https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/69dbdbf2541e1c44876968c4426610c2.pdf 1e89b73f25158d879d684bd6617a19c7 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under^he Afgess to Information Act - AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES EXTERNAL AFFAIRS • M.sarma^ejrt-dJLvision TO FROM De SUBJECT Sujet September 2 7 , I965 European Division REFERENCE Reference Ct£ V i s i t of Representative of Foreign Office '. j Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit A r itf ENCLOSURES Annexet DISTRIBUTION SECRET # CANADIAN EYES ONLY SECURITY NUMBER Numero FILE OTTAWA DOSSIER il-/l - 7 f 4M 3f' This Division has a number of revisions to offer to a text you sent us last week and rather than present them to you separately, which might make for some confusion, we reproduce below the complete revised text: » On the morning of September 21 Mr. Geoffrey Jukes of the Foreign Office Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit spoke to a small group from Disarmament and European Divisions. 2. Jukes began by explaining the functions of his Unit, which is one of the Foreign Office disarmament organs falling under the jurisdiction of Lord Chalfont, Minister of State with Special Responsibilities in the Foreign Office, whose portfolio was created in fulfilment of an election pledge of the present Labour Government. Since its inception the Research Unit has produced two substantive studies - one on the strategic nuclear balance and the other on anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs). It was no longer easy to define and isolate the subject of arms control, since it was inextricably bound up with other aspects of defence policy. ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES: 3. Jukes spoke at length on the Unit's second study and related how the Soviet military leadership, dominated as it was by World War II generals obsessed by an over-riding concern for national security, and apparently conceiving of ABM's purely as defensive weapons, failed to appreciate their destabilizing effect on the balance of deterrence. In this way they had precipitated an arms race in the 1950's in the spheres of strategic bombers and ICBMs. With its vastly superior economic resources, the USA had ultimately overtaken the USSR and put it at a considerable strategic disadvantage. The Soviet leadership, by making the same mistake in respect of ABMs, had forced the USA to embark upon an extensive ABM production programme and, by apparently starting deployment of its few missiles, was now causing the USA seriously to consider the deployment of its already far larger ABM force. It was probable that the USSR had already started deployment of Ext. 407A/BII. (Admin. Services Div.) ,/2 000006 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio .../2 "its ABMs, while the USA was still weighing its advisability in terms of cost and strategic necessity. MacNamara, however, had not yet taken the decision. By deploying missiles around its most important 25 urban centres, Washington would be covering a third of its population and twothirds of its industry, a pattern reflected in most western industrial countries. 4. The present balance of ABMs was from 40 to 60 for the USSR and several hundred for the USA with an ultimate target of 2,000. There was no way of determining the reliability of either Soviet or American ABMs, as the only way they could be tested is against ICBMs with actual atomic warheads. In any event, it was likely that the American version, the Nike-Zeus, was superior to the Soviet version* Although the USSR was more advanced in terms of size of booster rockets, its technology in other respects was probably inferior. BRITAIN 5* The British are considering an i n i t i a t i v e t o halt the deployment of ABMs as an anti-escalatory and anti-proliferation measure, but Jukes was of the opinion that i t i s already too l a t e , the basic decision for production and deployment having been taken several years ago. The production cost factor was not important t o Britain, since i t s s i z e and geographical p o s i t i o n made production f e a s i b l e . Insofar as Britain could be taken out only with IRBMs, i t enjoyed a s l i g h t l y larger measure of security than the FGR, which was exposed t o Soviet t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons. CHINA 6. Jukes did not think it likely that the United States would become involved in a nuclear conflagration with China, except in the event of unexpected and bltyepfcant provocation. He was a little disturbed however by a tendency in certain American academic circles to advocate the elimination of China's nuclear capability by aerial attack, while it was still feasible. This did not appear, however, toyrepresent thinking in American official circles. He thought that if nuclear weapons were ever employed by the USA against China.in such a way as to threaten the existence of the^regfle, the USSR would be forced to respond, for in Moscow's view a rumbustious neighbour was better than the KMT alternative, which would be regarded as an American satellite. The Soviet generals could not afford to see such a great shift in the world strategic equilibrium. It would therefore be highly dangerous for the Americans to assume that whatever happened between the USA and China, the