,. ...... _:_._.. .J--..:~-..l' "I,-\...,"" ..... _ _ _ ....., 1,..,......., -J r1n,.,r-..;-r,. ·w~:..~\.·.J, -~ ... ., •h- "'"''"..; ... .,_, ............... _ ........ _ Tho -.f'- ._..,.. • requirements of Canadian int(illigenco consumers e:s notifiecl to CBHRC from tim.o to time.. Th6se requirements are decided b:: ind.ivj_du!l.l departmcnta and a.re not coordinated by JIC or CRC. the divj.sion of main responsib1lities for SIGrn'r ts.sks reachc.ct a.t a Tripartite (US-UK.---Canad..1.) SIGINT Conference 5.n 1957 in . the interests of avoiding un-iecossary duplication. A workfo.g • arrangement for the allocation of taoks was propo~rnd by CBNRC/GCliQ/HSA. It was approved by DGS and reported 5.n October 1957 to CSB which exercised policy control before the IPG was formed. (2) Decisions on minor .a.djustE_~ants within the annual progra-~ne are required on a continuing ba.~is. These decisions are IT'cJ,do by CK-me using the :.:;a.me basis as for the goneral deci~ions, and they affect collection as well as processing tasks. Uew Pr_:ogramrncs - The dadsion pnint would be the IPG. _ Propcstls would be propa::;·od by cmmc and fonmr<l.cd to D:::;S. After considcr~ticn b)the CRC thc.:y would be submitted by DCS to I.PC for apprO"'"..-nl or referral to HiniDtoro. if neccssnr-y. A-2023-00052--00405 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies r- - 2 - ......... B. SFEGIAL CENTilE HA. TERIAL In5.U.al Authority - Appropriate Ministers. Annual Decisions Manning levels, annual program~es and estiril.ites. Processing activities involving these materials are components of n:m prograrrnnes and decisions aro ma.de by th!::: Defence Staff within existing mm policies. Action initiated by DCIS, for approval by VCDS and CDS. Funds provided by mm. New Progru.rnm1~s - Coordination of the requirements and vie•,·rs of user and producer agencies would be done by the JIC. Recommendations would. be submtted by JIC to IPC for approval. Decisions on new prograr.i;:nes within established policies would be made by Il'G, lri.th reference by individual IPC members to their ministers as they might feel necoscsary. Decisions on new program:nes involving now forms of activity or new policy considerations would be referred by IPC for decision to the Ministers of External Affairs, Defence and other mi.niBters involved. r .• ••• I) A-2023-00052··00406 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies SECRET IIJ. •Produ~tion of Intelli~cnc~ This st~ge consists of the further processing of intelligence data / by intelliecnce analysts to produco a product uscable by consumera of intelligence, including collabora.ting foreign a.genci~s. A. . GURRBNT IN'I7.LL1GEHGE (intelligence on significant current· developments or updating basic studies) (1) lfat:i.onal. Intelligence Description of Prograr~me - JIC current intellj_gence prograrrca includes (a) Warning Intelligence (:!ndications intelligence) programme executed on behalf of JIG by DCIS until an Alert imrolving action by JIG has been declared; thereafter by JIC. (b) Weekly Intelligence Report (WIR) - a weekly JIC sUia.ll'.ary of signif ic;i.nt events. (c) JIC Briefs - Ad Hoe reports on current events requ;Lring --------- .,:_ __ - ;- J.\.,.-- .... _____ .... ------~-- - ....... --·---11 _....,__..,...._.A.·...,~ ... -- ••---1:-- l hl 0 ""....,,...._,,...,..,.. ,- r..'T'I n,r,......-Jr-'l~rP to up-date basic intelligence studies on points of detail. -~sting Authoritz (a) Warning Intelligence - Intergovernmental Tripartito Alerts Agreement. (b) & (c) WIR and Briefs - Canadian Intelligence Prograrei-n:, .approved b;r IPC. Decisions Required concerning Warninr: Intelligence (a) aboyo ;rntercept Activi~~-~~ - during criuis situations stations operate and r-,Jport on the basis of stand ins instructions, modified by specific instruct~ons from CBtJ1C as nacoss~.ry. The decision point is the Station Gonunander- for stction operations on stt.nding orders; Director cmRc for instructions from cmmc. SIGrn'f Sta tea of i, J.crt - the so eovern the a.cti vi t:'i.c s of intercept end proccssi;1g activities. The dccisio:1 point for declarin,z nnd raodifyine; these statt:1s of SlGHiT Alert iD the Dirccto1• crnmc. . .. /2 A-2023-00052--00407 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies SECm:T - 2 - Intelli.~ence Alerts - these govern the activities of the intelligence community. The decision point for declaring and modifying states of intelligence· Alert is the JIG. • \-larnin.~ Intol].i~ence Outouts - depending upon the urgency of the si tu[!. tion, responsibility for action upon receipt . of warning intelli~ence ranges from the duty personnel to t..he JIG, as designated in JlC st.anding orders • governing intelllz~nce war;1ing activities. Decisions Reau.ired (WIR and JIG Briefs (b) and (c) above) - subject and area content J security and control. The decision point is the JIC. (2) Dep1.rtmental or Agency Intellir;cnce pescripUon of Pro[!rames - departmental or agency current intelligence progr.ir.:1'1les for departmental or agency purposes. Exi.sU.nQ Authori t,y r mm-CDS; XA-USSEA; SRB-IPC. DP.:C'\ii;ions reauired - sub.iect and area content, security and control. Decisi.on points department or agency intelligence programme mana.gers. . Be· . PASIC r..J'J'ELLIGEt~CE (studies involving substantial collation and an::i.lysis) (1) Nat~onal Intelli. 0 cnce Descr).ption of Prop.;rarmne JIC An[l__lli-1._Jlork ProP,ra.>:,ne and Ad hoe Pap~_f!. - long-term estimates related to objectives of Canadian Intelligence Programrr1e as approved by IPC; or as specified by cornmm-~r agencies; or in support of JIC delegations to internationallysporisored intelligence conferences. Existi~r, Authority - Canadian Intellige~ce Proeram~e approved by IPCc Decicions reouircd - subject and area content, security and control. Dod.~ion point, r J IC. ... /J A-2023-00052--00408 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies SECRET r. -3 (2) pepartment.al or Agency Intelligence Description of Progr~.rruries .;. departmental or aeency program.me;, .f c,,, basic intelligence studies within their areas of responsiM.13.t:r. E.xi sting Auth ori ty DND-CDS; XA-USSEA; SRB-IPC. Decisions required subject and area content, security and cr,r:·i.. ?' Decision points department or agency intelligenc~ programme ::~- :· • r .• '· • r A-2023-00052--00409 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified informatio Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements no classifies SECRET r, IV. Disse:nination of Intelli ~once ·1. This stage consists of the distribution to consumers, whether dor.1estic or foreign, of the end product of the intelli.5ence production process. It is by this means that the products of intelligence activities are made available to decision making points elsewhere within the Government. National intell.i,::ence is d.issero.ina.ted to departments er agencies, which must take responsibility for the timely provision of this material to the 1 relevant particular decision making points within their own organizations. This also applies to departmental or agency intelligence dissemiru:.ted to other dcpart:;ients and agencies. Departmental intelli;jence distributed within the origin.a ting department is usually directed to the relevant particular decision making points. • Release of any given item of end product to all decision making points within the 9"overnment which might have somo degree of interest, or to all potential consumers, is not auto!nat.ic. Security or other consid8r.rttions may require that the end product be withheld from some domestic or foreign consumers or handled through special channels in domestic agencies or to foreign consumers, or n:ade available subject to caveats regarding further 2. r ____ ..._____ .... ,.,.. ~ .....,.._ ..... +4 r,,Y\ __ ~4 -.-.-....... Caveats 3. , •. The most obvious caveat relates to the security classification of the end product,.including any w~rkings restricting it for perusal by CAl'JADIA~ EYES ONLY 11 • In addition, however, end product may be made available to consumers subject to a caveat that there be no further distribution outside the consumer agency; or outside the specific geographic locality of tho consumer agency (e.g.J a restriction to headquarters dissemination); or to a third p:1.rty without the consent_ of the originator (the so-called third country rule is generally observed in the CAN/UK/US coa1rmmitr, and so far as we are aware between most other collaborating collecting agencies in the world); or that there may be no attribution to a Canadian source if further 11 dissemination is rr.ade. Specially sensitive m-:i.terial 4. Occasj_onally deci5ions may be called for about" -the disse.."li:ne,t"i.on of intelligenc9 fro:n Can-:.ldian official sources w!·1ich have gained access to it by virtue of interna.tional arrangernents or auspices norn1tlly regarded as precluding an i.ntelligence function. Hccent exa:uples have be0n Canadil~n participants in U.N. peacekeeping bodies and the Internation3.l Control and Supcr-Yision Cowm.igsion:, in Indo-China; menbers of the Canadian Armed Forces t.raining tc.?.ms .in Tanzania and Ghana; and Canadians in varJoun intcrrn1tional orgnnizations. Inforr:1-:1.tion obtained from such :iourccs i!J rcgard,:d as· speci.~tlly t}Cil$:t tive and rr,1y require either to be kept enti:i.~eJ.y within C.::in.:i.d..i.nn circ1r;g> ·or made subject to special safcgu.--irds if foreign din3c.:..1ination in G(~mood fcaBtble. . .. /2 A-2023-00052--00410 �Released under the ATIA - unclassified information Divulge en vertu de la loi LAI - renseignements non classifies SECRET - 2 - A. F -~·1ow.1 IN'I'fil.LIGEtICE Decision reauired - To what depar~~ents or agen~ies of government should end product be distributed and ·what special caveats if any should be applied? • DecisJ.on point_ - JIC. (2) To Foreign Consumers (governments, international organizations or international conferences) Decisj__ on renuireq - To what departments or agencies of forei 6 n governments, or \·that components or individuals in international organizations or attendj_ng international conference3 should end product be distributed and \•;hat special caveats if any should be applied? Decision point - JIC . ··"I-·.· • •_ .. - • ••or,•"' , ,.rt,_ er"'"··"' - ·; . .. - . .. - .. - . . ~~ (1) To Canadian Const-!:~ Dccisj_on regulred - To what departments or agencies of government should end product be distributed and what special caveats if any should be applj_cd? pecision point c Originating department or agency intelligence progra.'IllTle managern. (2) Jo 1"orej gn Consll.l!',ers (governments, international organizations or international conferences) • •• •t_ ... Decision required - To what departments or agend.es of fordgn goYernm,:mts, or what components or individuals j_n interm,ticnal organizations or attending international conferences should end product be di~itributcd and what special caveats if any should b~ · applied? Decini_on point B - Originating clepartr:wnt or agency intellir-;cnco -pror,rar:i.;-r.-~ r.-1..:imecrn ~ubject, in cnsc of spccie.ll.y sensitivo m;.i.te:rial, to consultation in JIG or with Department of External Affairs. A-2023-00052--00411 �Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2024-02017 GAC Special Registry Binder 'Isbister Report' �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I 'acces 000001 a I 'information �i GAC - Released under the Access to.-lnfori-nations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information-: a • • ,If, CANA9~:-N EM B,Ass;r • _AMBA!:;SADE oy c:NAD-1 1746 Maaaachuaetta Avenue NW, Washington, D. c. 20036 Rov•ber 10,, 1970. Dear Mr. Robenaon, Here ia rq report on 1ntelllgenoe in three oopiea. It 70u agree, one 1• tor the Priae Miniater, who baa a.preaaed intereat, one tor Mr. Ritohle an4 one tor you.r-aelt. Only one other con has been mad.e and thia ia being held in the special registry here at the Embaaa7. Earlier dra1't• have been destroyed. • If 7ou viah to commun.icate v1 th me about the text, the apeoial channel•.,.. ot cour•• available through External. I ahall be pleued to oome to Ottawa tor d1aouaaiou u JOU U1' ooui4er nece••a.1'7• I viah I could have edited the report onoe more and I partioularl7 regret the repetitioll u between Seotlon IX ancl Seotion x. '1'he ooaplait7 ot s:, tezt ia more than matched, holfner, lq the oompluit7 ot the adain1atntive urangement• I a ont1ois1ng. I a hapPJ' enough to aula1 t the nport u it atancta beoawae I think it 1• clear and oouiatent an4 I hope it ia underatand.able. • •..•/2 Mr. a. G. Robertaon, Clerk ot the Pr1Ty Oounoil an4 SeoNtaJ.'J' to the Cabinet, But Blook, OTTAWA • 000002 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a • -2- In viev ot the oluaitloatloa. i t • unl.1Jcel.7 that JOU v1ll publish a poolan edlti•• U tu &D7 NUon it ahould beocae • .,..__,. to pNpaN !ION ooplu than an reqm.N4 tor l a t ~ oena14enUoa. I vould appreolat. beiag glftll an opponmd.'7 to ecU.t it. again. lb~-#e&~. c. M. ISBISTER • • • 000003 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a 000004 �GAC - Released u~der the Access ·to Informations A c . AMC - rn,OOff • '2'" 01' ''4"' l'ac,es al'lofo, TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT • Report by c. M. Isbister, Outside Examiner November 91 1970 TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000005 , �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) • • Table of Contents FORE.WORD Page seotion I. Purpose and Conduct ot the Enquiry••••••••••• 1 II. Perspectives and General Concluaiona ••••••••• .3 III. Scope and PUJtpoaea ot Intelligeno•••••••••••• 6 IV. Needs tor Intelligence Within the Framework of Foreign Policy and Defence Policy ••• ~••••• 12 v. Departmental Needs for Intelligenc•••4••4•••• 13 VI. Canadian Intelligence and the Tripartite Arrangement••••••••••••••••••••••• l4 VII. British and United States Programs •••.••••••• 25 VIII. Resources Devoted to Canadian Intelligence in 1970-71••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 29 IX. Deoiaion-Making Points and Prooeasea in the Canadian Intelligence Organization ••••.•• 31 x. Guidelines ot Chang•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 38 XI. Chairmanahip ot Committ•••••••••••••••••••••• 46 XII. Financing ot Intelligence •••••.•••••••••••••• 48 XIII. Recommendation••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 51 Appendicea "A" "B" "C" Needs tor Intelligence Within the Framework ot Foreign Policy and Defence Policy Reaponae by Department ot External Attaira on divisional use ot intelligence Response by Department of National Defence on Departmental need tor intelligence "D" Resources Devoted to Intelligence in 1970-71 Decision-Making Pointa and Processes in the Canadian Intelligence Organization 000006 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a 'l'OP SEOBET UMBRA POR C.AlW>Ull EYES OJLI -PORBWORD -- -- - -- -- ... ... • 'fhia report waa dratted before I left Ottawa in eul7 September. Since then I have ed.ited and rea19aQged it but the obaftllVation• an4 recommendations oe 111batan1'iall7 the same. I wondertd whether to introduce acme comment• to bring it more abl-eaat ot the cUl'rent situation, the lddnapinga, the eurgeno7 pcntera and ao tonh. I hope it is :more oonn.noing u 1t atanda, and in an7 event I have no •1na1de• intol'ID&tion b.ere in Washington. I have tried to make reoommendationa ot ways in which intelligence can better sane the Govel'mllent and nothing I lmow ot the current ■ituation leada • to change the••• Governments ot the paat have aomet!Ma adopted meaaurea to deal with aho•t tel"Jll situations and neglected tb• continuing natl.ll'e ot undvlying problema. Pemap■ thia repOFb oan uai■t in consideration ot the longer run aa well u ot the immediate. TOP SEORE'f UMBRA • FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000007 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SEORift' UMBRA FOR CANADIAN' EYES ONLY Purpose and Conduct of the Bngui17 I. .Following a decision of the Intelligence Policy Committee, Mr. R. o. Robertson requested me to act as Outside Examiner ot intelligence operations in the Government and I commenoed work in early June. The tel9Dls of reference area • (a) to examine and report to the Intelligence Po~:I Committee on the purposes, or zation, operation and financing or the Canadian intelligence program and: (b) to make recozmnendationa to the Intelligence Polioy Cmmdtt•• on any ot the foregoing in the light ot current governmental. objectives in the field.a ot 4etenoe, foreign policy and national security. 2. Special clearance• were granted tor admiasion to the various oentn ■ of intelligence operation• - collectors, analysts and uaera - here in Ottawa and in the other capitals I viaited • ). In London during the week of July 19 • 2S I visited the aaven governmental departaenta and agencies principally concerned. Th••• includecl the Cabinet Ofi'io•, the Common• wealth and Foreign Office, the Ministry or Defence, th• Treasury, Government Communications Headquarters, the General Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service. I had diaousaiona with the heads ot all but one ot these organizations and senior otficera in addition. 4. I made three trips to Washington, on July 16, Jul7 27 • 31, and a last one in September to visit the National Security Ageno7, the Dep8.l"tment of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, A:l!'lflT Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, The Assistant Seoreta.J7 ot Detense and the Deputy Assistant Secreta17 (Intelligence). Again in Washington everyone was helpful. . .... /2 TOP SECRBT UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000008 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECB.ft UMBBA FOR CANADIAB EYES OHLY - 2 - ;. I have been aware tor 79ara ot the tun4 ot good will towards Canada existing in certain other countries but never more than in theae visit• to London and Waahington. In the tield ot 1ntelligenoe I had expected moN reticence. Moat ot the .Americana and British I met were aa open and helptul aa it I belonged to their own govePm11ental aervioea. and indeed more ao. 6. I ha4 talka with the High Commisaioner in London and with the A:mbusador in Washington. 7. In Ottawa I viaited the PriVJ' Oounoil Ottice, the Oommunioationa BPanoh N.R.o., the Special Research Bureau, the Department ot Btternal. Attaira, the RoJ&]. Oanadiaa Mounted Police, the Department ot Rational Detenc•• the TreuU17 Boud and, among uae••• I conaulte4 NpHaen• tat1vea ot the Dep&Ptment ot Pinanoe, the Bank ot Canada• t;he Department ot Fiaheri•• and the Department ot 'Industrr• Trade and Oom.ei-ce. 8. With the ueeption ot-, etticient ••o•et&r7, I worked without atart, 'bJ' neoeaait7 and alao bJ ohoioe. To have obtained usiatanta tl'OIIL outside the intelligenoe oommun.1 t7 would have nquiNd too muoh time. To have dratted uaiatanta tJIIOa intelligeno• agenciea might have rendered 'llrf reoommendationa auapec, in wa7S which I could not pMdiot • .u this repon atanda I can uaume napona1bU1t7 tor everything aaid and it 1a limited to What I Judge to be the important matten. 9. A number ot memoranda ot high qualit7 have been prepued tor me 'bJ' our proteaaionala, however, an4 I willh to regiatv -,q gratitude to each ot thea. I ottered to include theil' nwa but none betrayed hia calling b7 aooeptina. 'l'he agenoiea oonoened have been diligent to avoid intluenoing my oonolusiona undul.7. . ...•/3 TOP SEOBEf UMBRA PQR CANADIAN JYES QNLY 000009 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAlf EYES ONLY II. Perspectives and General Conoluaiona vlhen this assignment was fix-at proposed I ~eaisted it. My time was limited and I wondered whether I could do a good job. This remains still to be seen. The subject matter is so vast, however, that there is a sense in whioh I may perhaps be more useful in a tew montha than 11' I had a yeu. In addition, I had been led in the past into aome related governmental widU'WorldaJ however important the tuka, I had tound them thankl.ess and dittioult. I wondered whether intelligence might t\ll'n out to be more ot the same. • 2. As I have learned aomething about intelligence my adverse reactions have diminished. I have oonoluded that the Canadian Govermnent should take intelligence seriowsl7, u it is taken in the United States and the Un..tted ~.ngdom, but in way1 appropriate to our own problem.a and interest•. This would be sOI11ething quite new., 3. The purpose ot 1ntelligenne is nnt to intrude into private lives as such but rather into other countries• secrets, intentions and pretensions. There is a lot tn he aft.id tor being able to compare the statements and undertakings ot govermnenta with what the7 are actually doing. Aa a case in point, the United States has been able to modify its requirements for international inapection in diaarmam.ent talka because of its confidence in its own ability to conduct intelligence 8\ll'Veillance. The points to be negotiated have been thua diminished. 4. On balance the role of intelligence ia to avert criaea and to moderate the reactions ot governments to crises in whioh there is the danger ot escalation to total war. During the aix-clay war over the Suez, intelligence authorities advised that there was no need to mobilize United States torcea in the area, despite impressions being created publlcl7 by the Ruasiana. In 1968 intelligence sou.roes revealed that the invasion ot Czechoalovald.a was not the beginning or a more widespread attack. . ....A • TOP SECllli~ UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000010 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY S. My conolusiona are easentiall.J' eimple. Exiating oom.ponenta of the intelligenoe atructUN are uaetul in themaelv•• and their relation• with other countri•• reault in substantial benefits to Canada. What ia laok:lng is at the coreJ there ia inau.fficien, ability to formulate purpoaea and objectives on a continuing buia at the govermaental (aa diatinot tJtOm the departmental) level. !hia 1• not a critioim ot persona or organization• because oocuions have never arisen in the past to define auoh reapona1bil1t1•• or to create the requisite machinery. With nev conoepta ot leadership and coordination the entire a;rat• would impl'Ove 1n tone, tempo and reaulta. This is my theme. • 6. I ahall bring tort1ai-d some proposal.a concerning organization. Important as thia subject may be, it takea aecond place to the definition ot pUJtposes and objeotivea at the governmental level. With defined goal.a people can overcome quite a lot or ba4 organisation • 7. Intelligence nol'm&ll7 deala with event• outaide the countPy. I have not been asked to examine security• which deala with domestic matt•••• There are connections, hovne•, between intelligenoe and aecurit7 which cannot eatel7 be ignored. 8. Particularly in the tield ot immipation important questions ot intelligenoe and aeourit7 aN meshed tof•tm••• Organized torcea with pUJtpOaea oontP&r7 to Canadian ntereata oan only be underatood by atudJing the pattern• ot thei.l' aetivitiea comprehenaivei7, and they otten operate b7 moving their agenta in and out ot the countl'7. FPODL the Govel'Dm.ent 1 a point ot view we weaken ouraelvea by allowing artificial barriera to exiat between intelligence and security. In recent 7eara, incidentally• contPC>la over immigration have been rendered more and more 1nett6ctive. At present there 1a al.moat nothing to prevent a lm.owledgeable professional connected with espionage, subversion, terrorism or organized crillle, tram entering the countP7 at will. (I have no doubt that aOIU special emergency m.eaaurea are being applied tempol'arlly.) ••..• /5 • TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR OANADIA.ll EYES ONLY 000011 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 9. There 1a another connection between intelligence and aecurit7 which 1•• in rq view, impoittant. Our secUl'it7 m.euurea sometime• give the im.preaaion ot dealing with amall cues in the same wq aa larger on••• In the mind• ot Jl8llJ' ••ni~ adminiatrator•• intelligeno• and aeo1119it7 get tai-i-ect with the aame bl'USh. The Royal Ooaiaaion on Seourit7 perhapa erred 1n giving undue auppo•t to existing prooedur••• Some new approaches are needed 1D aeclll"it7 to ditterentiate between the important and the leaa important. Until this is done both intelligence and aecurit7 will continue to be aftected by a aort ot Greshaa•a Law - that minor question• tend to drive important one• out ot circulation. • 10. Pinally, thia report containa comment• about the scope and importanoe ot intelligence in BP1tain and the United Stat••• Thea• comment• do not impl7 approval ot all ot the actions ot th••• oountr1••• I am interested in the aecurit7 ot the countJ.17 in the bltot.deat aenae and in making the Canadian intlu•n•• aa strong u it oan be in the .tutherance ot Canadian objeotivea in the world as it esi ■ta. Pe•hapa we can lean t'JtOII some ot the•• othe• oount•1•• hov to be •••n more etteotive than we are. . ..••/6 TOP SECRm UMBRA FOR CANADIAB EYES ONLY 000012 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SEC.Rlff UMBRA FCR CANA.DIAN E"lES ONLY - 6 - III. looR! and ¥po••• of Intelligeno• What 1• meant bJ' 1ntell1genoeT It ia tempting to define it u that pa.rt ot the total 1n1'ormat1on about the international environment which 1• gathered secretly by govel'D1118ntal agencies, including commun1cat1one intercepts.and other electronic meanaJ satellite and aerial photogral)h7J the work ot agentaJ information provided bJ' visitor■• and ao on. 11ot only ia auch a datinition unsatiatacto17 because ot its ciroulari'7, but because it does not go tar enough. 2. It 1• better to define intelligence aa lnt'ol'mation f'llc;lla all ao"Urcea pertaining to the aecurit7 of the countl'J' • and it• institutions. The purpoae of intelligence programs ia to intorm the Government of dangera and threats troa abroad to Canada• Canad1ana and national intereata. The columns or the dail.J' press are aouroea of intelligence in thia aen••• 3. Distinction• can be madet counter-int•lliganoe deals inside the country with espionage and aubversion tram abroad, aecurity intelligence deal.a with hcae-made subversion and revolution, and general intelligence ia directed abroad. h. While these terms are useful, they create problema U theJ' are taken too literally aa guidea to action. In the world ot espionage a complex operation by another oountl'J' mar involve Canada•• foroea at levela ot 1ntell1genoe, counter-1ntell1genoe and aecur1t7. It ia obvioual7 unw1ae to allow much graaa to grow between these cloaal7 related function• it a government intends to protect itaelt. 5. Intelligence involves more than the oolleotion of data. The quality ot governmental deciaion.a can be no better than the intol'llation on which the7 are baaed. The problem today 1• not the laok of data but to get th• to the right place ill time. Govermunta are being awamped with more than the7 can uae ettectively. With the acceleration ot commun1cat1ona and the multiplication ot method• of obtaining and atoring taota, it ia eaaential to tormulate • ...../7 '!'OP SECRET UMBRA FOR OANADIAB EYES ONLY 000013 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SAOBm UMBBA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 1 questions correctl7! to collect, eeleot. analyse and evant. In both the Britieh and American Governments it ie the intelligence oomrn,mity whioh ia generating mBll7 chang•• in these matter• and presiding over appi-a1ae what ia N th-.. • 6. In the United States and the United Klngd•• intelligence aervicea are now ranging into the oonaideration ot pi-obl• area.a outeide ot detenoe and aecurit7 aa traditional.17 understood. Posaibl7 theN is a new conoeptl)al framework emerging in wh:loh intelligence and other intOl'Dlation will be •••n in the t'utUN u an integrated approach to external. probl- 1n general. At this stage ot develo:paent of our own intelligence, it ia perhapa 'llDi-ealiatlo to atretoh the concept ot intelligence to this extent. At the same time 1 it 1a to be recognized that our intelligence makea aome vaiuable oontributiona outside ot the-security field• notably in ouitrade l"elationa with oomm:uniet countr1••• 7. For the peaent, Canadian intelligence should a1m mainly at an enhanced oapaoity to apprehend threat• to aatety and security• to diminish them, and to mobilize relevant information -rrom. all ao~••• 8• While it 1a aaet"Ul to ~17" to aay what we mean b;r 1ntelligenoe, it would be etultirying to bue programa on aome restrictive definition. Operations would then be tied to ideaa of the put even though new pi-oblema oontinual.17 ar1••• It ia preferable to talk about oreating ln the intelligence oc-,nnitI a oontinuing abillt7 to redefine objeotivea at the nat onal level and to adv1ae the Oovel'Dlllent in thie light. 