CDIM01905. 9 January 1953. "The Likelihood of the Soviet Union Initiating a War before their Full Strength is Mobilised"

The British report JIC (53)7, produced on January 9th, 1953, sought to examine scenarios where the Soviet Union would use “their maximum potential at the outbreak of a war.” The report determined that the window of warning the West would receive was contingent on three different scenarios: a surprise attack that did not fully utilise the advantage of mobilisation; an attack that occurred once full Soviet strength was mobilised; and a balance between a surprise attack and parietal mobilisation. The conclusion reached was that the warning period between a full surprise attack and an attack with fully mobilised Soviet strength was only one month. It was recommended that planners re-assess Soviet capabilities and strength based on a warning period of one month. The JIC was also recommended to draft a new report, which would examine the logistics behind a Soviet surprise attack, the circumstances in which a surprise attack would become the accepted strategy, and how likely a surprise attack would occur.