1 20 2 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d1aeb0465fa83ab439a54a65ac41566b.pdf 835d5298f5965987baaa53570394e31e PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act DoaflThent diuulgue eVi vfirtydgja LaLsur I'a ocas a I'information Defence Liaison/C.C. Eberts/gc TOP SECRET October 6, 1950 ri MEMORANDUM ^ x DOWNGRADED TO SECRET / REDUiT A SECRET Strategic Air Command Plans affecting Canada* • 1. It will be recalled that, at the urgent request of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, authority was given on August 18 for the immediate movement to Goose Bay, for a 6-week period, of the ^3rd Medium Bomber Group of the USAF's Strategic Air Command (^5 B-29's and B-50's and 20 tanker aircraft). This entailed the movement of some l400 USAF personnel to Goose and 850 to Harmon A.F.B. (the leased base at Stephenville) at which landings were to be made during the period of training at Goose. 2. It was made clear at the time that the object, of this move was to have the Group deployed against a general emergency, although it is understood that no "special" weapons were moved to Goose. Prior to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence meeting on October 2-5, it was, therefore, believed probable in Ottawa that Washington would be requesting permission for the V3rd Bomber Group to remain at, or return . shortly to, Goose for a further period, but nothing was known in Ottawa of any plans the U.S. authorities might be preparing for the basing or staging of strategic bombers in Canada in peace or war. Incidentally, the i+3rd Group returned to the U.S. last week because there are no buildings to house it at Goose and it could not remain there under canvas at this season. 3. ' During this week's meeting of the Joint Defence Board, the U.S. Section initiated a lengthy off-the-record discussion of — (1) certain construction that the USAF wishes to carry out urgently this fall at Goose, so that it may be physically possible for SAC bombers to return there before the end of the year; (2) the problem, in the immediate future, of obtaining Canadian permission for the stationing of Bomber Groups from time to time at Goose Bay without unduly Jeopardizing the security of the plans of the Strategic Air Command; (3) proposals for the deployment of SAC bombers to various parts of the world which are presently under consideration in Washington and appear likely to lead to an early high-level approach for permission for the Strategic Air Command to put Goose Bay and to some extent Harmon (and possibly Gander) to certain uses in the present situation and in any general emergency. L\., To deal first with the third point, on the first day of the Joint Defence Board meeting, Major General W. C* Sweeney, in charge of plans at Strategic Air Command, gave the Board a remarkably full and frank briefing on present thinking in the USAF with regard to the employment of the Strategic Air Gommand. ... £ 000245 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - 5* Following is a brief outline of his thesis. The timing of the first retaliatory blow in any strategic air warfare will be crucial. It is essential for the SAC aircraft to be deployed and completely ready for action at appropriate bases, and to be free to pass through advance bases, so that they may discharge their mission promptly and also avoid being caught on the ground where they would be high priority targets. 6. The principal Soviet targets are in the Urals, the Moscow-Leningrad area, and the Don basin. Present and potential USAF bases in Western Europe, North Africa and the Western Pacific are considered too vulnerable (owing to their proximity to the U.S.S.R.) to initial Soviet strategic bombing for the USAF to risk basing any appreciable number of strategic bombers there in peacetime against an emergency. It is therefore considered that the bulk of the SAC bombers should be based within the defence system of this' continent at pointe as near as possible to the Soviet targets. As regards suitable existing bases on this continent, it is estimated that, from Goose and Harmon 75 to 100 percent of the targets could be reached; from Eileson (Fairbanks), Alaska, and Limestone, Maine, 50 to 75 percent; and from bases further south in the States, 25 to 50 percent. Eileson is considered unsuitable as an SAC peacetime base as being too vulnerable to Soviet bombing and requiring flights over extensive areas of the Arctic. Bases further north in Canada are considered impracticable from the point of view of supply. 7* Thus, according to present USAF thinking, Goose would be the principal SAC advance assault base and the greatest importance therefore is attached to Strategic Air Command being able to station SAC bombers there in peacetime, and, in war, to stage large numbers of aircraft through Goose in an emergency, as a final fuelling and supply point. Some 250 would have to pass through on the first retaliatory attack. It would also be desired to use Harmon for the basing of tanker aircraft, and some limited use of Gander is also a possibility. 8. The principal requirements for implementation of any such plans at Goose would be the construction of additional personnel accommodation and storage facilities for fuel, munitions and other supplies, and the creation of adequate air and sea defences. The U.S. would apparently be prepared to assume the responsibility for providing the installations and manpower required. 9. While it appears that the President and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved broad principles for the employment of Strategic Air Command, it was indicated by the U.S. Section of the Joint Defence Board that the detailed plans for the deployment of SAC bombers and munitions to Canada still required approval at the highest levels In Washington. It was inferred, however, that proposals substantially similar to the plans outlined In paras. 5-8 above would very probably be made to the Canadian Government at a high level in the near future. ... 