9. AD effective intelligenoe progi-ua require• 4eoiaiona on the extent ot reaomaoea to be employed, oi-gaa1zat1ona1 atructure to tormul.ate Nquirements and ageno1ea to respond with what i• needed• ..... /8 TOP SEORn UMBRA FOR OANADIAlf EYES OlfLY 000014 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a 'l'OP SECRF:.l' UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - 8 - 10. In deciding upon the reaouroea to commit to intelligence programa weight should be given tos the relative importance of intel11genoe, and other information, in the main specific fie1da ot Canadian policy in the toreign (including economic) and defence field.BJ the degree or general usefulness which intelligence exchanges ma.y have in helping Canada dea1 across the board with more powerful countries such aa the USA, on the basis of a common fund of knowledgeJ and the contribution or intelligence to be made within the military alliances to which Canada looks tor its defence. I should attempt to state some of the desirable performance characteristioa of the intelligence community at the Government level, without implying that present arrangements are deficient on all counts: 11. • (a) 'l'he first is broad and includes all the others. The intelligence community should identity external threats and dangers to the satety, security and national interests or Canada and Canadians. Because of mu1tilatera1 aspecta or Canadian defence policy, this concern pertains also to threats against trienda and allies. Perhaps the corollary should go without &&.J"ing that intelligence should be able to identity opportunities to improve situations ao tha' tewer threats and danger• will ai-ise. (b) There oan hardly be any question ot the importance ot maintaining competent intelligence on the USSR, China and some ot the communist aatellitea. The intelligence community haa been d11igent in this. It there is a critioiam it ia that these have been studied to the exclusion ot other things. . ..../9 • 'l'OP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000015 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International TOP SECRE:r UMBRA FOR CANADIAN E.'YES ONLY (c) The intelligence comm.unity should 1dent1f7 new threats. an example being the intrusion ot _ _ , Here the reaponae ot the Govermunt and ot the intelligence oomm.unit7 haa been alow. In response to r,q question.a, American and British authorities expressed, _ • • ·- • It the United Statea or the United Kingdoa had raced a ocaparable situation. they would have Intelligence activity in this area haa, ot course, been inhibited b7 teara ot exposure with allot the political consequences. • (d) To produce hard and relevant intelligence on trouble spots, the intelligence community needa to blend into a more creative process the milita.I7 contributions ot Rational Defence, the political contributions ot External Ai'taira, the counter• intelligence and security contributions ot the ROMP, and the special rola or Manpower in the tield of immigration. (e) The intelligence community should reapond to various levels of interest, whether departmental or national. Long-range missiles provide a oaae in point. Since the Canadian Armed Forces have been given no ve'l!"'f gz-eat defensive role in thia field, the Government ma.7 well have an interest whioh ia broader than that of National Defence. Miaailea trom in the next couple of years is another example. I suapect that the Govermaent•s general interest in this exoeeda the purely military intereats. (f) The intelligence oonmm.nity should identity aubveraive assaults on Canada by external torcea not neceas8.1'1ly governmental in character. • TOP SECRET UMBRA • ...• /10 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000016 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - International -10- _ In this area, criminal and security se.f'eguarda ~• both important, and those who emphallize the latter aa age.inst the tol'mer ru.-e misintol'med• A not di••~J.ua hiat017 ~ttaohea M _ The intelligence commmt ty ahouJ.d be interested in thia tn,e of extemal threat. Eatpel'ts in sabotage and subversion tram • and elsewhere axae not prevented b7 present regulationa tram entoing Canada. (g) The intell1 0ence 0011111un1ty ahou1d develop a sensitivity to the relationship• between organize4 subversion frcm abNad and the lnatability 1n aome ot our citl.. leading to acts ot tenor and rlote. Thi• la mainly a domestic matter and the intelligence interest while real ia peripheral. When domeatio diat'Ul'bances are augmented by 1ntenentiona htola abroad the intelligence 0011D1mit7 llhou1d plq an ettective role. '1'he armed aei-vicea can be brought into action 1na14e the co\1.lltry under emergenc7 powers 01' 1 on pl'Ovinoial initiative, aa aid to the civil power. Theae·meaaurea need to tie brought up to date because there are obvio\18 gaps in th•• I reviwed this matter with National Defence. Reaponaibilitlea in the Government muat be well det1ne4 so that or1••• not be met with uncena1n,7. The Armed Pore•• z-ely quite pl'Operl7 on the ROMP toP intell1genoe in thia &Pea. • ..••/11 TOP SEORE'.f UMBRA FOR CAlfADIAB EYES ONLY 000017 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAH EYES ONLY -11(h) The intelligence community should develop a new capacity to define projects in terma ot Canadian interests. The North presents the leading opportunity. The intelligence oammunit7 1a expert on the Soviet Arctic but it could lead the governmental atructure into tol'D1Ulat1ng an oi-gan1ze4 data baae on the Arctic aa a whole. Thia needa to be done and no othei- organization 1s doing it. Reapons1bilit1ea and 1ntormat1on about activ1tiea in the Noi-th are now scattered in so many departments that it ia otten difficult to aoi-t out the tactual picture. With aapecta or sovereignty at 1aaue the Government hall an interest in obtaining a ·'more concrete view ot evel"7th1ng that ia going on. It the intelligeno~ communit7 has not enough manpower to take the lead, it might well contribute 1ntormat1on and methods. • (1) The Government should develop a better capacit7 to plan and budget toi- intelligence activities on a coordinated basis. Por security reasons this cannot be erteoted without mod1f'ying normal Tr•aaUl"J' Board procedurea. It ahould, however, be possible to make deciaiona to do a little more ot one thing and 1••• ot another, and to control the aggregate resource• on a centralized basis. • ..••/12. TOP SECRET UMBRA POB OilADiil' EYES OBLY 000018 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a 'fOP SECRET UMBRA FOR, OANADIAB EYES OBLY IV. Seeds tor Intelligence Within the Pram.evork ot Poreise Policy and n.tenc• Pol107 I have taken the Oovel'DJllent•• recent paper, Poreign Poliol tor Oanad1;91, and the Prime M1n1ater•• atatement ofpi-ii j, 196on defence pol107 u the beat atatementa or current governmental objectivea. '1-obabl7 neither wu dratted with intelligence apecitioal.17 in mind. Taken together, however, they provide a good baaia and rationalization tor continuing participation b7 the Government in intelligence work. The detailed analpia 1• included u Append.iJt "A"• • • ..•• /13 • TOP SECRh"""l' UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000019 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY v. Departmental Need• tor Intelligenoe Memoranda were prepal"ed at my request by External Affair• and National Detenoe to indicate attitude• in those Department• toward.a intelligence material• I obtained pe:rmiaaion to include these in their entirety and the7 are repi-oduoed u Appendioea "B" and "c". In 1117 view they aerve better than brieter • 1JJl'llar\ea to indicate the atrengtha and vealmeasea at this stage in the two moat important "consumer" Departments. The Defence memorandum 1• a atatement which indicate• military need•• The External memorandum is made up ot a number or individual aubmiaaiona. not articulated into a departmental view. Taken together theae latter ahow that intellige~ce is widely used and appreciated in ~ternal and, further, that it is not always understood and not given a very prominent place. I TOP SECRET UMBHA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000020 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) TOP SECR&r UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EY.&, ONLY Canadian Intelligence and the Tripartite Arrangeaeota VI. Canadian progi-ama can onl7 be understood within the larger ai-rangementa with the un1te4 State• and Britain which dve th• meanin2. Canada makes contributiou ot-a apecial1ze4 but important natui-e in selected field1, and dPava upon the common pool. Australia operate• in much the aame taahion aa Canada. 2. Canada i• a benetioi&.17 ot theae exchange• on a net bui•• Our partners al•o benefit but in a different aenae. It Canada were to vit~av, the other• could get along although they would have to do aome thing• in a more expensive wa:,, and their attitude• tovarda Canada would change conaiderably. It would be im.poaaible on our own to supply the Canadian Government with world intelligence except on a aoale IO amell u to be derisory. Canada should therefore continue to pay the p.l"ice of mamberahip in the club. It we were outside the ai-rangementa we would raok oui- brains to get in and the admiaaion tee would then be too higb.• 3. Canada la apending $40 million and 2,600 man-79a:ra in the fiscal year 1970•71• A check liat ot activitiea and Canadian contribution• to intelligence is u tollowat (a) Signal Intelligence directed noi-th, eut and weat from Canadian territoriea (the biggest spender by' ta:r)J (b) analyaia ana interpretation ot the Soviet Union north ot 60 and the Arctic on the Soviet aide, Wling raw materials collected in Canada and elaewhereJ (c) in Special Center activitieaJ uaing photogi-aphio raw mater1aia (d) information on agent• ot other countriea operating in and through CanadaJ • ..... /1~ TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAB E!ES ONLY 000021 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) TOP SECRRT UMBRA s.15(1) - International FOR CANADIAN EY&4:I ONLY -is- <•> intol'ID&.tion obtained b7 Canadian Poree• Attaoh6a and other military personnel po■ tecl abroadJ (t) information rrom interview■ with •hips• captaiu, traveller■, detector■ and 1mm1grantaJ (g) information tram d1plamatio source■ in eome aene1tive key poat ■ J (h) intelligence report ■, and conaent ■ on Britiah and American report•• under the aegia ot the Joint Intelligence OOJIIDitteeJ (1) apecial.ized anal7■i■ ot some ■elected Sorlet weaponaJ ( j) with Bl'itein and the United State■, 11mited but expert contribution■ to general milit&l"J uaea■• manta or all aspect ■ of the Sorlet Union and aate1llte countl'ieaJ • Ck) with the United States •. (1) in 1'ATO 1 participation in m111t8.l"J" appniaal■ , acoeptanoe ot aome reaponaibilitiea tor dratting ot paper■• What doe■ Canada obtain in i-etUl'llf In very bl'oa4 teiwmaf two thinp. Pirat, ve have acoes ■ to a pool ot world• wide ntelligenoe on which the United States and the United ltingdom Second, ver, S.aportant tor a oountl"J' which muat underatand the United State ■• • ·- - • • • - ·- 4• I have already referred to the large and 1ncreaa1ng extent to which intelligenoe organization■ are being uaed in London and Washington and it 1■ mainl.J' through the intelligence commun1t1ea that we have an opportunit7 to be in touch. S. !'he■e benefit ■ should be amplitied. .••.•• /16 TOP SECRE! UMBRA I FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000022 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International TOP SECfu.--..r UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 6. The Department of National Defence obtaina a current picture of milital'J" mattei-a in a wide range ot counti-iea, untriendly and otherwise. 7. The Government obtain• raw and pl'Ocesaed intelligence pertUning to or1aea and tl'Ouble apota, Cyprua, Biatra and the mid•Eaat in addition to and Russia. a. Each ot the United Statea Armed Service• make• ita own budgetary oaae to Congi-eaa in publio, aa it it la important whether the country ia deatroyed from the aea or trom the air. Altogether these can add up to totals In addit;on, t~e-~nited Stat~~ ~v~~nment~ ~1ke &llJ other, 1a Without-the inner aooeaa through intelitgenoe aouroea, Canada would aimp~ have to ohooae tor the truth among competitive press releaaea tram Waahington. 9. Intol"lllation derived from contempor&JIJ intelligence aouroea can be uaed in numerous ~tant aituationa u the hard baaia of verification ot other information and reporta. In recent weeka 1ntell1genoe provided immediate aoourate intormation about -- It 1• one thing to aee an item in the pi-ea■ ot another country but quite another to know what oredeno• to give it. 10. The RCMP and other• place great value on being able to turn to larfer United Statea ayat . . tor advice, interpre• tation and aaa atance, in addition to obtaining information. u. Canada dependa tor ita aatn7 upon otbara, the United State■ in particular. Since a oountry muat be expected to give tangible aupport to joint detenaive arrangement• on whioh it depend•t intelligence aotivitiea provide a concreh opportunity tor Canada to contribute. 12. 'l'h•r• are aom.e agreement■ and under■ tandinga whioh plaoe geographical limit ■ on the aha.ring ot intelligence. I have decided not to comment upon theae beoauae they do not••• to be very reatriotive in praotice. HJ impresaion ot the present urangem.enta 1• that Canada oan obtain acceaa to the intelligence on an7 uea in which it can eatabliah a need and an intei-eat. 13. I Thei-e ia a dittioulty to be aoknowledged, that United Statea and United Kingdca collection agenoiea natui-all7 tooua on their own problems in ohooaing intelligence target■• Since •..../17 TOP SBORET UMBRl FOR CABADWJ IXU 9JLY 000023 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA s.13(1 )(a) FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY s.15(1) - International our interests are different and sometimes leaa concretel7 defined, Canadian oonamura cannot uae evePJ'i;hing to vhioh the7 may gain aooess1 this gives rise to problems ot selection. Since Canada is alwa7a concerned about the world's trouble spots and about peace, however, there ia a very wide Canadian interest in the data which are available. 14. Why does the United States bother with Canada in thia field in which we are small and sometimes reluctant? Th~r• are five answers: J.4a. The British have 1• that they have an • and u imt>ression ••..• /18 TOP S.ECREr UMBRA FOR CANADIAJ EYES ONLY 000024 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) TOP SECRET UMBRA s.15(1) - International FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -18- 15. In contrast with many other international arrangements, the tripartite intelligence community has gi-own in a very special way. There are as yet no :rules as to how muoh intelligence a country should collect for the othe:ra in relation to g:ross national product, population, military expenditures or anything else. The relations are stable and they seem to be understood by the participants but not on an7 basis ot the value or what is exchanged f OP what. The governing oonoept is rather one or a balance ot effort by each participating country in relation to opportunities open to it, in briet, that each should tey to do its best. It ia in this aenae that Canada is regarded by the others as the most marginal member. • 16. Countries have engaged in intelligence out ot necessity and their own interests and thia is aooe;,ted. The CIA was born out ot Pearl Harbour. It grew in 1954 when the President needed a more accurate appraisal of the Russian bomber fleet than he was getting from the Armed Forces. It grew again with the calculus or ICBM •• and ABM: 1 a. There ia no ~uggeition that Canada should therefore have done these veey same things. 17. When people at the top or CIA are invited to express their views With this I agi-ee. 18. Canada does not run ~P~~~ ~d_ I_ found_ We avoid electronic and other eav••• dropping where there is riak ot politica1 embar'rasament. We •••.. /19 • TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000025 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) TOP SEC1Wl' UMBRA s.15(1) - International FOR CANADIAN' EYES ONLY \ • What it Canada were to reduoe 1 ta axpen41 turea on aignala intelligenoe by• ••7• ten peroent u part ot a general ecoDOIQ' pogram? Would this oauae a criala in the vipartite 0OlllllunityT Ia there aome tbNahold level ot Canadian partioi• pation below which the United State• would lo•• interest 1n the &l'19angementa? The anawer to thia lut question 1• 22. I have already pointed out that the preaent exohangea ue baaed tu- more on an equ111br1UIII ot willingneaa and ot ettort than on the value and quantity ot information obtained an4 pem apa not much more oan be aaid. 23. • A senior British otticial told ma that ••.•• /20 '101 SECRET UMBRA FOR CYADW IXII WJLX 000026 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) TOP SECRB'.r UMBRA s.15(1) - International FOR CA?t~DIAN EYES ONLY 24. In Washington and London I was ur~•d bY intelligence produoera and oonaumera that Canada ia even-more on the apot because it 1a the small.eat participant in the club. 2s. tiona From the National Secm-ity Agency I obtained suggea• 26. Ia it the case that the United States use• the 27. Oooaaiona11v in a criaia the ~ exiatin2 arran2em.enta to tell us ~he answer 1a negat1ve and the question 1a 1n ract m1sieae11ng. It we were to withdraw from the existing arrangements, we would be more vulnerable in this sense because we would lack acoeaa to critical inf'ormation. We would then have lost all ability to judge United States• policies and actiona in the light ot its own intelligence. Even though we do not engage luge reaow.-oea in this task ot judgment, crucial aa it is to ua, the fact is that at present we are getting the beat ot tvo worlds. We are participating in uohangea ot intormation and views at various levels in which This ia understandable. Our tear is perhaps or something difterent, that In practice, I thin~ theil' options ere ta1x-J.y i1m1tec:l on this score, both politically and technioall.J' • TOP SECRm UMBRA ••• •• /21 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000027 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations A ~ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - International TOP SECRE'? UMBRA s.15(1) - Defence s.15(1) - Security s.13(1 )(a) FOR CANADIAli EYES ONLY 28. how much assistance has Canada obtained trom_~itiah and_American intell1genct? 29. • Is there. however. Some in Ottawa believe there may be. Since Canada-does not accept the risks or participation in such work, we do not obtain access to much ot the intelligence gathered by these arcane means by Britain and the United States. I have had trank disousslona on this 211atter • 30. It may be asked whether the British and Americans are somehow 31. Canadian membership in the international arrangement ia baaed on the strategio position ot two northern interception stations more than anything else. Is this a diminishing asset or will it continue to be valuable? 32. Several trends are at work. Eleotronic interception ti-oJll satellites is emerging as an important technique but it is expensive. PhotograI>hl' from satellites is moz-e and morft ... .. /22 • TOP SECRE'.r UMBRA FOR CANADiil EYES ONLY 000028 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECIL~T UMBRA FOR CANADIAB EYES ONLY s.15(1) - Security s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International -22effective but there ia no proapect or ita replaoing signal intelligences these methods will continue to aupplement each other. The USSR ~ adonted def"enaiva oomrn•mioationa techn1Quea. including the•• development• are not neceaaarily undertaken aolel7 or primal'ily for security purpoaes. Along with this there is a geometrical rate of increase in For a long time to come, aignal. intelligence W111 continue aa the beat source ot warning of hoatila activities. 33. The united States will In brief", there Is no-inaediate likelihood that the Canadian intelligenoe contribution will be 41aplaoed if" we wish to maintain it. 34. The coat ot maintaining a given level ot signal intelligence is rising substantially from year to year. Aside fztom price increaaea which attect all governmental programa, the detancea to be penetrated are becoming more elaborate. 'fhia in turn calla tor methods which are more aophiaticated and expensive. 35• It it ia decided, u I think it should bet that aignal intelligence ia to continue to be the major Canadian contribution to the international arrangements, the Government should have a policy or capital spending to keep abreast ot new teohniquea. It may be that the next step ia in the computer field but I would deter to the proteaaional.a on this point. Since one•quarter ot the Government•• intelligence budget• ia tor capital programa which are well advanced, it should be quite possible to find the amounts needllld. • • ••..•/23 TOP SECRlff UMBRA FOR CANA '.)!Alf EYES ONLY 000029 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International TOP SECRBI' UMBRA FOR OANADIAII EYES OHLY 37. In response to my question•• a number ot aenior Americana and Bl'itillh In mJ word■ , not theira, O◄ My concluaion ia that it we wish to maintain our position• it weuld be wiae to take more aeriou■l.7 the uae ■ ot int~!~igence_in addition to collection ..... /24 TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR OAHADIA!l EYES ONLY 000030 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - International TOP SBCRi'l UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EY.ES OBLY 40. I have al.Na4J' drawn attention to the unaatiataoto17 na,w.-e of the arr~nta tor oool'dination of the 1ntelligeno• oommmit71 eatabllaliing of pr1orit1ea1 planning, budgeting and ao tOPth. Thi• ona•e• a av1oua weaklleaa 1n our relationa beoaua• no on• ia 1n a poaition to plan, negotiate and ad.via• om- Government with :ngutd to the ent:11'• lntelligenoe oomplez. No one 1• in a poaitlon to think and decide about maintaining American oooperation at tM lowat poaaible coat to om-aelv••• While the ooatinuing cooperation ot our pai;nen 1• oonditional upon the cont:ributiona ve make, important deciaiona about Canadian polloiu tox- the collection of intelligeno• are made at depal'tmental levels. This 1• dealt with oonONteq in what toll.ova. TOP SECRm' UMBRA • ••••/25 FOR OANADlilf EYB8 OJILY 000031 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International TOP SEC:R:IW UMBRA. FOR CANADIAN EYES OMLY •25VII. Bl'itiah an4 United State• Prograu At varioue etap• the United Kingdoa and the United State• have assumed wldeapi-ead concnte nspona1b111tiea u world powers. Intelligenoe aervicea have ~••n organized and extended during period9 ot retrospection following o•laea and diautera whioh might have been avoided if only ••••ntial information had been 1n the right plaoe at the Ol'Ucial moment. 2. Attar Peai-1 Bal"bour the United Statea faced the hal"sh tziuth that ita air and naval aervicea had had enough 1ntelll• gence to have foreseen the Japan••• attaok. '!'he ayatema ot that dq were inadequate to reapond. The trauma ot that e.xperienoe and the intention to avoid the possibility of a repetition were the forebears of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United State• Intelligence Bo&l'd. 4. Intelligenoe baa become big, widespread and effective in these goTernmenta and influential over a gitC>Ving range of subject matt••• Mon publicity ia given to the tumbles than the touchdowns. S. Some of the magnitude• ot expenditure are ataggering. 6. In London I wu intormed 7. In the United Stat•• TOP SECRE!r UMBRA FoR cANADW ms OJLY ••••• /26 000032 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) TOP SECRET UMBRA s.15(1) - International FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -26The amount apent by the Central. Intelligence Agency is of course a closely guarded secret. I would hazard a pure guess that intelligence expenditures in the United States are more than half or the Canadian Government's total expenditures on everything. (The~e is obviously when-he was in Ottawa recently.) 8. The scope or intelligence surveillance in al.l of its forms is awesome. The power of available techniques continues to gi-ow, electronic, photographic, sonic, sensory, seismic, under water, on land, in the air and in space, along with the continuation of older-fashioned methods. Accompanying all of this is the emergence of computer-baaed technology to assemble and use all of the information. It may be of interest to note that the • 10. 11. I should mention in passing that there is Most or the people I visited spoke about 12. Knowledge ia the basis of political, military and economic strength. In the contemporary growth or intelligence activities there is implicit a poluization of world power in Washington and in Moscow. The Russians are not lagging behind in the moat advanced technique& or surveillance • TOP SECR:6---rr UMBRA •.... /27 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000033 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) TOP SECRET UMBRA s.15(1) - International FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -211.3. Although the United Kingdom is ama1ler it has continued to operate world-wide intelligence, cooperating closely with the United States but maintaining a balanced structure with the capacity to go it alone if necessary. 14. There are of course fundamental difterenoea between the United Kingdom and the United States in the whole structure or government and naturally enough these ue reflected in the organization or intelligence. There is supertioially some diri'er,:moe here between organizational principles or centralization (Britain) and decentralization (USA). On closer examination there is a •~riking similarity between the two. This is not a coincidence but rather the result of interchange■ of ideas between leading officials on both sides during formative periods. Canada was somehow on the sidelines aa these developments took place. 15. The basic similarities between intelligence at the national or governmental level in the United Kingdom and the United States are as follows:- •...• /28 TOP SECRRr UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000034 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulg~~fj(fH~f e la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - International TOP SECR.h""'T UMBRA FOR CANADIAN I:.'YES ONLY 16. Appendix "D" contains more details on the United Kingdom intelligence organization. TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES OBLY . ..../29 000035 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECllli'T UMBRA FOR CANADIAN l!.-Y.2:S ONLY VIII. Resources Devoted to Canadian Intelligence in 1970-71 This is a s111rnnsry ot information provided by departments and agencies in response to a questionnaire. It represdnts a good estimate, subject to the aoceptability of certain judgments noted below that were applied to the data. 2. tollowsz The conclusions can be further summarized as (a) Total planned expenditure on the intelligence function in 1970•71 is about $40.4 million. • (b) or this amount, some $11.6 million is capital expenditure, and this figure would vary somewhat 1 from year to year. The operating cost, which is ' probably fairly stable except for price escalation, ,I is $28.8 million in 1970-71. Some 2,627 man-years I are associated with these operations. (c) The figure• above include some $3.1 million and 220 man-years not dedicated to intelligence as a primary function but rather as an incidental activity to other functions. Resources dedicated to intelli• gence as a ~rimary function in 1970-71 are $37.J million (including $11.6 million capital) and 2,401 man-years. data: The following judgm.ents were applied to the (1) :Expenditures on "security" as distinct tram. "intelligence" were excluded. This involved a reduction or $3.8 million for departmental security trom the External Affairs return on "incidental" intelligence expenditures. Other departments excluded "security" trom their returns. (ii) A contribution ot $4.2 million to CBNRC was removed trom the National Defence (DCIS) return to avoid double-counting, since expenditure of the same funds is dealt with in the CBNRC return. No other double-counting waa discovered. . .... /30 TOP SECRRr UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000036 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECR_:.T UMBRA FOR CAN;\DIAN EYES ONLY 3. The questionnaire asked respondents to list elements of the Federal Government who were suppliers of intelligence to them. The purpose was to determine if there were other departments and agencies outside the group canvassed who might be doing a significant amount of intelligence. Respondents have listed the following as "other suppliers": AECL, AECB, Customs and Excise, Justice, DOT, National. Harbours Board, EMR (seismology), ITC, Immigration, Export Development Corporation, CBC, Supply and Services. 4. • The questionnaire has not been extended to these latter. It is thought that nearly al.l of them are suppliers in such a limited and incidental way that such measurement would be impractical. {EMR, where there is a discreet activity, may be an exception). It is noted, hcwever, that a number of other departments and agencies are suppliers ot intelligence incidental to other activities, but it is not practical to measure the incremental coat, if any, of this by-product • The figures are shown in detail in Appendix "E" • . . . . . /31 TOP SECRb""'T UMBRA FOR CAHADIAM EY-2:S ONLY 000037 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYBS ONLY -31IX. Decision-Making Points and P:rocesses in the Canadian Intelligenoe Organization This section dea1s with intelligence organization and administrative decisions. The intelligence aotivitiea or the Government are considered in some detail in Appendix "F", under the following ma.in headings~ collection, processing, production and dissemination. 2. In summary, the decision-making processea, below the level of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence and of ministers, are as follows: Intelligence Policy Committee (IPC) 3. Recommendations approved by the Prime Minister and the Ministers concerned in 1960, aBsigned to the IPC responsibility for co~rdinating and maintaining general policy direction of all intelligence matters including signal intelligence and communications-electronic security. The IPC was cha:rged, subject to direction from ministers tram time to time, with determining direotiveB and priorities for the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), recommending what resources it should be given and asaesBing its performance in carrying out its tasks. 4. The IPC is the senior official level decision point on questions of coordination and general policy direction ot all intelligence matters, all aspects of the functions ot the JIC and al.l SIGINT policy matters within ·the IPC •a tel'm.8 or reference. 