CDIM00327. 27 January 1953. "The Current Risks of General War"

The document, “The Current Risks of General War”, produced on January 27, 1953, was meant to assess the risks of general war throughout 1953, particularly between the Soviet Union and NATO powers (and their allies). The report mainly focused on “the likelihood of war resulting from action by the Soviet bloc.” There were two types of wars that the Soviets would potentially initiate: a deliberate war, either to achieve its goals or as a preventive measure; or unintentional actions leading to war, such as “genuine miscalculations, accidental occurrences, or errors of conduct on either side.” The report concluded, based solely on capabilities, general war for the Soviets in 1953 would be considered “an uncertain gamble,” therefore a deliberate war to achieve their aims was unlikely. Preventive war was also ruled out; the report assumed that the Soviets would be unable to find evidence that there was “an adverse shift or trend in military power which could not be checked or undermined.” The greatest danger, the report suggested, came from scenarios where Soviet escalation, uncertainty, or the unintended consequences of Soviet policies would lead to general war, such as miscalculating Western resolve to retaliate, or misinterpreted actions in areas around the world. In its second half, the report reviewed Soviet military, economic, and scientific capabilities, and also analysed its internal political climate.