3 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces 6 I'information r> - 310. The U . S . Chairman suggested that t h e NATO Defence Committee's action in approving, in December^19^9, a Strategic Concept for the defence o f the North Atlantic area, appeared to constitute approval by the Canadian Government of the u s e of bases in Canada f o r strategic bombing, and also referred to the fact that the Newfoundland Bases Agreement does not specifically limit the types of m i l i t a r y activities that may b e carried out at H a r m o n (or the o t h e r leased b a s e s ) . Following is the extract from the approved Strategic Concept to w h i c h t h e U . S . Chairman referred: "IV. MILITARY MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT D E F E N S E CONCEPT Basic Undertakings 7. Over-all defense plans must provide in advance o f w a r emergency, specifically for t h e following basic undertakings in furtherance of t h e common objective to defend the North Atlantic area. T h e successful conduct of these undertakings should b e assured b y close coordination of military action as set forth in over-all p l a n s . a. Insure t h e ability to carry o u t strategic bombing promptly b y a l l m e a n s possible w i t h all types o f w e a p o n s , without exception. Shis is primarily a U . S . r e s ponsibility assisted as practicable by other nations." 11. The Canadian Section indicated that it w a s n o t aware of any specific NATO arrangement w h i c h w o u l d constitute definitive approval o f the u s e o f Goose o r H a r m o n by the Strategic A i r Command, and that, w h a t e v e r the terms o f the Newfoundland Bases Agreement, t h e Canadian Government would be certain to feel that it would, have to approve any SAC u s e of b a s e s in C a n a d a . It h a s since been learned in Ottawa that, before the Strategic Concept w a s approved, Canadian officials enquired whether the U . S . would require SAG bases in Canada a n d w e r e informed that it would n o t . In any ease agreement o n a strategic concept w h i c h merely served as a basis f o r NATO Planning, could hardly b e taken a s committing Governments to specific projects before they were embodied in approved joint p l a n s . 12. Apparently SAC considered it necessary to give the Canadian Section such a frank briefing o n its plans because it felt that its requests w i t h regard to the matters mentioned in p a r a . 3 (l) a n d (2) above might otherwise b e rejected b y the Canadian Government. The^questions w i l l b e dealt w i t h in letters to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee. fl. C. C. Eberts, October 17. 1950 The U.S. Section's requests with regard to the ' matters dealt with in para. 3 (l) and (2) above are reported in our two letters, of October 11 and October 17, to Secretary, C.S.C* C * C * E* 000247 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource "Strategic Air Command Plans affecting Canada" Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 06-Oct-50 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-b, File number: 50195-40, pt 1 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDAC01817 https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4fd8995525d00a68b4d390a8546e3479.pdf 835d5298f5965987baaa53570394e31e PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act DoaflThent diuulgue eVi vfirtydgja LaLsur I'a ocas a I'information Defence Liaison/C.C. Eberts/gc TOP SECRET October 6, 1950 ri MEMORANDUM ^ x DOWNGRADED TO SECRET / REDUiT A SECRET Strategic Air Command Plans affecting Canada* • 1. It will be recalled that, at the urgent request of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, authority was given on August 18 for the immediate movement to Goose Bay, for a 6-week period, of the ^3rd Medium Bomber Group of the USAF's Strategic Air Command (^5 B-29's and B-50's and 20 tanker aircraft). This entailed the movement of some l400 USAF personnel to Goose and 850 to Harmon A.F.B. (the leased base at Stephenville) at which landings were to be made during the period of training at Goose. 2. It was made clear at the time that the object, of this move was to have the Group deployed against a general emergency, although it is understood that no "special" weapons were moved to Goose. Prior to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence meeting on October 2-5, it was, therefore, believed probable in Ottawa that Washington would be requesting permission for the V3rd Bomber Group to remain at, or return . shortly to, Goose for a further period, but nothing was known in Ottawa of any plans the U.S. authorities might be preparing for the basing or staging of strategic bombers in Canada in peace or war. Incidentally, the i+3rd Group returned to the U.S. last week because there are no buildings to house it at Goose and it could not remain there under canvas at this season. 3. ' During this week's meeting of the Joint Defence Board, the U.S. Section initiated a lengthy off-the-record discussion of — (1) certain construction that the USAF wishes to carry out urgently this fall at Goose, so that it may be physically possible for SAC bombers to return there before the end of the year; (2) the problem, in the immediate future, of obtaining Canadian permission for the stationing of Bomber Groups from time to time at Goose Bay without unduly Jeopardizing the security of the plans of the Strategic Air Command; (3) proposals for the deployment of SAC bombers to various parts of the world which are presently under consideration in Washington and appear likely to lead to an early high-level approach for permission for the Strategic Air Command to put Goose Bay and to some extent Harmon (and possibly Gander) to certain uses in the present situation and in any general emergency. L\., To deal first with the third point, on the first day of the Joint Defence Board meeting, Major General W. C* Sweeney, in charge of plans at Strategic Air Command, gave the Board a remarkably full and frank briefing on present thinking in the USAF with regard to the employment of the Strategic Air Gommand. ... £ 000245 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - 5* Following is a brief outline of his thesis. The timing of the first retaliatory blow in any strategic air warfare will be crucial. It is essential for the SAC aircraft to be deployed and completely ready for action at appropriate bases, and to be free to pass through advance bases, so that they may discharge their mission promptly and also avoid being caught on the ground where they would be high priority targets. 