5. The Department of External Affairs provides the Chairman of the IPC and ot the JIC and the Director of Communications Security. The Defence Staff provides the Vice Chairman of the IPC and of the JIC. Department of External Affairs 6. Within the Department of External Affaira the Head or the security and Intelligence Liaison Division ia responsible for the intelligence activities of the Department. He is also the Chairman or the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Director ot Communications Security. TOP SECRET UMBRA . .... /32 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000038 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EY~S ONLY -32- 1. The Head of the Security and Intelligenoe Liaison Division reports directly to the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, who is also the Chairman of the Intelligence Policy Conmd.ttee. 8. The Head of the Security and Intelligence Liaison Division is, in effect, the intelligence program manager for the Department and the USS:GA is the senior official decision• making point within the Department. Department of National Defence 9. Within the Department of National Defence (nND) the Deputy Chief Intelligence and Security (DCIS) is the program manager for Defence Intelligence. He is responsible tor policies and plans for the management, operation and develop• ment of the strategic intelligence aesou.roes of the Canadian AP.ned Forces. Under DCIS direction, detailed management of the program is the responsibility of directors operating within their specific areas o:r fields of defined interest. • In the DND deoision-ma.ld.ng process, the Defence Intelligence Program (~Iilitary Intelligence) is established within the framework of Cabinet decisions on defence and foreign polioiea with intelligence prioriti~a being linked to the purposes for which Canada maintains its armed forces establishment. The departmental chain of control to or from DCIS is through Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS), Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), to the Minister of National Defence (MlID) with the Chief of Defence Staff Advisory Committee (CDSAC) being the senior decision-making point within the Armed Forces, and the Defence Council, under the Chairmanship of the MND, being the senior decision-making point within the Department. Although DCIS takes his direction normall.y from, and is controlled by, VCDS he does have direct access to the CDS and MND, with VCDS being kept informed. However, these by•pasa channels are not uaed for intelligence program planning and developm.entJ rather, they are used for the passage of important or criaia intelligence information to avoid delay in dissemination to top authority. 10. • •••• /.3.3 TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000039 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECfu.?.~ Ul1BRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -33Recommendations tor major changes in program and on new program development are staffed through and approved by VCDS for consideration at the CDSAC level, and thereafter at Defence Council. Interdepartmental action follows. 11. Decisions on intelligence matters that are within the framework of established programs are made at the DCIS and director levels with interdepartmental consultation being conducted at all levels from deak analyst to DCIS, and through the JIC. Examination and development of interdepartmental studie3 and projects is normally ai-ranged and accomplished at the DCIS Directorate level. 12. ~oyal Canadian Mounted Police 13. The Commissioner and the Director General of Security and Intelligence deal regularly with the Solicitor General concerning the security service. In addition they have direct access to the Prime Minister on certain matters aa occasion may demand. 14. The Commissioner of the ROMP is the senior decisionmaking point within the Force for all matters, including the security service. The Director General of Security and Intelligence is, in effect, the security and intelligence program manager. 15. The Security and Intelligence Directorate or the RCMP contributes to the work or other intelligence agencies and of the IPO Committees. Incidental to its primary mission as a security service the Directorate obtains intelligence of value to other intelligence agencies which 1a released to them with appropriate conditions governing security and control in each instance. The Directorate dra.f'ts one major JIC paper. Jolnt Intelligence Committee 16. The Intelligence Policy Committee is the senior deoision•making point for all matters of intelligen.ce for which the JIC is responsible. . .... /34 TOP SECRE'T UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000040 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRST UMBRA FOR CA!·Ti\DIAN EYES ONLY -3417. The decisions of the JIC are the collective responsibility of the members of the committee and the JIC members obtain departmental or agency decisions concerning matters before the committee through their respective departmental or agency decision-making arrangements. The JIC has no program management responsibilities of an administrative or financial nature; but it is responsible for the information and judgments contained in the intelligence products it produces, and the advice it providea to the IPC. _§pecial Research Bureau 18. The Special Research Bureau is administratively attached to the Department of External Affairs but has a separate budgetary and program planning arrangement so that its priorities are not in direct competition with the priorities of the Department proper. 19. Policy decisions concerning the nature and extent of the Bureau's program are made by the Intelligence Policy Committee. Administrative decisions are made by the administrative decision-making processes of the Dep~tment of External Affairs, and administrative action is taken on the authority of the USSEA. The program manager for the Special Research Bureau program is the Director of the Special Research Bureau. SIOINT Progl"ams 20. The Intelligence Policy Conmdttee is the senior decision-making point for general policy control over all aspects of the collection, processing and dissemination of SIGINT. The IPC exercises general policy control through the Director of Communications Security (DCS), who acts as manager for the conduct or relations with foreign SIGINT authorities, and for the justification and control of estimates and expenditures tor CBNRC and for the SIGINT equipment vote. The Communications Research Committee adviaes the DCS, as required, and is supported in turn by the Communications Research Technical Group. • •••• /35 TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000041 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP S,iC:L.:;T UNBR.l\. -3521. Manning, administration and maintenance for the SIGI!TT collection program carried out by the intercept service is provided hy DJID and is subject to DND decisionmaking processes and also to the general policy control of theIPC. Decisions on the tasking of collection, and on processing and reporting operations at intercept stations are made by the Director, cmrnc. 22. The SIGINT processing and reporting programs carried out by CBHRC are managed by the 1)irector of CBNRC. Decisions on the nature and extent of these activities and on the allocation of resources are made by the IPC, on recormnendations from the Des, advised by the CRC. 23. In fact,the intelligence system operates quite differently than the formal structure would indicate and the terms of reference of the Intelligence Policy Committee have become misleading. 24. This latter Comrnittee is ineffective: recently it went for six years without meeting. Essential decisions wAre made from time to time by telephone canvass of the members. Thus there has been no vital canter for the intelligence comm.unity, either to consider objectives and programs or anything else. 25.. • It is not enough to criticize the Committee for not meeting. It is composed of the most senior, able and hardpressed administrators in the Government. I suppose there must have been some doubts that an intelligence program required articulation and leadership at the governmental level. Whether or not this is the case. there should be no difficu1ty in revitalizing this Committee if this is agreed to be important. (The membership would, of course• have to be brought up to date with reorganizations which have taken place in the meantime.) \ 26. To the extent that the intelligence community exists at all. it is tied together by the Joint Intelligence Committee and by its Chairman who is at the same time the Head of Security and Intelligence Liaison Division in External Affairs and the Director of Communications Security. TOP SECRET UHBRA • .... /36 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000042 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UHBRA FOR CANADIAN Er~S ONLY 27. The Joint Intelligence Committee brings together the senior departmental experts and does a useful job. It cannot provide a substitute for the IPC: it lacks the authority to compose departmental rivalries at a high level or synthesis. It is forced too often to take the lowestoommon-denominator approach to intelligence questions. Ot co1J11se, it cannot consider intelligence programs in various departments on a comprehensive basis and change the status quo. 28. The Chairman is in a position which is too difficult, however great his ability. He is not sufficiently senior to make tb.e voica of intelligence audible at the policy level in his own department or to deal effectively with the high administrative level in NationaltDefence. As Director of Communications Security he has administrative ~esponsibilities over the Communications Branch - in my view wrongly. With the devolution of the committee system he has no authority to deal directly or through the Joint Intelligence Committee with the intercept station on matters of National Defence responsibility, so that there is neither a person nor.a committee to consider s1gna1 intelligence comprehensively. 29. The Chairman or the Joint Intelligence Committee has no secretariat to prepare papers but National Defence provides assistance in connection with JIC meetings and the receipt, distribution and despatch of some material. 30. The terms of reference of the Intelligence Policy Committee are broad enough to allow it to consider the related aspects of domestic sec1J11ity matters and or criminal intelligence in addition. This has not been done. Even within the ROMP organization criminal and security intelligence are kept in separate administrative compartments under the Commissioner who is of 001J11se very busy. It seems quite wrong to have no intelligence group anywhere in the Government with the responsibility of examining all aspects from a general and oomprehensive point of view. 31. With reference to CBNRC, the management function has been rendered ambiguous by the special executive responsibilities which have been given to External Affairs. Policy decisions affecting the intercept stations are outside its control. It does not receive considered direction from the Intelligence Policy Committee. Add to this the secrecy and aeo1J11it7 ot TOP SECRET UMBRA ....•/37 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000043 �GAC - ~leased under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -37its work and the conclusion is inescapable that the problems in that organization are as urgent and difficult as anywhere in the Public Service. 32. States I must go on to say. however. that the United Since the expertise collected in CBNRC is an asset to the Canadian Government, care should be taken to preserve and enhance its value in making the administrative reforma recommended in this report • •.... /38 TOP SEC!Th"T UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES oNLv 000044 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY x. Guidelines of Change In a more positive vein than in the preceding section, analysis of cUl"rent arrangements shows that three levels of decision making are required: a general policy level, exercising general policy control of all intelligence matters, including those requiring government-wide policy control (national intelligence), and those under departmental control; a middle level, exeroiaing government-wide control of activities at the national levelJ and giving professional intelligence advice to the senior levelJ an agency level, exercising detailed control of the intelligence agencies. General Policz Level 2. At the political level decisions are made by the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence for government• wide activities and by ministers for departmenta1 activities. At the most senior official level the Intelligence Policy Committee (IPC) was established to provide government-wide general policy coordination and control. For all activities placed under its general policy control, it is supposed to determine the nature and extent of their programs, the resources to be assigned to them, and to aaaesa their perfor• mance. It should control the natlll"e and extent of all relations with foreign intelligen~• activitiea. Departmental activities are controlled by senior departmental officials, with the exception of the special arrangements made for the Communications Branch. Middle Level 3. This level coordinates and controls intelligence acitivitiea at the national level including the production of intelligence at that level and relations with foreign national level organizations, and gives professional intellienoe advice to senior levels. It consists or the most senior ntelligence officers - who are the program managers or the f •.... /39 TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000045 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY individual specialized intelligence agencies. An interdepartmental committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), advisea senior levels on most intelligence questions other than SIGINT at the national levelJ produces the intelligence end-products required at the national levelJ and conducts relations with foreign national intelligence organizations. Comparable reaponaibilitiea tor advice and foreign relations concerning SIGINT are discharged by a Director of Connunicationa Security (DOS), advised by an interdepartmental committee! the Communications Research Committee (CRC). Coordinat on between the JIO and the DOS• CRO structure is provided by the moat senior intelligence oftioera being members of both the JIO and the CRC. Agency Level 4. The head ot each of the intelligence agencies is its program manager and principal decision point. These officers are s External Affairs - Head or Seourit7 and Intelligence Liaison Divieion; DND • Deput7 Chief tor Intelligence and Securit7J ROMP - Di.rector General, Security and Intelligence; SRB • Director ot Special Research Bu.reauJ CBNRD - Director, Oommunioationa Branch, National Research Council. Within policies approved at the general polioy level, and within assigned reaouroea, these intelligenoe program managera control day-to•d&J" operations of their agencies, and carry out necesaarJ" inter-agency bueineaa with the consumers ot theu- end•produota, the aouroea ot inputs to their agencies, and with foreign intelligence organizations at the agency level. $. In deciding what needs to be done at these three levels, the main questions requiring clarification are the principles governing which matters should be under control by departments and which under control by the Cabinet Committee. It is recognized that no clear-out divisions can be made but the following piainciplea are recommended u working guidellneat (a) Departmental control ia appropriate tor departmental activities which are based al.moat entirely upon their own reaourcea and to meet their own needs. For example, military intelligence about technical and operational military capabilities in more detail than other departments would normally need. TOP SECRET UMBRA . ...• /40 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000046 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECllli'"'T UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EY~S ONLY (b) Interdepartmental control of activities ia desirables - for those agencies which serve all departments - such as the Special Reseai-ch Bureau which provides eoonomio intelligence, CBNRC which provides SIGINT, and the intercept stations; - when departments need to make substantial demands on other departments or agencies tor information and judgmenta. Exam.plea or analyses and forecasts which should be produced 1nterdepartmentall7 tor this reason are1 analyses and reporting concerning foreign military activitiea in situations or interest to External Affairs - aa they require military u well aa political skills; judgments needed by the Defence Starr on the likelihood that foreign milit&rJ" forces could become involved in situation■ which might also involve Canadian forces - as they require External Affairs as well as military skills. In many cases one or both departments also need the services ot CBNRC or SRB. - for those activities which our allies regard as of substantial value to them and which therefore atteot their attitude towaz-da providing the help upon which all our intelligence agencies are very dependent; - for dealings with foreign intelligence organizations; • for those collection activities which involve risks or public or diplomatic protests or publioit7 of a type or extent which would be or concern to the t'k)vernment. TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN E..Y.8S ONLY 000047 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRI!.-irr UMBRA FOR CANADTAN hY3S ONLY -41Senior official level decision-making and organization 6. The basic pui-pose of intelligence is to help the Government to assess foreign situations by adding to material derived from other soui-ces of information and analysis. This requires the blending of the work of intelligenoe and of other advisers and calls for control or intelligence activities by the same most senior departmental officials who control nonintelligence activities. The concept of a single Intelligence Policy Committee, composed of the official heads or the departments most concerned with foreign af'tilrs, defence and security is therefore fundamenta1ly sound. Agency level decision-making and organization 7. The arrangement ■ aummariead under the heading of "Agency level" for the program management of intelligence agencies are fundamentally sound. so, also, is the division of functional specializations and or collection, processing, and production activities between departments and agencies. Considered aoross the board the intelligence agenoiea compare favourably for their size with equivalent activities in London and Washington and with other activities of the Canadian Government. 8. A noteworthy' difference between the scope or Canadian and of both British and American intelligence activities is the relative absence of a cove:rt intolligenoe oolleotion service in Canada (spies). No case can be made on the basis or critical Canadian needs, nor on the basis of the existence of unique human sources which could only be employed by a Canadian service, which would be sufficient to justify the large resources required, the long lead time which would be necessary to create a capability in this field, and the political risks attendant upon covert intelligence collection operations abroad. Middle level decision-making and organization 9. It is more difficult to determine the best urangementa at the middle level than at the senior policy or the agency management levels. The basic question is whether to accomplish coordinated and cooperative activities between the intelligence TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000048 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY operating agenciea by't a central intelli~enoe afenct; an intelligence communitz, coordinated an opera edhrough a coiimilttee or committees; or a loose association ot de artmental intelligence organizations conducting ad hoe bi atera1 and mu1t!iaterai dealings aa necessary. 1 10. A central intelligence agency with a single adviser and controller is not as compatible with the Cabinet system of government and ministerial responsibility, ud with the membership of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence and the Intelligence Policy Committee, as a committee representing all departments and 1ndependen.t agencies. Having a single adviser on intelligence matters is also more likely than a committee system to lead to intelligence being presented to senior official and political levels in isolation rather than blended with material from. other sources and f'rom. all departments, aa the proper role of intelligence would require. It ia noteworthy that the British Government, which more resembles our Government in its structure than does the American. l 11. A loose association or departmental intelligence organizations would entail problems for the IPC because of their number and variety. To coordinate advice from. them for the IPC a secretariat would be needed, but it would be leaa in touch with agency views and problems and less expert than a committee of agency heads. In the absence of continuing machinery- to produce national intelligence there would be a greater likelihood that conflicting intelligence would be presented to political and senior official levels by' individual departments. When national intelligence waa produced some kind ot ad hoe machinery would be needed, but it would be less expert and therefore lass effective than continuing arrangements. Departments and agencies would alao be in a weaker position if they dealt with foreign agencies aingl7 and on the baaia ot their own product alone than they would be dealing aa a concerted bod7 on the baaia ot our collective errorte. For many reasons, therefore, arrangements would be needed to achieve coordinated advice and cooperative activities. These arrangements would be weaker than a oommi ttee of agency heads with a strong sensa ot common interests, because they would be less strongly supported, would be less expert, and would lack a sense of collective responsibility for the effectiveness or our intelligence efforts aa a whole. • .... /43 TOP SECID!,-iir UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000049 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRE'T UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 12. A number or middle level arrangements could be made to work and each would have its peculiar merits and demerits. The worst problems to be avoided would be too much control and too many decisions being taken out of the hands or departments in an overcentralized system; and too many decisions being taken and too many activities being undertaken by departments in isolation in the absence of continuing machinery in which the intelligence agencies could participate in coordination and cooperative activities. 13. The best overall results are likely to be produced by a committee system, in which all the departments and independent agencies would be represented, and in whioh the committee members would take collective responsibilit7 tor the effectiveness of our intelligence efforts as a whole. This would require on the part of the members a sense or community as well as of departmental and agency interests and responsibilities, and it should be one of the principal concerns of the committee chai:rman to foster this spirit among the members. 14. The basic s:,stem fol' the middle level should be a single committee, which might be called the Intelligenoe Management Committee. It should consist ot the heads or the departmental and independent agencies. Its responsibilities should be to advise the senior official level on all intelligence questions whioh might be considered by the Cabinet Committee or the IPC; to produce intelligence end-products at the national level; and to oonduot relations with foreign intelligence organizations at the national level. 15. The scale of SIGINT in CBNRC and in National Defence and the extent of its resources should be regarded aa general policy questions under the IPC, and therefore of the Intelligence Management Committee. SIGINT is by far the largest and most important of the activities which our allies regaiad aa or substantial value to them, and which therefore affect theil9 attitudes to all our intelligence agencies. Since the sucoess of all agencies is likely to be affected in very important ways by all aspects or our SIGINT program, all agencies should have an equal voice in advising the IPC on the nature and extent ot this program and of its resources. This should include the TOP SECfil.""'T UMBRA FOR CANADIAff kth!s ONLY 000050 ! �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -44collection (intercept) stage as well as the processing stage. This should mean that middle level responsibilities for SIGINT should be the common concern of all departments and agencies, operating through a committee which would take collective responsibility for its activities. 16. Other activities I 'and Wh.1Ch ShOUl.d i1Kew1se oe added to those aiready under the control or the IPC, are Special Center activities and Canadian Forces Attaches and Advisers. This would provide comparable middle level arrangements for SIGINT and for all other activities, including those at present conducted by the JIC, and there would appear to be no merit in having two separate committees for this purpose. • • J 17. To avoid the occurrence of compromiae decisions which can arise in committees which require unanimous decisions, the terms of reference of the middle level committee should explicitly state that members should have the right to dissent from decisions of the committee and to express their views in footnotes, and the terms of reference should also explicitlJ record the collective responsibilit7 of the committee members. 18. ~resent arrangements should also be improved by a clearer identification and recording of those intelligence activities which are the responsibility of the Cabinet Committee, and therefore or the IPC and the Intelligence Management Committee, according to the guidelines set out in the preceding pages. These should be grouped into a number or clearly defined programs tor program planning and budgetary purposes. They should follow normal government procedures. Programs, plans and budgeta should be initiated by the pl'ogram managers. They 1 1 would be submitted to the Intelligence Management Committee tor ita comments and recommendations and fol' submission to the IPC, which would approve Ol' refer to i1iinistera aa necessary. Agency program managers should be responsible for the day-to-day operations and all relevant manag~ment decisions. The exercise of program management functions at the middle level, as occurs ) at present by the DCS for some SIGINT decisions~ should be · discontinued. The Special Research Bureau has a separate program already and this arrangement should be continued substantially as at present, with such adjustments as are required to conform to new community-wide procedures. SIGINT needs to be .... . /45 TOP SECR.f:!.""'T UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000051 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN l!.'YES ONLY -45reconsidered for program management purposes consistently with the recommendations ma.de for reorganization of the field. 19. I assume that the canter of gravity of intelligence matters should remain in External. Affairs for the present. Because intelligence looks outward beyond our boundaries, it seems to me to be best cantered in External. it that Depax-tment ia willing to handle it. The changes now taking place in External. in response to Government policies and internal reorganization will render it more able to deal with intelli• gence along with other things. This question should perhaps be reviewed again in two or three years' time. \. Whatever else ia done I think the Privy Council Office shou1d play a more active and positive part than in the past. Conceivably the PCO should beoome what I have called the canter of gravity of intelligence operations, particularly if External Affairs is disinclined to do more than at present. When the British created a specialized intelligence secretariat 1 20. There is a nice question as to how far the RCMP organization oan assume more ~esponsibility for the generalized aspects of intelligence (and counter-intelligence) without unduly stretching the individual case-by-case approach of a police force. On this depends to some extent whether a sma11 analytical and advisory group should be established elsewhere, perhaps under the Chairman of the Intelligence Mflilagement Committee or perhaps under the representative of PCO on that Committee. 21. TOP SECIWr UMBRA FOR CANADIAli EYES ONLY • •••• /46 000052 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EY~S ONLY -46XI. Chai:rmansh12 ot Committees In the design of the intelligence dec1s1on-maldng maoh1nery, it is important to ensure that intelligence is responsive to the changing needs of the users and that their tutu.re needs are anticipated, while at the same time full use is :ro.ade of those lessons from the past which are ot continuous value. 2. At the general policy decision-maldng level the ministers are aware of current and future priorities and concerns, but are not familiar with the processes of intelligence and of the :many considerations which affect its successful operation. They must therefore look to the most senior official level (i.e., the IPC) to ensure the right balance between responsiveness and expertise in the intelligence organizations. Since the basic purpose of intelligence is to assist in the asoessment of foreign situations, the Chairman of the Intelligence Policy Committee should be the IPC member concernftd most centrally with both intelligence and non-intelligence participation in this process. The present arrangement should be continued, whereby the Chairman of the IPC is the Under Secretary of State tor External Affairs. ). At the middle level the Intelligence Management Committee should contain a proper mix of career personnel trom the foreign and military services and or intelligence experts. The fozt111er should be chosen to bring fresh viewpoints, and users• viewpoints, to bear on all the processes and products or intelligence. The latter should bring to the collective consideration of intelligence the depth of experience which is necessary because of the complexity of the total ramifications of intelligence activities, and because intelligence involves many sensitive questions concerning control ot intelligence products and in our dealings with foreign agencies. 