https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/1d80d35209953c70a260730e87076478.pdf 385c76ec877f087c8beb16d04bab33ff PDF Text Text Defence Liaison/JGHHalstead/ga r 1A DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM TO: ........ 'J:'.1;1!9 .. .i\<?..R, ... !].\1;~.~':'"~~<?;t:~~?-.~Y. .............. . ·····················································"'~~ ..... .FROM:.... P.~:f ~r:i.q~ .. ~~~t~'?F!..\ ~) ......................... . - REFERENCE: ..................................................... . Security Date .. CONFIDENTIAL .......................... M?:J?~.l:;l ..?,.. J ~.f?~....... . File No. ~-0IIf_. f- '-fo . We have prepared notes for the Minister on United States defence policy, as requested. At the same time, however, I think we should express our misgivings about the advisability of making such remarks in a public statement in the United States at this time. 2. Although they have purposely way that they comment on the new U.S. larly on Mr. Dulles' exposition of it, than directly these views are bound to Administration and the public as being aspects of United States policy (which been drafted in such a strategy, and particumore by implication be taken by the critical of certain they are). 3. Such questions as are posed in these notes can and should be raised with the United States authorities through official channels. There will undoubtedly be opportunity to discuss them at the forthcoming Consultation Meeting in Washington. I think, however, that it might be taken amiss if the Minister at the same time enters into public dis·cussion on the subject. It might be regarded as an appeal to the American people over the heads of the Administration or as outside interference in the lively debate which Mr. Dullest statement has set off. Such a false impression might jeopardize the chances of our getting sympathetic hearing in private talks with the Administration. Liaison Ext. 326 (2/53) . 000104 �i ' Defence ~,· Lj_aison/JGHHaistead/ga ?j/•t {-- A, )J!I) -f' • lfo RESTRICTED 1, 1954 March ·-- Notes on United States Defence Policy for the Minister 1 s Speech in the United States Defence importance public in this to us all. debate of the free It recently world, part in the lively cerning of course, domestic to do so. timely, But I think controversy For one thing, for me to take that has been waged con- words and the meaning strategy; point of yours and a national under \Jith and I do not intend and perhaps in everything you do and we feel On the other your shadow. strategic we are dependent 3. freedom as yours importance. across the Atlantic. the security continuing finds our efforts We take partner roughly one- of yours, an active interest of all of the of your continent and which is of great and In a very real you and sense, on each other. is our freedom, and that point one-sixteenth the consequences We in Canada are also our allies a population hand, we occupy an area which is almost· as large increasing also of view of a junior income about live actions. of of view on some aspects I mean the point we inevitably viction striking problem. on the North American continent. on the countries What do I mean v•J'henI speak of a "Canadian viewn? active in New York in it would be appropriate, of our common defence tenth Mr. Dulles' be impertinent to comment from a Canadian 2. and other Relations Sta.tes of vital has been under States of Mr. Dulles' in the United 1' that since on Foreign the' significance the 1hew look is a matter particularly It would, age is a matter in the United speech to the Council January. atomic that concrete to promote We are convinced their and stability cohesion aware of our dependence of all expression cooperation prosperity of the free the Atlantic that their is our prosperity, world depends powers. in our membership within on This con- in NATOand the developing Atlantic community. 000106 �- 2 - Another our association terms factor of varying 5. sparse population natural resources only a limited with its ·also on active service mutual sea-lanes. and training 6. several inception for this All this purpose gives questions in mind three The first as a military without full problem. regard In Europe NATO contributed Sabre jet for the defence important Canadian to our NATOallies quantities of equipment and nav~gators programme, and our Parlia- '\ over $1 billion. us the right, I think, - to express considerations but which sometimes and integrated dozen warships of common concern. basic States of Canadian-built of this which constitute We have also There is another to the duty we owe to ourselves evident of the in destroyers, forces. in Canada for pilots, Since the on defence Nations command. squadrons aid in the form of large ment has voted has Canada has of the United Like you,. ·we have provided observers. depends, in the Korean theatre, Gruenther's and have earmarked ammunition the we can be proud to the which forms part to NATOin Europe twelve contribution. relatively to develop and our three Kingdom among the United of the Atlantic its Nevertheless, second only to those under General fighters with around the globe. economic vitality Our brigade we have a brigade forces of friendship heavy obligations potential. means in two world wars and, more recently, Korea and in Europe. the United of view is that distances, of which I think of freedom.in a contribution vast on whi~h its military ties and creeds and its made contributions are still and special colours Canada, defence point with the Commonwealth and all of common traditions nations in the Canadian - in addition our views frankly In doing so, I have which are probably self- tend to be overlooked. is that defence No military to the political is a political measures effects should as well be chosen they will have. 000107 __j �- 3 Irn1eed, there are occasions be used specifically numerous examples stationing to serve of this, of United on the European Continent ganize its own collective Community. European countries to deal withdravm, it integration of petty either 8. plans area that Europe to orthe the to their own aggression If these troops the movement toward were European and give way to the tragic combination and isolationism that