6. The principal Soviet targets are in the Urals, the Moscow-Leningrad area, and the Don basin. Present and potential USAF bases in Western Europe, North Africa and the Western Pacific are considered too vulnerable (owing to their proximity to the U.S.S.R.) to initial Soviet strategic bombing for the USAF to risk basing any appreciable number of strategic bombers there in peacetime against an emergency. It is therefore considered that the bulk of the SAC bombers should be based within the defence system of this' continent at pointe as near as possible to the Soviet targets. As regards suitable existing bases on this continent, it is estimated that, from Goose and Harmon 75 to 100 percent of the targets could be reached; from Eileson (Fairbanks), Alaska, and Limestone, Maine, 50 to 75 percent; and from bases further south in the States, 25 to 50 percent. Eileson is considered unsuitable as an SAC peacetime base as being too vulnerable to Soviet bombing and requiring flights over extensive areas of the Arctic. Bases further north in Canada are considered impracticable from the point of view of supply. 7* Thus, according to present USAF thinking, Goose would be the principal SAC advance assault base and the greatest importance therefore is attached to Strategic Air Command being able to station SAC bombers there in peacetime, and, in war, to stage large numbers of aircraft through Goose in an emergency, as a final fuelling and supply point. Some 250 would have to pass through on the first retaliatory attack. It would also be desired to use Harmon for the basing of tanker aircraft, and some limited use of Gander is also a possibility. 8. The principal requirements for implementation of any such plans at Goose would be the construction of additional personnel accommodation and storage facilities for fuel, munitions and other supplies, and the creation of adequate air and sea defences. The U.S. would apparently be prepared to assume the responsibility for providing the installations and manpower required. 9. While it appears that the President and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved broad principles for the employment of Strategic Air Command, it was indicated by the U.S. Section of the Joint Defence Board that the detailed plans for the deployment of SAC bombers and munitions to Canada still required approval at the highest levels In Washington. It was inferred, however, that proposals substantially similar to the plans outlined In paras. 5-8 above would very probably be made to the Canadian Government at a high level in the near future. ... 3 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces 6 I'information r> - 310. The U . S . Chairman suggested that t h e NATO Defence Committee's action in approving, in December^19^9, a Strategic Concept for the defence o f the North Atlantic area, appeared to constitute approval by the Canadian Government of the u s e of bases in Canada f o r strategic bombing, and also referred to the fact that the Newfoundland Bases Agreement does not specifically limit the types of m i l i t a r y activities that may b e carried out at H a r m o n (or the o t h e r leased b a s e s ) . Following is the extract from the approved Strategic Concept to w h i c h t h e U . S . Chairman referred: "IV. MILITARY MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT D E F E N S E CONCEPT Basic Undertakings 7. Over-all defense plans must provide in advance o f w a r emergency, specifically for t h e following basic undertakings in furtherance of t h e common objective to defend the North Atlantic area. T h e successful conduct of these undertakings should b e assured b y close coordination of military action as set forth in over-all p l a n s . a. Insure t h e ability to carry o u t strategic bombing promptly b y a l l m e a n s possible w i t h all types o f w e a p o n s , without exception. Shis is primarily a U . S . r e s ponsibility assisted as practicable by other nations." 11. The Canadian Section indicated that it w a s n o t aware of any specific NATO arrangement w h i c h w o u l d constitute definitive approval o f the u s e o f Goose o r H a r m o n by the Strategic A i r Command, and that, w h a t e v e r the terms o f the Newfoundland Bases Agreement, t h e Canadian Government would be certain to feel that it would, have to approve any SAC u s e of b a s e s in C a n a d a . It h a s since been learned in Ottawa that, before the Strategic Concept w a s approved, Canadian officials enquired whether the U . S . would require SAG bases in Canada a n d w e r e informed that it would n o t . In any ease agreement o n a strategic concept w h i c h merely served as a basis f o r NATO Planning, could hardly b e taken a s committing Governments to specific projects before they were embodied in approved joint p l a n s . 12. Apparently SAC considered it necessary to give the Canadian Section such a frank briefing o n its plans because it felt that its requests w i t h regard to the matters mentioned in p a r a . 3 (l) a n d (2) above might otherwise b e rejected b y the Canadian Government. The^questions w i l l b e dealt w i t h in letters to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee. fl. C. C. Eberts, October 17. 1950 The U.S. Section's requests with regard to the ' matters dealt with in para. 3 (l) and (2) above are reported in our two letters, of October 11 and October 17, to Secretary, C.S.C* C * C * E* 000247 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDAC01817 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum on Strategic Air Command Plans Affecting Canada Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 06-Oct-50 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-b, Volume number: 5910, File number: 50195-40, pt 1 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource LAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Overflight Policy Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en