4. To provide the necessary balance, and because of the wide and continuous responsibilities of the committee, the Intelligence Management Committee should have a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman. The Chairman should be a career foreign service officer fo~ the same reason as the Chairman of the IPC should be the most senior official of the foreign service. To provide stability and time to make an effective contribution to the job it is desirable that he should serve for a minimum ot ..••• /47 TOP SECRl!.""'T UMBRA FOR CANADIAN ~"'YES ONLY 000053 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EY~S ONLY -47two years. To ensure that fresh viewpoints continue to be injected into middle level management it is desirable that the Chairman should not serve for longer than four yeara. The Vice-Chairman shou1d have experience and qual.ifications which are complementary to those of the Chairman and he should be an·officer with depth of experience and expertise in the intelligence function. • •••• /48 TOP SEC!mr UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000054 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SEORPJ.r UMBRA FOR CAlLI\.DIAN EYES ONLY XII. Financing or Intelli5enoe There are two main ways of approaching the problem of dividing intelligence costs between departments. One approach is to make the division according to the benefits received by departments, and the other according to their abllity to hide the costs within departmental totals. While the form.er way would appear to be the more rational, there are very real difficulties i~ finding an objective way of ~•asuring the benefits received. For example, if either the SIGINT intercept budget or the CBNRC budget were divided up according to the benefits received, as measured by the number of personnel working on tasks requested by the respective departments, External Affairs would pay nothing - because no Canadian collection or processing is being done specifically for them - while the RCMP would pay a very greatly increased share. If these same budgets were divided up in proportion to the benefits received, as measured by the number of items of SIGINT end-product from all agencies referred to departments, then the Department of External Affairs would pay almost it not as much aa DND, whereas the ROMP would pay very little. ~• first of these two system.a is obviously inequitable in terms or benefits received. Since the total External Affairs budget is about one-twentieth or that of DND the second method would ra.ake it veey Io.uch more difficult tor them to hide their share than it would be for DND; and this method is obviously unworkable from the practical.financial and the security points of view. 2. On balance it is preferable that the principal depart• ments - External, Defence and the RCMP - should pay the costs of the activities conducted by their departments, plus a pol'tion of the cost of CBNRC, so that their total payments for intelligence activ!tiea are roughly in proportion to their total budgets. Under such a regime it is important that TreasU17 Board avoid giving the "paying" departments the impression that • they are being penalized for their service to the Government ~s a whole by continually asking them to reduce other things· to pay for intelligence. In effect, Treasury Board should accept the responsibility or tucking away out or sight the intelligence expenditures iu departmental budgets. 1 3. Decisions on the manpower resources and the sums of money to be spent or the intelligence program.a which should be under the general policy control of the Cabinet Committee ..... /49 TOP SECfu<..4T UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000055 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a • • TOP SECR.i.'..'T UMBRA FOR CANADIAN l!.'Yt:S ONLY should be made by the Cabinet Committee each year. The necessary program and estimates decisions should be made aa separate decisions from Cabinet decisions concerning foreign service, defence and security programs in general, although they will necessarily be in step. Program Forecast and Estimates submissions should be submitted by the IPC to the Trensury Board following normal procedures as to form. and content. Plans, manpower and estimates for intelligenoe programs under Cabinet Committee control should be examined by the Treasury Board, or by a special group or the Treasury Board, and decisions on them should be made and reported aa separate programs from those of the departments proper. In this way the intelligence programs which had been considered by the Cabinet Committee as separate programs would not be directly competitive with the programs of the departments proper; although. they will of course be indirectly competitive with demands on total government resources of those and other departmental programs. The personne,l and budgetary data for the intelligence programs would be submerged in departmental totals in the printed Government 8stirnates and for all public unclassified parliamentary purposes. These arrangements would be the same as those carried out by the Department ot External Affairs for the Special Research Bureau for the last three years. Funds authorized by these procedures should be expended as far as possible through the machinery of the Department providing the administration for the activity. 4. Departments receiving only the economic part or the total intelligence output are not now paying anyttiing towards intelligence costs. To do so would involve different kinds of security and presentational difficulties. It cannot be assumed that intelligence will never be the subject of public enquiry and report and SIGINT, as the largest and most expensive activity, would loom very large. Explaining expenditures tor such purposes by departments such as Finance, Industry, Trade and Commerce, the Bank of Canada, etc., would raise many more difficulties than the conduct of these same kinds of activities for military, political and security purposes, as many public disclosures and writings about SIGINT in other countries should have done something to prepare the public tor the idea that such activities are normal and necessary for those reasone. Measured by any criteria the proportional benefits received by those departments which receive only economic intelligence would be very small. The presentational diftioultiea, taken together TOP SECfil<..'T UMBRA ..... /50 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000056 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -sowith the administrative complications or administering a number ot very small amounts or money hidden in the estimate, or num.eroua departments, ague strongly against allotting aharea or intelligence budgets to departments who oonsume only very small proportions of the total intelligenoe produota and it is recommended that they not be involved • • . .... /51 • TOP SECRh""l' UMBRA POR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000057 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN BY.GS ONLY XIII. Recommendations: That intelligence be recognized as an essential and continuing activity of the Government with a basis in established foreign and defence policy. 1. 2. That the main purpose is to utilize information from all sources, pertaining to the security of the country and its institutions, to inform the Government of dangers and threats from abroad bYi foroig~ organizations which may be private as well as governmental and may operate inside or outside the country. 3. That the Government continue in the light of Canadian interests to participate in the arrangements with the United Kingdom and the United States, as the best way of obtaining access to world-wide intelligence. 4. • That an effort be made, consistently with the arrangements in 3. above, to give more emphasis to areas of direct interest to Canada • 5. That the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence be continued. 6. That the Intelligence Policy Connnittee be reactivated, o.long the lines suggested, to guide and appraise the entire intelligence communi'ty and to deal with all matters of interdepartmental and nation-wide-intere~t. 7. That the Joint Intelligence Committee be disbanded and an Intelligence Management Committee be created to advise the senior official level on all questions which might be considered by the Cabinet Committee or the IPC, to produce the best possible assessments on relevant matters at the I governmental level, and to conduct relations with foreign intelligence organizations at the eovarnmental level. 8. That chairmanship and membership of the Committee be as proposed. / 9. Tb..at Ex.tArnal Affairs review the Security e.nd Intelligence Liaison Division and its other intellieence arrangements to bring them pp to date with the new responsibilities and that an Assistant Under Secretary be responsible in the Department for intelligence. . .... /52 TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000058 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRb"'T UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYBS OULY 10. That an intelligence unit be established with the responsibility or examining all aspects from a more general and comprehensive point or view than at present. (Depending on where this unit is l~cated it might serve also as the secretariat of the IMC which will be a requirement in any event.) 11. That signal intelligence continue to constitute the major Canadian contribution to the tripartite arrangements for some time to come and that some capital improvements be undertaken to keep it up to data, these to be phased with the early completion or other capital programs in Nationa1 Defence. 12. That the Director or CBNRC be made the manager or CBNRC by terminating the special management responsibilities now exercised in .External A.:rfairs {DOS). 13. • That a method be found or conducting periodical administrative and management reviews of the various intelli• gence units, despite the requirements or secrecy which lead to the work being done in relative isolation from the GovernmentJs central control machinery. 14. That the Government develop the capacity to plan and budget for intelligence on a contemporaJ.91 and comprehensive basis, as suggested in aome d e t a i l ~ • ,,., 15. That total intelligenoeMa be maintained at their existing level during t h e ~ ; ; a r while the Government is developing a continuing capacity to appraise the whole field on a current baai~ • • 000059 ! �GAC - Released under the Access to lnformations''/\ct/l'•~(JI AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces ir l'informationi .·• . • ) J •,. 41 .,,... 000060 ;~ �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue x,iEuur•llis a !'information TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY Needs tor Intelligence Within the Framework ot Foreign Pollc7 and D'etenoe Polic7 Any consideration of Canada's need.a in the field ot intelligence must be based on the framework of Canadian policy objectives, as indicated for instance in the Oovernment•s recent paper, Foreif! Pollot tor Canadians, and the Prime Minister's statemen o? Apr 1 j, 1969! on defence policy. Summarized below are some ot the sign ficant points made in these documents, together with cOim11ents relating them to the subject of this report: (a) "Foreign policy is the product of the Government•s progressive definition and ptll'suit of national aims and interests in the international enviromnent. It is the extension abroad of national polioies." (FP for C1 s p.9.) •• The basic role of Canada's intelligence program is to help the Government assess the nature or this international environment. • (b) "Objectives have to be set not in a vacuum but in the context in which they will be pursued, that is, on the basis of reasonable assumption of what the future holds", but "the risks of faulty or short-lived predictions run high••• Foreoaata for foreign policy purposes must be generalized. They rest on the facts and interpretations or international developments which are both subject to correction and change, and susceptible of widely differing deductions." (FP for c•s, PP• 11-12 and 20.) -- Intelligence, prudently used, often provides a small but important extra margin of hard fact which perm.its the much greater mass of preaB and other overt information to be more reliably interpreted. (c) "Six main themes or national policy form aa well the broad framework of foreign policy," i.e. (1) Fosterief Economic Growth, including, in the ?ore gn rleta. export promotionJ keeping up to date on scientific and technological discoveries, world trade TOP SECRET UMBRA .... . /2 FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000061 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - International TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYBS ONLY - 2 - and tinancial trends! policies ot major trading oountr ea and bloca, etc.J expansion ot trade and marketaJ innovations in goods and services otteredJ immigrationJ information activities. (FP tor c•a, pp.14 and 34-S). -- Intelligence ot various kinda is important tor an understanding ot the great closed societies, the USSR and China, which are or mar eventuall7 be major trading partners or Canada and ot its Western economic competitoraJ indeed intelligence anal7ais 1a an ultimate source or much ot the most usetu1 published intol'Dla.tion about these countries. - Intelligence on the economic policies or non-communist countries is not uauaC:'1 important compared with other sources, but it sometimes provides information which is tactioal17 uaetul to Canada as well as its competitors (wheat sales opportunities. reactions to Canadian policies). -- Intelligence exchanges, e.g. with the United States, reflect and reintoro• the climate ot mutual confidence which tacilitatea early tranatera to Canada ot new technology (which is to an increasing extent military in origin). (11) Sateraarding Sovereignty and Independence "ls arge!r a matteroFprotectlng dana!i•a terr1toria1 integrity, its conatitutional authority, its national identity and freedom. or action". (FP for c•a, p.lS) • •.••• /3 TOP SECRET UMBRA I FOR CANADIAN EYES OKLY 000062 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a 'l'OP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY -• Intelligence is ot coUl'se direotl7 relevant to this policy theme 1n ita military sense, 1.e. the task of aateguarding sovereignty through surveillance and control of Canadian tex-rito1'7• stressed in the April 3, 1969, defence polic7 statement. - Intelligence exchanges have been useful, and oou1d perhaps be more ao, in gaining knowledge of external (i.e. Frenoh) challenges to Canada's oonatitutional fabric. This point is discussed. in paragraph 3 on page 11 of this report. (iii) Promotir! Social Justice, in the foreign t!e!a, nciudes In particular developm.ent assistance progems! which in turn mu.at be corre1ated with pol oiea on issues auoh aa the peaceful settlement of disputes, promotion of human rights, race contllot 1 control of arms expo:rt, and milita17. tra1ning progams. (FP for c•a, pp.15 and 3~-6). - Intelligence can help to throw light on the activities or Communist countries in these fields - activities which a.re important because or the extent ot resources behind them and because they can arteot the implementation ot Canada's own policies in the developing world. (iv) Enhancing the ~u.a11t{ ot Life involvea, abroaa, such'. abtlv!t ea as cultura1, technological and scientific exchangea, and bringing under control problema auch as air hijacking, the international drug traffic, and organized crime acroas frontiers. (FP to~ c•a, PP• 16 and 36). - Intelligence, by providing information on the technological and scientific need.a ot TOP SECRET UMBRA I •••••./4. FOR CANADIAN EYES O:NLY 000063 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN E.T"~ ONLY - 4Communist oountriea, can help to clarity' their objeotivea in accepting exchanges and assist ua in bargaining with them. International police action. backed by intelligence activities, is ot coUl'se important in the other aspects mentioned above. (v) Enam-ing a Harmonious Natural Environment -• Intelligence can provide information on the environmental concerns aud polloiee ot those industrialized countries which are closed societ1e,. Canada already has seriouaa enviromnental problems in common with the USSR (e.g.,in the Al'ctio)J accordingly• this ajpect of intelligence coul.d be increaai~ important in tutve. ; (vi) Working tor Peace and Securit7 "means seeking to prevent war or at least to contain it••• through defence arrangements. arms control, peacekeeping, the relaxation of tenaiona, international law, or improvement in bilateral relations." "Defence arrangements must be ••• suf':t'ioient to ensure respect tor Canada•• sovereignty and territorial integrity, and also to sustain the confidence o:t' the u.s. and other allies••• (and) sharing in the responsibility tor maintaining stable nuclear deterrence and by participating in NATO policy•making in both political and militU7 :t'ielda." (FP tor c•s, PP• 15 and 37-8). This policy theme is closely linked with the Prime Minister•s defence 011oz statement of April 31 1969, which n!loatea that 1 - Canada's defence policy lib:>uld contribute to world peace - Non-alignment for Canada is rejected - Appropriate Cnnadian participation in collective security arrangements (e.g. NORAD and NATO) will continue •..•• /5 I TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000064 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET UMW FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY • - 5• Canada's defence forces will be de11gned tort the sui-veillanoe ot Canadian ter•ito17 and coast lines, i.e. protection ot sovereignty • North American defence in cooperation with the United State• • agreed NATO commitment• • peacekeeping roles which may be assumed - Intelligenoe is baaio to effective Canadian policies in the field of peace and security •.. This is not only because of the tactical intelligence requirement• or Canada's military toroea but, more impo1''\iant, because the ability to make independent judgments about the relative military capabilities and intentiona of · the maJor world Powers is essential in order for Canada to be able to make its own distinctive contribution to 8.l'll18 control and d6tente efforts, and to decide on the most rational allocation or its own resources among different defence roles. Without contributing to and thus gaining access to the huge pool or intelligence raw materials gathered large1y by its allies, Canada would have to determine its "peace" policies and the pattern of its defence expenditures largely on the basis of other countries• assessments or the data. Such assessment• can be consciously or unconsciously colored by the political preoccupations or theii- authors. (d) Canada must assess its various policy needs in the context ot t~o "inescapable realities" - the problem ot maintaining national unity, and that ot "living distinct from but in harmony with the world•s most ,powerful nation, the United States". (FP tor c•a, pp. 20-1). (The paper elaboratea on this point about the United States in a number ot other paaaagea.) - I The possible relevance of intelligence to national unity has been mentioned above under the sovereignty polio7 theme. TOP SECRET UMBRA FOR CANAJ)IAJ EYES 01'JLI 000065 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECiml' UMBRA • FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY - Participation in intelligence exchanges with the United States - particularly in the highly sensitive but crucial communication• uea which provides much or the moat solid intelligence available - helps to set the United State•• Canadian relationshi~ (like the United StatesBritish relationship) apart trom the United States• relationship with virtually allot ita other allies. The tact that Canada, along with two or three other nations, is largely privy to what the United States regal'da as one ot ita own key sources or information is an important factor in the degree or frankness which United State• ottioiala feel they can or muat adopt with ua on iasuea involving other countries. - The world environment aa a whole is extenaively attected by the privileged lmowledge which the larger powers have or one another and ot smaller countries through their own costly intelligence ettorta. Our appreciation of thia tact, gained through our intelligence exchanges, helps us deal realistically with the policies not only ot the United States but also ot other major countl'iea. **** TOP SECRE.1? UMBRA FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY I 000066 �AffEN'DIX "' PI' GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a J DEPARHAENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS s.13(1 )(a) MIN!STERE DES AFFAIRES EXTlR.IEUR;:S CANADA s.15(1) - International Ottawa, July 27, 1970. /s1R.- 7J.J J~&.r Dr9 Isbister: " You will recall that in mid-,hi.rie, -,,,-hen we wer0: in the llncler-SGcret.ary 1s of'f'ice discussir1g the u::;ef\1J.n3ss to this Dcp2.rtment of our intelligence liaison r'.::lation3l:ips ,-:ith tbe U,':i and DE, the Under-S0c1·c:tary and l-Ir. Tremblay rcccnciendcd ttat you spca.k to the Heads of Divisicn about this Ir,atter. You subsc\;1uE~r,tly indicated that. you ..:ould like to see the results cf a sm~vcy ,,;h:i.ch we hEo.ve been cond'J..::ting with the Divisions since lzrch for the purpoE;e of cv2J.uating the reL:wan.ce of the intelligence th,:i.t i3 made availaole to tbom i.n terms of the Divisions 1 ,pri:icipal interests. '/le have consulted our Africa and Middle E-:tst Divinion (three sections), Arms Control and Disa:rm,.'1T:'ient Div:\.sion, Co1mnonwea.lth Di vision, Europe~n Division, Far Eastern Division, La.tin Am,~rican Division, Commercial Policy Division, Transport, Corrmunicationr, and ::nerQ' Di vision., North krnerica.n De.fence and t!ATO Div~.sionJ and Peacekeeping and Eilitc1.ry A0sista11ce Division<> A sumrnary of the results of our consultations is attached. You have ask2d in particular about the usefulness of intell:i,gt;nce in h~~lping us to adviGc the Govern!"lent in the course of the • This :Ls discussed in the section on 11 Non--French--speaking - South of Sahara 11 1.:nuer th'3 r:w.in headinD of 11 Africa and Eiddle East Division". You have also &skcd about the use cf intelligence by CIDA. Intelligence is very seldom sent to CIDA~ The latter i3 adv:i.sed on aid n1?..ttE;rs by the Divisions of this DepartmeGt dealing ::i·;.,h the countries concern-?--:::. n.nd tl:ei:r advice takes into accot.:.nt any information we receive through intelligence channels that inay be ava~i.lable and relevu.ntq ~- \ "Dr. c.~,r. Isbister, Soecial Advis~r to PCO, • 63 Sparks Street, Roor1 708, Ottm•m., Ontc.rioo 000067 �1 GA~ - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ Ailllt - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - Security s.15(1) - International /i.FRIC.'t At:D 1-:IDDJJ; :~;;.:/1' DIVISION (Non-French-speaking - s·outh of the So.hara) On April 8 we consulted the Head of the section of this Division rlud1is responsible for non-Fr(mch-speakine Africa south of tbc Sahara about the effectiveness of the ir1telligence th&t is avaih.b1c to him through our liaison ,:ith US and UK intelligence authorities. ',-le sought his views on the timeliness and usefulness of cur-rent intelligence as a supplemer:.t to the norm:.i.l reportinG of our missions on three categories of intelligence: (1) Detling with the growth of tension between (2) about Canadian problems arising out of our policy towards and (3) on the internal situations in individual countricso 2. Africa ar.d W.ddle East Division concluded that intellie;encc bearing on the development of tensions between was 11 of so:ne value 11. 3. In considering intelJ.ig.;;;nce c.8aling with efforts by revie•:rnd this intelligence anc. concluded thr1t the Goverrnn;mt I s policy of 1 intellieence was of c0nsiderablc value". 11 in helpj11g us to irnplerrJ.ent. the 4. In asking Africa and hid.dle East Division to consider intelligence on internal developnents in inc!ividual coti_nt.ries we considered that the where Canadian interests 1-,ere most directly engaged, would seem to be the most import&nt criterion- for a judeinent of the usefuln-:;ss of intciligence on develo:pments ia individual countrieso In takine up this matter with Africa and li:iddle F:rnt Division we observed that nin our po3t-morterns on the q_uestion we have formed the impression tha.t the volUJj1.inous intellieence av2.ilable to us throughout the on the ebb and flow of forces on the ground was of somG use to the extent that it confiri::-ied in deta.j_l what we learned from our r;ri.ssions in and elsewhere. i"ie belic:ve that the and the I \-1as of som.m·,hat more use. (\le are told by l{r. r-icLril.l. that, the l•:inister atta.ched ccmsiderc:ble value to evidence of various . including Canada, refortcd in the CanJ.di.in :lee:u.y Intc1li.~,mce Report .. ) We believe that it is arguable wh0thcr or not int.cl1J.rence could have saved the Government • •• 0 ./2 000068 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ • IMC - Divulgue en ver_t1.1.~l'f'!~;ur l'acces !'information / .... \" ,-·,.- ·r V'i;J• t-) -i-.,. f.\ • a s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International • . ,, i• ·J • i ~~-·"' ; . ,,. \:.,. 'I,,;; ..... ·'\f'i:riu~ 't;:-. - 2 - The intelligence, as you know, was in no position to est_imate with any precision the On eleven days before the the Canadian JIG made the following report: On the Capadian JIC reported: reports may well have convinced us that a was likely in the near future but we understand that you felt at the time that they fell short of providing us with sufficiently firm con-. clusions on which to base a recormnenda.tion to the Goverrn:.ent to defer a decision to bearing in r.1ind public pressure on the Government at that tin:e to take some such acti:m,. The intelligence was not therefore a decisive facto1·. The questim1 we should perhaps as%, ho...,..ever, is \•;hether it might have been d ecj_sive in other circumstance>s a.nd whether you felt it useful or even nccess3.ry to review the current intelligence available in rr1ak;lnf: po1~icy reco:n.i11e11dations in t.hit; instance and on earlier occa3ions in the cour::;c of the 11These • •• • 4 o/3 000069 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ i AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a ,/ s.15(1) - International s.13(1 )(a) - 311 Having these considerations in mind, and taking into acc:-ount. intellige:ncc on other situations besides the , we would be gratcfu], if you would indicate on this memorandum your est:ir.late of the tiineliness and _general usefulness of intelligence on the internal situations in individual countries in Africa south of the Sahara as a supplement to the reporting of Canadian missions., Is it of no use? of marginal value? of some value? of considerable value? essential? 5. Africa and Hiddle Ea.st Division provided some supplementary ccrrments on the first two questions and replied specifically to the third question i:1 the follo;-ling tE:rms: The following supplementary comments may be useful. One valid distinction, for example, can be found between subjects the area divisions are 1 fol_lowing 1 (exemplified by the first of the three areas you have raised, and to an extent by the second), and those with which we are deeply involved •( exen,pl:i_fied by the 11 ano. annve A. I 1 • In the area of I have found the individu~l intellieence reports of little value. In contrast, the periodic assessments made by the agencies involved on the ba::,is of all these reports are generally informative and 1 of soJI,e value'" 11 0n the specific case of the possible sale of a the assist3.nce of the intelligence community was obviously of cons:'.dcrablc value. I trust. that if there had been any relevant and ,-,re would have been informed., .ill ot.ner mst.ances reJ_a-c.ea to the intelligence has also been of assistance, at least in bringing to our attention which should be investigated. In other; more genera1.,·respects the intelligence material on Rhodesia falls into the category 11 of only marginal utility. I agree with your corrrnent th.s.t was of considerable value to us durin~ the it alerted us on occasion to their activities related to Ganadc 11 0n ••• 4 ./4 • 000070 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a r ./ s.13(1)(a) s.15(1) - International and Illade us better able to cope with th8se. There were occasions as well (again, if memory serves) when this material infonned us of moves on the pence-feeler front which helped U3 to assess the c).aims and counter-claims of the two sides in the conflict. It uas in the area of military information that we got perhaps the least out of the intelligence material pro·vided, though we revieHed it carefully and daily. This may be the fault not of the intelligence 'but uhich was one cf ereat lurches and loDg apparent stalemates. Xou are correct in statine that we felt unable on the b3.sis of all the information available to us, including the intelligence material and assessments (and I reviewed all the latest of these on t!1e morning of when the Govern:m0nt 1 s decision was to be announced, as a final precaution) j to recommend to theGovcrnment a further deferral of the annow.1ce1r.ent of its ~'•ihat I would dispute in this conte;..-t is that 'these reports may well have convinced us trB.t a was likely in the near futureo o. 1 • To my recollection, no one breathed a \·:ord of this at the time. The JIG (Ca,ns.da) as::,essment you have quoted in your para. 5 wD,s fair, but it did not in itself" give grounds for believing that a was irnmincnt; it recorded, properly, that There had at 11 ~'"' Ma-n~,--. ..-1.-,1,-,,.1 ~ ..;:"""..-1-":.~~~-"!~~ !'.