y-ears. isolation. is that Plans defence of other areas cannot for the defence of the world must obviously for the defence troops ,,,ithin of Soviet economic rivalry the inter-'l.var in geographic particular ,entirely of German militarism. nationalism, the are a of Western a guarantee with the threat that affords being and prosperity not be left is probable History These troops in the ability The second principle planned ends. means may Kingdom and Canaqian They are also would founder characterized United security will or with a revival political in peacetime. symbol of our faith Atlantic military one of the most recent States, living devices when certain take into be of a account (and not only 000108 �- 4 - ,, adjacent areas). related. joint It The third is that consultation. principle joint defence This principle in NATO, where we have gradually five years both a habit consultation smoothness and efficiency. consultation on defence States and certain other effect take of the threat ventional of their of atomic actually reduces deterrent is determination ultimatum, master be used if atomic weapons may involve instead 10. that If hostilities the atomic must be a clear that on this these sort compelled where it the decision of stopping of conto aggression is, Where aggression for the use is committed. ourselves unsuitable. and limited instead aggression proxy, minor First, understanding is placed should repercus- of policy. weapon in a situation example, political there for a major But of permanent to use the for one reason is launched or against the possibility into the Take its measures arise. to be effective, in enormously as a deterrent flexibility we may find or another, military retaliation strength our whole reliance a new factor likely and a clear • weapons will basis, consultation principles. complications military the United which complicates that Two major the United on a bilateral introduce on the principle account between is unique. of these sions. if today and surprising of multilateral application full of close and between an example Atomic weapons practical up over the last is the closest countries which I think planning built matters of course, defence has been recognized There and Canada, 9. require which now works with States in peacetime efforts and a machinery continuing but NATOprovides is closely by using of turning conflict them. The second the use of atomic complication in this weapons might, respect is in certain ••• 5 000109 �- 5 - circumstances, as well ~ause as in neutral advantages atomic of a public necessary, couse, opinion might might were lacking then be able countries, We should also visible will support if also be met with The enemy the domination but with of such without in the process may alarm reprisals population. reaction but in kind. the knowledge than to the that rather reassure if aggression than that tion is relatively vulnerable and inadequately with civil measures. These defence which should political 1i. on the account against atomic The factor application of atomic in geographic be on a global however, the world, equally nor can the prepared in weighing weapons that the advantages basis. also defence complicates should The threat and plans innnediate popula- factors the military isolation. is world-wide are all local deterrent. of the principle aggression clearly into disadvantages of reliance plw..ned be taken The power may exposed retaliation rather the people from a friendly of a country atomic of if public of the world's of troops of aggression, is, the weapon, weapons may have if the population defence on the keep in mind the psychological presence threat A or we might ·successfully have to reckon reassure gain. neutralization, proportion which the use of atomic concerned wielding from one quarter a large dis- should, countries. their force; countries Such support be disastrous to achieve aggression it delay. colllltry or at least alienate that in other the use of military defeat must be based be used without the results • the military convinced in the in allied whose political outweigh retaliation essential support reactions countries would far policy-of but public to meet The threat or serious not be of Soviet it must is not, in all parts of same means be used to meet it •• • 6 000110 �- 6 - .- -~. everywhere. Yet, introduces 11all an necessitate particular ~e'Wbe area of the master is 11 vital - warning concerning an implicit Perhaps atomic weapons "vitaln the use of atomic share t~sequences arise out of aggression action? to these however, that they be asked and carefully of that on the full are prepared others? which the principle of for or against the hand, be expected if to which might of the world questions weighed in the atomic and free with where I do not wish to suggest are the kind policy is to On the other decision in a part issuing complication can allies of a vital they have no commitments? success in the be reconciled to be no consultation, policy without can consultation is defence areas If the decision and rapid to be are not, retaliation? there what the answers are others to decide surprise use to the potential relates~ need for a of consequences while to be given Who is whether some areas the most serious involve one, .4nd if decisions. to justify the chain . . to aggression consultation. be a joint vital sense, the invitation 12. joint in this - how is a clear aggressor and painful sufficiently alone which may used to determine in motion! 11 weapons element difficult weapon and all would set labelled on atomic or nothing" extremely What criteria that reliance should be. of questions I think, that should in any consideration age, depends cooperation particularly - as I believe of all to make sacrifice~~freedo~ nations of when the it does which they share. 000111 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 2 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-02 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00021 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Memorandum from Defence Liaison to the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. defence liaison Dwight Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Korean War NATO