Introduction

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Canadian, British, and American intelligence communities produced a number of reports assessing the likelihood of war with the Soviet Union and, in some (mostly British) assessments, Communist China. These intelligence assessments identified a potential series of actions that could lead to general war, and contextualized these within international developments, assessments of Western and Soviet power, and analyses of Soviet rationale and objectives.

The documents in this briefing book are mostly Canadian and British, with a few reports belonging to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Though the topics analysed were often different, one commonality emerged from all the reports: the likelihood of deliberate general war was unlikely, owing to a variety of factors, such as (but not limited to) communist theory, Western capabilities, and the devastating consequences of atomic warfare. Instead, reports constantly stressed a need for cautious interpretation of intentions and decision-making, particularly in crises. All five countries’ intelligence communities agreed that miscalculation and wrongful escalation represented the most likely avenue to general war.

Part 3 of this briefing book contains all the "Risks" documents.