~"~- I -- • ··- • - r -··--. ·-· There seems to me no basis now, as there was not on to conclude that the -was only hours a~-w.y,, "In the light of the above, I would &ilswer the question in your parao 7 as 'of some value' in regard to situations which we are 1 followine 1 and which do not involve Canadian interests in any direct fashion, and 'of considerable value' in crises, such as the which were of direct interest to use Certainly durine th:: 1 we considered it essent:i..s.l to review on a dE.ily ba.sis, and to refer in some instances to senior management, the intelligence material you were able to give us on , 11 • 000071 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information (~ . ~.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International a :P.t~i ...f:.r (•.-•£-· ," ·, utn1~r.1 u:\~:i.::;;~n. \~:,, AI◄.,.RICA t..:,;t;••· !JrD lfrDDLE LL:3T DIVISION . (The .i-:-Xddle East) ·. On July 2 we consulted Africa and liiddle East Division about the usefulness of the intelligence that is· available to the Division th:rough our liaison arran,sements \·r.i..th the US and UI{ intelligence authoritieJ v We placed before them recent intelligence reports on {a) in which the position of the (b) the nature of Soviet influence (c) threats to the safety of (d) the safety of a ( e) developments in countries like .,.......,_ ....... .J.•~~- .f..- --v..,,. ..,;-.;_._ v·...; but which may +~,...,.,,... h.,.. -.f' __ ._.",..__.... __ .f..,.., \,,i,.._;..4...,. ...,..., ...,,,..._ --••"'-••• -- --v The Desk Officer responsible for H.1.ddla K~st affairs co:mr,,~nted that intelligence on (a) was of mareins.l value, on (b) of considerable value; on (c) of considerable value; on (d) of marginal value; and on (e) of som-e value 9 The Acting Head of Africa and. Hiddle :&1.st Division concurred with the judgments on (a) to (d), but indicated that he would consider (e) to be 11 of considerable value 11 • 2~ 3. • :F'ollow:ing are the Desk Office:r 1s cormncnts in detail: In dealing with a rapidly evolving sitl~ation such as the the desk officer in a political division is above all interested in a rapid flow of up-to-date factual inforillation. In the case of this crisis, this information ·was needed (a) to brief the 1-linister., (b) to prepare replies to questions in the House, (c) to ans\·rer queries from the public and the press, (d) to b1·icf other Divisions and Government Departments chiefly responsible for ensuring the safety of Canadian citizens, aud other interests. Higtly qualified specu.1,tive assessments of future develop1uents cLre of very secondary interest. (If he has enou~h raw material, the desk officer himself can i,iake whatever short term ass~ssments c>.re r·equir<.:d for operatio1Hl purposes) 0 000072 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International - 2 - Secn in this light, the British and USA intelligence reports ue recci ved durinr, the Here only I of marginal value to This com..rnent is not intended to reflect any judGi!'tcnt reeardj ng the contents of these reports; it refers solely to their tiL'lelincss for our purposes., 1-~ost of these reports h::.d been drafted the day before we saw the~, and referred to events vrhich had taken plac.o one or tuo dvys earlier, i.e. there was usually a 48-hour tiL'le lag b8l"lrnen an event D.nd our receipt of a report on ita F'or opcrations.1 purposes, therefore, the telegraru, fro:m our cmb3.ssy in , and the AFP and FBIS wire ser·vices, were of much greater use than the intcllicence reports., The one piece of inforn1ation received through intelligence channels which we.: used (after toninr; it do,.-m) in a mcmorandu11 to the Hinister turnvd out to be a quite misleading description of the situation • 11 Thc intdligence reports concern.i..ng are 1of considerable value'• They tend, however, to b<) fur too wordy and repetiti-✓ c of each other; the desk officer docs not usually have the time necessary to read with sufficient care to perceive sh:L:'"t.s of emphasis or small but significant developments which apµ: ar .in a 11 • r">"I~ r. n r.,... I"""~ ,.-,.."t"'I .f.,~,_,-.....,...,.~...._...,.. .... r.. ...,..,.. ~ \,..r,r, r. -···-..;- -~---,--.J. C"" • ._._."_....,,_~-, r.r> -C•'t'\n"!."rr'\,-., ................ _..,_- ~__ ,_. \.-.~ l'7'\..,, ~ r,\ ... ~·.; T\ r1 ·•-o··---o"·---~-o be desirable. (See ror instance and The first coutains 15 pages; the second 9 pagcs4) "The information which we received through British intelligence chct1mels concerning a was 1of' considerable value 1 We were, houevcr, har,1pered in our use of this 0 ma.tcrial by the ve.ry fact ·that it had reached us through • It took approy.i_.713.tely 36 hours for nrra.ngc--, ments to be made to have the information passed to our .&ukssy in As it turned out, the delay was not important since nothing untowc,rd occurred in the interim. 11 The intelligence reports on this subject. were only 1 of mart1inal vr,lue'• '!'hey added little to the information provided us b;;r our mis,:iions, the .... State Department and the representatives of the and abroa.de Cl~• O ,,/3 000073 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a • s.13(1)(a) s.15(1) - International 3 The intelligence reports on recent events in these two countricG arc 1 of some value' to us, s,ince both are covered by 1:either coW1try is, however, of groat con corn to USo 11 11 4o Following are the covering com.rnents ·made by the Acting Head of the Division: 11 We have given this project thorough study., Since Hr. Delvoie is my co-consumer of intellieence m.-:i.terial on the area - and indeed is often able to go through r0}'.;orts in ereatcr detail th.:tn I can find time to do - I have had him com11Emt specj_fically on each item. 1..ooked at statistic2.lly, you will find that Mr. Delvoie rates the inteJJ.igencc matcri,•J. as having been 'of ma:ceinal value' in two of the five exmnplcs used, of 1 considerable value 1 in two others, and tof some valne 1 in respect· of If you like, this gives about a e500 battiue average, which is faj_rly respect.R~\lCc I agr-oe with his ratine,s on the first four- items, but would s3.y for myself that I found reports on bf considerable value'. '£he difference in our [cSsessments here prob3.bly reflects 11 biW fa1,;i:, i,i-ia.i, he rei-l.;_i:::; more P1~i,f:r1HJ 1 ron oi.r1er sourc:,~:-; T,t1?.H :i" 110 on these countries, and is therefore less dependent u~cn analyses f'rorn. intcllig1.HiCe sources,. nI should like to corr~ncnt 1rDre generally on the U3efulness of intel ligence material 0 First, while accepting Kr,. Delvoie 1 s point that in a 'hot' situation intelligeµce channels may bring us reports somewhat belatedly, these still seem to me ve1-y useful for keeping matters in perspective. Moreover, there is an incalculable factor here; ,-lhile most of the time we may have '-iad the same information from other sources in such situations, ho'.-! does one evaluate the occasional instance wbere an important elcE1cmt has not in fact been covered in reports from other som·ccs? To ny mind, in circu1ust2.nces. where important Cc:nndian inte1·ests arc urgently at stake, a fair amount of sifting through material which inc\,:Ltably is largely repetitive and is perhaps not terribly ne..r, well repays the efforto 11 As noted earlierJ I place a high ratint; on reports and assessment3 on countries It follows that reports on countries where ,re don 1 t even have non-r~side.it accreditation can be especially valua.bleo Although we would hope these will normally be coUJ1trics \•;here there arc not large Cariaclian interests at stake, the fact is th:..t well-digested m::d:.erj_al o!1 {for example) and e·-rcn can be very useful., • 0 0 ,../4 000074 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ s.13(1 )(a) ~C - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'a~c~s ii/information ·1 s.15(1) - International ... -4'• u~-l ,,! f. ,..-n.,.c· '-'•··!:.,,,.• i( 4 "f fl r,, '· •• l- ~\ t~ I 1tib \.-.,-~J ' •' .. 1-, -4 "Obviously, I aeree with Hr. Dclvoie about the desirabD-ity of __ having su•,1,--:1aries 1'lhich highlight new ele1,1ents •in lengthy reports on situations of e:ontinuing interest I realize this may not ;-;.hmys be practicable; but without such st11n.'11ary, or some pointer to new clemonts, I fear m,my of th0se repo1·ts 1,mke little impact with me, for sheer lack of reading tim3o none final pointo Hr. Dclvoie has noted that one of the items which we made use of proven to have been rnisleading9 i·lhile this was unfortunate, I think in a da.ngcrous and trick'.,r situation ue are batter off to g~t promptly warning signals which raay u1t:i.In3.tel~r prove to have been exaggerated than to not get vrarning of nasty developments~tr 000075 �IT~ ',Released under the Access to Informations Act/ l; r~ ;;».W~Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information ••r • s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International A'F'RIC/t ,\J.;:J l:IDI)I.J~ 3AS'l, DIVI3IOI~ --(French-speakLn;; Afri~a) • On April 6 we consulted the Head of' t.he section of' this Division wr..ich is responsible for French-spec1kinz Africa arout the e ffectivenoss of the intelligence that i;:, availabl<, through our liaison Kith the US and the UK intelJ.iecnce authorities o :10 sought his vie,·ra of :-1:e usefulness of two kinds of intelligence: one h~ving a bearing on relations \•rlth ; the other for the relevance it may h:ive to a require1:1cnt to understand the current political, econo,,1ic and mili"t,ary situations :i.n individu2..l francophone African cou.:itries generally. 2. After havine exa.r:ri.ned a compcndiu_;n of British Secret Intelligence Service intelligence reports on in Africa, and CIA reports on Africa and W.ddle 1;.:i.st. Division con-~ eluded that this kind of intelligence is of considerable value. 3, • v.'e provided Africa and Eiddle E._9.st Division with exa.r.:rples of recent intelligence on developn,.cnts in individual francophone Africc>.n countries including reports of and intelligence on a As exa~1ples of int&lll.ge::nce having a direct b;:;aring on Canadia:i problems or providint; coverage of events in francophone countries in which C&nada has we asked .Africa and 1-Iicldle Ea.st Di vision to indicate how useful they believed this kind of :i.ntel.ligence to be in helping us to urn:1~:n:,tand Lilt cu.1Teni... ~.i..i...ua.t.:i.uns in the courd::,r:u:::s io:r· whici1 i:.i1ev we:::1·c::: responsible a~1d to make rcasonc.bly accurate forecasts of stability in fra.ncophonc countrieso The Division concluded that this kind of intelliecnce is of considerable valueo. • 000076 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ tl'{IC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - International s.13(1 )(a) -ARHS C.:ON'1'ROL AND DIS,\llM.r'J•t'.2:N'l' DIVISION On June 22 we consulted the Head of this Division about the usefulness for his purposes of the ir_r~elligenco the.t is avo.ilable to us throueh our liaison ,-:ith the US and UK intelligence nuthorities(! In discus3ing this matter with him vre noted that the Directorate of Scientific and Technical Intelligence at CFHQ obta.ins, collates and analyzes intelligence bearing on We v.sked him how useful he regarded this intelligence to the c.xtent that it may enhance our ability (a) to Gvaluatc the progress of potentinlly i;-!lportent steps towards and (b) to judgo the utility or othe1~.-1ise of ar1y post,iblc Ca.nadian initiatives in this ficldo He <1ns;..rered that he consid0red this kind of intelligence essentialo He added that 11 our only opportunity effectively to influence \·{ithout the DS'l'I analyses of avail.::,blc intelligence we would l;)e dependent and he unable ·to 6Xert any influence during the consultations 11 • • 2. We noted that through our relationship with the US and 1..rn: intellit;ence authorities \';e are able to judge fairly accurately the effectiveness of We asked the Head of Division to place a value on this relationship ~ ..... , , -.. .....; ........ _....,..._..... ....,, ............ 6 ,4-\.,.'"' ,... ...... ..,,,,,, ..... --~+ ..... -~,.. v,t;,v -.Ji...u:.u,..., .._. . . . _ . _ . . , , _ , 1 . . . ;.. .(..\... ..... ~ f,,A,,,V .. .._......,v ... ,.. ..",.. ... ~,.....l ,,....,4-. _ _ ,1-lt.-i. ~ ...... ..,.-L ... _ .......... ..:......,_ .t-"....,.....,~,..,.b previous pnragrapho He replied that he considered it value"' and added that U3 officials .J..t-- .......... 'l~ ... ,....i.~ .... tJJ..l-...., 11 ' " j , . . . . . , . , , . . . . , v . . 1 .. . v , 1 . • .:..,... .L.1-.- ~ , vii-.._.. of considerable .3o We ncted that through our intellii:;cnce liaison relationship we receive some help in making judgmcnts on the likelihood of such countries as -r,..!e asked him to place a value on the intelligence in question. He conclucled that it was "of some value"• 4. We noteci that we receive current intcllir,ence reports on such matters as 1;Je added that while most of this intelligence is e,merated for the US GovtJrn•• mcnt for the purpose of hdping the US authorities to a::,sess 'it L1aY also be useful in helping us to ~-;e asked him to ccinn1ent on the v&lue of this kind of intelligence on the basis of both criteria. He replied that it was of r.:areindl use in assessing and observed that our :.!bbassy in ,1as much more perceptive in a:r,aJ.yses of intentions towards but added that U3 iatcllir,s:nce reports arc.; He concluclecl hm~ever that the j11telligcncc reports on the generally was of consid.:.~rable ·value .. • ... /2 000077 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information s.13(1 )(a) a 1 I' I'-- s.15(1) - International - 2 - In his general co;;u:i1ents he alDo observed that "Access to intellieence and Canadian an2.lysis of it is of increasing importance to this Division because of: I / (1) which will be crucial to progress in all other areas of ::.nd in l-ihich our geographical position creates a special Canadian interest distinct from our allies; (2) a growing trend towards a (3) increasing sophistication of and II (4) the requirement to analyze intelligence from the stand:;-oint of , and foreign policy consi,der~tions as well as by refe;ence to its I J • " ·Q00078 �/ -{iAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ ~MC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information 'i' n n ( :- ~--; ·s.13(1 )(a) , Ul s.15(1) - International r i t i:: ::.·?ZL·~-ri . - . . . . . ·a:• ..... t-,~4-v-• ... COl-J:01-;;:r.tlTH DIVISIOI'I -------On July 6 we: co::iEulted the Head of this Division about the usefu1nnss for his purposes of tl:c i11tclliecncc th:1.t is available to us throu6 h our liuison ,-.rith the US nnd UK intell:i. 0 ence authorities., We asked him in particular about the value of intellir;cncc reports on that were made ftV£,il8.ble to him before, durint; and after tbe in which Ca.nadian comm0rcial interests were threatened follo1ring the W0 requested hin1 to view tLis intelligence as a supplement to the reporting of Can0.dian missions in the area (and as a gap-filler in areas where 1·:e ·.,,sre not represented) and t.0 place a value on it, using as his rfrain criteria the usefulness of' this kind of intelligence in (a) helping the :-Jcp:::rtrnent to form judgm.ents of the prospects for political and economic stability; (b) enhancing our ability to offer sound advice on trade, aid and corru,10rcial policy; and (c) givin~ us a better capability to advise the Government on rr.easur-es to protect Canadian int.E.J'e3ts in the area. He replied that the ~telligcnce wa.s of considarable value. 29 We also asked hiin about the relevance of US, UK and Au~,tral:i.an intEilligence reports on other countries of concern to ·his Division, and in pc1rt:i.cuL;,r 1 ,-Je asked him to place a value on this kind of intelliefmr.P. i,Jhcm r2r::-iwied ns supplcn:.entR.ry t0 the renortin~ of Can&die,n missions and - a::; . a. .i.ci\.:l,Ul" J.U 111::J.JJ.Ulg u;:; ,.._ i.,U t,J.V'v i:tUYJ l,(.:: lJV V..1..J.Jr:..J l.,JJ.\:"• I t J.,J\.:.}J~J.V..l.;,,.1.'-'•J.v•.J ,.. V..L l"'n . .1 _, •.J.t..1.,1,....., v,.....,....., Cor.unerce and 1;ational Defence and to a3sess the prospects for politic2.l and economic stability in He replied that he considered this intelligence to cc of considarable val ue<i 4. }i'ollowing are the more detailed cominonts of the Head of Commonwealth • Division: In retrospect, there is no ·doubt in my mind tha.t, the intelli•gencc reports are of very co~1siclerabl0 value in fillint; in gaps :i.n our knouledge about what has gone on in '£his is particularly true of the JIG reports originat'ing in Londono 'l'hey ar9 of considerably hiehcr quality, being specific, reasonably accurate, _and much to the point, than material originating in Hashington, Do C.-, especially a.1xmt the Looking back on the sitm.tion over the h st four Lionths, I think the Lonflon J IC: reports const:i.tute the ,1~0st accurate and comprehensive account available to ua of what was eoinr, on. Reporting from our rniss ion was slo.·,er, was nuch less detailed and considerably less comprehensi VG on the detc<l.ls of the On the whole, USA reports ovcir the ·same period tended to be more gcneral:i.zed and considerab)y vaguer than the British r3J,orts,. 11 000079 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AM -1jvulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information 7 s.13(1 )'(a) a s.15(1) - International t1Again, the British reports _ _ Rre exceD.e1tt - detailed, specific, and as far as I lmow accurateo However, our requiremcn:t for ini'or.wation in this amount of detail i3 less becatise our intere:ots in the form of business: enterprj"scs, and resicl.ent Canadian coi:tmunitieG Again, infor~~tion on assessme,1.ts the tro1.;.ble is that when reading a ne~-.r one, l 1·ind that l have rrc,::uently forGotten what was in the last c,ne or what the general situatic,n \·!as in that. particular areao Perhaps soi~e method of quicker and more continuous ct.istribution could be d::ivised~ A good pa1·t of the problem is the way in which infonn[..tion bec0mes availe.ble to the people in di visions. During a crisis, one tencls to be flooded with information of all sorts, much of it press and radio reports which are often of poor quality c1nd very nlanted., the gr3at problem is to recognize and sift the .-:heat from the chaff, at a tililc \,hen one is very busy doing ,!larly other thines. Under present distribut.ion rules., divisional officers have only brief access to highly c-1.EJ.5sifi{)d intelligence reports; in a welter of information and misinform.:l.tion, there is a tendency to forget what the JIC reports of a few days ago 3aid, and there is some difficulty in getting access to it quicl:J.yo 11• 11 • • 000080 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International EUTICPF;AN DIVISIO?J - On Hay 19, 1970 we sought the co;mnents of European Division on the effectiveness of intelligence th&t ts available to them through our liaison with the US a.nd UK intelligence authoritil.'ls., ;fo requested a gener·al asscssr ment and we also sought the vie,•;s of the Division on the timeliness &nd use-fulncss of current intelligence, vieweed as a supplement to the normal rcportin 6 of Canadi.c,.n missions, on three specific subjc;cts: 4 (1) the question, which is frequently raised in NATO, about the possibility of and (2) (3) 2. On the firHt point European Division in.forJ1ed us that they believed that the intelligeace which they received during the was essentia.l. They replied that • "There was a wealth of public information once the Where the intellig<::nce was important was on one point - whether this was an rn1 .J .i.Jid.1, • _ J j.JUJ.u ... , We,..:> Juaut; _... ov -. ~J..t>d.1'.l...Y ,- cJ.UU - oV .• - 1 ... 4ll.l.\,l\...L.\" . I . -, --i -• -- - , • U.Y ..i.1H•C.L.L-.L/','-'U,_;c; that its import,:mce is ovarlookedo. In f&.ct this point- v,--as the vital o_nee The intelligence was essential 1:-e- 3. On the second point, European Division co:mmented that intelligence has bezn of 11 cons:i.derabla on the question of positions on t.h::: value" in helping thera to understand the , and in providing us guidance in quest.ion of our discussions of this matter in NJ..'i'Oo On the third point, dealin;.: with intelligence bearine on current speculation about changes in the European Di vision concluci.cd that, considering it as a supplement to the reporting from our F..mbassy in this kine! o~ intelligence has been 11 of considerable valuo 11 • ir1 meetinz; the Department 1 s requirements to be well informed about the at least in the period running up to the tiI:ie of the Primz l-linister 1 s visit to the Ji, 5. European Division added the following com.11ents of a general natu.re: non one plane, we find the value of intelligence reports may vary depending on the report o.nd the other infor:.ution available to us on the subject. On another plan~, the flow of such reports is essential since it helps us to confirm specul-:ttion, analysis and facts~ 11 000081 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1Ha) s.15(1) - International On June 29 ue consulted the Head of the Dep3.rtrncnt. 1 s Far Eastern - • Division about the usefulness for his purposes of the intelligence that is available to us throti.6 h our li.aison with the US and UX intelligence authoritias,, 2. We rt?vie~ved with r.im intelligence dealing 1.d.th fo::tcign, and developinents :i..n other countries of the Far F..ast where 3,. we considered a recent estimate of based on a study of intelligence fro!u all som·ces prepared by the Canadian Directorate of Scientific and 'I'echnical Intelligencell' In asking that a value be placed on this kind of -intel:i.igence assessment we suggested that the following criteria might be borne in mind: ''The Canadian GovcrnL1ent may be thought to have some requirement to be in a position to assess the We have a3f.mmed that the is a factor of fundarnental importance 111 t.ha ror:nUJ.ation or foreien polici0s notably in • \Je have a.Lso assumed that, whJ.J.e we must attach importance to being able to assess, independr:.i1tly of the US, the it is also important for us to do so in the case For exa,'llple, follmrine the recent public statements in the US about the need for an , we have assumed that the Canadian intelligence authorities would need to be in a position to advise Ministers, ba.scd on their own assessment of the raw intelligence, on the nature of the o.f In commenting on this kind of intellieence estimate, Far K,.stern Division obsei Ved that its conclusions v1ere of· considerable valuee h,. 1 ••• 0,,/2 000082 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ Allll9- Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information ( s.13(1 )(.a) I s.15(1) - International - 2 - 'l'hc Division addec. the folJ.owing co;mnents on th-e criteria: ~•Jhile 5.t wou1d no doubt be desimble to be able to for·m an indcp~ndcnt judgment of I wonder if this is really pcssible uhen we h:i.ve no independent sources of inforrn':l.tion. i·.'e are unlikely to have a.nj' rr.::asonable basis for challengin3 an inte1lie;2nce estiriUte of ho·d many of what kind of have or are likely to develop., Where our independent judgrnent of the is essential is in assessing ~·Je would have no way of challens:i.ng American estimates about the number of probably have, but might have very diffcr0nt id0E.s about what they \Jere likely to <lo with them., No doubt uc will, in any case, be rr,ade privy to American intelligence infor.ll3.tion in cases where Wash:lngton thinks this might help to convince us of their case for taking a certain course of' action. 11 11 • 6. We considered basic research papers, pre:;::iared by the CIA brineing together mostJy 11 open 11 information about internal developments in and we asked to have a value placed on these kinds of co,npilations on the ~C"Ol-'\-l'"_,..~+.;,-..7'\ -- - -- -- - -~• - -- - - - +t,..._,..+ - -- - - +1-.n-r. - -- - - - internal situc:1.tion in ·-----v 1-.. - ..... ..... ,-. ...... .,3 .... ,.... ..... "',... ,.... ...... '\..., ,... .... ",..J .... .f.- " ~ \,.. ..... \... ,.., ........ " should we 7. The Division commented tha.t reports of this kind are occasionally of considerable value, adding nrhis is largely a qucf;tion of the time available and th3 day-to-day operation.::.l requirements of the de;:;k officer. Even the laq;er and more specialized reports of this Jr..incl \IOuld be a useful part of a "data base 11 or "intelligence library" •· particularly if it ·were :r;-,ade available to officers proceeding on a 'o 8. On the Ct!rrent intelligence on the Division inJicated that most of it is of marginal value and not8d that sor.1e \·ras of co::1s idera.ble value (referring to o 9. The Division added the following general col'.1l11ents on the items of intelligence we reviewed dealing v,'ith nln assessing the value of these specific item'.,, I have in mind! (a) whether or not the jJ1.:ormation was &.vaib. ble throu~h other cban.riels - i. e .. to what ext.ent did the int.clligcnce input add to our knowledr,e or undC;rstu.nding; (b) the bulk or volume of the material related to our capacit;) to absorb it usefully; (c) the intrinsic interest of tte infor20atici1~ In other 1·1or-rls, the value of infor:-::ation or assessments fro:n intell~1.f;0nce sot:rces is reduced if they are too specialized or tecr,nic&l, if they do no 1:1orc th;:;.n add an a.ssentii1£; voice to material r0ceived from. other sources, or if' th-ey ar& too volur:d.nous. Our capacity to absorb 1:1ateria~ about is not unlirciitod, c::.nd r:u.torial from intelli[;cnce scu.rces must compete for tr.e desk officer I s time Hith re~orting from 0ur 000083 office, reports from th8 British FBIS ••••I L~'. i, , ·-· Y H:'..f. ~~ ·:' l'· :1· 1,., it,-\·,!' .. " .... , n. tJ r "'t. ;.\ .... ..,,A, ). �GAC - R?!,eased under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC hivulgue ei:i vertu de la lbi sur l'acces a !'information s.13(1)(a) . ., •" u c.;, ri ·o ~ >• n••i,:~,\,\ ... n-')\ r<:·Hl'."\-~,r. ,t .. <,,.-• s.15(1) - International t l: f l.J • .,. ,._ •• Bulletins ai.1d newsp.:,.p3r G.rticles by reliable and well-informad reporters:rci 10. On v,e reviewed a number of US and UK intelligel'1ce est-imat0s and reports ·on and asked thcDivision to place a value on them, as being representative of intelligence on a3 a r1hole, to the extent that th6.Y supplement the reportin 6 of Canadi-9.n missions on areas in which we are represented and fill gaps on areas where we are not, and to the extent that they Y.l'l.Y help us to carry out prasent and possibly future truce supervisory tasb 0 11. The Division commented in the follow:i.nc terms: ·.• .;i. Since quite a bit of this in.formation never reachad GF'E it has been of no value to uso Even if it did reach us much of it would be, c.t the most, o:rJ.y 1 of 3or,1e value'. The value, howevcr 1 is mainly in keeping us informed -;f-e'vents our missions have no . way of providine first hando It is a gap-filler which we hava to ba somewhat skcptical about and wl1ich does not alway& have an immediate and direct bearing on our specific interest in namely, our responsibili'.:.ies •on Once it has been established that the1·c are the rest is detail from the point of view of our acti vi.t:l.es on 11 "Periodic special assessments ar~ of greater value from GFE 1 s -,..,,,,,,,...,"'1 ··---·- ·-,.,,"\-- r.,,e, . "f1' ~·u·on+ c: The material vubmitted to us included a lot in the way of daily bloH-by--blow rGports of Generally speaking, because of its d12;;tail and volume, thJ.s ld.nd of material cannot be digested in GrE, particularly in any e.>...-tendcd period of crisis, because of the limi.ted officer str,meth of the division. In normal times, it does, as alr.-:::ady noted, serve as a g2,p-filler, eiving information on events our mls$ions have no way of providing first hande 11 It is this kind of raw or semi-digested material rather than the periodic special assessr.:1cats of a broad political nature and the periodic SUJilJ1'...aries of events (which· I indicated were of greater value to us) that I hart in mind when I said we had to be somewhat skeptical about such informationo We know fro1;1 c:x.--perienco in the for C!Xarr.plE;, 11 There wa.s no reason t-o believa it i,muld bch:1:1e di1'1"erent.Ly now in H1<.,kine a C?,se c:igainst the In fact it sceri1s to be gcnc1·2.lly acknowledged that, certainly in the first w0eks after md to achieve this lt, t.enctcct t.o e.xar;gcra1,c facts. The 111br(;d skepticisn t}12.t !'esults fros any len!:'.thy 0x1,.)sur0 to l!v.ltt ers e.pp1ics to 211 infornJ.t:Lon sources, incluc::~rig USA sourcC:s in vie~-, of the USA' s direct invol vemen"v in eve~t::-, ,-;Lich cannot help but influerice the wny in which its officials vieH devclopIfi('nts • * (3 out of 20 items) 0 • •• /!;. 000084 �s.13(1)(a) GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information . I-? s.15(1) -· lr:iternational a ! I - 4 11 That skepticism, howeve:c, is surelJ part of the :'Lr1t.elligencc assessment pro C3SS and the con11;1ent in my notes -Hhich l'Sl has drm-n: attention to shquld not be taken as more than the normal c::i.utionar-y word about any t foreign t inforn.:~.tion. It vas not intenc.ed to apply so rr,uch to assessments as such .-:h:Lch, by their nature, are subjective and are auto;na.tically open to discussion and to differing opinions, It is, in fact, these assessrntmts, as I indic&ted, which I consider are of grea,,:,er value to this di~vis:i.on to a great extent because they indicate tlia construction being put on events by otherso 11 If I had to L1akc a v0ry general estimate on the material I see I would ag;_~ee that most of it is of marein:.::,l value but so::nc of it is of considcre.blc, value°' 11 ]2., He soueht the comments of the Division on the usefulness of US, UK and Australian intelligence estirnates and reports 6n other ar ..,as of tte Far last in helping us to make more accurate jud 6 ments than -.,.,,c othcri:ise Hould in assessinz; the prospects for 13_. The Division commented: The trade and aid interest of this division in respect of .is largely confined to advis:L'1g othc_r divisions and CID1l on the politic2.l situation and the internA.l stability of countries in the ar?.a. In these areas vre prefer our 01•,11 sources and where they exist, they meet our needs e:itirely to the extent that their ma.npcnrer per:nitsq Recently we were asked by CIDA &bout the t:ituation around a certain dar.1 site in The intelligence intake covered the situation from the J;Oint of view but did not answer the sp3cific question: 1·.Nas work on the and wa~ it likely to continue? t As we had CIDA was able to get the info:!'"