USSR would not intervene. FRANCE 7. Jukes gave an explanation of French strategic planning. I t was not possible and i t was not de Gaulle's intention, he argued, t o create an independent nuclear deterrent. ..../3 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 73 "GERMANY 8. Jukes said that, although the Germans complained of feeling "isolated", there was really nothing that could be done to meet - with any kind of parity - the Soviet missile force of 700 rockets, a large proportion^ of the USSR's intermediate tactical and nuclear capacity deployed against the PGR's border. (It was difficult to design an ABM interceptor for th£se weapons because of the short time of flight.) (Berraany could be wiped out by these weapons and its vulnerability remained a fact., Strauss' position in and influence on the new Bonn Cabinet would be cruicial in determining how aggressive the FGR was likely to be from now on about demanding (a) more nuclear deterrents on its soil - (the Bonn Government have already made it clear that a non-dissemination treaty is now high on their list of priorities) - and (b) more say in Atlantic nuclear policy generally. Strauss' extreme position, of course, has been to suggest that Germany might denounce the Paris protocols of 1954 wnich banned the production of ABC weapons on German soil. Although Jukes thought some of this was simply a political football, it seems clear that Erhard may be obliged, in this respect, to take more note of the new nationalistic awareness that characterized the recent election campaign. 9. Like Mr. Arnold Smith, Mr. Jukes saw an interesting sequence of events proceeding Khruschev's fall last autumn: Khruschev's projected trip to West Germanyj the preparatory visit by Adzhubei at which time he lavished unaccustomed praise on the FGR and even on the calibre of the German soldier in World War II; the rumoured possibility that the FGR might extend badly needed credit to the Soviet Union in return for a deal on Wast Germany; and the disappearance of Khruschev followed by statements from both^ Moscow and Pankow^ that the DDR should not be "sold for gold". All of this seemed to suggest that Khruschev had had in mind some significant departure in German policy and tended to support speculation that this could have been a factor contributing to his downfall. Indirectly, Jukes seemed to suggest that Ulbricht's successful freewheeling O%M*O in Cairo and Berlin was perhaps connected with the deposition of the Soviet leader, who had seemed to consider sacrificing £fcJn*W. EASTERN EUROPE 10. While Eastern European forces were equipped with air frames designed to carry nuclear weapons and were trained in nuclear tactics, they were not equipped with nuclear warheads. In fact, even Soviet forces did not possess their own warheads, which were entrusted only to the KGB. A �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information "COLLATERAL DISARMAMENT MEASURES 1-1. Jukes thought the proliferation of nuclead' weapons was inevitable. In his view, proposals for nuclear-free zonesA/ere not too meaningful in terms of realistic arms control but were merely atmosphere-improving devices (Mr. George pointed out that/any improvement in the "atmosphere" was worthwhile and that the detente owed more to what had been accomplished towards disarmament than to any other area of negotiations with the USSR.) ECONOMIC ASPECTS: OF ARMS RACE 12. Jukes asserted that Soviet interest in arms control lay not so much in the diversion of resultant savings into economic production (the savings would not be appreciable), but rather in the avoidance of cost escalation in the next generation of weapons. The USSR was already operating much closer to its acceptable cost ceiling for. arms expenditure than the USA, and Jukes suggested that to the extent the present Soviet leadership was collective, pressures from the military for a larger share of scarce resources would be diffused. Since no single member of the leadership seemed to have secured a position where he controlled, and thus represented, the armed forces' alternative, demands for resources were likely, for the time being, to be effectively competitive with theirs. ARMS; CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE 1-3. Jukes explained the principle by which ABMs neutralized ICBMs. It was not by an explosion generating heat or blast (the vacuum in space nullified these effects), but by a nuclear explosion generating concentrated x-rays, which "cooked" the warhead. 14. He spoke of present difficulties in using outer space for military progressive purposes, since space techniques were now on the verge of permitting the inspection of orbiting bodies by opposing interests. Inspection by means of Soviet and American satellites had already had a mutually reassuring effect on the great power who, though they had the capacity to shoot down each other's reconnaissance satellites, had never done so." 37 / s Europaan Division � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00001 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum from Eur Division Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 9/27/1965 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 1, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Visit of Rep of Foreign Office Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en