?Btion needed a;id in the form it was needed from, if I remenber correctly, our r,tission in Can~Jerra.. 'I'he AustrD.lians 11 r'rom our point of view the intelligence intake ii1 this area wou1d be ratad as of mareinal valueo Fossitly other intE.:rested divisions mieht give dif!'er..::i1t answers so far as their specic,l interests 2.re cor::.ceJ•ncd~ 11 14. In the course of our review of the usefulness of inteJ.lie,;!nce een~rally with Far r..astern Division the ficad of the Division o.ffcrad the attached notes on 11The Use of Intelligence in the Formulation of Canadian Fo:,.•cicn ro1icy 11 ·,,hich he considered might be of interest to you" 000085 �GAC- R'eleased u~der the Access to Informations Act/ GFR/ A• J.wicAJl~/nEDU de la loi sur l'acces a !'information __ TOP SEC H.B'I' ..... July 16, 1970 . -fi:'t/Cy 2- cf-_5 p-ic Use _of. Jntelli['cncc 1.n the Fonc\ulation of Cnn2.dian Foi~ci.rn Po1_:1.c;y_ Informat:ton ia t~ic b1H:is of nll forei[;U policy activity no one e<.mcorDc·d with the dcyelopncnt nnd execution of foreign policy wilJ. JJ.ght,ly dopd vc hin:n elf of ony :,ourcc of relevant infonnation. Intelligence Dateri;.:?.1 1 in ~pite of the restricted Wces to which i t can be put, must, hm-:cvC:;r, con:rpetc wlth et.her infor-4,ation for the attention of the u2cr and th<:> rc6ources available. Thus, while there may bo no Buch thiDg us u:-iclcss polit.5-cil 1.nfo:rra.ation, obviously soma information is rr.ore useful than other and rnus-t be given a hi[.hcr pr.:i.ori ty. &nd. 2. The ms.nagem~nt of the Dcpartraont of Ext.ernal A.ffalrs, pa.rt.icula:r·ly at this juncture in. its history, is concerned with two things, or two aspects of the sr-nrn thing: thfi r.,ia.:id..murn effecti Ve-) use o{ the r.lE'it.crial resource::; ayailable to i t c.nd the time of H,s trn:Lncd personnel \s,~1ich constitute its pr:i.mar.1 resource. The questj_on to be decided is \•;het:ier tho cost of our intolJ.:lgcnce intrckc in manhour-a a..Tld r,:oney is ,-:orth the use we make of i t or whether these resources could mor-a usefully be employed in other <lirect,ions. • 3. Thin matter of prlor.ltic)s should derend upon the policies we are r,ursuin!.!. Drmdnc: en the 1:.'hj te P:i!10P, t.hP. f'i!'~ty - - - . 1 . - - J .... ...,~ ...... ""',1 '°·••·..:;"' v _,_._, v..11 vuv.i.uu.:;, J...tll•t:..l.1...Lgt:I.Lt.;C 1·cqt}J..I'en1e11·1:, is no doubt the matter of national u..-iity which although outside the a~ere of IJ....'tcrnal Affairs is nevcrtheleso vitally relcviiJ1t to it~ Our second intelllgence priority ,-:ould be thn maintmancc and CY.tcneion of our n&t:i.onal independence which is. nt the very hea1·t of the ExtemDl Affairs operation. Other cJ.a-nents with intelJ. ~cnc:c implicatior.:.a have been identified in the Depart~:;ent•s hhite Paper but. the following cb3ervi.itions will. be confined to the uso of inteJ.lie;er!CO material in rele.tio:1 to the above objectives. ·-• - - - • ,,__. .,,, - -- ' .• - ' .. 1 • .. .. .. • - - • /~. Regarding national u.'1i ty, it is essential tha.t ou1.. roct.emal policies corr.mand broad gmeral acceptance within the country and that our external policies reinforce tJw CO\mtry' s icfontity. It is a common diplomatic device for one cot1nt:cy to try to drive wedges betHccn different Ecctio::-is and intercr,ts v.d. thin another country, and there in every reason t : ) bcliE:ve tbat CDnada ifi vulnerable to this trcntrr:mt nnd han not bc0n ex.empt from it. The existence of t!-li~; sort of "arr;rcsd.ve" intelligence opt;rations indicates that there io a clear rn:c.d for a coi:.pctc.nt dcf8nsive apparatus to re3pond to the challenge. 5. Regarding the pl'<:>scrvat5.on of Canadian ir:dr,pendence, the only scrlous threat to thi~ comes t'ro,11 the United State:J. It is trnd1.tional to cc.y tKo things b0cnt our 1·cla tj_on~,hip ,-t:lt.h t.l..e Uni tcd. Sti:;.t,o::;: (a) that its influmco on C2.nacla. is lo.rcc1:r t'ncc.nsc:i..ou~,, unplanned and a pro::lnct of modern mass co:mi.-J.nJ.cr.t.iorn:;, •• . 2 000086 �rG-Al- Released under the Access to Information; Ac-t/~AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information -·2 compounded by close physlcal proximlty, u.nd {b) that Can,:i.da is J)l.'1ysicZllly incn.publc of dcfendinc; itself nu1inr;t nrm-:-,d attack from the United States. I \-iould not cure to try to refute either of t.'wce atate"1cntn nor enter into debate on the norc cont.roverr.:i.al-issue c1f the conncqucncos of U.so cconord.c pcnd,ration of this country through tr.:=,do Dnd cnpitcil invcsb1mt. I ,-.'OlU.tl however question some of the concluoions ·that aro custon:arily drm·:n i'r01,1 the unc~mtestcd facts rn.entloncd above. 6. To begin l'd.t.h I do not think that we should a::;surne that tho United States docs not en_::G.ge in intelli[::cnce operat:i.0111> or C71ploy other conscious moans of trying to gat,her intdli[;cncc ond exert influence en our domestic and. foreign policiC::n. ·i-:e car...'10-C. theroforn ascume that there j_::, no need for Cn.nada to cngace in defensive intelligC'nce operations directed against the United Stt;.tc~s. I am not a:\'arc of any such opcra.t:tons but on the bafiis of "need to kn01·I 11 , I r-hould not hcnr of t.hr.,,.1 in ~ny event. 7. Reearding other aopecb of indcpmdcnco., there r.rc and i,n.11 be occasfons when it is necessar-.r for iu, to take mnanu:.."c,J to protect. Cailadian interesto abro:1.d that are substa..ut.ially d:l.f.fe1vnt frcm Amer.i.can interests in foe sar.i.e p,nts of the wo1·ld,, Ot\l' usG of lmer1.can oources of information in formulo.tine policy in thc,se areas must obviously· be subject to some reservations. Fol' cxt1.'Tlple, let us as::nm10 that the direct Canadian interest in Vietnn~ fa ai1i:,ply • P. • m:1t.t.r---,• nf' n::1t.-t nn::il .i·,.,.,..,,,.,+_; Nt::> - . --· -·-· ---- - ---~·-·· li't"\~ "' -SC ... - - --·· ('l('\r,~ n,t111ho,.. v·..---·-.......... ____._._ "{' -··· ""'·'""r,,-,,.. ~--,., . . -.-- ..... - ,.,..,. .4r, &•- ,.,_...,.. noT.. :mare vn e Amcr.Lcons • reac1:,ion t.o t.ne pr0sr.urcs c1·catca riy Vietn&'M:se coniJro.m:!.:;;m nor the:l.1• view of its relationFhip to Chinese e.xpansionicm. \·:0 have boen thrust into t.ho positlon of bdnr:; a rr:crnber on the Indochlnc3c ICC where, to begin w-lth, we interpreted om.· l'ole as qua.s:t-,judicial. Our position was c>J.ways complicated by the per-version o~· the co:r:missiornf by both Indians and Poles to serve thelr own particular foreign policies but 1n any event, HO ::;oon fcn.md ourselves obl:lgcd to look at the Vietnam s:ttu&.tion not only in tc,.',110 of th0 issues invol vcd but nlso :i.n tero:J of our rcla.tionsrd.p with the United States. The problem \-ie hrvo had to face in rec~nt years has bc.:m to try to :maintain so:ne sort of a r0putation fox• objcct:i.vity w'ith Canadian public opinion an.d with the outuide world without nt the same thne giving a dangerous degree of offence to n1ccessivc U.S. governmmts. It could be argued that· our task has been complicated rather thc111 helped by the sort of information v:e havi:· ucc!1 recci ving fro:.r1 the ,\:r.ericans nbout Vietnam and even more by the recently publiciz,cd re:ports of our &-upplyin.z them '11th infonnat.:lon obta:i.ned throu[)i our position on the ICC. I have no knowledr,e of '\-bat if any information was gi.vc:n to us at t-he time of the Gu_lf of .'l'onkin incident but I would hazard the guess that if the rocorcl were looked up we l-rouJ.d find t.hat we were eivcn the s~mc sort of 11 sriow job" as the U .s. CongrcErn and th:-!t our government's atata-,wnts at that ti.'1113 l-:ere based on thin f;Ort of in.fom&tion. 000087 �G'Jl.C <~eleased under the Access to Informations Act/ AM(: Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a - 38. -Obv:tcu:,ly no qucstfrm of 1ri.or;:~lity :ts hrwlvcd in t.nis m3tter nc the ;,~,1crican govcrnmc.1t is entitled to use whatcv<::r me.ins ure at its di:.:,posal to att,.d.n :tts policy object.ivcs subject onl.y to the law o.t cLl.mininhing rct.urns a.n1 ,-:hat might, be te•trn.cd s. spccicl. application of Grcr.h81t 1 s law whereby counterfeit infcrmation tf,nds to dis credit sound. • 9.. To generalize" one can argu.c, as I hc1ve 1 that our difficult role in lr.dochina would h-cive bN:n easier if w~ had not received any E>pecibl .:,nd regular intelligence from A;ncr-lcc:..n sources on tbc subjzcte lt aJ.ght be said, in rebuttal, t.liat o'bv1ously nllo·,rnnccc have to be made in areas r.herc spccfol nationo.l ir.tercsts arc involvccl but then in the case of Great PowcrG the:..€ is virt-u8lly no place in the world where they do not h.:.wo spedal rn\Uonal interests. For cx2.:-.1ple, our effort.s to find new mat·kets for our goods a.ad t,o make nm'I contacts in diffc1'Bnt p:J.rts of U1 e world as clearly we intend to do, the artas lYJth in t~)rr:lS of ecocraphy and subject matter·, in ~..nich Cann.clian rn1d A1nerican interests coincide will dj_ir.ininh radically. 10. Earlier in this mcno there l/D.S a refera1ce to the axiom that Canada cDJmot defend it8clf rnilita:dly fro.n the u.s.A. "t.hilo t.his is t:!"\:_e i~ w:nu.d be a mif;tclcc to conclude from this that we mir,ht ju~t an well save ourselves the troubl~- of conside:d.n~ t.l-ic po3sibil.tty that the USA rrd.git a.ttc..~pt to play the C[!.rd of r.1-'iiit.::.1•\r . mlnri:-,macv . . ;1r, ~ T:'IPl'ln!=. r,f C\Xr>'l"T.-\rw nric,~c,11rP r,v01'I T.hrmnn other equally effective means a.re available to them. he· should also have_ rr:6 ular and systanntic uppreciat1ons of the othc:r. r.1e1cmf'.:\, econo:rJ.c or financial, that const.i t\ite p..1.rts of tJ-i.e U.s. diplon'.?.tic araenru.. I do not l;ant to be ridiculous on this but since we are on the subj~ct it is reasonable to note: (a) the proven nbility of the U.s. eoverrnr,ent to evnduct mil3. 1''.l.ry operations Hi thont. rc:fc:.~ncc to Coneress and in spite of the wishes of a large p,1.rt of the population, (b) the bypersensitivit.y of /,r;wr:i.canu to-..rn1'<l .::,.atters thc::y regard as affecting their sem1.rity cind Urnir pOofd ble u~e of this a.1:c,;umcn t in futm-e cenli.nr:s with u::, on matters that \-;c, for e:xa::::i.plc, night rq~ard as pureJ.;-,r co:1servationist or co1:::nerc:i.al. It is not propo5c·d here to discus:, the v2J.uA of our mnint<!in1ng a JI1il:i.ta1y_ posture that \!Ould 1:'.~tke tbe cxry of "llapcl II r:.o~:ntl convincing. Thin is nn area for our thinkers· cm the unth:i.nl<:ablc. In 11'.'ltelliecnce tcnns, however, we should try to develop the cap3.'bility to assess for ourselves (or r,ith the indirect a.id of other r.m.allor covntrh·s) the oeriou::;ness of any U.S. allusion to the n:ovr:nc.mt. of 1-13.r:incz to, say Alaska, or the vDU.dlty in hn<'.n1cnn official (militar-.1) eyes of any future apr-etl to th8lr nation2J. cecuri ty :tn disputes we n:ay he.ve \',i th tbcl"'l. ll. Canadic1J1s pride tJ.1c:riscJ.ves on knowir}f; J~neric-.3JlS '"ell. If true, our kn~i.:J.cd.ge rbould inclu::lo v. rc.:i.l:i..!'t:lc ar:prec:tatio:1 of a Gr<':at f'o,-;('r 1 s cap:.i.c.:L t.y to ju.stlfy a.ctlo:n~. lt d<;cns to lie of vita!. ir.iportu1c~ to it~;clf. C~rn:.da 12.. of vi-tal :i.rnport.c:,nce to th•~i U,S.A. a.rid it should be of sc•me intere::1t to us to 1-'..now hcH they pro;_:;ose to defend tnis particlu.ar vital interest in cc.eh of i tr, 1'.l::ay aspc-::ts. 000088 �GAC - ~l~ed under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC -'fli~gue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a -4l2 ~ In no forei;;ccc:ble circt:1,,utanccs cn..11 v1 e cnvJ.sa 0 c 011rsclvcs ali[:ried with the So,1.et Union ltf,D.in::,t the United St2..tcs or even ar. being nrntral be"i;,1;:c<c:n t.he:n. F':.:-om this it can be argued that llll intolligencc reld,ionBhip with th~ United Stater is cr;::;ent:t?.l if we ai·c to have any effc-c.t on en Amc:."i.cun forelgn pol.i.c7 which can involve un ar. well as tiiu.1 in ,..-.:1r. It is true tlnt by cxa.-rdninG infonnntion g1ven t,o us by J,mcric•v.ns wo c,,__,, como to ctlf fercnt. conclusion~ thf'Jl they do u1'dle u:,inc the ur,1-3 inform<1tion. Scccmi oplnions of thfr. Borli cen bo h:i.r:hly irnpo1't,2.nt but these are not lj_kcly to have much influcncu on ultimato docibionn. lf our inability to see thins a t.l1t::1:.~ \·n:: . ·,r.·nn~ted it,, it would prcsmt no tcdrn:Lc,tl problem for the Ar:.,' .i:-i.cann to prc::cnt us with the 5.ngclligcacc mator:i.al neccssnry to lead uo to the o:mclusion thr~y -wunter.i u.s to reach. On the o·i:h~r lwnd if the u.s. (or any othor country) has j_nfon'lation it thinks it in their interc:;t. for U3 to have we can rely on being given it through norr:1a.l chan.a~~l:J. 13. Attached, vtl th apologies, is 8...'1 cxt:rJ.ct fro!ll a book I wrote durinc rey sabbatical year at Toronto University, shori:.ly to be pu'olinhed by thl~ CJIA., 1·:hich incorrorates ni:y vic,,\·s for ,.,;!iat they may be worth en the gc~1cral usefulness of covert infor.r.at:l.on. 14. On the question of the c rccJibility of infom.::Uon received from the U.s,. ( 01· v.ny other countr1J) 1 it is obv:i.ous that the ,1bj.lit7 to doctor and select informntiou doos not m'?a"l. that it in0vltr.blv 1,,.rill hi'! h,1t nl"!J_y t~J.{· ='- !10? !."t~;~ :::~:::rtici~:;~ ;::.:,:;".;, :,-.:, .:. 1., 1,:..:.1:..~ ~-u u.J..1. ::,•Ju..1.·t;e~;· or 1ruon:1at.:1.on v,11cre there is nn obv:i.ous interest ~Yld an OL)Vicus ability for doing r.o. ln the ea:;,~ of U.s. intellip,encc it cnn be a.ssum':!d that they do not vmnt to sacrifice their credibilit.y on minor issues. Conr.equsntly 1'rr-.arrnge.-:1cnt 11 woulci be resorted to oll.ly 1•;hcrc ther>3 w,1re very ctr()r'.g reaH,ns cHhc:.• in tcrm.s of domeutic U.s. politics or on i1rnucs of the first rr.ngnitude affectirn; our bilateral relationships. This obviously docs not render U.::i. lntelHgence VRluclose, even in tJie:c;e special c1reas. On the contrc:.ry it will often be v'ltal to know what line tliey cl.re ta.kine. I1, does argue for the nppl:i.C'lt.:\.011 of the usual grain of f:alt to info1~ation receiv0d fro:a My source where the in.fonn8Ilt has an obvious intore::.,t in pro:::,oting a rnrt.icuJ.ar point of vie1-:. -...-.-..J.-- 0 I would conclude from all this th::.: t the balance of e.dva.--itage and di sadvant:i.ge in recei vin~ this type of infonna. tion spc•cifically from U.S. sources - is a question of price and priori.tie~. Ree2rtling price, the value of intclligcnc0. to this dep:.rtrr.{;;11t thould not be too difficult to calculate. Leaving addo othr- r users we must service, and those of other Canc:;dian agencic::; t.'1at service t~s, \·te should be abla to c::,:press our 01m dep:1rt:~ent, 1 s interest in j_ntcllieencc material in tcrm!l of o. pcrccnt.a[;o of om· a.vru.lablc r.1i:u1-yeara based on the u~e we 1:w.1:c of inco::Li.n[~ rn;1.t.er:tal as compnrc:d ;.:lth the time t: pent in pr.)ces2,i11g incomin_s cir1d cr:t,z_oing rn.atcrlal. lf. r!ly a:.,s1.!i:iption~, rcga:cdinG t_;o';t.;rnrr,cnt pric:r:itios nro 000089 �GAC - Re1 ased under the Access to Informations Act/ ' 7 AM,0:_ Dipulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a .. ·'i.: .... ';1 cc1r:i.·,~ct, w o mie,ht well .find that tnerr,ies now cxcl~r;i Yely devoted to the (JXChrmr,e of infoi~naticn with the U.SoA. mil11t be m.ol""C usefully directed toi:ard evaluating i·-ratorican intentions "31cneve:r· A Cru-ia..dion interest iulikcn this relevant. On the asm.:.mption that it \Krnld bo virtually imr,osnible for u::; fonu:;1lly to opt out of cxisti.ng arrmlf::<::nents or to witbd:i:-nw uny e..Xif,t.ing ft.cllitics, l should think t.l-iat wherever possible avtdlnblo rescurcc,s rr.ij1t b~, directed elscwhe1•c. 'fois :!.3 not to :;..,._y tli~t we 1d.1-l or shotLld got out of thn intellieonce bUfJincss but only. that our pnrticip3.tion ohot,ld bo looked at f roni t.ho point of \licw of Canada as the l-friit-o Paper cca.n.s to p:t."€'oc.11t it, i.e. le::.~s .::s a woul.d-bs horld ro~·:cr or lntem1t,tliate statuo and more irn a country for the ro.·.:.iment prlmad.ly concci>.,1c.-d '1-:ith it~1 ovn fut.ur.:.::; npecif1.cally the➔ p1·eservation of it::. unit;,· fro:n cutnide interference, U10 pi•c:so:rvation o.nd ~xten:iicn C)f its indercnd(;;nce, and the bet.tor rerviclng or its own direct intemn.tiona.1 inte)....-:•eto. The ineellice,1c0 i1,1pltcat.ione o! this chnnge 1·:ould be a reduction of auphnci:; on multil.:-.tc~ral hll.1 ,1cltt'.olit:ik :i.ssucs and ~m incre.a:;e in bilateral an::!. otl1e1" iO:'lUCS~,rth-itmor-o dir-ect Canadian intcront. I I 000090 �s.13(1 )ta) ,7 < r- • GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - ·international - LA'i'IN Al-r::rnIC:\IJ DIVISION -.-.. On June 22 we consulted the Head of La.tin American Division about ·the usefulness for h:i.s •purposes of the intelligc:1ce thc:.t is available to us ttrouc:;11 our liaison with the US and UK intelligence authorities., ~'le reviewed with him a number of reports of I{s.rch-June on tr.e in Latin ,\rnerica. 1.-rhich were ·of concern to this Departm,:;nt both in the context of the in the area and of the line that we shovJ.d take in j_ntern5.tional meet.in.zs called to discuss the problem., He concluded that these reports were of considerable v&lue~ 2o 3P lJe also reviewed with him reports of the claims of La.tin American countries to various areas of the &nci. to place a value on this kind of intelligence in the light of the Canadia~1 r:r0vernment 1 s current prccccupation with this problem.. Ee deferred to the vir;ws of the Departr1.c::nt rs Legal Division whose representatives are currently e:::1gage::l in talks with L1tin American countries on this questiono The Acting Head of the Legal Division conu11.Emted that this intel:Li6 ence "is of great interest and value to trn 11 .. 4., Finally, ue revleHed 1·1ith the Head of I.atin li.Irrerican Divj_s:i.on the usefulness of intelligence reports in general on Latin American countries and ,9.sker. h:i :n to ulace a value on th,sm to the extent that they supplement rej.,ort::..ng - J.J:Uii.l . . ,... VUi!ctU..LdU ;,U.:>,:>J.VHb ... d,L\... }'.l u V.LUv vV!,l\,, \,,V v v i C.6'' I V.J.. - .• -- \..-'° VJ.1.UU .l.J.• - - - •• .l . . •• - ,.._ V\.11...U.1.V..I. ..._VV •• •.,_.,,., - _, . •! ,,.. 1_ ••~A..i-v.a.• Canada 1,ut in w:1ich \\'"e TiktY ha-Jc some con~ ern f O!' Canadian investm~nts (nota't>ly in the ') q He c0m:'l.entcd that so:ue of tht3Se reports were of marginal utility and that others 1,;,3re of consider'"". able value. 5. Follov,ing are his detailed comments~ 11 In response to t.he cng 11iry in your memorandum under reference I w-ould s2.~· th2.t the reports in Docket No .. 1 - those on in Latin Ar:1erica - played a centrc"~l part in helping us to determine the seriousness of the problera and the consec;uent need to adopt measures to We speak with less than authority with reg2rd to the reports in Docket Yo., 2 - thos~ on the claims of Latin ;:.~1;1cr-ican countries to various areas of the but, :mbject to uhatever Legal Division Md.y th:;_n1~, we are ir:,.clined to consider these reports to be of soi2e value fror.i the Cana.clian point of view 9 11 000091 �@Acf, Released under the Access to Informations Act/ -/\MC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.1-3(1 )(a) •'!"'r•.,,.-.~· s.15(1) - International ~i.'.u.tii - 2 - •=:~'hen it comes to miscellaneous reports such as those enclosed in Docket No .. 3 v:c hii.Ve found that, with rczarcl to the area in general, such rcf,orts are usually of marginal value though very occ2.sionally we see one which in of so::tc, or even of considerable, valuco In the case of reports on develo;:,ments in cou!ltries in which Canada these reports are almost al1·1ays of considerable value and 1.i.ay, on occ2.sion, be essential. "We have only two gcner.:::i.l comments with regard to the usefulness of intelligence in relation to this Division's requirzments • The first is that some material - but by no means all° - is so dated as to have lost its value... At the same time we would like more especi:2.lly to caµhasize that, at this time ,,.,hen we are making an effort to adjust to reduced staffs at the embassies in cur area, intellieence material - even though when reading it we iJJU3 t keep in mind its internal bias - has a truly enhanced value for· this Divit;ion as o:1e .source of enlightenr.-1cmt on what is going on in La.tin America 0 n 000092 �/ •• / s.1311)(a) s.15(1) - International GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulg_ue ~n vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a ttQ·£\ ~~Ptt:'1' E;-; ... ·,-,:·~ i ,-;: t)..,t; • ._r.:. Ii t.; .......... ,:'\, OFFICE OF ECOliO11IC .\FFAIRS Tc"om,nerdal Policy Division) On lli1rch .31 we· consulted the Head of this Di visj_on about the - usefulness for his purµosen of the int,clligencz that is available to us through our liaison Hith the US and UK intelligence authorities. He sought hiG views on .the usefu.lness of recent SIGHJT dealing d.th three internationtl COliDne::rcial policy situations vrith wl1ich bis Division was concerned: 'rhe Division considered that the ,•:ere of only marginal usefulness as t.hey were not available t.o the Divisj_on before the departure of the Canadian delegation to Had they been received in ti.rrie, th0y the would have been of sor.ie valueo The Division considered that the SIGINT on· Has o:: considerable valueo 4c: The SIGINT on was considered to be of 11 very considerable value 11 in strenthcning Canada's l Division e~11phasized that intelligence could be made more useful by widf-r dissern.ination (for which arrangements .have since been me.de) a.nd specdicrdissemination,. The Division added thc:.t e:xnmplcs of intelligence of equal or greater value than that qu.oted above on have recentJ.y been noted in SIGIN'f on 11 attitudes on suir..rri.aries on inclmU.ng a recent cne on t11e and "' 000093 �s.13(1 )(a) 7 Gf_,C - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ r AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - International OFFIC:.S OF J~C0!-70:UC AFr'AITtS (Transport, Comrnunications and Enere,y·Divisi~n) On April.3 ·we consulted the Head of this Di,;ision about the usefulness for his purp0ses of the int.elligencc that is available to us through our liaison with the V3 and UK intelligence authorities. We put before him He asked h:i.L1 3fJecifically to co1i'.lmcnt on the value ot: SIGIN'l' bearing on recent attempts by a He corrunented that the iritelligen~o was timely enough to enable him to take appropriate counter-action~ He added that he regarded the intelligence in t,his case as essential in protecting Canada 1 s politico-.econorn.ic intere,:,ts and, in general, concluded that intelligence bearing on his Division's interests was of considerable value4 000094 �·r GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ no c, ~ .., r, £ r~ ~-{ ~-/t>ivulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.13(1)(a) Tl/L" r.)r:l..,~'~. u .....iha s.15(1) - International • O}~FIC~~ OF rcr.ITJC0-;,!11,I'i'AHY AFFAIRS. (North Arr: 1·ican Dci" cnce and l-L>!.TO .iJi vi&ion) On June 25 we con.sulted the -Head of this Division. about the usefulness for tis pm-poses of the intelligence that in available to us through our liaison arranecrp.ents with the US a.nd UK intelligence authorities We sought the co,mncnts of thj_s Div.'.i..sion on the jJnportance· which it would attach to the intelligence or "data ba.se 11 which the Canadian Government receives from the US and UK intelligence authorities to the ext8nt that this intelligence ma.y be useful in Q. (a.) (b) (c) (d). 2.. We asked that they also consider this question in the light of comrnitmeni:,s 3. Specifically, we sought the views of the Division on ef'rit.ish 000095 �GAC- Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International h. We pointed out that repr~scntativcs of the US and Canadian intelligence coiii!m~.nities consult nnnuallv on the :'le asked the Division to place a value on this exercise and on the intelligence on which it is b&.acd in ansH•c:ring th·c critc:tia (b), ( c) and (d) which are outlined in paragraph 1 aboveo 5. Thirdly, we asked the Division to arrnign a value to the intelligence we receive from the US and uK Governments to the extent that it helps us to respond to the commitments imposed on us by the 'l'ripartite Intelligence Alt:rts Agreerr..;:;nt and the 1965 Agreemant with the US Government on cor,su_ltation on Canadian North Anterican defence policy<, 6. Firnlly, l':c asked if the Division considered that these agr-eements, requiring consultation with the US and UK for the purpose of arriving at common intelligence appreciations of the threat to North '.Arre rica and I~ATO, remain in Canada 1 s interest and are relevant to Canadian foreign and defence policies jn the 1 70 1 s,; ?• In its reply (which is copied in full in the succeeding par~grc1.phs) the Division indicated that the intelligence on thewas of considerable valut,; that the annual intelligence estimating exercise with th~ US is essential under each of t-h~ t-hr~e ~;~ _ + ~y•j_ ?. r~e.:rt. i':'ned; th~t in:!: ~lli0~::~ 8 --. ...~~.:! 'b~ ccc c~~tial tv tne uovernmem, 11 l.t. were required to consult uith the US Government under the terms of the 1965 e.greement; (the Division felt unable to comment on t11e Alerts Agre~ment); and that the 1965 Agreement continues to be highly relevant to Canadian North A11erican defence policy. 8, :Following are the detailed cor,iments of the Division: nOn the question of the usqfulness of intelligence on the occasion of the we would agree with the British that in,telligcnce \·ras of considerable value, and pe1·haps essential, in establishinz the key fact at tr.e outset that the Hr. Harsha.LL or our Division, ,•;ho particiP3.ted in th-.:~ departJrJ.ental task force which coordinated policy in the period after the _ recalls this point clearly; but he does not clearly recollect any intelligence being recEdved about the course of the crisis &fter the nature of the had been esta~lished, This in itself does not prove that no significant intelligence was provided to the ta::;k force chu'ing the period, but it does at least ir:1ply th"'.t the inte.LLigence was not so relevant that it impressed itself on his ni.ind., ·000096 �GAC - R-e!Jased under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International - 3 1}':ore generally, informs.tion on is of com·se of basic ii"':lportance to HATOo H01...-evcr it is not clear to us how much better infon ic.d Canada is on this subject than other lTATO countrien which do not ha.ye extcm,ive intelligence liaison arrang0:r,ients with the US and UK; basic , sufficient for imtm ce, for broad brush p0litical .iudmncnts on subj ccts such as seems to be avai.Lablc to all 1eadinr, NATO members~ Privileged information from US and UK sources may however be of particular ir.1port3,nce for our forces, which rcqui1~0 much more detailed information to fulfil their military rcsponsibilitieso Horeover in an c.:ncrgcncy, as the indicated, special US a.nd UK intellieencc information ( e.,g. COHDJ1') could be of great political as well as military importance.· 1 1 11The agreed c,u;us anrmal estir,:ate of the threat to North America is essential under Exe.eh of the three criteria m,:;ntioned" However it might be desirable to establish closer link:;, at the working l,3v-2l, beh,reen the 1pract.itioners 1 concerned with doctrine and dcploy:ments to meet the threat, and the intelligencG co;m;mnity responsible for· ass0ssing the threat. • T!"!':' ~TIC' ~::!.8 e::-:p~::-:8:: ~:. it:; ~c:;j_~-c tv t,('.. cJ,010 tu L.CL1J r-J.i..tier~ 1.m,c.t.ugence resources of the CIA to obtain more detail on 'special situations t vrhere there is a particular Canadi&n interest (JIC letter to CIA of Septe!llber 20, 1967). Similarly ,,re would welcome arrangements to make it easier for the Canadian intelli•·· gence community to be responsive to p3.rticu1ar needs of officials dealing with defence policy, somet:imcs on short not:Lceo (For exainple., on the bomber threat, it might have been useful during certain stages of the defence policy review to have more background than CAIJUS provides on the prospects for the end of the decade. Similar questions arise on the and. for example, on the risk of which is of special interest to (.;anadao) 11 While we of course agree on the- general usefulness of US-UK intelligence, we do not have any viE:vrs on the more specific issue of the usefulness of US-UK intelligence to Canada in fulfilling its commitments under the Tripartite Alerts Aerc:emcnt or on the relevance of the Agreement as a whole; this would appear to be a matter dealt with at present solely within the intclligcricc community., The Agreement itself is rarely if ever mentioned by US or Canadian officials on the 1policy 1 sidi;, and we have: not received information from msmbers of the intelligence co.rr.m1mity on how the !,ereemeut is working or what its :i.J:-1plicatic-n:; for ot.r Orm responsibilities might beo 11 ••• "-/4 000097 �GAC - Relei~ecf'iinder the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.13(1)(a) •• s.15(1) - International - 4 .. 11 The 1965 agreement on Consultation continues to be:highly relevant to Canadian Horth knerican defence pol.icJ, and of course the intdligence inforr::.1.tion He receive from the US (and, to a :much lesser extent, Britnin) HOl~ld be essential to the Government if it were ever called upon to decide whether io agree to the use I\ \ of nuclear weapons by NGtAD forces - which is the real subject of the 1965 Agreemento "As for the second part of your question in this paragraph, ioeo whether the requirement for 'consultation with the US and UK for the purpose of arrivinG at co1IFnon inteD.:ig ence appi·eciat:i.ons of the thraat to NATO and North America' continues to be relevant and in Canada I s interest, we cannot say whether the ei'f ort to try to arrive at com:non appreciations (as distirict .from the acquisition of informr::i.tionfrom the other countries which helps us to make £:lL~ Ca.rir,,dicm appreciation) is a ps_rticularly useful exercise in t:10 contE::xt-of the particular Agreements you mention. Docs the consuJ.tation process itself facilitate the flow of information to us? How much are US or Briti&h judgmcnts affected by exposure to Canadian v:i.ew~; during intelligence consultations? Does consultation help us learn more about differences of opinion or emphasis within, eog• tl1e US intelli{~enco community which could later be reflected in ambiguous or indcc:i.sivc US policies? (Varying US assessrnAnt.r, rd' +! ..,~., '..,-., o. .... 0.01.; .i.a jJU.LHL,; • 1·rom ttie Conadiah point of view it can be just as bportant to learn of the exi&tence and nature of divergences of view within the US (or ind::-ed tbz Canadian) intell:i.gei.lce community as it is to know what the agreed lo;-rest-commc,n-denom:i.nator assessment is., 1 ,:0 We might point out, incidentaRly, that the 1965 Aereement does not itself refer to the establishmer+t of common intellil;ence appreciations although para. 4(d) mentions t.he desirability of c3.ch govornment having 1 an adequate understandint; of the vim·:s of the other concc::rnin[; the backeround of that situation (increasing intcrn,-;T{onal tension)~ v;e might add that the six month meetines of civilian and military representatives mentioned in par~,. 4(d) are not in fact ever held on the 'policy' side~ Are they held on the intcD.igcnce sidc? 11 11 9,. Our answers to the questions posed in the .final hlO pc.ragrc1,phs above are: (a) The CAN-US consuJ.tation process facilitates thc floi, of ir:iforr.a tion to us; (b) i3ritish and US Judgrncnts are f:ccqucntly alte:red follo~:ing e.-(posure to dif feri:r.g Can.s.di&Ti viei-;s ;· ~ ._":\. ,, 1.:: 000098 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1)(a) • • s.15(1) - International - 5(c) Consultation with the US and .drit:i.sh intelligence cornrnu'1ities .. has given us an insight into conflicts within both governments on such issues as The six-month meetings envisaged by the 1965 Aereement have also not been held on the "intelligence siden.., (d) ., 000099 �~c<(Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC" Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.13(1Ha) s.15(1) : International OFFICE OF' ?OLTrICO-l~TJ~ITXR.Y i'J•'FI~IRS {Peacekeeping and l:i:ilitary As-sista.~e Division) 0 On Harch 18 we consulted the Heed of this Division about the usefulness for his pu:cposes of the· intelligence that is available to us throueh our liaison with the US and UK intelligence authorities. Because this Division 1 s principal active cor,~ern in the field of pcacekeepine : _ 1-:c asln:d the Division to plc1:cc a value on the intelligence that it receives for the bearing, that it has on helping us to understand c:.nd forecast the trend of events on the We also asked th,3.t, in placiag a value on this i.nt elligence, the Division me:isure the usefulness of intelligence against other i.nfornicition reaching us, outside of intelligence channels, from our multiple reporting missions such as the ~nb.:i.ssies in ~·lashinr;ton and London, the Cana.dian Permanent 1-rission to the UN and the Canadian Delegation to NATO., 2. In its response, the Division concluded that intelligence, while not necessarily more timely than reports from our missions, is cssenti:l.l i..."'l helping us to understand the current situation in and to forecast the trend of events o The Division added that intellig<::nce v as also of some value in helping us to anticipate the li!-ccly courses of action tak~n by the US and UK Gove1·n,ncnts in reacting to 000100 �A-fJ"!!fW l}t. SECRET DEPARTMENT 01" NATIONAL DEFENCE GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a C.Al1ALI.A1 LYES ONLY MINISTtRE DE LA OtFENSE NATIONALE V 2000-2.5 (DCIS) Canadian Forces Eeadquarters ottawa 4, Ontario J?Septe~ber, 1970 Dr. C.M. Isbister Special Adviser to the Privy Council Office 6J Sparks St ottawa, Ontario - Dear Dr. Isbister: To ~eet your request for a National Defence input on the question o! Departmental need for Intelligence, the LCIS 'Wishes to offer the attached study, entitled "The heed for Intelligence". It was prepared by Plans Branch (Director of Strategic Planning) to meet a CtS request in October, 1969 and is valid toda]. 2. The stud1 represents a fair staten1er.t of r1eed as seen by the str&tegic planner at the CFHQ level. However, there are a m:.1rhAr nf ~spects of national level intelligence functions which are t,J..\.,!lttr llOl, CVVt::J~~u U.&. .;J.j,_t,,,;~1 a..1.0 l..lV~~ :.,\,I.~ ea.A"-' .lAV~ ~:!_.-.-.:.~. ~r;;:~.:;::-:..:.-:: emphasis due to the purposes for which the original study was prepared. 'i'hus, the purpose of this ooTering statement is to supplement the views expressed in the Plans study. 1bis is done by offering additional points for consideration so as to make the roles and value of intelligence more readily apparent to the non-military reader. J. One important consideration'is that Intelligence is a subbranch of the VCDS Branch beaded by a Deputy C: ief in the sa111e manner as Plans, Operations and Reserves, and force Development. This functional equality ensures that the decision-n:a.kers at the Vice Chia!, Cts, and l:l~D levels obtain a balanced view of Lepartmental requirements to meet the defence objectives of the GoverrJJl'ient. In fact, this organizational set-up goes a long way towards ensuring that Intelligence, whic.h is the end product of Canadian analysis of Allied and Canadian coJ.lected information, plays its part in the forir.ulation, developn·ent, and employment of the Canacian Aned Forces, and is i!idica ti ve of Canada 'coming of a 6e' as a tr.;.l;y inde per.dent nation. 1he important point is that the end proci..:ct, or :i.r.telli.:,ence used, is a consey_uence of analysis done from the GanaC:ian feint of view. . ./2 SECn.ET C.tJ-.ADli.N EYI'S ONLY 000101 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information A version of this page was found in the public domain. SECRET CA;~ADIAh EYES rn;LY - 2 4. It is Canadian policy to provide military forces to accomplish in order of priority as listed, the following roles: a. Assistance in maintenance of internal security. b. The surveillance of our territory ~nq coast lines, ie, the protection of our sovereignty. c. The defence of 1-.orth Alr.eriea in cooperation with the USA. d. The fulfill.ment of such N;..'IO co:r:m:i b,ents as may be agreed upon. e. lhe performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we nay from time to ti::.e assume. 5• Ti .ely and accurate Intelligence that is "Canada first" orientated is essential to the development nnd maintenBnce of an effective yet economical military posture whether the concern be cr,e or internal security, sovereignty, collective defence or peacekeepii.g. The development of corr.ponent and unit organizations (broad and deta:iled) _,,..,._~ _..,..,_,._ --r ....,.,,.._....,,_,.._,._"' • - --- -· ~ - ~ ··~·4- T"\-1 '"t '"'~ r.:.r "".n-Mt!"' ~~ 6 A I'\¥'\ .... ,..o.t'JIY'\l"Y"IC" A ,,_,...r: cnl,-; 1·1mc,..,t• • ~l"f"l~i1'Y'O• ment, anc the selection of com..c.onent and 1.:ni t types to rr;eet both the strategic .and tactical demands which arise fror. Canad3..an co;r:mi tll;ents are in lare;e part depencent on our Intelligence on toth enemy ancl friendly forces, their Ca.i)abili ties and deployn"ients. From top to bottom, for training and operations, the military establishr,;ent r>eeds scur.d kco,~led£e of foreign military organizations, deployments, v,eap ons characteristics, doctrines of employment, likel;,y courses of action, fi.:tur·e prospects, ar,d topographical, en'rlronmental and poli tical/econon:ic fact0rs. ~s noted in the Plans study, t1L planning and management of the Canadian Forces would indeed be haphazard and vn-nation like if it were not based on the best available Intelligence which he.s been analysed by Canadians for use of the Canadian Forces. 6. Assistance in maintaining internal security is essentially a !unction of preparation to aid the civil power ~hen called upon to do so. This involves Canadian Forces cooperation ;.ii th the hO:P, provincial and municipal authorities on matters relatec to subversion, sabotage, espionaise and serious threats to peace and orc1er. 'Jhe or.~gir.s of these threats may be external or internal to Canada, b~t if the forn:er, they are 'lmlikely to involve the military f or·ces of an 't;nfrier,dly power except those elements which have been tasked to gather Intel-• ligence. However, if the occasion were to arise in which contingents of the Canadian Forces were to be comn:itted to internal sec1.:.rity operatior.s .. /J 000102 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information .• SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY - J because of ach.al or impending breakdown of civil authority, the need for operatior.al security Intelligence, which is collated and coordinated for r.ilitary use, -would be iillJ'lediately apparent. The rnainter,ance of current and long range. estil'i~ates of the danger, extent, and locale of the internal security threat is, therefore, a high priority task !or Intelligence in support of continger,c;y planning. 7. The role of surveillance of Canadian territory and coast lines, while relevant to the defence o! North America, is net at the present time primarily a function of preyenting ur1al:thorized intrusion bJ foreign ir.ili tar,- forces. In fact, Intelligence estimates in recent years have been unable to envisage circumstances where the employir.ent o! military forces by an unfriendly power in deliberate violation of Canadian sovereignty would occur except :in the context of a general nuclear war. These estimates have been based on the premises of: the state of mutual nuclear deterrence between the Soviet tnion 8.lid the t'SA, the existence of CANADA - 'CSA defence treaties and arrangeir.ents, and the la.ck of suitable military capabilities on the part of any foreign power to test, through overt hostile action, the defences of North Jur;erica below the level of m1clear war. In general terms, these estirr.ates still hold true, nevertheless, intrusions could occur in the future unwittingly, by design, (for reconnaissance purt-'"'u,......, ;,..,,,. ~!~..:, ~.:.:·~:::;~ :~ ;:::;=~=.:::'::..::: ~':'..,., ♦-~~ nr-""'+;...,:~Y'll"t~'1 n-r· ~PY\Ar.Q i Y11lClear "'ar) and/ or si:ir.ply to test Ciu:.a.dian reaction in respect to jur- · isdiction of remote areas. In the long term, commercial aspects generated by the prosfects of development in the Canadian Arctic will create a situation where militBry surveillance, including Intelligence collection and analysis, of activities in territories that are now largely ~nocc\:.pie<l, of uncontrolled waters, and of air space, may become an important function relative to the presenation of Canadian sovereignty. In tr.is regard, negative Intelligence is at least of equal val\le to positive indications of an imper.cling or di:veloping threat. ~ e. The value of tha annual Car.ada - United States (C.A111JS) estimate er. the threat to North All,erica to Canadian defence developments can hardly be over-emphasized. Our participation with all the J..ir.erican Intelligence a 6 encies (CIA, tIA, 1:S/1., and the three Service agencies) and -with Eeadq,.,;.arters NOfi.A.D,. which has only an observer status in the preparation of the astir· ate, 6 ives us a clear insight of .AJ.erican strategic thj_nking and force development in addition to US views and attitudes on the Soviet Union, China, and other powers, toth friendly and potentially l:.nfriendly or neutral. This allo"'s Canadian Intelligence to develop viel-is on the united States and the balance of military power which can be of considerable .. /4 SECRET Oi.,LY 000103 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a SECRET CAN.ALI.All EYES CNLY s.15(1) - International - 4 - value as s~pport for Canadian decisions on the tyf~, q~ality, and quantity of aefence measures required of Canada both for the defence of C..nadian territor.i and North Ar.erica, and the preservation of Canadian so'\-ereiinty. Every other year, the respotisibili ty for draftillt:. the C.i-.lXS estimate devolves on Canada and this is very profitable to us. Not onl_y does the opportunity t9 influence iunerican Intelligence views·arise thereby, but also the cnus of challenge as to the -validity of the assessment then lies with tho Americans. Very often the conseq~ence is publication of Intelligence which might otherwise have been withheld fro~ general Canadian use due to sec~rity classification and ~,ericci.n interests. C.AKUS,. as a. consequence of contir,uing, year round exchan~es of inforxnation and analysis prov.1.des Canadian a\:.tr:orities a wn.ch 11:01:·e accurate and ti1r.ely assessment of the strategic situation ancl threat than any estimates that are revealEid through NATO oi· other bilateral or alliance arrangements including those of international. co~.rr.ands s~ch as ieadquarters NORAD. 9. Although NATO, SHAPE, and S.ACLAl~T Intelligence is available to Canada, it is not as important to the Canadian decision 11iaker as Canadian estimates whether the latter agree or differ substantively or in minor detail with the viev.'S of these international organizations. Canadian Intelligence plays its part in the development or liATO Intel:ii'<tmce anci 111-1,ar i~i..1.u Cornma.nris. but i i si1uulo. o~ .aie,cogn.l.t.t:iu U1a~ "' ..... ~, co~~and,&nd ea~h nation endeavours to have its views aocepted in the process, and that the result is at best a co~promise. The 'agreed• estilr1ate is not always the most appropriate one on which to base national military planning, tmd witho~t our participation and consequent recognition of the difference, Canadian defence planning "iith respect to NATO would be 'captive'. Moreover, Canadian access to .American and British source 1riatel'ial which, in whole or part, is not automatic:all;y or alwais revealed to other NATO nations and international collll!lands, adds to the col'lpetence of Canadian analysts when advising on both the accuracy and the relevance of internation~l Intelligence estimates. 10. ~ben considering the peacekeeping role, the importance of Intel. ligence to the success of Canadian activities exterids beyond the function of planning. Contingent coxr:mtnders and their staffs must be thoroughly briefed and the troops educated on conditions and likely developments in the crisis area. This is an Intelligence f~nction with ir.ost of the lll8.terlal used being the result of continuing analysis and national holdings on military, pclitical, econo11ic, topographic and er,virom,:ental conditions in the area. During the peacekeeping operations, •- lll&kes Intelligence a prilfiary concern for the national continlsent. The importance of local Intelligence collection and analysis, and the need for a link .• /5 SbfRE'I CAl,AtL-11; KiLS ONLY 000104 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu. de la loi sur l'aci:es !'information a s.15(1) - International SECRET CA."IIDH-.N EYES ONLY - 5between the contingent and Canadian authorities who monitor the operation at the CFHQ national level are ftmdamental for the safety and success of the Canadian forces involved. It is this link and the analysis stemming therefrom which assists Canadian authorities in decision making in respect to the continuation, level and kind of-participation, and cessation of the mission. The vital role of intelligence in peacekeeping may be difficult for the authorities of the United Nations to accept, but for officers and men who have participated in peacekeeping and control ccmnission operations, its importance is very clear. With regard to Operational Intelligence, as defined in the Plans study, the part played by the central DCIS organization requires amplification. Canada, as a consequence of govor.nment to govenmi.ent agreement, is a partner in the Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement with the United States and the United [ingdca. Operational Intelligence also includes the staffing of the Current Intelligence Indications Centre at CFHQt manning of camn.unications, watch-keeping on a 24-hour basis, and analysis of mu-rent military deployments and operational activities, particularly in COOIII\lllist countries and aroas of C0;..1lfflunist country interest. The function is to warnt through the JIC, senior Canadian authorities, the United states and the tiuii.t.<l ltlnic:<lCw c.n !;-~!.;:::t::-:: ef h~::i:i}~:t:;.,..,, Tl',1-rt.he'l"r!lnre~ although Operational Intelligence is otherwi:se a nmct1on OI operat.ionu. ctllW111rnj ~~,!.;. •.; case is primarily the responsibility of international headquarters under which Canadian ·units serve, Canadian contingent eamunders and their staffs must be kept aware of Canadian estil!lates if for no other reason than the protection of Canadian forces involved and Canadian intorests in respect to a developing crisis. The need of operational eamnanders for timely CAnadian intelligence estimates would be very clear 11. G,J.; ~. Scientific and Technical Intelligence is a basic and essential need tor accurate and timely analysia of the irllitary establishments of foreign nations. It is required to assess the characteristics and capabilities of specific wenpons systems and equipnents, to indicate pres.mt and projected levels of scientific competence of potential adversary nations, their present and future areas of emphasis and the weapons and equipaants likely to derive therefrom, and their overall capabilities as compared to Canada and its Allies. Technological forecasting is a.n illportant aspect of Scientific Intelligence and Canada can hardly &!ford to remain ignorant of the rapid advance of science in those countries fran which information is not freely available. The possibility of 12. ... /6 SEC]l~ CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000105 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a SECFILT CAEEIAN EYES O}ILY - 6 technolo~ical surprise remains one of the ma~or concerns of Intelligence at the nat:i ona: level. lJ. There are rr.ar,y Lepartn,ental rieeds for Intelligellce which are ~:r-ha.es 1,ot i-;r.JY;rJiately ap:i)arent. The Plans st"Gdy covers some of these "Lnc.er Ue J:-.e,,cin 6 of ricther Aspects". }:"1:,ch rr.ore xde:t. l be said in this area but it. is co:ieidered sufficier,t to emphasize the poir:t that the l11tE lliger,ce data bank on foreif;,r, anr,ed forces, weapons anC: equipir.ents is of conside1atle value as an aic to decision making on questions of anns and equlpire;nt e.rrangemer,ts, ?\.:rchases, loans and military aid. Also the procees of ceveloping accurate :mai:,s and charts ht1s been markedly improv6c in recent years through use of Intelligence methods for collection ar.d a1,alysis. • Finally, the value of Ir:telliger:ce in contrib~ting to the kno'Wledt,;e and education of anr,ed forces personnel, and p,rticularly the very real contrjb~tion it makes to the fonnal education of officers and officials at Staff Schools, Staff Colleges and . the Kati or.al De fe11ce College is ;rnrt.hy of note. 14. ~ention was made earlier cif the equality of .ir1telligenee with other staff fl:nctions in CFF~. It remains now to note hew Intellii;ence i:-.akes an iitpact on all levels of staff plar.nir,6 . This is achieved throl:.gh ci.aily desk to cesk contact and discussion between Intelligence analysts and staff officers both belo;.; and at the Director level. ~-~~~ _:''t"-"'"' .:-c- "'~ f'f\Yr~1p1f',>ri't.Pt1 ny ~1A-r1odic briefi11~b ~riJ t~cv~l0-~~i1c;-/~, ::,~ sh:die·s l--'!·E:re the Intelligence fac.:tor is important to the action recoirn-.er!ded. In a 1tore fonlB.l sense; the Intelligence contribution tc the Lepartir-er.ts.l planning and managen,ent process is exe:rr.plified by the t•efe:r:ce Elarmir.g G1~idance tocu,:ent which lists all Canadian Intelligence estiniates as reference material for staff planning and, tbroughot:.t its text, reflects the essentials of these estimates in the developrr.ent of defence objectives and prograrr.ll'les. 0 James 1a~or General tept:.ty Cr.ief Jnte,lli~ence ar;d Sec .. ri ty ,. I' 000106 :J ----------:.... �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a SECRET (CAHADIAN EYES ONLY) V 2100-1 (DSP) 24 October, 19l9 TH£ hut FO~ I.:, T£Ll.IGENCE 1. To discuss the neec for intelligence and the purpose it served to the n~in users. fAJCh CChC:J.JSlCI.S 2. Through participation in collective defence and as a result of speci&l agreerrents with the United States and Britain, Canada gains privilei;_ed access to mjlitary, political and econou:ic intelligence gathered by other countries. i;evertheless, to er.sure the best a.ssessn;ent of Canadian interests it is vital that there be an exclusively Canadian input to the intelligence estiiriates which forn: the basis for our planning and operational cecisions. L Good lrrf.ellie..::.r11.a, ll:> 1,,u,:; uts.i,l.:> 0:f .s. .:;~.:.;:..! zt:-:::.teb; -r,,.~.,. ..,-...; ,-h f'l rrw!': our capabilities plan and operational c-:mcepts. Without it. we ·wouJ.a .1.acK the assurance that our defence policy is expedient. 4. The Canadian contribution of resources to collective defence arrangements ensures our participation from the onset. Intelligence is one of these resources. 5. In the planning·and implementation of peacekeeping activities, sound intelli 6ence ~11 help to ensure that Canadian contingents are properly structured, equipped and ceployed to carry out the tasks assigned. 6. Sound intelligence is vital to the impleir.entation of alert systems to ensure flexibility and suitable reaction to any change of circumstances affecting Canadian security or Canadian interests. 7. Defence research, to be productive, must be based on the best, most detailed and wide rancing intelligence available. 8. Although this paper focuses on the need for intelligence by the major military users, the need for intelligence is not restricted to LNt. Other departments of govern111ent also benefit from the activities of the Canadian intelligence COIT'JTIUnity. . ./2 SECF.:2.'I (CAru'iLIAN EY~S ONLY) 000107 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a s.15(1) - International :..i?:CFJ!.T (CAHAilli~ EYf.S ONLY) - 2 - lt.hi:.f: t:,e :,ees for :;.ntelligence on which to bGt,e i.:lans and operaL.ior.al coLcepts is al:-~e,st a self evider:t fact, it is not always so ap1,arent U-at there is alsc, a v1;,r,.1- real req~inment for Car,G.dia.r. ir.tellit;E·nce and Cai.a6i&si f,rc.:ct:ced i,,tE:lligenc;;; Q.sti.i:ates to ens-i:re that our situation is assessec. l:: ol.~ective fat.i·,ion without :he risk of being, und1,,;l;'>' influenced b3 OU tside orinicn. • 10. A seccnc 1::,enerd factor ~:orthJ of 1t.entior, is that throut:h our contributions to and our partici~at ior. in 11. ln a~rlition to intelligence it should be r:cted that there is 8lso an 12. 1,obdthstar:dbg tr.e Canadian orier1tation to collEctive security and t.Le ;;rotection of' tbE> cieterrent • there is also a neE:d for iritelliJer.ce in :.reP.f; otLe.:r Ll,;,.h ~~e,;;;; :::,!"?('t1,y ~f!f:nciated with our contrit1...tior, to 1,estern defence. lJ. ln tt is p&.f er the valhe of int€lligence to the use:r is discussed ur,de r si.>. ma,:i or hec.d.i q,s: a. Strategic Planning; b. Contir,ental [;e.fence Planning; c. lLte1r,;,.tional Pla.nnint,;; d. Cf-Hdio:,al Intelligence;. e. tefer;ce r,esearch and AnalJsis; f. Cther As}Jects. 14. Althou.;h intelligence is disseminated tc ar. Hxtensive list of departrr.ents, branches and a~er'.c:..es in the Governner:t, ·Kithin r:;r the first anc' proba.'oly rr:ost essential appl:ication of intelliger:.ce occurs curing the prcduction of stn.i.tvgic studies which is the initial step of the m&nat/3rial process l•~adinc; to the •)_veraticr,a:;. concept ar.d im)Je1,~er.tation _r;1ar. for the C:efonce forces. If theze sti..:dies, m.any of whicl-: an. wice, ran 6 ing in nalur-t:, a.re not l::ased ::>r. ~r;curat€ ancl tip to d.,,te inforIT;ation and intelli 6 ence, then .. /J ,. SECf'LT (CJ.1f1LIA1; b1ES C~,.i.."i) 000108 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information SECF.ET (C.Al;AI:IMi EYES ONLY) .:. 3 their o;.;n valichty is q1_;estionable. Of particular importance in this 1·esp' ~t is the assessll'eLt of the circUJljstances which affirm a defence ; r.t ::·est; t;.Sl:.ally the intelligence appreciation of the U.reat and capabi.· .' . '. • es of the potertial enemy. Thus, 'intelligence exert& considerable infh:er:ce r,ot onl;y or, r,rograms for force strucb.:.re, mBnning and procurement but also on frioriti€)S and allocation of resources. \.,;ithout it ol:.r planning processes t,oulc: be !H.1.fl·.azarc. at best. 15. ':here are mG.ny sources of strategic intelligence available. to Canada beside c :, ow11, e.g., in ~!t.TO: Srik.PE, !.:ACLAliT and KOw.I. Hot-:ever, these ai-e ea.c ; -oncerr::ec -with only one particular field and related to one theatre. Canac:'an intelliger.ce tstimates are Canadian oriented. They enable us to obt, :an a balanced :ud€,err,ent on those fs.ctors that relate most, regardless of a ea, to the c·efence of Canada and to the achievement of our defence policy ob~ecti ves. lt. .Since ,:e can never maintain forces to cover the whole range of 1, uss;ible defence needs, it is essential to isolate from all the possibilities in a rapidlJ cha.n~int; world those that are most likelj to occur and, of these, to decide which are most critical to the security of Canada. C8!1adian intelli 6 er:ce ·.~ 3tL'llb.tes a1e essential for :oiakinf, jud€,ements such as these, ··17. Basic to the determination of policies and plans for lvorth .American defence is an accurate and continuing estiwate of the threat, 'l'his assessment is detailed in the Canada-linited States lntelli 5 ence Estimate (C.AU;s 69) which is a joint appreciation agreed between the two countries and which is base~ on a considerable contribution from Canadian intelligence sources. It is this Canadian input that ensures our participation ir, the formt:lation of .eL1ns and policy for !forth .American defence from their inception. 18. The Canada-united States Intelligence Lstimate is the basis from which the objectives plan is developed for presentation to the 'C.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian f.efence Staff. IN 'I.i.:.t.HA 'I IC:,AL PLANL li\'G 19. ~ . In U.e main, l'iA'I'O plans and i-'Olicies are based on NATO intelligence estimates. Eowever, there is one direct contr:.bution from the Canadian intelligence corrnnrni ty whiQh is of partic1.:lar significance in relation to Canadian reactions to k;\.'IO pro;Josals. In a number of cases, f;i..'10 ir.telligence does not take into account recent developments because such infor:i;ation is not mac:.e available to it tecause of the risk of security breaches by the large multi-national staffs. C::i.nadiar. ir:telligence sources, tee a use of their relationsbip •with specific countries, are often _able to provic.e infoni:atior. that would not otherwise be available. TLis pt:rely Ca.nacian input often enab:!€s t;,e Canadian planning staff to take a more e.t:libhte1,cd afpro&ch thar. wc.,uld otberwise be the case. . ./4 CEC.i. 1' T (CAh.ALl..All !::YLS O!~lY) 1 000109 �A version o! this page was found .in the public domain. GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a SECRET (CANABIAN EYES ONLY) - 4 ·2c. feacekEeping. Canadian produced intelliger;cE:- serves the planning st&.ff d\;ril,.:., three stages of peacekeeFing operations: a. ~.vents 1ec.e:iq, up to a peacekfeping operation; b. .".ctivities imir.ediately prior to a peacekee_p.lnt;; operation; 21. 1!.ver.ts Lec:dq. lp to a Peacekeepir.g Operat:icr.. 1he international .,..,lat:Lii.c .=;t~ff cc.r,tirn.:c, 1,sly :r:or1itors intelligenc':' c,1, Selected re_g,ions of U-.e ""orld that :.2.\'t b, .. eclrr1arked on the basis of tbeir potential as likely an,2s fer ft:h,n:. _-E.'&i.!E:!.ce.-:ini acti,.'ities. Luring this state the pla1mers rr.t:.st be apprised o:· c::.::.} the inf orn:a.tior, and intellig,(;nce it is possible to c:..td1, on the pol:'..tical, ira.litar.) and economic structure of the cotmtries co1.cE: r11Ed. 22.. .Acti,rities lnanediately Prio! to a Peucekeeping Cptr3tiot!. Cnce the decisior,J.as teen made to coir.rr;it Canadian Forces to a pe.;.cekeeping task the plaunE rs will 1·equire a continuous updatint:, cf all intelligence 1-elative to the area, in partict:.lar tha.t of a militar~- na.t1.ire which will ir,fhence the strength, organization, arms and equiprr,ent of the Canadian co11i...:.iu,_,:;r,L. 23. Lurinr. the Peacekeeei1_1,g, Open,tion. Tbe info:r.nation gathering resources of a peacekeEping force are limited and unC:.er rather strict rest r-ictions in so far as the -CN is concerned. Therefore, in order to protect our own persor..nel, intelligence aeencies outsicle of the theatre of operations must keep a close watch on events in the area to ensure that there are no untirrely s1.,rprises. This is a cor,tinuing commitment as long as Canaciar. _rlersonnel are involved ir: the operation. C?Ei.l!.TlCl~Al. L/.i'L:...l.IGl:.t-,CE Levels of hes,:,onse a. Inar.ediate h.1:.s;,onse F.egt:irer::ent. Air I,efence Command, 1 .Air Livis:ion, haritin,e CouJ1,and, C8 nadian Contingent Cypn:s £..nd 4 ChBG, in whole or in !)art, must be capable of i1nnediate response to specified threats. The provision of battle intelligence in reE-ard to those threats 11,ust be timely, accurate and continuous. I-:es;~onsibili ty for such intelligence lies rrim.arily -with the international haadqt:arters to \o:'hich our forces are assignee. b. Earl;y f.csponse 1-\.equireo;ent. Naritin.e, 1-:obiJe and Air '1.raLsport Com:s:ar.ds ir.ust be capable of rapid response to thre&ts to national sovereignt;, and internal securit:r, .. /5 -- SECRE.'I (C.AKADIA11 El1.<.;S Cl;LY) 000110 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a • : , • kversion of this page was found in the public domain. SL:CRET ( ChliALIJu\ EYES 01;1y) - c:: .,/ &.nc. to international peace and security. The provision of intE: 1 ll~er;ce must be adequate, of course, to meet tbe 1.eecls and the respor,sibili ty for this lies pri:r..arilj ·,.;i th CFi-:'-• c. • Gra(:;i..;&tec ;_ es: or.se. The Canadian Forces, in whole or ir, part, TT,,Jst be capable of suitabloe resronse to the forrr.al alert systems, or to a phased increase ir1 re&diness for emer1.:,er,cies outside the scope of the formal systems. The iir.fle:r.1: ntat ion of ar.y phased increase ir, readiness is bafed 0~1 i.ntellige:ice. Ii.esponsibili ty for froviding this is shared ty CF!-i~ and applicable intE'rnational headquarters. 2.'.;,. Dpe1 ,?.t:i onal Plam,ing. Prelin:inary planning for identifj able catet:ories of operatior.s •.,ithin existing co!TJT:itrr.ents or specific :i;:ossible c~;erati0ns, n:ust be initiated, updated, superseded or car.celled on tr.e assessrrent of continuous intelli[ence. ~ost of this planning is carried out in coL~1·nction with other goverr.u.ent and/or international a 6 encies, a.no. is facilitated bs the product of as contir:uoi..;s c:.n exchange anc coordination of intelligence emo~~ the intelligence core~unity of ttose a~encies as can te arranged. K.1ch of the inforn-.atj_on needEd concerr;s the national and interm.tional at,enc:, with which planning is being cone and is often more cifficult to obtain than that concerning the threat. This requirement - .. ·--'- t... _ ___ i. 'L- __, _____ J.._ ~ .. _ _ _ .:_...:, ___ _, ,L" _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J,. "'\.::_,.: _ _ ~_ a,,.,_,._, YtJ ........~....-'-1..,t......, ...,,_, ~'!- t,,1 • ...__.._...,,,,..W • ...,._. r.._ . .._.,_••-.-..-. .... -~---.,_,,..., • 26. Cperationa: I.eadiness. 1he -whole process of achieving the general Gtar,dard of o1)eratio!;al rE,adiness fixed by national potic,:i, inclt:cHng the fcrrimlation of concepts, doctrine, and proced,.:res; tre organization, equip.1".er.t, training and orientation of or,er·ational elen:e:nts; tr.e developrr.ent of si..;pport ca..i)abili ties, ar.d periodic testj.ng and e-valuaticn, cannot be effectively carried 0~1 except in the context of the current state of the nation ir. relation to the world situation. This calls for the a'~:iilabili ty of str·ategic, tactical and technical intellieence, lonE, and short term, of eve1-y nature, n;ilita.r;,r and othen.;ise, and comf-'iled '~n us~ble form. Such intelliter.ce is the res.1,onsibilit_y of the Canadian intelli1;;,cnce con::nunity. 27. The Defer,c8 nesearch and Anal_ysis Establishn:er.t require:s detailed intellibEonce ·cata of a wide variety. The m!ijori ty of its studies are highly c:ei\er-.dent o:-i the caliL.re of inte]ligence received. As is the case with other user·s of intelli 0 0,ce, tLe quality of its end i'rocluct can only be as good as the input l:.sed. Strategic operational research, to use one example, l'E:<-tuires present arn! futc:.re estL,ates of the capabilities of .:.:.oviet and Chinese threats to hortb Arr:erica, j_ncluc.ing dete.ils on developments such as lillWs, FCos a11d EGBs. ../6 SECF-ET (C.h!·;AI.1.Al, EYES Ct-~LY) 000111 �J GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la foi sur l'acces l'infqrmation a 1 SE.;CliliT ( CJ.JiA.Dlih EYES ONLY) - 6 28. For rr,ari time, land and air operational researcr., a great deal of data is req 1.:ired en the cperG.tional concepts and equipment systems o! other r;aticr.s if :r;eanL.;.,.f1A: co:nparative analyses are to be obtained. For war e;ames ar.d other ir.ctLccs of anal,>"sis by· simulation, the ar.alysts must know as !"mcb -:J.bot:t t~:e tc:.ctical concepts and weafon SJ stems dcvelopf.:d or under cevelcpr.ent b;; potential ene1d.es as they do about U,eir own. 29. Atireeme!1ts 0:1 the P'-' rchase, Exchange or Loar, of :Kilitary Eguipr1ent. Ir: so1t;e cases, i1:fonni.tion obtained from intelligence is of value before c onch;.C.:~Lg abl ~,;;rr.ents with other natior;s ret,;ardillg the p;..rchase, exchange or loan of niilitar., equipr.ent. Intellieence also maintains surveillance of son,e i ten1s of rr,i~_i tary equiprr.ent and weaponr;y after theJ havt: been sold on the C.s.nadian export market. JO. 1':il:i tary Ai_g. Before moetir.g requests for :nili tary aid it is r,ecessar.:,, to ass'..:re as far as is possible, that it will he used for the purpose stated and within the pararr:eters of Canadian Govern.'nent polic,Y. .iifter c.elivei·y, si.;rveillance is nece.~sary to ensure tbat m:ilit ary aid is being ~sed within the letter and spirit of the a 0 reement . • a. ii.::x:1->erier.ce has proved a need for the widest possible covera 6 e to be obtained, catalogued and stored. b".'- In F..any cases, intelligence is the or.ly source !or obtaining maps and charts, and for updating them, particularly for areas not covered within the terms of international map exchar46 e agreements. ;2. ·Ac.vice on Security Classification and Disse:r,ination of Classifies? lnforn:ation. In view of the wide variet,y of security classifications in use by the "estern allies, it is often difficult to decide what subjects n:ay or rr.ay not be discussed, with whozr. anc what the release and disse11ination of classified information should be. All directorates of CFh~ dealing with classified material obtain continuous ad,~ce and direction on these aspects and it is also available for the correct classification o! documents and publications origir.a.ting wi t~in CFH-:.;. JJ. Indoctdriatior: ar.d Education. Or:e of the o,•erlooked uses of intelligence is the contir:ucus indoctrination and education intelligence ptovicles commanders arid stcffs through the circulation of intelligence ,itests and estj~ates. lhis backgrour.d often subconscio~sly ~rovides a measure of the experience on which ~udger.1ents are r.1ade. S.:::.C:hLT (CANArI.Af; LYES m.LY) 000112 �Pages 113 to / a 125 are withheld pursuant to section sont retenues en vertu de l'article 13(1 )(a) of the Access to Information Act de la Loi sur l'acces a l'information �GAC - Released undefr1:[:iff\cc~s sJo lr:ifor~?tions Act/ 1 AMC - Divulgue en va:hiiae.J~J.li:~a l'informatio. Resources Devoted tc Intelligor,· Found in Public Domain Denartment Unit ma.ri-years -Deputy Chief Intel.ligence Sex-vices (DCIS) ($OOC) Total National Defence lfo.t ional Research Council .2:;xternal Affairs 1882 19,86'i othe'r funct:io!1~ man-yenrs {fpOOO) -Communications Branch 435 4,776 -Department 17 246 -Special Research Bureau 50 man-years u~~000) 1882 19,BG7 - Security and Intelligence D'irectorate 25,674 11,415 ,o2 31-• 2'' 2 ()"),, 213 2.,852 2095 . 22,719 3h, 2111- l 25 18 235 2,::: 435 4,776 1 , :_, of"\2 '+ :, , 21 327 327 81 ___,..,,1,J_!_...-. --2...0:-_ _.._57L.,<.2. 821 2401 Qner_ation_s~4_·_ _ 2, 85_2 4 . • ·- - ---r)rco) -~ 213 .. -Staff assigned to DND Total External Affairs • TOTAL --------c----~-----Total incidental to 19,86, -Directorate of Maps and Charting Defence Research Doard 'fotal Rc~~o1·irces - - - - - - - - - - - Oneratj.O:lf':_> • .J:'t ., • ~s a primary ~uncc1s11 ;l!ational • Defence in 1970-71 ./-' -- - __5-7\ ' 4 81 71 902 902 g 110 8 110 lJ.O 226 3,068 ...L 1 'OJ...., ,..., 1 40,353 / 000126 I. I �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a TOP SECRET HAlfffLE VIA COHIRT Decision Hakinr- Points and Processes in CHAN1IBLS ONLY the Ca.'1P-dian IntelJ.iF-.:e::ce Orgad zation I. Collection of Ir:t ell i :~:nc e The principal inputs of ·raw and processed intellisence to Canadian production processes come fro::i the collaboratir.:; intellit;ence a;~encies of the U.S., Britain, /,ustralia, }Jew ZeELland and N1.'T'U: with important Canadian inputs in so:rre instances. The acquisition of intellirence thrc-ugli liaison and mutual exc.r..::.:.g.s arranger:ients with collaborating .foreign ag:encies is included at the end of this section on Collection of Intelligence. A. SIGINT ;t: t~ Source Description - The intercept of communications and other electromagnetic signals. One hu!1dred intercept positions, plus the necessary •&ncilliary and support staff, have been approved to operate at field stations in Canada (five at present), which arc located to provide the most useful and unique contributions to the intercept coverage on a world wide basis provided by the intercept program:nes of the United States, Britain and Australia. Initial Autho1"i ty-',i. - Chiefs of Stai' f Co:mni t tee and appropriate Ministers. j ,. ___ , .. _, -- n--.:.-...>..:_ . - . ....................... _.._ J. t...,J -1..\...7\.,l_t.V n - - . ! - . ! - .. Jlt;~l.,._JI r:-,i\,.IJ.f.,·.11 Manning levels for intercept stations, station ad.'llinistration and mti.ntemmce. T'nis is a DND progra..'110e and decisions on annual -._ prograrrcr~and estimates are made by the Defence Staff within -existing mm policies. Action initiat.ed by DCIS, for approval by VCDS and CDS. Fund3 provlded by DND. . (1) (2) SIGINT equipment for intercept stations Annual prograr;1,11es and estimates are prepared by the CR'ffi and forwarded through tne C?.C to the Director of Cormnunications Security ,mo submits to IPC for decisions. Funds a.re provided by nrm. Ind.tvidual contract der..and requisitions, v.'ithin the approved annual progranr.ie, are prepared by CinG and forwarded to DC3 for approval. They then go to DND and are processed through mm channels for approval by the Deputy Hinister of National Defence. Requisitions, when approved, are sent to the Department of Supply and Services for the contracts to be let. * The current authorities are ths :ilOSt recent annual decisiong reached according to the follmd.ne procedwes. . ... /2 ( '\ 000127 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a (3) Intercept ta s~:s ca.rri ed out l:>·r st&_!.ior1s These are decided on a continuing basis by Gi!.'.;tC in accordance wit.h processing require::ients based on intellL;ei;ce requirements submitted by Caru=.dian user agencies and coll&Lorating British and U.S. agencies. New Programes (including capital construction and equipment procurement) Coordination of the requirements and views of user and collection agencies would be done by the DCS through the CRC. DCS would submit recommendations to If•C for approval. Decisions on new prograrr.mes within established policies would be :aade by IPC, with reference by individual IPC members to their ministers as they might feel necessary. Decisions on new programmes involving new forl!ls of activity or new policy considerations ,,.,.ould be referred by IPC for decisions to the l1inisters of Extern2.l Affairs, Defence and any other ministers involved. B. C. SPECIAL CENTRE MATERIAL ,,_ r, ___ AIV VQ,&J.O,~C:U& _11~ - ••• _.._, - - l..-• •-• vU.1...J.<Ov 1.,.l.VU I I • • Cl,\,; 1,.1..Y .I. 1.,_y. HUMAU SOURCES CANADIAN FORCES ATTACHES - Source Description - The collection of intelligence within foreign countries by visual observation, _photography and such other means as may be authorized. Initial Authority - l-!:i.nisters of National Defence and External Affairs. Annual or Periodic Decisions I (1) Staffing CFA Posts. Personnel selection decisions are made by the Defence Staff (Chief of Personnel in consultation with DCIS) but are subject to the agreement of the Department of Extern&.l Affairs. Changes of manning level are decided by the Minister of National Defence, subject to the concurrence of the ltinister of External Affairs. (2) Annual Progz-a.:unes and Estirn,~tes, Operations nnd l,iainte12~.~c~ (:includ.ir,g travel and training). Decision point is VCDS. Submissions rnacie by nets. ... /3 000128 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a .. s.15(1) - International - 3 - (3) Taskin,;; and Reporting. Decision foint i:3 D:~L.5. Head of Mission may override such decisions if the loca.l situation dictates. Head of .Mission also controls protocol tasks and co;amercial tasks wl'iere appropriate. New Prograin:aes - T'ne creation or deletion of CFA posts; new forms of activity and procurement of special operational equipment. The decision points would be the Hinisters c-f National Defence and External Affairs. Proposals would be subr.iitted from DCIS through VCDS to CDSAC to Hinister of National Defence who would consult the Minister of External. Affairs and the Cabinet if necessary. SHIP OOARDnn FRCGRA.lfME Source Description - The collection of intelligence within Canada from selected Ships Captains, involving the br:i.efin::?: and debriefing of these sources Initial Authority - :Vri.nisters of National Defence and External Affairs. Was submitted to ministers by the IPC on the recom,~endation of JIC . ..... _ _ _ _ • - • ..... - ' - ' - ' - - ' - " H .... ~u..._vu.~ . u ,.. - w.,.;n~o C.A.Lit>;.,,...L.,U£S uv.t.U ULLJ...L.l,,O.J. •.Y J:t:=:>UU..J:Ct;~j 110 separate annual programme or estiraa.tes action required. Staffing, tasking and reporting, 'training. Decision point. is DCIS. New Progrru!r.-.es - The extension of programmes beyond existing authority. Decision points would be Ministers of National Defence and External Af£airs. Recommendations woul.d be made by DCIS through JIG to IPC for approval and submission to ministers if necessary. CANADIAN FORCES SERVIN; ABHOAD Source 03scription - The collection of intelligence abroad by selected personnel of Canadian Forces serving abroad (including Canadian aircraft and ships in transit abroad). Initial Authority - Ministers of National Defence and External Affair~. As occasions arose approval was obtained from ministers by the I.PC members on the recommendations of the JIG. Annual and Period:i.c Decisions - uses existing m:i.litary resources·; no separate annual program.:..o.e or estimates ·action required. I St.a.ff5:_ng, tasking and report.in;;>;, trainin_g_. Docision point is DCIS, sub,1ect. to consultation with the Depart.':l0nt of External Affairs i f necessary. ... /4 000129 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ . AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a Found in Public Domain - 4 - New i'rograrmaes - New forras of activity; :1ew areas or countries involved in operations; use of specinl. operat.:.ona}. e0uip:uent. Tile decision points would be the !·'.inisters of ~iatio11al Defe,1ce and :..x.-ternc1l Affa.5 rs. Recommendations would be n;,.de by DC13 tiirough J iC to IPC for approval and submission to rrunisters if necessary. Source Description - The collection of intelli 6ence within Canada from selected travellers, defectors and ir:unigrants. The interdepartmental Defector Com:nittee coordinates action concerning tJie adr:iission of potential defectors to Canada and tr1eir status and handling in Canada as defectors or innnigrants. Initial Authority - Ministers of External Affairs and National Defence. Was submitted to ministers by the IPC on the recommendation of the JIC. Annual and Periodic Decisions (1) Annual programmes and esti:nates - Decision point is the IPC. ,. Submitted by i".he. (2) l)j r-ector S~B. Staffing, taskin~ and reporting, training - Decision point is Director SRB. (JY Selection of sources for debriefing - Decision point is Director SRB. (4) Selection of source for briefing - Decision point is USSEA. Recommendations submitted by Director SRB. New Program.'ll.es - Extension of activity to sources of information about additional countries. Decision point would be Minister of F.,xternal Submissions would be made by Director SRB through JIG to IPC for approval and submission to ministers if necessary .. Affairs. CANADIJ..N DIPLO!~TIC OFFICIALS ABROAD (excluding CFA 1 s) Source Description - The collection of intelligence within foreign countries by observational trips to sensitive areas or the solicitation of infonna.tion or opinion from a potential informant. Initial Authority - Hinister of External Affairs. Annual or Periodic Decisions - Continuing programn;.e using existing diplomatic resources; no annual decisions required . • . .. /5 000130 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a . I I .• Found in Public Domain SECRET - 5 - Operational Decisions - \fr.ether to engage in a particular collection act.,ivity .r,aving regard to the diplo:natic propriety of tt1e proposed a.cti vi ty and the universal require::1.ent II to respect" local laws and regulations. The decision will usually be taken at the local level by the Head of the Diplomatic Mission. RCM? SOURCES Source Description Iritelligence about matters other than security obtained by the Security and Intelligence Directorate incidental to their p1:i-mary mission. Decisions Required - The only decision additional to those pertaining to the role of the Directorate as a security service are decisions to release the intelligence gained to ot..,er interested intelligence agencies. The decision point for this is the Director General Security and Intelligence or the Co[ffinissioner of the RCHP. D. MISCELLANEOUS SOURCF,S In addition to human sources available in Canada t.hAre :i.rA ot.hP.f' v~~,-:u. ,,~l.L,l.i: :._: - ~ . - . :.,, • • ~_,:_.-_;_ . . ~~.!;_,~:;_~~.u~~~~;~ -~-~--_.;! -~:l "'! .- " " ' ~ ' " &... . . ~ p~- ~~V-• ~.!..=-==.:::..:.-:. v.i;:,.i.i.,.i.ug ~w.ua or in transit.., crasnea a:i.rcrart., na ter1a1. exhibited at Trade Fairs or Exhibitions, foreign published material and filins. Such sources are exploited by DCIS or SRB on a continuing or an opportunistic basis and using existing resources. The Depa...-tment of External Affairs is consulted if there are risks of public or diplomatic protest or publicity about the activity. Decisions concerning operations are taken at senior official or ministerial level as appropriate. E. PROCUREMENT FROM COLLABORATING FOFIBIGN AGENCIES Source Description - The acquisition of intelligence through liaison and mutual exchange arrangements with collaborating foreign agencies. Intelligence problems facing the West are so complex and difficult that not even the United States or the United Kingdom can meet all their intelligence needs from their own resources or plan their intelligence programmes in isolation. Cooperation is even more necessary for Canada, because our intelligence resources are so lir..d.ted. Our cooperation l.s prina.rily with the United Kingdom and the United States and to a lesser extent with Australia, New Zealand and NATO. . .. /6 I 000131 �.• GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi·sur l'acces !'information a Found in Public Domain - 6 - Periodic decisions - whether to solicit ~articular infornation in accordance with consumer requirements and within existing authorities. The decision point would be the pI'ograrwae manager responsible for the particular liaison channel and contacts involved. It could be the JIG or a departmental or agency intelli~ence programme manager. New Pro~raalilles - The extension of arran,,;~m.ents beyond existing authority to new countries or new and politically sensitive categories of intel;.ligence. '!he initial decision point would be the Minister of External Affairs, with reference to the Cabinet Committee on Intelligence as appropriate. Proposals would be submitted through JIC to IPC • for approval ar.d submission to Ministers • • ·• I 000132 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'atces !'information a Found in Public Domain SECR.ST II. Processing of Intelligence This stage consists of the primary precessing of collection products by specialist personnel to produce a product useable by intelligence production agencies, including collaborating foreign agencies. A. SIGINT Initial Authority - Appropriate Ministers. Annual Decisions , Manning levels, annual programme and estimates for CBNRC. The decision point is the IPC. Proposals are prepared by CBNRC and forwarded to DCS. After consideration by the CRC they are submitted by DCS to IPC for approval. Funds are provided by individual departments, to whom shares or the CBNRC budget are allpcated according to an agreed formula. Operating Decisions. (1) The general allocation of rrocessing tasks and priorities. =:--:-:::~::~ a) ~~~~_:·:..:_--;~.~~~ .:- ~~:'.:_-:j--..J ~'!" ~nuuri -- •~- \...~-~~~ The ~~~ requirements of Canadian intelligence consumers as notified to CBNRC from time to time.. These require.ments are decided by individual departments and are not coordinated by JIC or CRC. the division of m.3.i.n responsibilities for SIGINT ta6ks reached at a Tripartite (US-UK-Canada) SIGINT Conference in 1957 in the interests of avoidi.l').g unnecessary duplication. A worklng ·arrangement for the allocation of tasks was proposed by CBNRC/GCHQ/NSA. It was approved by DCS and reported in October 1957 to CSB which exercised policy control before the IPC was formed. (2) Decisions on minor adjustments within the annual programme are ·required on a continuing basis. These decisions are mado by CBNRC using the same basis as for the eeneral decisions, and they affect collection as well as processing tasks. New Programmes - The decision point would be the IPC. Proposals would be prepared by CBNRC and forwarded to DCS. After consider~tion by the CRC they would be submitted by DCS to D>C for a.pprovo.l or referral to Ministers i f necessary. • . . ./2 000133 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a Found in Public Domain SECRET • - 2 - SFECIAL CENTRE MATERIAL Initial Authority - Appropriate Ministers. Annual Decisions Manning levels, annual programmes and estimates. Processing activities involving these materials are components of mm programnes and decisions are made by the Defence Staff within existing mm policies. Action initiated by DCIS, for approval by VCDS and CDS. Funds provided by DND. New Programmes - Coordination of the requirements and views of user and producer agencies would be done by the JIC. Recommendations would. be submitted by JIC to IPC for approval. Decisions on new ) . programmes within established policies. would be made by IPC, with reference by individual IPC members to their ministers as they might feel necessary. Decisions on new programmes involving new forms of activity or new policy considerations would be referred by IPC for decision to the Ministers of EJ..-ternal Affairs, Defence and other ministers involved. .• I 000134 �GAC - Released under the Access to lnformatiO!']S Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a , Found in Public Domain SECRET III. Production of Intelligence This ·stage consists of the further processing of intelligence data by intelligence analysts to produce a product useable by consumers of intelligence, including collaborating foreign agencies. A• . CURRENT INTELLIGEHCE (intelligence on significant current developments or updating basic studies) (1) National Intelligence Description of Progra.m.~e - JIC current intelligence progra.nn-ue includes (a) Warning Intelligence (indications intelligence) prograrrane executed on behalf of JIC by DCIS until an Alert involving action by JIC has been declared; thereafter by JIC. (b) Weekly Intelligence Report (WIR) - a weekly JIC summary of significant events. (c) JIC Briefs - Ad Hoe reports on current events requiring - - _____~ -- ....-~--. - . ~--,... .,__ \,V .&,.1,.., ... ._ l.l.lJ-UO. l.,Q .,..,H_.P't't~~r __ ix,,.;:,.L1., fh.l .,..,.•"""""'+.;,r\n.: . . 1lnrla.,. . . ,; .' ..., UU.'-l..&..\,., ._, - ""'f'" . _, -- .I. ► ~v......,4-v.., - ~ ....,.._ detail. 'Existing Authority (a} Warning Intelligence - Intergovernmental Tripartite Alerts Agreement. (b) & (c) WIR and Briefs -· Canadian Intelligence Progrart'...mc .approved by IPC. Decisions Required concerning Warning Intellisence (a) abovo Intercept Activities - during crisis situations stations operate and report on the basis of standing instructions, modified by specific instructions from CBimC as necessary. The decision point is the Station Commander for station · operations on standing orders; Director CBNRC for instructions from CBNHC. • SIGilrf States of Alert - these govern the acti vi tifJs of intercept and processing activities. The decision point for declaring and modifying these states of SIGINT Alert is the Director CBNRC . . .. /2 000135 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a Found in Public Domain SECRET • - 2 - Intelli~ence Alerts - these govern the activities of the intelligence community. The decision point for declaring and raodifying stat·es of intelligence· Alert is the JI_C. Warning Intelligence Outputs - depending upon the urgency of the situation, responsibility for action upon receipt . of warning intellisence ranges from the duty personnel to the JIC, as designated in JlC st,anding orders • governing intelli 6 ence warning activities. Decisions Reouired (WIR and JIG Briefs (b) and (c) above) - subject and area content, security and control. The decision point is the JIC. (2) Departmental or Agency Intelligence Description of Prov,raror;:tes - departmental or agency current intelligence P.rogrammes for departmental or agency purposes. Existing Authority: - mm-CDS; XA-USSf.A; SRB-IPC. t1P.~isions reauired - sub.iect and area content, security and control. Decision points B.· department or agency intelligence programme managers. BA.SIC IN'I'ELLIGENCE ( studies involving substantial collation and analysis) (1) National Intelligence pescription of Programrae JIC A~ual Work ProP,ramne and Ad hoe Papers - long-term estimates related to objectives of Canadian Intelligence Programne as approved by IPC; or as specified b)' consuroor agencies; or in support of JIC delegations to internationallysporisored intelligence conferences. Existing Authority - Canadian IntelligeQce Programme approved by IPC. Decisions reouired subject and area content, security and control. Decision point - JIC. • . .. /3 000136 �; GAC - Released under the.Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a Found .in Public DomaJn I • SECRET -3 (2) Departmental or Agency Intelligence Description of Programmes - departmental or aeency programmes for basic intelligence studies within their areas of responsibility. Existing Authority DND-CDS; XA-USSEA; SRB-IPC. Decisions required subject and area content, security and control. Decision points - department or agency intelligence programme managers. ) . Al .• • '· • 000137 .. �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information .. SECRET • IV. Dissemination of Intelligence t. This stage consists of the distribution to consumers, whether dor.iestic or foreign, of the end product of the intellisence production process. It is by this means that the products of intelligence activities are made available to decision rr.akin~ points elsewhere within the Government. National intelligence is dissemir..a.ted to departments or agencies, which must take responsibility for the timely provision of this material to the , relevant particular decision making points within their own organizations. This also applies to departmental or agency intelligence disseminnted to other departr:ients and agencies. Departmental intelli~ence distributed within the originating department is usually directed to the relevant particular decision making points. 2. Release of any glven item of end product to all decision making points within the Government which might have some degree of interest, or to all potential consumers, is not ·automatic. Security or other considerations may require that the end product be withheld from some domestic or foreign consumers or handled through special channels in domestic agencies or to foreign consumers, or 11Bde available subject to caveats regarding further ---- --·- -- --- ~4: -""......._4 Y"\r\+.; r"\Yl Caveats • The most obvious caveat relates to the security classification of the end product, including any ma.rki:.r,s restricting it for perusal by 11 CA.tlADIA~ EYES ONLY 11 • In addition, however, end product illa.Y be rade available to consumers subject to a caveat that there be no further distribution outside the consumer agency; or outside the specific geographic locality of tho consumer agency (e.g., a restriction to h'eadquarters dissemination); or to a third party without the consent_ of the originator (the so-called third country rule is generally observed in the CAN/UK/US co:11rn.w1i ty, and so far as we are aware between most other collaborating collecting agencies in the world); or that there may be no attribution to a Canadian source if further dissemination is made. 3. Specially sensitive material • 4. Occasionally decisions may be called for about the dissemination of intelligence from Canadian official sources which have gained access to it by virtue of international arrangements or auspices nor;nally regarded as precluding an intelligence function. Hecent e:;r-.amples have been Canadian participants in U.N. peacekeeping bodies and the International Control and Supervision Commissions in Indo-China; me:nbers of the Canadian Armed Forces training teams in Tanzania and Ghana; and Canadians in various international organizations. Infor:n.:i.tion obtained from such sources is regarded as specially sensitive and m:iy requir·e either to be kept entirely within Canadian· circles, or made subject to special safeguards if foreign dissunination is deemed feasible. . .. /2 000138 �GAC -·Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - Divulgue en vertu de la loi sur l'acces !'information a •• SECRET ·• -2 A. NATIONAL INTF.LLIGEUCE (1) To Canadian Consumers Decisi.on reauired - To what depart.11ents or agenqies of government should end product be distributed and what special caveats if any should be applied? Decision point - JIC. To Foreign Consumers (governments, international organizations or international conferences) (2) Decision required - To what departments or agencies of foreign governments, or what components or individuals in international organizations or attending international conferences should end product be distributed and what special caveats if any should be applied? Decision point - JIC. .... - ... ... ··-- .....- .. ~ - .{l) ~ ' '·- -; ' ' - To Canadian Consumers Decision required - To what departments or agencies of government should end product be distributed and what special caveats if any should be applied? Decision point~ Originating department or agency intelligence programme managers. (2) 'To Foreign Consumers (governments, international organizations or international conferences) Decision required - To what departments or agencies of foreign governments, or what components or individuals in international organizations or attending international conferences should end product be distributed and what special caveats if any should be · applied? Decision points - Originating departnent or agency intelligence ·,prograr:t1l8 managers subject, in case of specially sensitive matEirial, to consultation in JIG or with Department of External Affairs . • 000139 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00004 Title A name given to the resource IPC/6-70, Intelligence Operations in the Canadian Government, Report by C.M. Isbister, Outside Examiner, 9 November 1970 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 09-Nov-70 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CSE A220 Committees - File 72-1 Part 2 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource CSE Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-00052 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English